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Abstract 
 
Theological reflection on music commonly adopts a metaphysical approach, according 
to which the proportions of musical harmony are interpreted as ontologies of divine 
order, mirrored in the created world. Attempts to engage theologically with music’s 
expressivity have been largely rejected on the grounds of a distrust of sensuality, 
accusations that they endorse a ‘religion of aestheticism’ and concern that they prioritise 
human emotion at the expense of the divine. This thesis, however, argues that 
understanding music as expressive is both essential to a proper appreciation of the art 
form and of value to the theological task, and aims to defend and substantiate this claim 
in relation to the music of twentieth-century Russian composer Dmitri Shostakovich. 
Analysing a selection of his works with reference to culture, iconography, interiority 
and comedy, it seeks both to address the theological criticisms of musical expressivism 
and to carve out a positive theological engagement with the subject, arguing that the 
distinctive contribution of Shostakovich’s music to theological endeavour lies in 
relation to a theology of hope, articulated through the possibilities of the creative act. 
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Note on Abbreviations 
 
References to the score are made where possible citing the rehearsal figure and the 
number of bars preceding or following this. For example, [35]
1–3 
refers to bars 1-3 after 
rehearsal figure 35. 
 
 
Note on Translations 
 
Translations of Russian names and places are cited consistently throughout, with the 
exception of those references occurring within direct quotations, where citations remain 
true to the translations of the original sources.  
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Introduction 
 
From within the hidden depths of an attic in 2004, or so the story goes, the diary of 
Dmitri Shostakovich came to light. The discovery was the cause of great excitement 
amongst music scholars, who hoped at last to gain an insight into the private life of one 
of the most elusive and apparently contradictory of composers. A group of specialists 
was assembled, and they began eagerly to read Shostakovich’s neat script. What secrets 
of the musical world were about to be revealed? None whatsoever, it transpires, for 
Shostakovich, perhaps in anticipation that his diary might fall into the wrong hands, had 
chosen to remain almost silent on matters of music, instead filling the pages with the 
precise goings-on in the world of his other great passion – football!1 
 
Thus the controversies surrounding Shostakovich’s life and career live on. Born in St. 
Petersburg in 1906, Shostakovich was a child of the Soviet era, and the first truly Soviet 
composer.
2
 During his life, he witnessed the political turmoil of twentieth-century 
Russia, and experienced firsthand the effects of the Stalinist regime. As a result, 
although he has become one of the most successful composers of the century, his place 
in history has been secured as much by the discussions surround his political allegiances 
– the now ubiquitous ‘Shostakovich Question’ – as by his music. Outlining the nature of 
such discussions, Ed Vulliamy writes: 
 
The ‘Shostakovich Question’ is a debate over the relationship between the 
composer and the triad of Stalinism, Mother Russia and Shostakovich’s own 
deep humanism. It asks: why did Shostakovich remain in the USSR while others 
like Stravinsky left? Was he obliged by a love of country to acknowledge, if not 
accept, the government? Or was his life torn between a public and private self? 
Indeed, was every musical phrase a thread woven through a tortured tapestry of 
dissent, a passionate but coded cry of opposition?
3
 
 
                                               
1 Paul Cassidy, The Brodsky Quartet, as told to Brian Viner, and recounted in Brian Viner, ‘Shostakovich 
certainly knew the score when it came to the finer things in life’, The Independent. 
www.independent.co.uk/sport/cricket/brian-viner-shostakovich-certainly-knew-the-score-when-it-came-
to-the-finer-things-in-life-517956.html (03.12.2005; accessed 04.11.2011) 
2
 The other two renowned Russian composers of this era, Rachmaninov and Stravinsky, had both grown 
up in pre-Soviet times. 
3 Ed Vulliamy, ‘Flak in the USSR’, The Guardian. 
www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/mar/14/russia.edvulliamy (14.03.2004; accessed 30.10.2011) 
12 
 
On one side of the debate has been the ‘official’ view, put forward primarily by the 
Soviet government and prominent within Russia during Shostakovich’s lifetime, that the 
composer was a genuine supporter of Stalin’s Communist Party; on the other has been 
the ‘dissident’ view, widely propagated in the West in the years following 
Shostakovich’s death, that he was in fact opposed to the Soviet authorities. This 
dichotomy has served to colour the ways in which we relate to the composer’s music, 
and has led to a number of his works being interpreted as either advocating or mocking 
the Stalinist regime.  
 
In this thesis, I am not engaging closely with the Shostakovich Question. The task of 
uncovering the true nature of people’s allegiances during the Soviet era is profoundly 
difficult, not least because of the great risks entailed by making explicit personal views 
which did not toe the party line. Furthermore, as Richard Taruskin points out, not only 
is it unlikely that the question will ever be definitively answered, but perhaps to even try 
is to ignore the real meaning and value of Shostakovich’s music, and indeed it has at 
times been the case that such debate has threatened to eclipse the musical appreciation 
of his works, replacing it instead with questions of a purely political or autobiographical 
nature.
4
 However, such is the influence of these debates that they cannot be completely 
overlooked in any serious investigation of this composer’s life and music, and two areas 
in particular remain of significance to this thesis. One of these concerns the reliability of 
published material regarding the composer; the other has to do with the ambiguity 
portrayed within Shostakovich’s musical works. 
 
Chief amongst the proponents of the ‘dissident’ interpretation is Solomon Volkov who, 
in 1979, published Testimony, a collection of the so-called memoirs of Shostakovich. 
Claimed by the author to have been dictated to him personally by the composer, 
Testimony paints a picture of Shostakovich as embittered, anti-Stalinist and firmly 
against both communism and the Soviet system.
5
 However, the publication of the work, 
four years after the composer’s death, proved to be the source of great controversy and, 
in the years that have followed, many heated discussions have taken place regarding its 
                                               
4 Richard Taruskin, ‘Public Lies and Unspeakable Truth: Interpreting Shostakovich’s Fifth Symphony’, in 
Shostakovich Studies, ed. by David Fanning (Cambridge, New York, Melbourne: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997), pp. 17-56 (p. 18) 
5 Solomon Volkov, Testimony: The Memoirs of Dmitri Shostakovich, trans. by Antonina W. Bouis 
(London: Hamish Hamilton, 1979) 
13 
 
authenticity.
6
 It has been revealed that Volkov in fact met with Shostakovich on only 
three or four occasions – nowhere near long enough for the entirety of the book to have 
been compiled – and a close examination of the text points to its reliance instead on a 
number of previously published, and yet unacknowledged, sources.
7
 Although the title 
page of each chapter bears the signature of the composer, apparently endorsing the 
authenticity of the work, it has been argued that the original manuscript shows this to 
have been achieved as the result of careful editing, and doubts have also been raised 
about the reliability of a number of the eye witness testimonies included in the script.
8
 
 
In reality, then, although some aspects of the volume are likely true, other elements, and 
in particular the ways in which these are presented, are less likely to be accurate; 
Volkov, it would appear, skewed Shostakovich’s remarks for his own purpose and gain, 
and with the intention of deliberately sparking controversy. For Wendy Lesser, the 
emergence of other, more reliable sources in the wake of the publication of Testimony 
has ultimately rendered the work irrelevant. She writes: 
 
...now we have numerous other kinds of evidence – the oral testimony of the 
composer’s friends and relations, recently published letters to and from him, 
analogous instances in previously unprintable novels, stories, and poems, and 
our own increasingly informed sense of how life in that time was lived – to 
suggest that Shostakovich could never have been the placidly obedient Party 
apparatchik he was sometimes made to seem. So Volkov’s central and rather 
doubtfully obtained revelation is no revelation at all. And, perhaps more 
importantly, nothing is gained by this sleight-of-hand effort to transform the 
reluctant public figure into a secret dissident, for the Volkov portrayal of a 
resentful, self-righteous Shostakovich is far less appealing and finally less 
persuasive than the tortured and self-torturing man it replaces.
9
 
 
For these reasons, I shall not be using Testimony, or those works which seek to defend 
it, such as Ian MacDonald’s The New Shostakovich and Allan Ho and Dmitry 
                                               
6 Laurel E. Fay, ‘Shostakovich versus Volkov: Whose Testimony?’, in Malcolm Hamrick Brown, ed., A 
Shostakovich Casebook (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2004), pp. 11-21 (p. 11)  
7 Laurel E. Fay, ‘Volkov’s Testimony Reconsidered’, in Brown, ed., A Shostakovich Casebook, pp. 22-66 
(p. 52); Fay, ‘Shostakovich versus Volkov: Whose Testimony?’, pp. 14-17 
8
 Fay, ‘Volkov’s Testimony Reconsidered’, p. 33 & pp. 53-55. Also, Shostakovich was renowned for 
signing documents he had never read. p. 43 
9 Wendy Lesser, Music for Silenced Voices: Shostakovich and his Fifteen String Quartets (New Haven & 
London: Yale University Press, 2011), p. 6 
14 
 
Feofanov’s Shostakovich Reconsidered, as authoritative sources, but rather shall refer to 
them only within discussions about differing interpretations of Shostakovich’s works, or 
where the information they present is corroborated by alternative, more verifiable 
sources.
10
 Instead, I shall be primarily engaging with works by scholars such as 
Elizabeth Wilson, Laurel Fay, Richard Taruskin and David Fanning who, in my view, 
provide a more rigorous investigation into and a more sophisticated interpretation of the 
events surrounding Shostakovich’s life and music.11   
 
As the above discussion reveals, the conflicting interpretations which surround 
Shostakovich’s works have arisen largely as a result of the way in which this music has 
come to be viewed in relation to its social and cultural context. As Isaak Glikman points 
out, ‘[Shostakovich] was no doubt ambivalent, torn asunder by conflicting emotions 
towards his native land, his art, politics, and deep commitment to humanity. This, at 
least, is the texture of his sound and the purgatorial genius of his work.’12 Any 
discussions surrounding the ‘meaning’ of Shostakovich’s works, then, undoubtedly 
remain more complex than a simple two-sided, ‘for or against’ debate, and this view is 
echoed by Fanning, who argues that the surface of Shostakovich’s music appears as if it 
were ‘overlaid with mirrors’. He writes of it: 
 
if we fail to notice these mirrors – if we regard the musical surface as essentially 
a transparent window on Shostakovich’s intentions – we may in fact be seeing 
only our own prejudices, ideological and/or aesthetic, reflected back to us. On 
the other hand, even if we do sense the presence of mirrors, we can never be 
precisely sure where and at what angle they are placed.
13
 
 
Such ambiguity of expression thus forms a fundamental part of Shostakovich’s music, 
and perhaps it is even the case that to deny this ambiguity is to stifle something of the 
creative power of these musical works. As Christopher Norris argues: ‘Shostakovich’s 
sufferings of artistic conscience are ‘there’ in his music, and the critic who ignores them 
– or regards them in purist fashion as matters of ‘extra-musical’ interest – is closing his 
                                               
10 Ian MacDonald, The New Shostakovich (London: Fourth Estate, 1990); Allan B. Ho & Dmitry 
Feofanov, Shostakovich Reconsidered (London: Toccata Press, 1998) 
11 For a further discussion of the issues surrounding Testimony, see Brown, ed., A Shostakovich 
Casebook. 
12 Isaak Glikman, Story of a Friendship: The Letters of Dmitry Shostakovich to Isaak Glikman, 1941-
1975, trans. by Anthony Phillips (New York: Cornell University Press, 2001), p. 1 
13 David Fanning, Shostakovich: String Quartet No. 8 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), p. 6 
15 
 
mind to an important aspect of the music’s meaning and form’.14 This is not to say that 
these works can only be related to in such a way, for it is still entirely possible for them 
to be enjoyed purely on the merits of musical sound alone; however, it also remains the 
case that a contextual interpretation creates for us an additional layer of meaning, 
equally as valid as any purely musical interpretation, and which further adds to our 
enjoyment of and ability to relate to the piece in question. Indeed, it is this very 
ambiguity of meaning and potential for a multiplicity of interpretations that arguably 
holds the key to understanding the enduring value and relevance of Shostakovich’s 
music among audiences today. As literary critic Frank Kermode argues, it is through an 
interpretative flexibility such as this, whereby the nature of a work ‘subsists in change, 
prevails, by being patient of interpretation... [and shows] tolerance to a wide variety of 
readings’, that art comes to be identified as a classic – that is, as timelessly relevant and 
of inexhaustible value.
15
 In this thesis, then, I am seeking to take account of, and indeed 
to embrace, this interpretive ambiguity, understanding it as at least in part intentional on 
the part of Shostakovich, and as a defining characteristic of his musical style. 
 
What is more, this sense of ambiguity also serves to draw us in, making us part of the 
process of the generation of musical meaning. Lesser points to the fact that, although 
Shostakovich’s may be the voice we hear behind the works, we cannot infer their full 
meaning only or entirely on this basis: ‘Shostakovich’s quartets may speak to us of the 
world in which they were created and the man who created them’, she writes, ‘but that 
is only partly what they do, and they only partially do it’.16 Rather, it is the case that our 
interpretations as listeners play an integral role in forming the meaning of the work as a 
whole. As Taruskin puts it: 
 
The fact is, no one owns the meaning of this music, which has always supported 
(nay, invited; nay compelled) multiple opportunistic and contradictory 
readings... But that hopelessness of final arbitration is precisely what has given 
the music its enormous social value, its terrific emotional force, and its staying 
power... We can never simply receive its messages; we are always implicated in 
                                               
14 Christopher Norris, ‘Shostakovich: Politics and Musical Language’, in Shostakovich: the Man and his 
Music, ed. by Christopher Norris (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1982), pp. 163-188 (p. 165) 
15 Frank Kermode, ‘A Modern Way with the Classics’, New Literary History, 5:3 (1974), 415-434 
(p. 429) 
16 Lesser, Music for Silenced Voices, pp. 294-295 
16 
 
their making, and therefore we can never be indifferent to them. It is never just 
Shostakovich. It is always Shostakovich and us.
17
 
 
In this thesis, I want to argue that one interpretation to which we might be drawn by 
Shostakovich’s music is theological in nature. That Shostakovich was a self-confessed 
atheist living in a society which had as its aim the elimination of religion need not prove 
antagonistic to such an aim, for I am not here claiming the existence of any hitherto-
undiscovered religious intent within Shostakovich’s works, and neither am I attempting 
to cover them with a theological gloss or a self-imposed ‘reading-in’ of religious views. 
Rather, as with all interpretations, I am coming to these works from a particular 
perspective – in this case a theological perspective – with all the background and biases 
that perspectives necessarily entail. It is not the case, then, that Shostakovich’s music is 
being forced to surrender its secular character, but rather that the secular, in my view, 
need not lie outside the realm of theological interest or endeavour.
18
   
 
Much reflection on music from a theological perspective such as this has taken a 
metaphysical approach, interpreting the proportions of musical harmony as ontologies 
of divine order, mirrored in the created world, and an investigation of the development 
of this tradition forms the subject of my first chapter. Attempts to engage theologically 
with music’s expressivity – its ability to relate to and convey matters of human context, 
emotion and meaning – have by contrast been largely rejected on the grounds of a 
distrust of sensuality, accusations that they endorse a ‘religion of aestheticism’, and 
concern that they prioritise human emotion at the expense of the divine – issues that are 
discussed in my second chapter. This thesis, however, informed by the music of 
Shostakovich, aims to defend the place within theology of reflection upon music as an 
expressivistic art: Shostakovich’s music, it argues, both requires and inspires a 
theological engagement that is prepared to take music seriously as a fundamentally 
human form of artistic expression, and in this way, it suggests, we are enabled to 
discover something new not only about the music in question, but also about the way in 
which we approach the theological task.  
 
Over the course of his life, Shostakovich wrote in excess of two hundred works 
including symphonies, operas, chamber music, choral pieces and film scores, and it is 
                                               
17 Richard Taruskin, Defining Russia Musically (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), pp. 476-77 
18 I shall explore this idea further in my discussions of Karl Barth in my first and third chapters.  
17 
 
hoped that the collection of works forming the body of this thesis reflects something of 
this diversity. Focusing on just a few pieces in this way enables a depth of reflection 
which would not be possible with a larger selection of works, and also takes into 
account the importance of understanding music in a specific rather than general sense, 
allowing as it does for a detailed engagement with the context of each work. Thus 
whilst the various theological interpretations offered might at times ring true for other of 
the composer’s works, I have sought in each case to provide reflection upon a 
paradigmatic example, in order that a proper consideration of the individual 
characteristics of each work might be achieved.  
 
Shostakovich’s Fifth Symphony was written against the backdrop of the Stalinist Terror 
and in the wake of the composer’s personal persecution at the hands of the government. 
In my third chapter, and informed by a theology of culture, I argue that this work 
presents a musical realisation of the cultural critique central to the thought of both 
Theodor Adorno and also Karl Barth. Written some four years later, Shostakovich’s 
Seventh Symphony, the ‘Leningrad’, has a context no less turbulent or traumatic, begun 
as it was in a city under siege and completed after the composer had been evacuated. In 
light of the Russian Orthodox theology mediated through the novels of Dostoevsky, in 
my fourth chapter I argue that this work takes on the qualities of an icon, engaging as it 
does in a process of preservation and transformation. My fifth chapter has as its subject 
three of the composer’s more intimate works – the Second, Eighth and Thirteenth String 
Quartets – which I here explore in relation to a theology of interiority. Finally, I turn in 
my sixth chapter to one of Shostakovich’s earliest works – his opera The Nose – here 
considered from the perspective of a theology of comedy. In conclusion, I reflect 
theologically on a theme which runs through these works as a whole – that of hope.  
 
Finally, it should be remembered that there are many differing kinds of music, and a 
wide variety of ways in which these might be perceived. As a result, theological 
reflection on the art form remains continually open to re-invention and re-interpretation 
– processes to which this thesis, it is hoped, contributes but one possibility. The 
following chapters, then, are by no means the right or only way of thinking 
theologically about music, or even about Shostakovich, but rather they offer a single 
perspective on an infinitely broader theological horizon. 
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Part One 
Theology and Music 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
Music in the Great Tradition 
 
 
It is an evening in late September 1791, and in a theatre in Vienna Mozart is revealing 
his latest opera, The Magic Flute, to the world. On stage, handsome Prince Tamino 
must overcome a series of trials to claim the love of the beautiful Pamina, aided in his 
mission by a golden flute, the music of which has the power to transform the hearts of 
all who hear it. By turn light-hearted, comical and deeply beautiful, the work is received 
with tremendous acclaim, and will go on to be performed throughout the world. For the 
young composer, the opera is also to become his swansong, for his untimely death, at 
the age of just thirty-five, lies only a few months away.
1
  
 
Fast forward a century, and in a house in Basel, theologian Fritz Barth sits playing 
extracts from Mozart’s masterpiece on the piano for his young son, Karl.2 This was to 
prove a formative moment in Karl Barth’s life and he went on to develop a passion for 
the works of the composer, beginning each day listening to Mozart’s music and even 
admitting that, ‘...if I ever get to heaven, I would first of all seek out Mozart and only 
then inquire after Augustine, St. Thomas, Luther, Calvin and Schleiermacher’.3 After 
all, he writes, ‘it may be that when the angels go about their task of praising God, they 
play only Bach. [But] I am sure... that when they are together en famille, they play 
Mozart, and that then too our dear Lord listens with special pleasure’.4 
 
The music of Mozart was to have a deep impact upon both Barth’s life and his theology. 
Towards the end of his life, in the last volume of Church Dogmatics he completed, 
Barth discussed what he calls ‘secular parables’. Jesus used the form of the parable as 
‘no mere metaphor but a disclosing yet also concealing revelation, self-representation 
and self-offering of the kingdom and of life’, and in the same way, argues Barth, we 
find evidence of God’s revelation not only in Scripture but also in the secular and the 
                                               
1 Peter Branscombe, W. A. Mozart: Die Zauberflöte (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) 
2
 Karl Barth, Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart, trans. by Clarence K. Pott (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 
1986), p. 15 
3 Barth, Mozart, p. 16 
4 Barth, Mozart, p. 25 
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everyday.
5
 We can do this because there is no autonomous, ‘godless’ sphere. All of 
reality comes from God and has the capacity to bear witness to God.
6
 At much the same 
time, Barth published a famous essay on Mozart to mark the bicentenary of the 
composer’s birth, and here he suggests that Mozart’s music might function in this way.7 
In the collection of Table Talk How I Changed My Mind, Barth says: ‘I am 
not...inclined to confuse or to identify salvation history with any part of the history 
of art. But the golden sounds and melodies of Mozart’s music have always spoken 
to me – not as gospel, but as parables of the kingdom revealed in the gospel of God’s 
free grace...’.8 
 
For Barth, Mozart’s music speaks of faith in God’s good creation.9 Prior to his 
explorations of the secular parable, Barth had set out his thoughts on Mozart’s music in 
Church Dogmatics III/3, where the focus of his discussion is das Nichtige 
(‘nothingness’) – Barth’s understanding of the concept of evil. Contrasted with this is 
the idea of die Schattenseite (‘shadowside’), which has to do with the necessity of death 
and decay in order for there to exist the possibility of growth and regeneration. Die 
Schattenseite, then, is not to be confused with das Nichtige, for it stands not in antithesis 
to God but rather is part of the goodness of God’s creation – ever-present but always in 
the end overcome by the light. It is precisely this understanding of creation which Barth 
hears in Mozart’s music: ‘[Mozart] heard the harmony of creation to which the shadow 
also belongs but in which the shadow is not darkness [and] deficiency is not 
defeat...Thus the cheerfulness in this harmony is not without its limits. But the light 
shines all the more brightly because it breaks forth from the shadow.’10 Later, this 
comes to be echoed in the Mozart essays, in which Barth argues that in the music of 
Mozart we hear the resurrection in light of the crucifixion – a victory which triumphs 
but does not negate that which has gone before: ‘the light rises and the shadows fall, 
                                               
5 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics IV/3 pt 1, trans. by G. W. Bromiley & Thomas F. Torrance (Edinburgh: 
T&T Clark, 2004), p. 112 
6 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics III/3, trans. by G. W. Bromiley & R. J. Ehrlich (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 
2004), p. 184, and from an informal discussion with Tim Gorringe. This understanding would also appear 
to revise Barth’s dismissal of all forms of proclamation, including music, in Karl Barth, Church 
Dogmatics I/1, trans. by G. W. Bromiley & Thomas F. Torrance (revised ed. Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 
1975), p. 55. 
7 Following a discussion of Mozart’s music, Barth muses that ‘...the New Testament speaks not only of 
the kingdom of heaven but also of parables of the kingdom of heaven.’ Barth, Mozart, p.57 
8 Karl Barth, How I Changed My Mind, ed. by J. D. Godsey (Richmond: John Knox, 1966), p. 72. For a 
further discussion of the analogous function of secular parables, see Philip E. Stoltzfus, Theology as 
Performance (London, UK & New York, US: T&T Clark, 2006), pp. 159-161. 
9 David J. Gouwens, ‘Mozart Among the Theologians’, Modern Theology, 16 (2000), 461-474 (p. 466) 
10 Barth, Church Dogmatics III/3, p. 298 
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though without disappearing...joy overtakes sorrow without extinguishing it...the Yea 
rings louder than the ever-present Nay’.11 What is more, in this way, the music of 
Mozart also presents for Barth a parable for divine freedom.
12
 At the centre of Barth’s 
theology lies the freedom of God as true source of human freedom, achieved only 
through the embrace of finitude and the acceptance of limitation, and it is this sense of 
finitude which Barth finds in the perfectly balanced form of Mozart’s music: ‘In the 
face of the problem of theodicy’, he writes, ‘Mozart had the peace of God which far 
transcends all the critical or speculative reason that praises and reproves’.13 
 
For Barth, then, Mozart’s music is not about interiority or self-expression. He writes of 
the composer: ‘[Mozart] neither needed nor desired to express or represent himself, his 
vitality, sorrow, piety or any program. He was remarkably free from the mania for self-
expression.’14 ‘Mozart’s music is not, in contrast to that of Bach, a message, and not, in 
contrast to that of Beethoven, a personal confession... Mozart does not wish to say 
anything: he just sings and sounds.’15 What marks Mozart’s music out from that of other 
composers, argues Barth, is that it is the result of a purely objective perception of 
reality: ‘[Mozart] had heard, and causes those who have ears to hear, even to-day, what 
we shall not see until the end of time – the whole context of providence. As though in 
the light of this end, he heard the harmony of creation... He heard concretely, and 
therefore his compositions were and are total music.’16 Such an appropriation is also 
evident in the Mozart essays: ‘Could it be that the characteristic basic “sound” of both 
the earlier and the later Mozart – not to be confused with the sound of any other – is in 
fact the primal sound of music absolutely? Could it be that he discovered and struck this 
“tone” in its timelessly valid form?’17 
                                               
11 Barth, Mozart, p. 55 
12 Gouwens, ‘Mozart’, p. 466 
13 Barth, Church Dogmatics III/3, p. 298. As Stoltzfus points out, the role given to the figure of Mozart 
would even appear to directly model that ascribed to Christ earlier in Church Dogmatics III/3, where he is 
referred to as the one who reconciles nothingness with the goodness of creation. Stoltzfus, Theology as 
Performance, p. 147 For more on freedom in Barth’s theology, see Karl Barth: Theologian of Freedom, 
ed. by Clifford Green (London: Collins, 1989) 
14 Barth, Church Dogmatics III/3, p. 298  
15 Barth, Mozart, p. 37. Here Albert Blackwell concurs: ‘Josef Krips is reported to have remarked that 
whereas Beethoven’s music aspires to heaven, Mozart’s music was written from there. Of course the great 
conductor’s remark is a joke, but not a joke without significance. It reflects a judgement that on the 
asymptotic curve of musical genius, Mozart’s music is farthest from subjectivism, from mannerism, from 
egocentrism. It is correspondingly nearer to universality and timelessness.’ Albert Blackwell, The Sacred 
in Music (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1999), p. 124 
16
 Barth, Church Dogmatics III/3, p. 298 
17 Barth, Mozart, p. 28. In this way, Barth overcomes the nagging issue of Mozart’s less than spiritual 
personal life and any influence this might have had on his composition of (particularly religious) music. It 
has, however, been argued that Barth’s near obsession with Mozart results in too much emphasis being 
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Here Barth is alluding to the ideal of ‘absolute’ music – music that exists autonomously 
from text, programme, drama or extra-musical function.
18
 This notion came to 
prominence in musical aesthetics during the eighteenth century and was revived in the 
early twentieth century by the Neue Sachlichkeit or ‘New Objectivity’ movement. 
Inspired by composer and scholar Ferruccio Busoni, whose work Barth greatly admired, 
the movement aimed to attain ultimate clarity in musical form and was thus responsible 
for a renewal of interest in the music of Mozart.
19
 Given that Neue Sachlichkeit was a 
dominant theme in Weimar Germany and the subject of theological critique in Paul 
Tillich’s Religiöse Verwirklichung (1929), Barth would certainly have been aware of its 
developments, and it is entirely plausible to think that it contributed to his deep 
appreciation of Mozart and his resulting theological reflections.
20
 
 
This account of Barth’s theological appreciation of the music of Mozart introduces my 
first chapter in which I set out two of the principal ways of regarding music in the 
Western tradition. The oldest way of regarding music in the West is to understand it as 
having intrinsic significance and as being ontologically autonomous, that is, as 
corresponding to, and echoing, the very structure of being. This idea has philosophical 
roots in the work of Plato, whose interest lies in the cosmology in which music is 
grounded, and later comes to be appropriated theologically by the Western church, 
especially through the writings of Augustine and Boethius. The accounts of these 
scholars form the first section of this chapter. 
 
In the Enlightenment, philosophical ideas about music developed in very different 
although nonetheless related ways. The works of Immanuel Kant, and later of Eduard 
Hanslick, put forward an account of music which seeks to understand it in terms of its 
                                                                                                                                         
placed on one composer, who is therefore unlikely to ever truly live up to the exemplary estimation in 
which he is held. Jeremy Begbie, Resounding Truth: Christian Wisdom in the World of Music (London: 
SPCK, 2007), p. 155 and Gouwens, ‘Mozart’, p. 468 
18 The idea of absolute music might be understood in relation to the concept of ‘art for art’s sake’, which 
came to prominence through the art critic Theophile Gautier in France in the mid-nineteenth century. 
Focusing primarily on the visual arts, the movement represented a reaction to utilitarianism: it wanted to 
say that there is an area of life (aesthetics) which is not driven by capitalism, and thus that the true value 
of art is intrinsic. Art in Theory, 1815-1900, ed. by Charles Harrison, Paul. J. Wood & Jason Gaiger 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), pp. 95-100. 
19 Stoltzfus, Theology as Performance, p. 125 
20 Paul Tillich, Religiöse Verwirklichung (Berlin: Furche, 1930). As Stoltzfus puts it, for Barth, the 
‘analysis of experiential feeling or mood can only lead to an interpretive dead end’, and rather he is 
seeking to provide ‘the aesthetic counterparts to a consciousness-based or interiority-based aesthetics... 
[which] are inadequate because they do not lay claim to the objective and liberating dimension of the God 
who loves in freedom, but rather wallow in a perpetual, “peaceful” negotiation of mood.’ Stoltzfus, 
Theology as Performance, p. 152 & p. 155. For a further discussion of the musical aesthetic influences on 
Barth, see Stoltzfus, Theology as Performance. 
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specifically musical form. Continuous with the ontological tradition in that an interest in 
the internal construction of music remains, these later accounts differ significantly from 
earlier views in the sense that music’s metaphysical connotations are replaced by an 
interest in its sonic, structural features. In the case of Kant, this interest is manifest in 
the notion of music as idea; in Hanslick, focus is placed on music as sensation. The 
contributions of these scholars to the development of our understanding of the 
philosophy of music form the subject of the second section of this chapter. 
 
Finally, in the third section I consider the contemporary theological appropriation of 
both ontological and formalistic understandings of music, such as is set out above in 
relation to Barth’s reading of the music of Mozart. Here the work of Jeremy Begbie 
comes to the fore, as I discuss the ways in which he has sought to provide theological 
support for music’s structural features, and in particular its temporal processes, and also 
his move to uncover the potential of the ontological accounts of Plato and Augustine to 
inspire a contemporary appreciation of music’s grounding in a created cosmos.  
 
This first chapter, then, seeks to explore two related strands of the development of 
musical thought as it has occurred in the development of Western philosophical and 
theological reflection. In my second chapter, such discussions will be extended as I turn 
to investigate a third strand of this development, which attempts to account for music in 
terms of expressivity.
21
 Such discussions are necessary for the contextualisation of any 
theological study of Shostakovich, as his music has to be understood within the 
philosophical and theological traditions out of which it has developed.  
 
 
I. The Pythagorean Tradition 
 
(a) Pythagoras and Plato 
 
In contrast to contemporary understandings of music as a form of art, in ancient Greece 
music was instead classified as a branch of mathematics, that is, as primarily concerned 
with the numerical proportions of harmony (‘αρμονία or harmonia) rather than the 
                                               
21 A similar approach to discussing the theological relevance of music is to be found in Albert Blackwell, 
The Sacred in Music, in which music is dealt within in both ontological (‘Pythagorean’) and expressivist 
(‘Incarnational’) terms.  
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auditory experience of musical sound.
22
 The origin of philosophical thought regarding 
music is traditionally attributed to the figure of Pythagoras who lived in Greece in the 
late sixth century BCE, although given that little is known about him, and as he left no 
writings, it is likely that many of the ideas which now form what is referred to as the 
‘Pythagorean tradition’ were in fact the product of his followers, which later included 
some of the Platonic school. According to legend, Pythagoras observed blacksmiths at 
work and noted how their anvils, when struck, produced sounds which were harmonious 
with each other. He deduced that this was the result of the sizes of the anvils being in 
simple mathematical ratios to each other. Pythagoras then applied this to music and 
found that the natural harmonics of a vibrating string – the octave, fifth and fourth – are 
produced when the string is divided into the mathematical proportions of a half, a third 
and a quarter respectively. From this Pythagoras was able to demonstrate that the 
proportions between overtones in any natural harmonic series are constant. Of particular 
interest to the Pythagorean tradition was the placement of the smaller intervals of the 
scale – those lying between the natural harmonics. Such intervals were not perfect but 
rather consisted of major and minor variations and were therefore considered dissonant 
rather than consonant. The exact sizes of these smaller ratios were the subject of great 
speculation and the differing possibilities for combining them led to the production of a 
variety of different scales or ‘modes’.23 For the Pythagoreans, each mode represented a 
different character or temperament and carried with it associated ethical implications – 
ideas to which I shall return in my second chapter. 
 
The work of the Pythagoreans was later taken up by Plato (429-327 BCE). As a 
rationalist, for whom mathematics underpinned every aspect of the universe, Plato was 
keen to emphasise the theoretical aspects of Pythagorean numerology. Although the 
harmonic ratios had been discovered empirically, Plato believed that it was only through 
the rational exploration of such notions that their truths could be properly understood. 
He suggests that the order of music is an echo of, and dependent upon, an ultimate order 
within the universe. This speculation developed to form the vision of the ‘music of the 
                                               
22 The Ancient Greek language contains no single word for what we today class as ‘music’. Instead the 
terms ‘μουσική’ (music), ‘τέχνη’ (art in general) and ‘καλός’ (the domain of the beautiful) were used to 
refer to various aspects of what we understand as music, although μουσική included other cultural and 
intellectual studies such as drama and poetry, and likewise τέχνη involved a far wider understanding of 
art than we have today. These differences in terminology and conceptualisation need to be remembered 
when exploring ideas about music in Ancient Greece in light of modern day musical developments. Andy 
Hamilton, Aesthetics & Music (London & New York: Continuum, 2007), pp. 13-18 
23 For a more detailed examination of the understanding of harmony in ancient Greece, see Martin 
Litchfield West, Ancient Greek Music (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992). 
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spheres’ – a metaphysical idea found in The Republic and rooted in ancient cosmology, 
in which the distances from Earth to the visible planets, and also the velocities of these 
planets’ orbits, are held in mathematical proportion to each other, as demonstrated by 
the harmonic ratios.
24
 It was even thought that the planets each emitted the sound of a 
differing pitch, together producing each of the seven tones in the natural scale, although 
this cosmic ‘music’ was inaudible to humankind, for, as Cicero explains, the sound is 
‘so great that human ears cannot catch it; you might as well try to stare directly at the 
sun, whose rays are much too strong for your eyes’.25 Whilst the notion of the music of 
the spheres represents only one example of what was a far wider conception of ‘αρμονία 
– such ratios were also thought to exist in many other aspects of life, from proportion in 
architecture to concepts of God – it was in music alone that these ratios were considered 
to have been proven.
26
 
 
In the Timaeus, one of Plato’s later works, the musical application of number theory is 
referred to again, this time in the form of an allegory of the nature and creation of the 
‘world soul’ as told by the character Timaeus, a Pythagorean.27 The narrative clearly 
refers to the mathematical conception of musical harmony and details how the structure 
of the musical scale might be related to the underlying harmonic structure of the world. 
In the act of creation, the creator god combines ‘Sameness’ and ‘Difference’ (the two 
essential elements of reasoning in Platonic thought) together with ‘Existence’, and then 
divides the mixture into the proportions of Pythagorean harmonic ratios – first 
according to the powers of two and three (which in Platonic thought symbolise the two 
dimensional and three dimensional and which create intervals of octaves and twelfths) 
and then further into fifths, fourths and major seconds. The proportion which remains 
(an interval slightly smaller than a minor second) is taken as the size of the eight tones 
of the scale, probably as occurring in the descending Greek Dorian mode.
28
 The scale is 
then divided along its length to form two strips which are placed across each other to 
form an ‘X’ and then bent around to form two concentric circles. The outer circle is 
named after the ‘Same’ and revolves clockwise, while the inner circle, named after the 
‘Different’, turns anti-clockwise and is further divided into seven smaller circles, each 
                                               
24 Plato, ‘Republic’, trans. by Paul Shorey, in The Collected Dialogues of Plato, ed. by Edith Hamilton & 
Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), pp. 575-844 (X, 617a-b, p. 841) 
25 Cicero as cited in Edward A. Lippman, A History of Western Musical Aesthetics (Lincoln & London: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1992), p. 7 
26
 Stoltzfus, Theology as Performance, p. 20. For more on proportion in architecture, see Leon Battista 
Alberti, The Ten Books of Architecture, Leonie edition (New York: Dover, 1986). 
27 Plato, ‘Timaeus’, trans. by Benjamin Jowett, in The Collected Dialogues of Plato, pp. 1151-1211 
28 Stoltzfus, Theology as Performance, pp. 21-22 
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with their own size and rotation. Timaeus’ description is at this point somewhat unclear, 
although it appears the patterns of these smaller circles imitate the perceived movements 
of the planets, despite no explicit reference being here made to the ‘music of the 
spheres’.29 The whole of the physical world is then created within this soul which 
provides ‘a divine beginning of never-ceasing and rational life enduring throughout 
all time’.30 
 
Later in the work, Timaeus discusses the human soul, formed in the same manner and of 
the same elements as the world soul only less pure in nature.
31
 Unlike the world soul, 
however, the human soul is not completed by this process but rather is given only its 
rational or divine part. To this are joined mortal aspects – the emotions and the appetites 
– which are created from the four elements.32 The soul is then ‘impinged’ upon by the 
unruly and irregular motions of these mortal aspects, the movements of which are 
known as ‘sensations’. The impact of these sensations upon the soul, although not 
enough to destroy the proportions of ‘αρμονία woven within it, nonetheless causes them 
to become distorted, thus rendering the soul vulnerable to temptation and distraction. 
Proper balance and control can be restored only through the immersing of the soul in the 
proper ratios of harmony, as mediated through certain modes of music.
33
 
 
Through the mathematical beauty of harmonic ratios, then, Plato finds the concepts to 
express his view of the balance, order and harmony that he felt to be inherent within 
both the structure of the cosmos and the human soul, and this view was to be shared by 
philosophers for many centuries.
34
 
 
(b) Augustine and Boethius 
 
Drawing upon these accounts of music as mirroring the order and proportion of the 
cosmos, the first Christian writers extended and adapted such interpretations to reflect 
their understanding of God as divine origin of created reality.  
                                               
29 Plato, Timaeus and Critias, trans. by Desmond Lee (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1971), fn. 
pp. 49-50  
30 Plato, ‘Timaeus’, 36e, p. 1166 
31 Plato, ‘Timaeus’, 41d-42, pp. 1170-1171  
32
 Edward A. Lippman, Musical Thought in Ancient Greece (New York & London: Columbia University 
Press, 1964), pp. 37-38 
33 Plato, ‘Timaeus’, pp. 1170-1171 
34 Plato, Timaeus and Critias, fn pp. 48-49 
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Although not a Christian, the third-century philosopher Plotinus (c. 205-270 CE) is of 
significance here for his role in bridging the gap between the philosophy of the ancient 
Greeks and the theological concerns of the early Christians. To understand his 
contribution to our perceptions of music, it is necessary to first look a little closer at 
Plato’s conception of the relationship between art and the ‘ideal’ realm. For the Plato of 
The Republic, art is a form of mimesis (imitation) – a copy of some aspect of the world. 
As the material world, for Plato, consists of imperfect copies of the eternal Forms, art is 
therefore understood as an imitation of an imitation and thus as even further removed 
from perfection than the rest of the world.
35
 In Ion and Symposium, however, a different 
approach emerges. Here, rather than being imitations of reality, art presents a more 
direct copy of the Forms than does the rest of the world, with the artist viewed as 
divinely inspired and as having the ability to reveal truths that could not otherwise 
been seen.
36
  
 
In Plotinus, we find a blurring of this division between the eternal Forms and their 
imperfect copies which comprise the material world. Plotinus begins with his notion of 
the ‘One’ – the indivisible, transcendent and unknowable cause of all else in existence, 
from which emanates first the nous (intellect or mind) and lastly the physical material 
which makes up the world as we experience it. So whilst paralleling to a degree Platonic 
beliefs, Plotinus in fact presents not a dichotomy between Form and experience but 
rather a continuum stretching between the ideal and the apparent. It is as though, he 
suggests, the ideal realm were a source of light which is brighter nearer its source and 
then gradually fades as it travels away, but still remains the same light no matter how 
faint it becomes.
37
  
 
Following from this, Plotinus’ estimation of music is generally held to be more positive 
than that of Plato. As the direct, albeit distant, emanation of the One, for Plotinus sense 
experience remains trustworthy at least in part and thus music exists as ‘the earthly 
representation of the music there is in... the Ideal Realm’.38 Music ‘goes back to the 
Ideas from which Nature itself derives...’ – not merely an imitation of an imitation (as is 
the case in Plato’s Republic) but rather as an active participant in the transcendent 
                                               
35 Plato, ‘Republic’, pp. 596-599 
36 Plato, ‘Ion’, trans. by Lane Cooper, in The Collected Dialogues of Plato, pp. 215-228 (534b p. 220); 
Plato, ‘Symposium’, trans. by Michael Joyce, in The Collected Dialogues of Plato, pp. 526-574 (186e-
187c, p. 540) 
37 Plotinus, The Six Enneads, trans. by Stephen MacKenna (London: Faber and Faber, 1956) V.6.4, p. 417  
38 Plotinus, Six Enneads, V.9.11, pp. 440-441  
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power from which it originates (as is the view of Plato in Ion and Symposium).
39
 
However, even for Plotinus it remains the case that we should seek to look beyond the 
sensual qualities of music to the beauty ‘that manifests itself through these forms’, and 
that we must ‘be shown that what ravishes... was no other than the harmony of the 
intellectual world and the beauty in that sphere’.40 
 
The work of Augustine (354-430 CE), shows the introduction of ideas such as these into 
Christian thought. Although the extent to which he drew upon the Platonic-Pythagorean 
tradition remains an issue of some contention, the influence of many of its ideas upon 
his work is nonetheless obviously apparent: he, too, adheres to the notion that the 
universe is held together in the numerical proportions to be found in musical harmony. 
In his commentary on the Genesis account of creation he quotes from the Wisdom of 
Solomon 11:22: ‘But you have arranged all things by measure and number’, whilst 
allusions in his commentary on Psalm 42 to the ‘intellectual music’ of heaven heard at 
the point of death are further evidence of a Platonic approach towards music as 
something to be grasped conceptually rather than enjoyed sensually.
41
 
 
In his early although incomplete De Musica, Augustine also discusses those ratios 
apparent in rhythmic verse – the patterns of light and heavy stresses which comprise the 
various poetic metres – and concludes that these, too, convey for us the proportions of 
musical harmony.
42
 These metres, he argues, can be arranged in order from the less-
perfect ratios to the more perfect to form a hierarchy, and by listening to them with the 
help of divine guidance, the mind can rise from the ‘lowest’ numbers to the ‘highest’ 
and so attain knowledge and love of God.
43
 Music, then, reveals to the fallen soul God 
as origin of all number and proportion.
44
 So whereas for Plato music’s order pointed 
towards an ultimate order found within the universe, for Augustine this ultimate order 
comes to be defined as God. Indeed, for Augustine, in some sense God actually is music 
– the ‘supreme measure, number, relation, harmony, unity, and equality’ – and the 
                                               
39 Plotinus, Six Enneads, V.8.1, pp. 422-423; Plotinus, Six Enneads, I.6.2, pp. 57-58 
40 Plotinus, Six Enneads, I.3.1, pp. 36-37 
41 Augustine, ‘Expositions on the Book of Psalms’, in A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene 
Fathers of the Christian Church, ed. by Philip Schaff (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1956), VIII.42.7, 
pp. 133-134 
42
 W. F. Jackson Knight, St. Augustine’s De Musica: a synopsis (London: Orthological Institute, 1949) 
43 Jackson Knight, St. Augustine’s De Musica, V.13.28 
44 Augustine, Eighty-Three Different Questions, trans. by David L. Mosher (Washington, DC: Catholic 
University of America Press, 2002), 46.2, pp. 79-81 
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music of the world is a partial expression not only of the silent music of the spheres but 
also of the eternal music of God.
45
  
 
However, Augustine’s theological embrace of music is not complete, for when it comes 
to music as an auditory rather than simply intellectual activity a profound ambivalence 
is made apparent. As Augustine himself puts it: ‘I waver between the danger that lies in 
gratifying the senses and the benefits which, as I know from experience, can accrue 
from singing’.46 On the one hand he wants to say that the experience of music can move 
us towards God, for it makes the divine, numerical properties of music available to the 
ear in tangible form. On the other he remains greatly concerned that music’s more 
sensual qualities hold the ability to distract the soul from the proper contemplation of 
spiritual matters – a wariness to which I shall return in the following chapter. So 
following both Plato and Plotinus, Augustine concludes that we should not allow 
ourselves to be distracted by musical sound but rather that we should seek the pure, 
mathematical qualities from which this sound derives.
47
 
 
A further continuation of the Platonic-Pythagorean musical numerology that should 
here be noted is that of Roman scholar Boethius (c. 430-525 CE). Intent on bringing the 
ideas of Greek philosophy to the Latin world, his De Institutione Musica, one of a set of 
manuscripts written on the subject of the quadrivium, was to become the basis for the 
academic study of music for nearly a millennium.
48
 As Leo Schrade puts it: ‘More than 
anyone else did [Boethius] form the musical mind of medieval men’.49  
 
Continuing the idea that worldly music exists as in some way a copy of the eternal 
music of the universe, Boethius identifies a continuum of three levels of musical 
understanding. The first, musica mundana, is music of the universe, comparable to 
Plato’s ‘music of the spheres’ and Augustine’s eternal music of God – the highest and 
most perfect form of music. Below this is musica humana, or the music of human 
beings, which refers to the inaudible blending of the higher and lower parts of the soul 
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into an harmonious balance. Finally, musica instrumentis constituta, the lowest form of 
music, is sonorous music as it is created by musical instruments – music as merely 
sound alone, which forms the necessary, albeit small, first step towards the proper 
comprehending of the proportion that exists in the unheard music of the universe.
50
 
 
Boethius’ categorisation presented a renewed articulation of Augustine’s sense of 
worldly music as a partial and inferior copy of the perfect, heavenly music that is God. 
It also served to further dismiss music as a practical activity in favour of the intellectual 
study of music theory. Indeed, in Boethius’ day, performers of music were considered 
mere manual labourers, unaware as they were of the harmony which lay behind their 
actions. Composers were only a little better, for although they had awareness of the 
harmonic laws, this knowledge was based on intuition rather than reason. The only true 
musicians, therefore, were the philosophers – those who had perfected the study of 
music by perceiving it through reason alone. As Boethius himself puts it: ‘How much 
nobler is the study of music as a rational discipline than as composition and 
performance. It is as much nobler as the mind is superior to the body, for devoid of 
reason, one remains in servitude... [A] musician is one who has gained knowledge of 
making music by weighing with reason, not through the servitude of work, but through 
the sovereignty of speculation.’51 The legacy of such divisions was to last for centuries, 
with the role of performing musicians considered menial right up until the eighteenth 
century and a prioritising of musical theory above musical practice is still to be found 
within some aspects of formal music education to this day.
52
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II. Musical Formalism 
 
(a) Immanuel Kant 
 
Even as the practice of music gradually began to evolve, with the advance of equal 
temperament and an increasing emphasis on music as an art of performance rather than 
the focus of numerological study, philosophical reflection on the subject remained in 
many respects unchanged, and it was not until the eighteenth century, and the work of 
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), that thought about music found a quite different 
expression in the development of musical formalism.
53
 
 
Kant sought to bridge the gap between the two differing schools of thought which 
characterised the Enlightenment period: rationalism, which prioritised the reasoning of 
the mind, and empiricism, which favoured the perceptions of the senses. Central to his 
endeavour was an attempt to account for the role of the mind in shaping what we 
perceive to be ‘reality’ – to explore the extent to which we can in fact ‘know’ anything. 
In the first of three influential treaties, The Critique of Pure Reason, which deals with 
questions of metaphysics, Kant argues that there must exist a level of reality which we 
cannot know – a ‘noumenal’, in-itself world which is inaccessible to ‘phenomenal’ 
human experience as it lies outside the perceptive or conceptive limits of the mind.
54
 
Here Kant is disallowing the kind of metaphysic that we find in Plato’s Timaeus. The 
second critique, The Critique of Practical Reason, moves from asking ‘what is’ to 
considering ‘what ought to be’, exploring moral judgements and the notion that free 
individuals are bound to certain ethical obligations.
55
 Finally, The Critique of 
Judgement discusses aesthetic and teleological judgements – judgements of design and 
purpose.
56
 Here Kant explores whether judgements of beauty might rightly be 
considered a form of reason and thus is concerned with developing the notion that 
aesthetic judgements are not simply expressions of subjective preference but rather have 
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an underlying objective basis. For Kant, then, beauty holds a place of great significance 
within his philosophical system: without a theory of the aesthetic, he wants to say, 
metaphysics and ethics remain incomplete.
57
  
 
Although reflection on the nature of beauty has existed since the earliest times, such 
activity was not recognised as a distinct discipline until 1750, when Alexander 
Baumgarten, influenced by the work of the Third Earl of Shaftesbury, coined the term 
‘aesthetic’ as referring to knowledge that is perceptual and sensory rather than 
conceptual and intellectual.
58
 Drawing upon such ideas, Kant identifies four aspects, or 
‘moments’, which define the characteristics of and grounds for judgements of beauty. 
Firstly, the quality of aesthetic judgement is ‘disinterested interest’: judgements of 
beauty are not the same as sensual pleasure, which is ‘interested’ in the gratification the 
stimulus provides, and neither are they the same as intellectual or rational judgements, 
which are ‘interested’ in the acquisition of knowledge outside itself. Instead, aesthetic 
judgement is freely undertaken – a ‘pure disinterested delight’. At the same time, 
however, it is not completely free, for in order to be a ‘judgement’ at all the perception 
of beauty must be rooted in something more than mere personal preference.
59
 This 
forms Kant’s second aspect: that aesthetic judgement is without concept but at the same 
time universal – the result of common agreement as to what constitutes beauty. Here 
Kant is denying the complete subjectivity of taste urged by Hume: taste might be 
subjective, argues Kant, but this does not mean that anything goes. Disagreements 
regarding aesthetic value, then, occur not as the result of differing subjective opinions 
but rather through errors of judgement, that is, through engagements that are ‘interested’ 
or ‘conceptual’ rather than genuinely ‘aesthetic’ in nature.60  
 
Thirdly, Kant argues that the relation of aesthetic judgement to its object of 
contemplation is purposive yet at the same time free from purpose: beauty pleases in 
form alone, not in relation to any external use, nor even through comparison to our 
conceptions of what it ought to be, and thus comprises a ‘formal subjective finality’ – it 
is perceived with purpose and yet at the same time no thought is given to any purpose 
beyond the contemplation of beauty in itself.
61
 Finally, the modality of judgements of 
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beauty is that of ‘exemplary necessity’ – that we identify a quality of necessity in beauty 
that is the result of an order which cannot be determined but which nonetheless exists. 
This, he maintains, forms the ‘subjective principle’ of beauty – that aesthetic 
judgements are ‘subjectively universal’ on account of the fundamental affinity shared 
by all human minds alike.
62
 Therefore, Kant concludes, although we might find pleasure 
in utility, which is enjoyed in relation to a purpose, and pleasure in sensation, in which 
we are gratified by the agreeable, it is pleasure in beauty alone which simply satisfies: 
beauty is ‘the one and only disinterested and free delight; for, with it, no interest, 
whether of sense or reason, extorts approval’.63 
 
Kant’s account of aesthetic judgement then rests on another apparent paradox: 
judgements of beauty do not lead to knowledge and yet they are still conducted in a 
cognitive fashion. In order to make sense of this it is necessary to look further at Kant’s 
theory of the relationship between imagination and understanding. The role of 
imagination, he argues, is to make order out of otherwise chaotic sense data, so that this 
order might then be unified by understanding. This is not to say that imagination simply 
copies or re-presents that which it perceives but rather it remains fundamentally free, 
acting in spontaneous creativity. When presented with an object of beauty, however, 
imagination ceases to act with complete freedom, for in beauty it comes to see 
something of the order which is normally to be found in the realm of understanding, and 
so in beauty, imagination and understanding are brought into a state of harmony. As 
Kant puts it, there is a ‘quickening of both faculties...to an indefinite, but...harmonious 
activity’.64 What is more, whereas, when at the service of understanding, imagination 
must adhere to the laws of conception, in aesthetic experience, which is by nature 
conceptless, it becomes liberated from the constrains of conceptuality – still cognitively 
based, but no longer intellectually tied. At the same time, understanding, although 
perceiving in beauty evidence of its own ordered activity, cannot fit these patterns 
within the grounds of its normal conception, and so the mind simply delights in the free 
play that exists between imagination and understanding.
65
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But how does art achieve freedom from concepts and yet still have the order of form 
required of objects of beauty? For Kant, the answer lies in the role of the genius who 
‘gives the rule to art’, intuiting that state of harmony which cannot be articulated or 
taught but which is essential to beautiful art. The imagination of the genius must be 
honed and perfected through practice and learning, so that artistic ability in fact 
becomes a matter of the innate perception of beauty’s form tempered by the education 
of taste. When perfectly balanced, this combining of genius and taste results in what 
Kant refers to as an ‘aesthetic idea’ – a ‘representation of the imagination which induces 
much thought, yet without the possibility of any definite thought whatever...being 
adequate to it, and which language, consequently, can never get quite on level terms 
with or render completely intelligible’.66 Here imagination shapes reality to form an 
image which is both ineffable and yet at the same time recognisable to cognitive skill, 
and thus aesthetic judgements achieve the autonomy from conceptual and sensual 
determination necessary for the contemplation of true beauty. The ultimate form of 
beauty, then, is ‘free beauty’ – beauty as found in nature and the ‘fine’ arts which is 
pleasing through the perception of form alone. Judgement of such arts is reflective and 
detached, having ‘the effect of advancing the culture of the mental powers’.67 By 
contrast, lesser beauties, (which Kant calls ‘dependent beauties’) are those arts which, 
classed as ‘agreeable’ rather than ‘fine’, merely entertain or amuse, and thus appeal 
more to sensation than cognition. Like dinner music, he argues, such art is little more 
than ‘a quaint idea intended to act on the mind merely as an agreeable noise fostering a 
genial spirit... [and make] the time pass by unheeded’.68 So for Kant such arts might be 
considered ‘fine’ only in as much as their beauty derives from the sensations created by 
the interplay of cognitive functions as the result of sensations – from the ‘proportion of 
the different degrees of tension in the sense to which the sensation belongs’ – and not 
from the experience of agreeable sensation in itself.
69
 In so doing, Kant would here 
seem to attribute a higher value to the mental cultivation which art might inspire, over 
and above the genuinely aesthetic experience in itself. 
  
The emphasis placed by Kant on the aesthetic virtue of conceptlessness and on free 
beauty as found in the contemplation of form alone might be taken as suggesting that 
music should fare well within his system of philosophy. Indeed, many scholars have 
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appealed to Kant’s theory of aesthetic judgement to argue that music might even enable 
us to glimpse the unknowable, ‘noumenal’ realm itself.70 For Kant himself, however, 
this is not the case. Although arguing that music does offer something in the way of 
mental stimulation by merit of its diversity and intensity, its main recourse, he argues, is 
to emotion, and so it remains primarily a matter of sensual pleasure rather than 
cognitive delight. For Kant, music ‘is certainly...more a matter of enjoyment than of 
culture...and it possesses less worth in the eyes of reason than any other of the fine 
arts’.71 What is more, although music consists in what might be perceived as pure form, 
its transient nature means that its patterns disappear in an instant, leaving nothing 
permanent for the mind to grasp, and hence music’s conceptlessness, although an 
aesthetic virtue, is in music manifest as an artistic vice.
72
 So as an agreeable art, music 
is unparalleled in its ability to arouse feeling, but for Kant this remains of the least 
importance in terms of the merits of art. Music in its purest form is, in fact, furthest 
removed from the artistic ideal, and ultimately amounts to little more than the ‘beautiful 
play of sensations’.73 
 
So how exactly does music, essentially conceptless by nature, end up so derided by an 
aesthetics which values freedom from conceptuality as highly as does Kant’s? The 
reason lies in a disparity between Kant’s application of his theory of aesthetic 
judgement to nature and to art. Whilst judgements of nature can indeed uphold the 
aesthetic ideal of free, disinterested and conceptless contemplation, judgements of art, 
on the other hand, are necessarily tied to the artistic object in question, and as a result, 
Kant develops a tendency to assess artistic value not so much in terms of aesthetic 
purity but rather in terms of contributions to culture.
74
 Consequently, his theory of 
aesthetics fails to work in relation to music on account of this art form’s transience and 
insubstantiality, but he blames this on music rather than on his theory.
75
 As Herbert 
Schueller points out, if Kant had applied his aesthetic theory to music rather than his 
conviction that art should contribute to cultural advancement, music might have come to 
be held in higher estimation among the arts, given that, ‘[o]f all the arts, music is the 
most exemplary of this self-maintaining play which is not related to rational concepts at 
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all... The order of ideas in music resembles the order of rational, intellectual ideas, but 
of course no concept can be adequate to musical... ideas as internal intuitions’.76 
 
Kant’s aesthetic ideal, based as it is on the cognitive experience of form alone, leaves no 
room for the affirmation of sensuality. For some, however, this move is deeply 
problematic, for it serves to detract attention from the very essence of a work of art. 
This might be especially true of music, for, as Wayne Bowman puts it: ‘A music 
emancipated from history, from science, from morality, and from sensation is ultimately 
a music emancipated from meaning itself’.77 For Israel Knox, music which is perceived 
as purely form is nothing more than ‘a beautiful and ineffectual angel, beating in the 
void his luminous wings in vain...’78 What is more, Kant’s notion of ‘free’ beauty states 
that music is most music-like when it is pattern alone, completely removed from 
extraneous influences, and whilst this contributes to the ideal of ‘absolute’ music, it also 
implies that music in its purest form is actually the least acceptable within Kant’s 
aesthetic theory, for by becoming conceptless and disinterested, music gives up those 
very aspects which provide any hope of its being accepted as cultural contributor rather 
than mere sensual distraction.
79
 So in the end, Kant’s liberating of judgements of beauty 
from sensual pleasure inadvertently leads to the devaluing of that which lies at the very 
centre of the experience of art.
80
  
 
But what if music is not just fleeting, sensuous experience? Perceived as an ‘art of 
tone’, for Kant, music pleases only the appetites and not the mind, having as it does 
little to contribute to the cognitive world of ideas. But how would it be, asks Bowman, 
if music were perceived not in terms of tones but rather as an ‘art of time’? In the 
Critique of Pure Reason, he argues, time is established as an ‘a priori framer of 
experience, a pre-condition and necessary foundation for all general knowledge’.81 
Could it be the case, then, as Carl Dalhaus suspects, that Kant’s aesthetic theory ‘suffers 
from too narrow an idea of the function of time in music’?82 Had he begun from a 
perspective of temporality he would have had a much stronger basis for assessing music 
both in terms of beauty and in terms of its appeal to cognition. What is more, temporal 
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events have the necessary formal requirements to be accepted by Kant’s theory of 
judgement and thus such an understanding could easily have led to the endorsement of 
the musical experience. As Schueller puts it: ‘...time as a mode of human thought seems 
to occur in its purest form in music, of all the arts’, and thus, as Bowman remarks, the 
potential for music to become a ‘profound shaper of new orders of cognitive 
experience’ is released.83 
 
The lowly role attributed to music by Kant very likely stems from his inability to 
appreciate it. Even when music lingers in the mind, he argues, it is ‘more annoying to us 
than agreeable’: it is like a ‘perfume that...gives a treat to all around whether they like it 
or not’.84 Music ‘scatters its influence abroad to an uncalled-for extent...and 
thus...becomes obtrusive and deprives others, outside the musical circle, of their 
freedom’.85 It has been suggested that Kant’s emphasis on the fleeting existence of 
musical patterns might be attributed to an inability on his part to retain the tonal 
configurations which comprise the musical gestalten that truly and lastingly engage the 
mind.
86
 However that may be, Kant is an object lesson that music is not a purely 
academic concept grasped by the intellect alone but rather can be properly known only 
in the genuinely musical experience. 
 
(b) Eduard Hanslick 
 
Eduard Hanslick’s On the Musically Beautiful, published in 1854, is the classical 
account of musical formalism. Reacting against Romanticism, Hanslick argues that 
music must be understood independently of the feeling it arouses.
87
 He does not 
‘underestimate the authority of feeling over music’, and of course allows for the ‘intense 
feelings which music awakens in us’ – the ‘otherworldly stirring’ that music ‘by the 
grace of God’ achieves – but rather maintains that music’s fundamental nature and the 
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feeling it arouse are two very different matters.
88
 Such feeling does not contribute to 
music’s ‘content’, and neither is it instrumental to musical beauty, but rather it must be 
understood as ‘nothing more than a secondary effect’.89 Hanslick is vehement about 
this. Appeals to feeling as constitutive of the true nature of music defile musical beauty: 
they are the musical equivalent of attempting to discover ‘the real nature of wine by 
getting drunk’.90 What is more, they direct attention away from music in itself – from 
the musical structures without which there would be nothing to feel about.
91
 To the 
argument that music represents not specific feelings but indefinite feeling, or feeling in 
general, he responds that the terms ‘unspecific’ and ‘representation’ are essentially 
contradictory: ‘[E]very artistic activity consists in individualizing, in impressing the 
specific upon the unspecific, the particular upon the universal’.92 Even in light of the 
many musical examples which would seem to have representation as their core – opera, 
‘programme’ music, vocal music and so forth – he remains adamant that musical 
perfection is to be found only in instrumental music, for this alone ‘is music purely and 
absolutely’, and ‘what instrumental music cannot do, it ought never be said that music 
can do...’.93  
 
So if musical beauty is other than feeling, how are we to conceive of it? Music’s 
autonomy, argues Hanslick, is of the utmost importance. Musical beauty is an objective 
fact – an internal structure which remains intact regardless of whether or not those who 
perceive it respond emotionally. Indeed, music is beautiful even when it is ‘neither 
perceived nor thought’.94 Like Kant, Hanslick wanted to go beyond music’s apparent 
subjectivity and transience, but unlike him he argues that beauty is to be found not in 
the Ideal but rather in the sensible. Such sensation is not, he argues, to be confused with 
subjective feeling, for, although it can at times result in such an end, it also leads to the 
outwardly-directed contemplation of the musical object – a contemplation that is 
specifically and uniquely musical in nature.
95
 This contemplation is governed by the 
imagination, for, unlike both feeling and also understanding, which have largely 
prevailed in accounts of musical aesthetics, imagination does not degenerate into the 
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extremes of pathos or logic respectively but rather stands between the two, producing 
that which is neither fully reason nor fully feeling.
96
 
 
What, then, is the nature of musical beauty? Hanslick puts it thus: 
 
The primordial stuff of music is regular and pleasing sound... Unconsumed and 
inexhaustible, melody holds sway over all, as the basic form of musical beauty. 
Harmony, with its thousandfold transformations, inversions, and augmentations, 
provides always new foundations. The two combined are animated by rhythm, 
the artery which carries life to music, and they are enhanced by the charm of a 
diversity of timbres.
97
 
 
Musical beauty consists in the purely musical – in tönend-bewegte Formen, or ‘tonally 
moving forms’.98 By form, Hanslick is not referring to the underlying structure of a 
work as is so often denoted by the term: for him, musical form is no ‘mere acoustical 
beauty or...symmetry of proportion’. Rather, he argues, ‘forms which construct 
themselves out of tones are not empty but filled; they are not mere contours of a 
vacuum but mind giving shape to itself from within’. In the experience of music the 
musical imagination ‘enjoys in conscious sensuousness the sounding shapes, the self-
constructing tones, and dwells in free and immediate contemplation of them’.99 For 
Hanslick, then, the beauty of music’s forms remains autonomous and objective, heard 
rather than conceptual or ideal, and thus he seeks to affirm a specifically musical 
beauty, distinct from the general accounts of aesthetics which attempt to universalise 
various experiences of the beautiful.
100
 
 
Despite his earlier denial of the worth of music’s representational qualities, Hanslick 
now claims that, since music moves tonally, it might indeed represent kinetic qualities 
such as expansion and diminution, acceleration and slowing down. The shape and 
motion of music, he argues, are similar to feelings such as these, and so music, whilst 
incapable of representing feeling as such, might nonetheless still portray feeling’s 
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dynamic qualities.
101
 However, for Hanslick, this is indirect and incidental, and 
certainly not important enough to force us to account for feeling within our judgements 
of musical beauty. Rather, its significance lies more in that it serves as an explanation of 
his use of ‘feeling’ terminology within musical description – a use which, he maintains, 
is permitted provided that its essentially metaphorical nature is made explicit.
102
 
 
Hanslick’s rejection of feeling within musical aesthetics, then, is not absolute but rather 
allows for an, admittedly small, appreciation of it under qualified terms. This might be 
further demonstrated, he argues, through the differing responses to the musical 
experience by musicians and non-musicians. Whilst non-musicians are inclined to ask 
whether a piece is happy or sad, musicians, he maintains, ask instead whether it is good 
or bad, thus showing a properly contemplative perception in which music’s 
individuality and particularity come to the fore. Here attention is not primarily held by 
feeling but rather is directed towards music’s tonally moving forms which fully engage 
the imagination. The ‘worthiest, the wholesomest...manner of listening to music’, 
concludes Hanslick, is therefore one in which pleasure is primarily derived from ‘one’s 
own mental alertness’.103 
 
So for Hanslick, true musical contemplation is ‘the mental satisfaction which the 
listener finds in continuously following and anticipating the composer’s designs, here to 
be confirmed in his expectations, there to be agreeably led astray’.104 As Morris Weitz 
puts it: ‘...listening to music ought to be a painstaking attending to the unfolding of the 
tonal combinations, much more an intellectual and an imaginative procedure than an 
emotional one. The enjoyment or disappointment derived from understanding the 
progression of sounds are the only legitimate emotional accompaniments of proper 
musical response’.105 Music’s tonally moving forms comprise its only subject, for 
‘[M]usic speaks not merely by means of tones, it speaks only tones’, and thus, in 
comparison to other examples of beauty, musical beauty demonstrates a complete unity 
of form and content.
106
 Music means nothing and yet it remains meaningful, for its 
meaning is ‘wholly, specifically, and only musical’.107 
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Hanslick’s fundamental belief that musical beauty consists in something more objective 
and universal than mere personal preference, and his insistence that music itself should 
form the focal point of our discussions of the art form, account for the impact his 
argument has had.
108
 At the same time, however, his views remain problematic, not 
least because of his acceptance of the dichotomy between subjectivity and objectivity 
and the idea that science is unwaveringly objective whilst that which is non-scientific is 
necessarily subjective. As he puts it: ‘Scientific investigation should never ascribe to or 
presuppose of music any other concept than the aesthetical, unless we abandon all hope 
of ever establishing this tenuous science on a firm basis’.109 The upshot of such beliefs 
are that music’s beauty is in some way lessened if it is connected with anything other 
than the tonally moving forms of which it comprises: the abandonment of feeling 
becomes a foregone conclusion and many genres of music are consigned to a status of 
musical inferiority simply on the grounds of their association with text, drama or 
programme. At the same time, ‘absolute’ music, such as is typified by the Western tonal 
tradition of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, is raised to a position of supremacy 
on the basis of its pure, autonomous nature rather than the artistic merit of any 
individual work.
110
 
 
The argument put forward by Hanslick that there is a domain of beauty which belongs 
to music alone is an attempt to establish music as the supreme art form. He wants to say 
that music’s beauty is entirely intrinsic: that music’s form is its content. However, as 
Bowman argues, this view of musical beauty as entirely self-contained, dependent upon 
nothing other than itself, all too often comes across not in terms of ‘freedom of’ but 
rather in terms of ‘freedom from’, thus creating the unintended impression that music is 
‘not only autonomous but utterly insular’.111 Hanslick’s arguments may therefore 
rebound and lead to the view that music is entirely irrelevant. 
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III. Jeremy Begbie 
 
(a) Musical Temporality 
 
When discussing Kant I noted the criticism that had he taken account of temporality he 
might have ended up with a very different appreciation of music. In Theology, Music 
and Time, contemporary theologian Jeremy Begbie explores precisely this, arguing 
that doing so generates ‘fresh and fruitful resources for the theological task’.112 He 
wants to reflect theologically ‘not simply about music but through music’, so that 
our musicality leads to greater understanding and clarity of thought within our 
theological endeavour.
113
   
  
Begbie begins his reflection with a consideration of how music actually works. Music, 
he argues, is not an object but rather a practice, or a set of practices, most notably those 
of music-making and music-hearing: music is ‘the intentional bringing into being of 
temporally organised patterns of pitched sounds’, which are deliberately perceived not 
just as sounds but as musical tones and which are essentially temporal in nature.
114
 
Following Jean-Jacques Nattiez, Begbie argues for an understanding of musical 
‘meaning’ as created both through music ‘in itself’ and also through its extra-musical 
connections, although he notes that the pleasure we derive from music generally stems 
from the ‘dynamically and intrinsically interrelated’ nature of musical tones 
themselves.
115
 Further, he underlines music’s engagement with the physical world, 
arguing for an understanding which embraces music as comprising not only the sounds 
which are heard but also the musical instruments, human bodies and sound vibrations 
that make possible its existence.
116
 
 
In terms of understanding music’s temporality, Begbie draws on the work of Victor 
Zuckerkandl, who argues that music is formed from multi-layered, metrical waves of 
tension and release which are created through the interrelation of beats through time, 
felt through rhythm and articulated in tones. Music is thus shown to be a ‘thoroughly 
this-worldly art’, experienced as ‘temporally, dynamically alive’, functioning through 
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time and therefore through the physical reality of the world.
117
 This understanding, 
argues Begbie, challenges and corrects two misguided notions of the linear conception 
of time – that future events are briefly present before fading into the past and that the 
present exists as a ‘swell’ which travels down a continuing line of events.118 Time, for 
Begbie, is intrinsic to God’s creation: it is a positive part of God’s ‘good ordering’ of 
the world.
119
 This contrasts with a tradition going back to Plato, mediated by Augustine, 
for which temporal things are unreal and fallen. For Augustine, as I showed above, the 
study of music focuses on what it might achieve outside of a temporal framework – how 
it might enable the fallen to return to God and how it might offer a glimpse of eternity – 
ideas which, to Begbie, are misguided.
120
 Music, he argues, demonstrates that change 
can be an orderly affair and need not imply chaos, and also teaches us to regard waiting 
as a positive action through which we might be educated – a moral event which reminds 
us that we are within the narrative of the world’s history and not above it. Further, 
music’s layering of patterns of tension and release shows us the existence not only of 
different time-durations but also of different time-structures, and the experience of 
music serves to challenge a negative view of finitude: as Barth discovered through 
Mozart, decay is necessary for there to be the possibility of life, and music, which can 
exist only if sounds are allowed to die away, presents us with the artistic embodiment of 
this process.
121
 
 
Applying such ideas to the doctrine of eschatology, Begbie argues that music teaches us 
about delay and patience, with its patterns of tension and release revealing what it 
means to have to wait for the fulfilment of promise: as the ending of one wave is at the 
same time the advancing of another, music shows us how temporary closure leads to 
greater longing for resolution.
122
 Through musical anticipation, such as is typified by 
the suspensions of a cadence, we glimpse the prefiguring of final resolutions – a 
demonstration of the present experience of a now that is yet to come – and in the 
experience of musical resolution we are enabled to better comprehend the 
inexhaustibility of God’s overflowing abundance.123 
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Begbie then argues that music’s temporality might show us something of the 
relationship that exists between the eternity of God and created time. Here he focuses on 
contemporary composer John Tavener, whose minimalistic music aims to create an 
impression of timelessness and to give a window onto divine eternity. To this end, 
Tavener employs a restrain of directionality, change and motion within his works, so 
that the beginnings and endings which mark the passing of time are subtly avoided. 
Whilst acknowledging that such music provides a sense of ‘space’ in an otherwise 
crowded world, Begbie nonetheless finds Tavener’s attempt at overcoming musical time 
theologically problematic, primarily because of its failure to realise the engagement and 
interaction of God with the temporality of the world – that God’s eternity has been 
revealed through a human life and death, thus fundamentally affirming rather than 
negating the reality of time.
124
  
 
In relation to musical repetition, Begbie points to the integration of ‘sameness’ with 
‘difference’ – the same melody heard again in a different key or on a different 
instrument, perhaps – arguing that music highlights for us how those instances of 
sameness would appear to be of greater significance than those of difference. When 
applied to the Eucharist and liturgy, which are themselves repeated acts, such an 
understanding, he argues, enables us to comprehend the necessity of both stability and 
disruption, together with the preservation of the key elements of the init ial theme. Here 
Begbie identifies in particular the practice of musical improvisation as demonstrating 
for us reinvention, reinterpretation and the interpenetration of past, present and even 
future enactments.
125
  
 
Finally, in a continuation of this reference to improvisation, Begbie pursues an 
alternative understanding of the relationship between music and time to that of Tavener. 
Comparing the approaches towards musical freedom of John Cage, for whom musical 
form is a matter of chance acceptance, and Pierre Boulez, who instead maintains the 
importance of strictly dictating the pattern of musical development, Begbie argues for a 
third conception of improvisation in which the constraints of musical nature are 
embraced rather than avoided, thus reiterating his point about the necessity of limitation 
for genuine freedom. The practice of jazz improvisation here serves to illustrate 
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Begbie’s point, governed as it is by a set of rules which both constrains the patterns of 
musical development and yet at the same time sets them free.
126
 
 
Relating this jazz-based freedom-within-constraints back to a theological framework, 
Begbie examines the idea of gift exchange, detailing how the skills involved in jazz 
improvisation – those of passing musical ideas from one musician to another – mimic 
the notion of divine ‘gifting’, that is, the endless abundance of giving and giving back 
which consists both within the triune God and between God and humanity.
127
 From 
here, he expands his discussion to include the doctrine of election as found in Romans 
9-11, which, he argues, might be understood in light of musical improvisation as ‘a 
sustained attempt on the part of Paul to introduce the Roman Church to the improvising 
strategies of God, and to convince them that coming to terms with God’s time and 
God’s timing is integral to being caught up in God’s electing purposes’.128 Finally, he 
outlines the way in which musical improvisation might clarify for us the ecclesial notion 
of gifting as found in Romans 14:1-15:13.
129
  
 
By engaging with the formal aspect of musical temporality, Begbie demonstrates that, 
through music, we might come to understand both the physical world and the passing of 
time as affirmed by God. Music, then, helps us understanding both creation and 
incarnation. However, we might ask whether the formal analogies to which he appeals 
exhaust the potential of music to be interesting to theology, and here another of his 
works comes into play.
130
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(b) Music and the Cosmos 
 
Begbie’s 2007 work Resounding Truth asks ‘[h]ow God’s truth might sound and re-
sound in the world of music’.131 Once again, Begbie here considers music both in terms 
of its inner workings and in relation to its external influences. Music’s actions, he 
allows, are fundamentally socially and culturally embedded, influenced by the 
associations, both musical and extra-musical, which we encounter in our everyday lives 
and which together shape the common practices of our own traditions.
132
 At the same 
time music also involves elements which he refers to as the ‘integrities of the sonic 
order’ – the sound-producing materials, sound waves, temporality and distinctively 
musical sound patterns which remain essential to all music regardless of its context.
133
 
Do we, he asks, place too much emphasis on context and fail to understand music as an 
objective reality? By way of righting the boat he proposes a return to the more 
ontological ideas of the ‘Great Tradition’ – to the views of Pythagoras, Plato and the 
early theologians. A ‘cosmological’ approach such as this enables us, he maintains, to 
rediscover music as grounded in a universal, God-given order. This, he believes, in a 
way that in some respects echoes the Platonic tradition, helps us to know how we might 
live well in the world and in relation to God.
134
 
 
However, Begbie also acknowledges that aspects of the Pythagorean tradition, when 
viewed in the light of modern musical and scientific advances, remain problematic, and 
in particular he points towards its fundamental distrust of the physical and favouring of 
the intellectual and spiritual, together with its resultant emphasis on music as number 
rather than sound.
135
 In contrast to such ideas, he suggests that we might draw upon the 
views of this tradition but also that we must modify them in some ways: ‘...we might do 
well’, he tells us, ‘to regain a sense of music’s profound physicality – its embeddedness 
in God’s given material world’, and, as in his earlier book, he here underlines music’s 
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‘sonic integrities’ as pointing towards its fundamentally physical nature.136 Such an 
approach, he maintains, is already to be found not only in the works of theologians 
including Augustine and Barth, but also in the music of composers such as J. S. Bach 
and James MacMillan.
137
 
 
Informed by such ideas, Begbie seeks to develop a theological account of music situated 
within what he refers to as a ‘Christian ecology’ – the created cosmos in which we live 
and our calling to respond to God within such a world. He considers first the role of 
music in an understanding of the world as created by God. Here music is viewed as a 
‘gift of God’, which, far from imparting some kind of transcendental knowledge or 
experience, instead serves to affirm the goodness of created reality through its 
fundamental dependence on the processes of temporality. In the Western tonal system, 
Begbie finds evidence of the ‘ordered openness’ of the world, with the shaping of 
natural harmonics to form equal temperament pointing towards that which is given by 
God but shaped by humanity, whilst the blending of different tonalities and instruments 
to form a single musical work are seen as displaying the ‘diverse unity’ of creation.138 
 
From here, Begbie asks what music might show us about the nature of our lives within 
God’s world. Arguing that acts of human creativity are at the same time acts of 
discovery, he returns to the idea of the ‘sonic integrities’ to demonstrate the process of 
musical composition as primarily rooted in the order of God’s creation. Human 
creativity, he wants to say, is essentially bound up with the notion of limitation, not 
in a restrictive sense, but rather in that creativity is in fact made possible by the 
existence of such limits – an echo, again, of Barth’s understanding of the music of 
Mozart.
139
 This emphasis on limitation is continued in Begbie’s notion of music as 
embodying respect, through which he seeks to replace the Romanticised image of the 
composer as one who creates from their innermost being – ‘through turning inside’ – 
with the notion of musical composition as a reaching outside the self to embody the 
order that exists in the whole of created reality.
140
 In tying these ideas together, he 
concludes that music should be understood essentially as a process of development – a 
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shaping of the sonic integrities, not through personal imposition, but rather in line with 
God’s good creation.141 
 
Begbie then turns his attention away from the process of composition to ask instead 
how the experience of music might be of interest to theology. Considering music in 
relation to ideas of healing, he argues that music’s harmonic patterns of tension and 
resolution might help us to avoid some of the common misconceptions associated with 
the doctrine of hope – that, in contrast to claims that it is nothing more than escapism 
from the real world of suffering, or naïve optimism, or a form of domination which 
attempts to control others by threats or promises about what is to come after death, 
music enables us to understand a ‘cross-shaped’ hope, which takes seriously the 
message that Easter does not negate the crucifixion, and realises that true hope can exist 
only in the face of suffering.
142
 He also considers how our experience of music serves to 
bring individuals together as community, and so once again rejects Romanticised 
notions of individualism and inwardness in favour of an understanding of music in 
terms of ensemble – especially important, he maintains, in terms of our perception of 
the role of music within the Church.
143
  
 
Finally, Begbie asks how certain sound patterns might be perceived as having particular 
theological resonances. The quality of musical sound is here of interest, and he argues 
that the interpenetration of several sounds within the same space without monopoly – an 
effect which cannot be achieved in more material art forms – presents us with an 
analogy for the Trinity, whose constituent parts exists as three distinct elements and yet 
as one unified whole.
144
 He also considers music’s emotional connections, arguing that 
music assists with our emotional education and thus with the wider redemption and 
renewal of humankind.
145
 At the same time, however, our romanticised, anthropological 
notions of music, he argues, together with our reluctance to accept music’s physicality, 
have served to prioritise the emotional expression of the composer at the expense of the 
reality of music ‘in itself’, resulting in ‘a vast cosmology revolving around the human 
ego’.146 Music has come to be used ‘fundamentally as a tool of human will’; ‘[t]he 
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harmony of the spheres has collapsed into the song of the self’.147 Of course music has 
emotional effect, but Begbie wants to make ‘a conscious effort to do justice to the other 
side of the matter, music’s embeddedness in a cosmos created out of the inexhaustible 
abundance of the Triune God’.148 Theologically this has to be right, because 
anthropology is part of cosmology: both are rooted in the divine creation.  
 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
The immense appeal of the Pythagorean tradition of thought for Christian theology can 
clearly be seen. The fact of order, Plato and his successors want to say, is a miracle 
which is nowhere more vividly echoed than in music, and music, in turn, is possible 
only because of the existence of a profound metaphysical order. In Augustine, such 
cosmology is given theological grounding as he seeks to view the order of music as 
pointing towards the ultimate order of God. Centuries later, Barth, who in his younger 
days was a keen student of Plato, draws on this tradition in his writings on Mozart, 
though in a very different way. Begbie, too, revives aspects of it, albeit with significant 
revisions, most notably the development of an appreciation of physicality, in escaping 
from the ‘song of the self’ and seeking to re-situate music within a God-given world. 
Creation, the Priestly writers tell us, is the imposition of order on the whole of reality, 
including the human will; music makes this order known to us and instructs us in 
adherence to it throughout our lives. 
 
Learning from the scepticism of his predecessors, Kant disowns this metaphysic but still 
affirms the significance of the aesthetic: order is again of importance, but here as an 
account of how it is we know anything at all. Placing judgements of taste in a sphere of 
their own, linked to those of reason and of morality, the aesthetic experience is, for 
Kant, part and parcel of our awareness of the world and of ourselves. Perceptions of 
music reside in the ideal – in the contemplation of musical form in the realm of 
imagination – and as such are an aspect of the way in which we come to grasp 
something of phenomenal reality.   
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Hanslick argues for music’s autonomous significance. Over against many of his 
contemporaries, he wanted to say that music is not dependent on feeling but rather that 
it is rooted in physical reality and, in contrast to Kant, that it is not the preserve of the 
ideal but rather comes from sensation – from the actuality of music’s tonally moving 
forms. This view relates to the older tradition of thought in emphasising that music is 
not just titillation but rather says something about how reality is constituted and how 
human beings should relate to that.  
 
Aspects of these ideas of musical formalism are also to be found within theological 
reflection. For Barth, it is in the structure of Mozart’s music that we are enabled to 
glimpse something of the balance of God’s creation, and to understand that peace which 
passes understanding. In the work of Begbie, music’s temporal processes are read 
theologically, and the passing of time comes to be perceived not as an indicator of 
fallenness but rather as essential to God’s redeeming love. 
 
At the same time that Kant and Hanslick were writing a quite different way of thinking 
about music was being developed. This alternative tradition within the philosophy of 
music has, albeit to a lesser degree than the traditions discussed within this chapter, 
played a part in the shaping of theological reflection on music, and it also bears on how 
we are to understand Shostakovich. It is to the discussion of this alternative tradition 
that I turn in my next chapter.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
The Theological Significance of Musical Expressivism 
 
 
On Christmas Eve, in a house in Germany, traditional festivities are underway. The 
family exchange Christmas presents, and a young girl, Sofie, who has a passion for 
music and a talent for playing the piano, is given music as her gift. ‘Oh, wonderful 
music!’ she exclaims, ‘a whole lifetime of Christmases! “You shall sing, O children of 
God, the most glorious things”’.1 Her joy sparks discussion amongst the adults in the 
room, and they go on to explore the meanings of Christmas – the incarnation – in 
relation to those emotions which music inspires within us. 
 
This is the opening of Schleiermacher’s Christmas Eve: Dialogue on the Incarnation – 
a collection of theological reveries on the subjects of family life, childhood, feminism 
and music, all woven together in the evocative setting of Christmas from a bygone era. 
As a theologian, Schleiermacher was greatly influenced by the Romantic and 
expressivist traditions of his time: reacting to the Enlightenment, and especially to Kant, 
Schleiermacher wanted to put theology on a new footing, characterised not by reason 
but rather by feeling. In his Speeches of 1799, he writes: ‘Religion’s essence is neither 
thinking nor acting, but intuition and feeling (Anschauung und Gefühl). It wishes to 
intuit the universe, wishes devoutly to overhear the universe’s own manifestations and 
actions, longs to be grasped and filled by the universe’s immediate influences in 
childlike passivity.’2 He tells his cultured contemporaries to ‘Observe yourselves with 
unceasing effort. Detach all that is not yourself, always proceed with ever-sharper sense, 
and the more you fade from yourself, the clearer will the universe stand forth before 
you, the more splendidly will you be recompensed for the horror of self-annihilation 
through the feeling of the infinite in you.’3 
 
Twenty years later these ideas have matured into the ‘feeling of absolute dependence’. 
Human beings, writes Schleiermacher, have a self-consciousness which accompanies all 
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activity and which is a consciousness of absolute dependence – a consciousness that 
‘the whole of our spontaneous activity comes from a source outside of ourself...’ What 
is more, ‘The Whence of our receptive and active existence, as implied in this self-
consciousness, is to be designated by the word ‘God’.’4 By now it is doubtless the case 
that Gefühl no longer means emotion as we would use the term today, but rather has 
become ‘both the immediate consciousness of the world transcendent to the self, and the 
original response of the self to the world...an irreducible, autonomous aspect or 
dimension of the self’ – in short, the sense that we are fundamentally reliant in every 
aspect of our existence on the infinite reality and presence of God.
5
 
 
The Christmas Eve Dialogue, published in 1806, mid-way through Schleiermacher’s 
explorations of Gefühl, shows through music something of this process of development. 
On the one hand music reveals to us the ‘feeling of absolute dependence’ that 
characterises Schleiermacher’s later thought, with Sofie’s child-like wonder and 
enchantment at her Christmas gift illustrating music’s requirement of the listener that 
they be open and receptive to what is heard. Moreover, later in the Dialogue, Sofie plays 
the piano for those assembled in the house, and Schleiermacher writes of how, after the 
performance, ‘...all remained still, as so often happens with religious music, in a mood 
of inner satisfaction and retirement. This reaction was followed, however, by a few 
silent moments in which they all knew that the heart of each person was turned in love 
towards all the rest and towards something higher still.’6 Here, then, Schleiermacher’s 
concern is to show how music’s connection to feeling and emotion might tell us 
something ontological – how it might speak to us of our relationship of absolute 
dependence upon the infinite nature of the divine – and, in this respect, he is perhaps 
close to the thought of Augustine, for whom the harmony and proportion of music are a 
mirror for that of the divine.
7
 
 
However, Schleiermacher’s use of Gefühl within the Dialogue has a tendency to slide. It 
does not always point towards his later ideas about absolute dependence, but rather, at 
times, has more to do with feeling as emotion. Here Schleiermacher draws on the 
thought of Willhelm Wackenroder, who claims that the theorists of the ‘wretched web 
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of numerical proportions’ that constitute formal musical training fail in their 
endeavours, for they do no more than attempt to describe artistic inspiration without 
properly comprehending what it is.
8
 A more productive method of relating to music, 
argues Wackenroder, is to understand it as the human attempt to express those emotions 
which otherwise cannot be expressed: although formless and sensual in character, it is 
through music’s affective powers that human imagination and feelings come to be 
shaped, and it is this influencing which, he claims, is overlooked by the traditional 
theorists who are too concerned within thinking about music to actually hear what is 
going on within.
9
 To make sense of this musical shaping, he maintains, requires Gefühl 
– an aesthetic attitude towards life as a whole, expressed in individual instances of joy 
or sadness, and universalised through the art form of music.
10
 
 
In the Christmas Eve Dialogue, such an understanding of music is echoed by 
Schleiermacher in theological form. Unlike words, which can convey only concepts, 
music, he argues, can instead be understood as expressive of feeling, and in particular as 
expressive of religious feeling. Thus music no longer performs an ontological function 
but rather musical feeling comes to be equated with that of a spiritual nature, as 
Schleiermacher, speaking through the character of Eduard, puts it: ‘...every fine feeling 
comes completely to the fore only when we have found the right musical expression for 
it... And it is precisely to religious feeling that music is most closely related.’11 This 
opinion is summarised at the end of the Dialogue, where the old bachelor Josef rejects 
the debates about the meaning of Christmas, and instead calls on the company to simply 
‘sing something religious and joyful’.12  
 
This account of the role of music within Schleiermacher’s theology introduces my 
second chapter, in which I discuss an alternative way of relating to music to the 
ontological and formalist accounts of the previous chapter. The tradition of 
expressivism has various strands and connotations. As discussed in the introduction to 
this thesis, music’s expressivity has to do with ‘its ability to relate to and convey 
matters of human context, emotion and meaning’. Further, and again as I have touched 
                                               
8 Wilhelm Heinrich Wackenroder’s ‘Confessions and Fantasies’, ed. by Mary Hurst Schubert (University 
Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1971), p. 180 
9 ‘Confessions and Fantasies’, p. 190 
10
 For an extensive analysis of Wackenroder’s influence on the thought of Schleiermacher, see Stoltzfus, 
Theology as Performance. 
11 Schleiermacher, Christmas Eve, p. 46 
12 Schleiermacher, Christmas Eve, p. 86 
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upon earlier, expressivism can also imply a stress on music as humanly-made, that is, as 
a means of personal expression and creativity.
13
 In addition, an understanding of music 
as expressive at times also concerns music’s connection to ethics and its moral effects. 
In summary, then, in exploring that to which I refer as music’s expressivity, I am 
seeking to understand something of music’s relation to human life and experience, as 
distinct from a dominant interest in music’s internal structures and their supposed 
cosmological significance, such as was discussed in chapter one.  
 
Although expressivist interpretations of music are generally understood as having come 
into being from the eighteenth century onwards, largely although not exclusively as a 
result of the Romantic movement, the tradition was in fact anticipated by Plato (whose 
works Schleiermacher translated into German) and I therefore begin this chapter by 
once more returning to ancient sources. From here, I turn to the later contributions to the 
philosophy of music of G. W. F. Hegel and Arthur Schopenhauer, some of whose ideas 
were appropriated theologically in the works of Schleiermacher as discussed above. 
Finally, I discuss the contributions to contemporary philosophical and sociological 
thought about music of Roger Scruton, Theodor Adorno and Susan McClary, together 
with the theological correlate of these ideas that is to be found in the reflections of Heidi 
Epstein. Once again, such discussions remain necessary in order for this study of 
Shostakovich to be contextualised within the traditions out of which it has developed. 
 
 
I. Musical Expressivism 
 
(a) Ancient Greek Influences 
 
In chapter one I gave an account of the ancient Greek understanding of music in terms 
of its mathematical structure – in terms of the ratios and proportions found in harmony 
and rhythm. What needs to be noted is that at the same time music was also understood 
in terms of its affectual qualities, that is, its emotional and even its moral impact on both 
individuals and society as a whole. The earliest Greek thought about such qualities is to 
be found not in philosophical writings but rather in the mythical tradition, where music 
is viewed not primarily as numerological but rather as sonorous, sensuous and 
powerfully affective. Such ideas were embodied by the figure of Orpheus, the musical 
                                               
13 See introduction, p. 16 
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talents of whom included saving the Argonauts by calming a storm with his singing, 
moving their souls with music more powerful than that of the sirens, and charming the 
guards of Hades whilst attempting to save his wife Eurydice.
14
 Early Orphic thought, 
which derived from the irrational and individualistic Dionysian cult, centred on the 
compulsive character of the human response to music, and in particular on music’s 
apparent ability to induce the suspension of the will and reasoned thought.
15
 In its later 
formulations, however, by which time the influence of the more logical Apollonian 
tradition had become prominent, the Orphic concept of music is transformed from ‘an 
inarticulate outpouring of emotion’ to ‘an harmonic science with a tonal as well as a 
verbal logos’ through which the Orphics aimed to attain purity of the soul.16  
 
It is in the works of Plato that we find the philosophical development of these mythical 
ideas. In The Republic, Plato considers again the harmonic aspects of music, only this 
time not simply in relation to number theory but rather in terms of music as an auditory 
and sensuous discipline, intimately bound up with the lives of both individuals and of 
society as a whole.
17
 Drawing on the ‘ethos theory’ formulated by Damon of Athens in 
the fifth century BCE, Plato considers how taste in music reflects a person’s character, 
with different musical modes expressing differing personalities. He argues that music 
shapes people’s souls and actions, and thus that musical education is morally important: 
‘...rhythm and harmony penetrate deeply into the mind and take a most powerful hold 
on it, and, if education is good, bring and impart grace and beauty, if it is bad, the 
reverse’.18 Similar themes are also taken up in the Laws, in which he discusses 
how rhythmic and melodic complexities should be avoided as they lead to depression 
and disorder.
19
 
 
So for Plato, music’s power remains potentially harmful, as is reflected in his references 
to Orpheus as a model musician whose music is a source of inspiration but also of 
                                               
14 As told in Apollonius of Rhodes, The Voyage of Argo: The Argonautica, trans. by E. V. Rieu 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1959), in Apollonius, but also in Robert Graves, The Greek Myths 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1955), I, p. 112 
15 Lippman, Musical Thought in Ancient Greece, p. 45 
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18 Plato, ‘Republic’, 401d-e, p. 646 
19 Plato, ‘Laws’, trans. by A. E. Taylor, in The Collected Dialogues of Plato, pp. 1225-1513 (II, 664a, 
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danger.
20
 In particular, Plato argues that innovation in music should be treated with 
caution as it can threaten the order of the state and hence, in the ideal society of the 
Republic, music is viewed as a source of education and pleasure but also subject to 
censorship and control. ‘You should hesitate to change the style of your literature’, 
Plato tells us, ‘because you risk everything if you do; the music and literature [mousikē] 
of a country cannot be altered without major political and social changes – we have 
Damon’s word for it and I believe him’.21  
 
Later Greek philosophy sought to further explore music in relation to its ethical affects. 
Aristotle (384-322 BCE) agreed with Plato that music could shape human character, but 
also argued that it had value as part of the good life – ‘the use of music for intellectual 
enjoyment in leisure’ – and, unlike Plato, did not call for certain musical modes to be 
banned. What is more, Aristotle would appear not to favour mathematical approaches to 
music but instead focuses on music in its auditory and experienced form.
22
 This 
empirical approach to the philosophy of music is further developed by Aristoxenus (4
th
 
century BCE), a pupil of Aristotle. Emphasising the role of the listener in musical 
appreciation, Aristoxenus’ primary focus is on neither Pythagorean numerology nor 
Damon’s ethos theory, but rather he views music as emotionally expressive, requiring 
the use of the hearing as well as the intellect in order to enable its understanding. As he 
puts it: ‘To be a musician, as we are always insisting, implies much more than a 
knowledge of harmonics, which is only one part of the musician’s equipment...’.23 
 
Whilst these experiential understandings of music are clearly distinct from the more 
formalist considerations of the harmonic tradition as discussed in the previous chapter, 
they nonetheless remain closely related to, and indeed reliant upon, the mathematical 
dimensions of music’s existence. As early as Greek mythology, then, and later in the 
works of Plato and his successors, attempts to unite the harmonic understanding 
of music with its emotional and ethical affects can be clearly perceived, for it is 
precisely through music’s patterns of tonality that such affects come to be achieved. 
What is more, these ancient interpretations in many ways foreshadow the later 
                                               
20 Plato, ‘Ion’, 536b, p. 222; Plato, ‘Laws’, VIII, 829e, pp. 1395-1396); Plato, ‘Protagoras’, trans. by W. 
K. C. Guthrie, in  The Collected Dialogues of Plato, pp. 308-352 (315a, p. 314) 
21 Plato, ‘Republic’, IV, 424c, p. 666  
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 The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. by Jonathan Barnes, 2 vols. (Princeton, US & Chichester, UK: 
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23 Aristoxenus, ‘Harmonic Elements’, in Source Readings in Music History, ed. by Oliver Strunk (New 
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development of musical expressivism which, as I shall now show, was to characterise 
much of the modern discipline of musical aesthetics throughout the second half of the 
eighteenth century.  
 
(b) G. W. F. Hegel 
 
Expressivist theory arose as part of the response of Romanticism to the Enlightenment. 
Prioritising feeling, the irrational and the natural world, expressivism put forward the 
idea that we can connect with nature through turning to the inner self – an idea we 
already find in Schleiermacher. Our realisation of nature thus becomes a form of 
expression, for it can be known only through our articulations of it. What is more, such 
expression is not just a revealing of that which is already known but rather is in itself a 
process of making – of formulating fully that which was previously only formulated in 
part. It is within this process of shaping and revealing that art comes to play a central 
role: unlike the Platonic mimesis, art, too, is now seen as expressive in the sense that it 
not only makes truth manifest but also brings human nature to fulfilment. Thus earlier 
ideas of art as the mediation of a cosmic order begin to fade, and are replaced by notions 
of art as uniquely human activity which both conveys and creates our innermost being.
24
  
 
In the work of G. W. F. Hegel (1770-1831), the impact of expression theory on the 
development of aesthetics, particularly in relation to the understanding of music, 
becomes apparent. Although now generally regarded as misguided in their basic 
assumptions, his ideas were nonetheless an important pre-cursor to later ideas regarding 
music as an expressive art form, and remain fundamental to understanding the history of 
the philosophy of art.
25
 In particular, Hegel was concerned with how we might address 
the question raised by Kant regarding the subjectivity of aesthetic experience, as 
discussed in chapter one.
26
 He wanted to say that there cannot be aspects of reality 
which lie beyond the grasp of the human mind, that is, to do away with Kant’s division 
of the phenomenal (that which we can know) and the noumenal (that true reality which 
lies beyond our comprehension). Arguing that aesthetic experience is more than simply 
a matter of taste, Hegel instead proposes that art can disclose to us something of the 
truth of reality: art, he argues, is not simply a matter of beautifying that which we 
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already know but rather is a way of discovering the truth about ourselves and the world. 
This cognitive element, he suggests, makes art a matter of profound significance within 
human life – a significance which is overlooked by Kant in his reduction of aesthetics to 
the judgement of taste.
27
 Further, Hegel also questions Kant’s belief that philosophical 
concepts result from timeless, abstract reasoning, arguing instead that the human mind 
evolves over time in relation to historical and cultural advancements. Thus our 
experience of the truth of art is underpinned by an historical consciousness so that 
‘aesthetics becomes a history of world views... a history of truth, as seen in the mirror 
of art’.28 
 
Of central importance within Hegel’s philosophy of art is the notion of Geist, which is 
Absolute Spirit, or mind, or God. Reality, argues Hegel, consists in the unfolding of the 
divine truth of Geist, which is manifest throughout the history of humankind. In 
particular, Geist is made known through self-conscious human endeavour, most notably 
in religion and philosophy, in which Geist is realised as pure idea, but also, albeit to a 
lesser extent, through art, which is Geist in sensual form.
29
 In this way, art comes to be 
perceived as a vehicle which elevates the mind’s awareness of its ideality – a means by 
which we can come to know reality as it actually is.
30
 Therefore, and in line with the 
expressivist tradition, Hegel understands art first and foremost as a product of human 
creativity: beauty is that which originates in the mind rather than that which can only be 
copied from nature, as had been argued by Kant.
31
 
 
The history of art thus becomes a part of the story of Geist achieving self-conscious 
realisation within the world. For Hegel, this is a story in three parts. In the earliest form 
of art – symbolic art, such as is found in ancient Egypt – form represents content but 
does not transform it. Later, in classical architecture and sculpture, such as that of the 
ancient Greeks, the perfect balance of form and content is achieved, and this is the 
fullest realisation of beauty. Finally, in the Romantic art forms of music and poetry, 
content and form become one and the same thing, thus enabling the perfect self-
expression of Geist in art.  As Hegel puts it: ‘symbolic art seeks that perfect unity of 
inner meaning and external shape which classical art finds in the presentation of 
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substantial individuality to sensuous contemplation, and which romantic art transcends 
in its superior spirituality’.32 
 
So for Hegel, music is of higher value than the visual arts by merit of its inwardness. 
Unlike sculpture or painting, it is not the image of something external, but rather has as 
its content the ‘inner life’, making it closer to the ideal of pure mind.33 What is more, 
through its temporality, its existence only at the instant of perception, music is 
understood primarily in relation to our inmost being: ‘The ear has scarcely grasped it 
before it is mute; the impression to be made here is at once made within; the notes re-
echo only in the depths of the soul which is gripped and moved in its subjective 
consciousness.’34 Both music’s form and content, therefore, are unique in their ability to 
reveal to the mind and soul their innermost nature. Despite its emotional quality, music 
is not, argues Hegel, irrational, but rather, in an echo of the Platonic-Pythagorean 
tradition, there remains a close connection between musical harmony and music’s 
expression of the soul. Music is both the experience of ‘formal inwardness, pure sound’ 
and ‘a retreat into the inner life’s own freedom’: it is no ‘purely natural shriek of feeling 
but the developed and artistic expression of it’.35 
 
Nonetheless, Hegel still remains somewhat ambivalent about the true value of music, 
and this is because of the dangers he perceives to be inherent in an art form which is so 
closely aligned to the movements of the soul. Music’s lacking of the constraints of 
materiality, he argues, mean that there is a risk that composers might get carried away, 
and thus that music might become nothing more than mere self-indulgence or 
amusement.
36
 This risk is heightened in the case of music that is ‘purely’ music and so 
not confined within the limits of a text or programme. As a result, Hegel’s philosophy 
might be held in tension with the notion of ‘absolute’ music, which, as we discovered in 
the previous chapter, was becoming prominent at this time; on the one hand, such music 
embraces the ideal through its indefiniteness, whilst on the other, this very 
indefiniteness threatens the clarity and unity of the whole.
37
 So the music that we might 
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expect to be the highest expression of the ideal is in fact lacking in the very qualities 
that give music value, for music without ‘spiritual content and expression’ is ‘not yet 
strictly to be called art’ – it is not really genuine music at all.38 Ultimately, then, music’s 
freedom of expression proves to be its downfall, leading Hegel to conclude that poetry 
is of greater value in the journey of the soul to true self-attainment, for ‘what poetry 
loses in external objectivity by being able to set aside its sensuous medium...it 
gains in the inner objectivity of the views and ideas which poetic language sets before 
our apprehension’.39 
 
It might be argued that art comes to be devalued as a result of the prioritising of the 
metaphysical notion of the ideal, for the Romantic phase, in which form and content are 
united in the highest artistic expression of Geist, signifies the end of art, which can be of 
no further use in the developing of humanity; the ideal can only be fully realised in the 
non-sensual form of philosophy, and thus art is in effect nothing more than a ‘sweet but 
transient interlude in the all-important quest for the absolute idea... a necessary...but 
ultimately inadequate expression of the truth’.40 What is more, it might also be argued 
that Hegel’s claim to have achieved the unity of music’s form and content – of its 
outward expression and its inner nature – is false, thus leading him to his final 
conclusion that it is in poetry that Geist is more properly revealed.
41
 
 
However, despite these difficulties, Hegel’s account remains interesting for what it tells 
us about the nature of music and its value within human life. It shows us how formal 
excellence is not the same as musical excellence – that the ‘musical and the more 
broadly human value of music are not the same’, and that ‘[m]usic without spiritual 
content is not yet music’.42 In so doing, it demonstrates how music is not simply a 
matter of entertainment but rather might be central to human growth and self-
realisation.
43
 For Hegel, music enables us to relate to ‘felt life’ in a way that no other art 
form, or even philosophy, is able: far from an ‘empty sounding’, music is rather a ‘vital 
expression of what it is to be human’.44 
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(c) Arthur Schopenhauer 
 
Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860), who was a contemporary of Hegel but outlived him 
by thirty years, further explored the role of music in relation to expressivism. In The 
World as Will and Representation, published in 1818 but not influential until the second 
half of the nineteenth century, Schopenhauer also contests the Kantian distinction 
between the phenomenal and the noumenal; he, too, wants to say that there is no reality 
which lies beyond our experience. In contrast to Hegel’s ‘ideal’, for Schopenhauer the 
‘in itself’ of reality is ‘Will’ – an irrational and indestructible force which runs through 
everything in existence, the ‘absence of all aim, of all limits...a blind, irresistible 
urge’.45 The phenomenal manifestation of Will – through which we come to know, 
albeit indirectly, something of the true nature of reality – is found in the ‘willing’ of 
human consciousness.
46
 In this we glimpse ‘the thing-in-itself...manifested under the 
lightest of all veils...’47 However, unlike Will itself, the willing of human experience 
necessarily entails a level of consciousness, and so is not blind or aimless, but rather 
consists in the relentless striving after and desire for particular objects or outcomes. 
Schopenhauer thus presents a view of the universe which, in contrast to the Hegelian 
prioritisation of reason, is instead characterised at the most fundamental level by an 
endless ‘struggle for existence’ fraught with stress, conflict and tension.48 The idea of 
human progress is rejected and replaced instead by ‘a picture of mankind in general as 
doomed to an eternal round of torment and misery’ from which we cannot hope to 
escape but rather must continually endure.
49
  
 
In art, however, argues Schopenhauer, we ‘keep the Sabbath of the penal servitude of 
willing; the wheel of Ixion stands still’.50 In artistic representation, the world is revealed 
in abstract form, so our perceptions of it are free from the normal constraints of willing-
led directedness and we experience momentary relief from the perpetual grasping that 
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characterises our existence. Art is thus a form of knowledge, as was the case for Hegel, 
and like Plato, for Schopenhauer, the genius of the artist enables the rest of us to 
glimpse nature as it really is, although the point he is making here is that this glimpsing 
of reality is not achieved through the abstract act of reason but rather through the 
sensuality of perception.
51
 Here, too, are to be found echoes of Kant’s understanding of 
aesthetic judgement as ‘disinterested interest’, in which artistic perception transcends 
ordinary forms of perception, and thus is attributed special value.
52
 Most importantly, 
for Schopenhauer, the respite from willing which art affords brings us to the closest 
possible point of experiencing the noumenal Will, that is, Will as it stands in true form 
rather than imperfectly expressed.
53
 
 
The art form of music, continues Schopenhauer, presents us with a very particular kind 
of artistic representation for, unlike the visual arts, it does not depict objects from the 
phenomenal world but rather has as its subject Will itself. As such, music becomes a 
means for expressing the ineffable – for ‘communicating the incommunicable...for 
presenting that innermost essence of the universe which cannot, by definition, be 
represented’ – and thus is understood as the highest of arts.54 For Schopenhauer, melody 
is singled out as being of particular musical importance. Melody is, he suggests, ‘a 
constant digression and deviation from the keynote in a thousand ways... [expressing] 
the many different forms of [W]ill’s efforts, but also its satisfaction by ultimately 
finding again a harmonious interval, and still more the keynote’, and thus its patterns of 
tension and release mimic the waves of human striving and satisfaction.
55
 Rhythm, too, 
is of significance, for in its interaction with melody another layer of tension and 
reconciliation is added to the musical experience.
56
 In these accounts, Schopenhauer is, 
for the first time in musical aesthetics, attempting to explain music from the ‘inside’ – 
in terms of the tonal reality of its phenomenal existence. He thus makes an important 
move towards the seeking of a way by which we might account for the profundity of the 
musical experience – a view later continued in Susanne Langer’s conception of music as 
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a ‘tonal analogue of emotive life’, and also in attempts to account for music’s 
expressivity within its formal nature.
57
  
 
For Schopenhauer, however, music remains one step removed from the world of 
feelings, for, as an expression of Will itself, it is not concerned with phenomenal 
representations. Music, he argues, does not express specific emotions but rather abstract 
emotions – the emotions in themselves, as they exist in noumenal reality, devoid from 
human striving and desire: ‘...music does not express this or that particular and definite 
pleasure, this or that affliction, pain sorrow, horror, gaiety, merriment, or peace of mind, 
but joy, pain, sorrow, horror, gaiety, merriment, peace of mind themselves, to a certain 
extent in the abstract, their essential nature, without any accessories, and also without 
the motives for them’.58 Thus music does not cause us to feel actual emotions or 
experience actual suffering, for that which it conveys exists only ‘in mere tones’.59 As 
Schopenhauer puts it: ‘The inexpressible depth of all music, by virtue of which it floats 
past us as a paradise quite familiar and yet eternally remote, is due to the fact that it 
reproduces all the emotions of our innermost being, but entirely without reality and 
remote from its pain’.60  
 
Music, then, has a language which is purely its own – one that is not derived from 
concepts or words of the phenomenal world but which is rather a direct copy of the 
noumenal Will. In this way, music has the ability to convey a universality which the 
mind alone is unable to attain, and thus Schopenhauer’s understanding of music goes 
deeper than that of Hegel, for whom music remains attached to reason and ideas. Here 
Schopenhauer cites Leibniz, for whom music is ‘an unconscious exercise in 
metaphysics in which the mind does not know it is philosophising’.61 As a result, argues 
Schopenhauer, music has no need for words, which ‘...remain for the music a foreign 
extra of secondary value, as the effect of the tones is incomparably more powerful, more 
infallible, and more rapid than that of the words’.62 Words give merely the ‘stripped-off 
outer shell of things’, but music gives us the ‘innermost kernel’.63 So in contrast to 
Hegel, for whom poetry is ultimately superior to music, Schopenhauer, despite his 
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expressivist aesthetics, is nonetheless fully in support of instrumental or absolute music 
as the most pure representation of the abstract emotion of Will.  
 
Despite the prominent position given to music within his aesthetics, Schopenhauer’s 
appreciation of the art form remains tinged by his pessimism – his view that perfect 
harmony remains impossible, both on a cosmic level and in terms of the relations 
between the musical tones, and thus that our release from willing can never be 
more than a temporary experience.
64
  Indeed, it would even appear that Schopenhauer’s 
views are built around a central paradox, for, given his emphasis on the ultimately 
pointless nature of Will, the ‘wonderfully stirring’ nature of music can in fact be 
nothing more than the copy of something that is in fact ‘inherently chaotic, miserable, 
and repugnant’.65 
 
However, Schopenhauer’s claims remain striking in their account of music as a virtually 
direct encounter with the innermost reality of existence.
66
 His views were also to yield 
practical effect, significantly influencing the works of Wagner and, as a result, the more 
general development of Western classical music.
67
 What is more, in presenting an 
understanding of music as autonomous and yet nonetheless reliant upon feeling – in 
detailing how music expresses emotions but through tonality and only in abstract form – 
Schopenhauer’s aesthetics of music serves to further combine formalist and expressivist 
accounts of musical meaning, and thus to foreshadow developments which were to later 
occur in the philosophy of music. 
 
(c) Roger Scruton 
 
The most important contemporary philosopher who endorses expressivism is Roger 
Scruton. Rather than initially setting out a particular way of viewing the world, Scruton 
instead begins with an analysis of the mode of perception used when we engage with 
musical sound. Music, he argues, is a special kind of sound, determined not by its 
objective nature but rather by our decision as to what should define it; the experience of 
music, he wants to say, is one that relies fundamentally upon a process of imagination 
and metaphor: we perceive musical tones as existing in an imaginary space, as separate 
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entities from their sources of production, and hear them as metaphorically ‘moving’ in 
terms of pitch. The difference between that which is just sound and that which is 
musical sound, therefore, lies in the fact that music is ‘the intentional object of the 
musical perception’ – the result of our decision to perceive sounds as distinctly 
musical tones.
68
 
 
For Scruton, music is not an inherently representational art form, for although it may be 
employed in representational ways – as, for example, in the case of programme music – 
thoughts about a subject are never essential to its understanding as they may be in the 
case of the visual arts.
69
 However, as he notes, even representational art forms may 
mean more than simply the narratives they convey, and thus works of art, including 
music, have an aesthetic meaning over and above any representational qualities. It is to 
this aesthetic meaning that the term ‘expression’ refers and, although expression theory 
alone may not be the sum content of aesthetic meaning, for Scruton, it nonetheless 
serves to explain the impact of art and its place of value within our lives. Indeed, citing 
Croce and Collingwood, for whom something is grasped in and through aesthetic 
experience which cannot be made known in any other way, he argues for expression as 
the aesthetic value, that is, as the only criterion of aesthetic success, for aesthetic 
experience itself is the very definition of the ‘recognition of expression’: expression is 
part of what is understood when a piece of music is understood as music.
70
 
 
But what does it mean to understand music? For Scruton, understanding music is not 
like understanding language, for although there may be certain similarities between the 
two, music does not involve the assignment of values by use of a semantic theory as is 
the case with language: music does not give us knowledge of facts or information. 
Rather, he argues, musical understanding is inseparable from the experience of music; it 
is part of the very definition of aesthetic perception – part of the intentional hearing of 
sounds as tones and thus of attending to them purely for their own sake. Such 
perception, he maintains, plays an important part in the formation of our world, for in 
‘disinterested’ contemplation, achievable only by humans, we ‘[search] the world for a 
meaning that is more authoritative and more complete than the needs of animal life’.71 
What is more, Scruton here elaborates on his earlier observation that our perception of 
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music is metaphorical, now noting that it is not only the case that our experience of life 
informs our understand of music, but also that our experience of music contributes to 
our understanding of life – that we ‘understand the music through the concept of life, 
but also life through its embodiment in music’.72 Thus the importance of aesthetic 
experience is underlined, for ‘[art] shows the meaning of the world, by translating the 
world into appearance’.73  
 
In contrast to scholars such as Schenker, for whom musical form comprises an 
underlying structure, Scruton argues that it is our perception of tonality through an 
‘imaginative act of intention’ which provides music’s central organising force. In 
particular, Scruton is critical of the way in which scientific accounts of musical 
organisation, like that of Schenker and also of Leonard Meyer, overlook the very thing 
which makes music interesting: its life. Given his insistence on our metaphorical 
understanding of music, for Scruton, our perception of musical order is one of 
movement, and not merely any type of movement, but a directed, intentional action – a 
gesture.
74
 It is through words, gestures and actions, he argues, that we understand the 
human world, and it is in art, and most of all in music, that these achieve self-
sufficiency, so that the experience of movement as musical form is the ‘completion of 
human gesture in the sphere of total freedom’.75 Thus, whereas for some, music has no 
meaning other than its form, through explaining musical structure in terms of 
metaphorical perception, that is, in relation to human life and to gesture, Scruton’s 
theory of form also points towards a theory of content and, what is more, even suggests 
that it is in music’s expressive power that its true meaning and value are to be found.76 
 
Taking emotion as a paradigm case of expression (for it is in the expression of an 
emotion, he argues, that the emotion itself comes to be created) Scruton’s theory of 
content has as its centre the thesis that ‘art provides us with a means not merely to 
project our emotions outwards, but also to encounter ourselves in them’.77 Now his 
                                               
72 Scruton, Aesthetics of Music, p. 235. Here Scruton would appear to be drawing on Hegel’s notion of 
music as ‘felt life’. 
73 Scruton, Aesthetics of Music, p. 236 
74 Scruton, Aesthetics of Music, pp. 222-224. Similarities may here be seen with the work of 
Schopenhauer. 
75 Scruton, Aesthetics of Music, p. 340 
76 Scruton, Aesthetics of Music, p. 342 
77
 Scruton, Aesthetics of Music, p. 348. Here Scruton follows the Hegelian idea of the expression of 
emotion as its creation. For Scruton, this notion has the potential to explain the value of art and to give the 
grounds for a fully cognitive theory of aesthetic interest. However, as he points out, it has yet to be 
proven that artistic expression is truly the realisation of emotion. Scruton, Aesthetics of Music, p. 152 
67 
 
contention here is that we can understand expression only if we can understand our 
response to it, and that this response is one of sympathy ‘awakened by the presentation 
of another life’.78 This sympathy, he argues, is not simply a matter of feeling but also 
comes to be caught up in action and gesture – in the very things which constitute our 
understanding of music. Our whole being is absorbed by the movement of music; it is 
something that we join, such that ‘our whole body is absorbed by the movement of 
music...compelled by incipient gestures of imitation. The object of this imitation is life – 
life in the imagined form of music’.79 What is more, and as Plato realised in his ethical 
approach to music’s affects, it is through the acting out of sympathies thus inspired that 
our emotions come to be educated, but also corrupted, and so, as Scruton points out, this 
is one reason why art matters.
80
 
 
For Scruton, the response of the listener to the aesthetic perception of sound thus forms 
a kind of dancing: a ‘sublimated desire to ‘move with’ music, and so to focus on its 
moving forms’.81 Therefore, he concludes, the hearing of meaning is inseparable from 
aesthetic experience, for musical expression is integral to what it is to experience music. 
Here Scruton’s debt to Schopenhauer, for whom the expressivity of music is a direct 
result of its formal nature, becomes apparent. What is more, for Scruton, such a 
conclusion also serves to explain how formalists can hear music as expressive of a 
musical content and yet at the same time deny that this is what they hear, maintaining 
that musical value is to be found in form alone.
82
 Returning to the ideas of Hanslick and 
his definition of our experience of music as tönend-bewegte Formen (‘tonally moving 
forms’), Scruton here argues that such an account in fact does not lead to an entirely 
formalistic understanding of musical meaning but rather is fundamentally reliant upon 
metaphorical perception, for the very understanding of musical movement is the result 
of an imaginative act of intention. Thus, he maintains, conceptions of musical 
formalism and expressivism are ultimately destined not to diverge but rather to tend 
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towards each other, for our perception of form is necessarily metaphorical, whilst that 
which we perceive as metaphorical is, in the end, musical form.
83
 
 
Why, then, he asks, is it so difficult to produce descriptions of our experience of 
musical expressivity? Music remains ‘ineffable’: there exists ‘something that words 
cannot capture, but which must nevertheless be heard and grasped in our deeper 
experience of meaning’.84 For Scruton, the theory of Einfuhlung is of interest here. 
Although, as he discusses, the original theory drew a distinction between objective and 
subjective forms of knowledge, he argues that, given the inseparability of the mind from 
its outer manifestation, the difference in fact lies not between the awareness of 
‘subjective’ facts and their outer expression but rather between two separate aspects of 
perception. In life, we experience the difference between first- and third-person 
perspectives on the same objective facts; in the ineffability of musical expression, we 
experience ‘a special case of the ineffability of first-person awareness – the 
impossibility of translating ‘what it is like’ into a description’.85 As Scruton puts it: 
 
Understanding music involves the active creation of an intentional world, in 
which sounds are transfigured into tones – into metaphorical movements in a 
metaphorical space. At a certain point, the listener has the experience of a first-
person perspective on a life that is no one’s. This ‘recognition of expression’ is 
simply a continuation of the imaginative activity that is involved in 
understanding music: the activity of hearing sounds as figurative life, so that 
‘you are the music while the music lasts’. That, in short, is why we should see 
expression as central to the meaning of music.
86
 
 
Therefore, we are presented with a modern account of the philosophy of music which 
demonstrates the possibility, and indeed even the necessity, of engaging with music in 
terms of its qualities of expressivity. What is more, Scruton argues that not only do 
musical form and content finally achieve inseparability in our understanding of musical 
meaning, but that in talking about meaning we are also faced with questions of value, 
and thus our judgements of appearance have implications which run deeper than those 
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of mere personal preference or subjective taste. Aesthetic values, he maintains, are 
intrinsic values, for they are the result of disinterested aesthetic contemplation from 
which there stands to be gained nothing except the experience itself, but, at the same 
time, they matter to us in a way that goes beyond appearances alone. They are ‘part of 
the attempt to create a place for ourselves in the world, and to situate our selves among 
our fellows’; they are what mark us out as human, that is, as able to contemplate our 
surroundings and identify some aspects as preferable to others.
87
 
 
An important step in the considering of aesthetic value, argues Scruton, is that of 
analysis – of the bridging of the gap between the sounds we hear and the aesthetic 
experience which results.
88
 Analysis, he maintains, tells us how we should attend to a 
piece of music in order to appreciate it fully: it makes explicit the formally implicit and 
leads us to a level of understanding which could not otherwise be obtained.
89
 Further, 
analysis is also an act of synthesis – a creating of the intentional object of musical 
perception through an awareness of the elements which comprise this experience – for, 
in describing the musical surface, we are also rearranging it so that the musical object 
itself comes to be constructed through the act of aesthetic attention.
90
 However, as 
Scruton points out, music nonetheless remains an irreducible metaphor, and so cannot 
ultimately be reduced to a description of its parts; when too much emphasis is placed on 
analysis, it is merely sound and not music that becomes the object of concern.
91
  Given 
the potentially limitless bounds of aesthetic interest, the process of analysis might be 
approached in a variety of differing and equally valid ways, and it then falls to the task 
of critical reflection to decide which of these might be considered as of aesthetic 
value.
92
 The process of analysis thus forms an integral part of both our aesthetic 
experience of music and our considerations of musical value, and for this reason, 
in the following chapters, analyses of Shostakovich’s music will form the substance of 
my discussion. 
 
But what does it mean to speak of aesthetics as part of human life? Why do aesthetic 
values matter, and what is at stake in the rest of our lives as a result of our judgements 
of taste? In Plato, Scruton recalls, taste in music was seen as a reflection of character, 
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with the types of music an individual favoured revealing their attitudes and values in 
wider life. By the eighteenth century, this had developed into the belief in taste as an 
expression of virtue, thus meaning that aesthetic choices affected the way in which a 
person came to be perceived in a moral sense. So, concludes Scruton, aesthetic 
judgement is ‘as fully and immediately an expression of character as our taste in friends 
or jokes’, and thus the education of taste becomes a matter of primary importance, both 
in terms of the individual and society as a whole – an extraordinary return to Plato!93 
Once again, then, questions of musical criticism are raised – of the aspects of music 
which are selected as of value and importance and the process by which this selection 
takes place. In order to consider this further, I shall now explore an area of musical 
study which has become of increasing importance over the last few decades – that of the 
relationship between music and its social and cultural context.  
 
 
II. Music and Context 
 
Throughout the nineteenth century, as I have shown, the subject of absolute music took 
central place within formalist and, to an extent, expressivist discussions of musical 
aesthetics. By the twentieth century, however, some philosophers were challenging 
assumptions as to the autonomous and self-contained nature of musical experience, 
instead placing emphasis on music as a fundamentally social and cultural activity. In 
contrast to earlier ideas whereby there existed a ‘fixed, objective essence or inner core 
of musical practices’ without extra-musical reference or association, music now came to 
be understood as a product of its context, grounded firmly within an historical 
framework.
94
 Such an understanding of music served to situate it within power struggle, 
ideology and propaganda, insisting on music as both reflection of and contributor to 
social change and development, and conceiving of it as part of the continual process of 
cultural creation and re-creation. Therefore, whilst the belief in a pure, idealised musical 
realm comes to be challenged, at the same time, and as was realised as far back as Plato, 
music is understood in such a way that it becomes genuinely relevant to, and powerful 
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within, the developments of both the individual human character and the communal 
human life.
95
  
 
(a) Theodor Adorno 
 
The most influential account of the interaction between music and society is that of 
Theodor Adorno. Following Hegel, Adorno argued that human consciousness is an 
historical process, fundamentally shaped by culture and society – a notion which, he 
maintains, is deeply problematic as a result of the fact that most people remain largely 
unaware of it, thus allowing themselves to become vulnerable to subliminal socio-
political influences. In a specifically capitalist society, he argues, this influence takes 
the form of the translation of relationships between people into relationships between 
objects, so that even ideas become concrete and objectified, no longer appearing as part 
of a social and historical context but rather perceived as inevitable, universal and 
necessary. People are thus drawn into a ‘false consciousness’ whereby they no longer 
challenge the way in which society is run – a situation perpetuated by those in power, 
whose positions of authority are dependent on the continuing unquestioning submission 
of those whom they control. For Adorno, the task of the sociologist is the breaking 
down of this false consciousness so that capitalist functioning might be revealed as it 
really is. Arguing that capitalism has now advanced beyond the point at which it might 
be revolutionised to Socialism, as had been the aim of Marx, Adorno instead points to 
the importance of critical theory in raising awareness and thus as instrumental to the 
creation of a new consciousness.
96
  
 
For Adorno, music, too, is influenced by capitalism and as such has lost its ability to 
function critically within society. Following György Lukács’ application of Marxist 
economic and political principles to culture, according to which capitalism has led to 
the reification of cultural artefacts and practices into commodities that can be exchanged 
and consumed, Adorno argues that much contemporary music is now used by the 
culture industry as a tool of manipulation. ‘Popular’ or ‘light’ music, he maintains, is 
primitive and lacking in originality thus making it banal and vulgar, designed only for 
the casual entertainment of the listener and the economic interest of the music industry 
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(echoing, once again, Plato’s Republic). Rather than providing a meaningful experience, 
such music exists only to create a demand which production can then claim to fulfil.
97
 
Even ‘serious’ contemporary music, he argues, is geared towards the same effortless 
consumption, such as, for example, the works of Stravinsky, which he perceives as an 
attempt to return to styles of the past which are then presented as timeless and objective, 
thus reinforcing the capitalist ideology that nothing can be other than the way it is.
98
 
 
It is not only musical works that have been damaged by the advances of capitalism; for 
Adorno, listening, too, has regressed so that, as a society, we are no longer capable of 
hearing music critically but only as mere entertainment. This is not simply a change in 
taste, but rather that our choices regarding that to which we decide to listen are no 
longer the result of personal interest but rather have become dependent on the influence 
of the culture industry, and thus are reduced to the consumption of standardised goods.  
People have become infatuated with the fame of composers, performances and pieces so 
that their response to hearing music bears no relation to the actual music they have 
heard but rather, in line Marx’s doctrine of commodity fetishism, the products of labour 
come to be valued only in consumption and exchange and not in themselves.
99
 As a 
result, argues Adorno, people no longer properly understand music, and what is worse, 
they fail to recognise that they do not understand. Music’s role has become that of 
providing mindless, mind-numbing distraction, preventing people from serious 
reflection about the world and reassuring them that ‘since this world provides such an 
abundance of enjoyable things it must be in good shape’.100 Thus, he concludes, we no 
longer hear music in a critical way, but rather as yet another form of ideology which is 
unquestioningly consumed.
101
 
 
Hope, however, is not entirely lost. For Adorno, the critical role of the composer is 
maintained: he or she need not always mindlessly follow the dictation of the state but 
rather has the potential to act independently and create music which subverts established 
orders. Such music, which Adorno terms ‘modern’, is typified by the works of avant-
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garde composer Arnold Schoenberg, whose adoption of the twelve-tone idiom was for 
Adorno the paradigm of the refusal to submit to the laws of consumption. Through his 
compositions, Adorno maintains, Schoenberg expresses the threat of social alienation 
through its own forms and structures so that his music, ‘without consciousness of its 
social location or out of indifference towards it, presents and crystallizes its 
problems...in a merely immanent manner’, and thus achieves severance from capitalist 
dictates whilst at the same time opening up to its audience the renewed possibility of 
critical reflection.
102
 
 
The problem with this argument is that if the influence of society is as great as he 
maintains, how can it ever escape hegemony to critique it? On the one hand, music must 
be freed from its cultural constraints in order to regain its critical potential; on the other, 
music is essentially a product of its social and historical context.
103
 His argument as to 
the regressive nature of listening would seem to imply that, even if some degree of 
autonomy could be achieved, music’s message is nonetheless rendered unintelligible as 
a result of his assertion that those within modern society have lost the ability to hear 
what serious music is actually saying.
104
 So perhaps Adorno is being deliberately 
paradoxical here, insisting that we need to register both music’s social significance and 
at the same time its bondage to social forces. This paradox, according to him, 
characterises all music at all times, though the hegemony of capitalism intensifies the 
difficulty of hearing music. In particular, his paradox seeks to put the lid on 
absolute music.
105
 
 
The virtue of his argument remains that, in recognising that music is ‘a socially and 
historically situated phenomenon whose very materials change through time’ and that 
‘no era can rest on the insights, achievements, and values of another’,106 difference is 
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affirmed. Adorno challenges those who seek a single, unchanging ideal, a 
musical ‘absolute’.107  
 
Roger Scruton challenges Adorno’s account of false consciousness, finding the problem 
rather in the decline of the more cultured tastes of the elite, together with the rise of the 
‘democratic man’ who believes in his entitlement to his own tastes.108 ‘[T]he 
transformation of popular music’, he writes, 
 
was not a bourgeois phenomenon at all, and had less to do with the triumph of 
capitalism than with the triumph of democracy. Nor does it illustrate the need 
for an ‘ideological’ music with which to mollify the exploited masses. The 
masses themselves produced this music...[and] it is precisely because people 
have been freed from ‘domination’ – that is, from a society constrained from 
above – that this mass culture of which Adorno complains is here to stay... It is 
the collapse of the bourgeois culture that has brought about the situation that 
Adorno deplores...
109
 
 
Scruton is sceptical of Adorno’s appeal to the critical power of composers such as 
Schoenberg. He doubts that the resources of tonality have been exhausted. Even if that 
were the case, he argues, ‘it seems to me, it cannot justify the belief that there is some 
other language available to the composer than the language of tonality’, for when we 
hear atonal music we in fact perceive it only in relation to the tonality which it seeks to 
subvert, thus explaining why we find atonal music difficult to comprehend.
110
 What is 
more, he maintains, modern music cannot be forced on people with the requirement that 
they enjoy it, but rather audiences decide for themselves which music they deem to be 
enjoyable and thus successful – an argument which would appear to explain the general 
lack of enthusiasm for the music of Schoenberg, which remains aesthetically 
inaccessible to most.
111
 Thus for Scruton, avant-gardism can never be the answer to 
music’s regeneration; instead, this is to be achieved not through the abandonment of the 
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tonal system but rather through its rediscovery, as is the case with Wagner’s Die 
Meistersinger, in which ‘tonality triumphs, and, in its triumph, is also transformed’.112 
 
(b) Susan McClary 
 
The New Musicology movement of the 1980s took up Adorno’s insistence on taking 
social context seriously. Here attention turned not primarily towards the potential (or 
lack thereof) for the development of music as a critical discipline within modern 
society, but rather to the rediscovery of music from past eras. When viewed through the 
lens of sociological critique, it has been argued, such music comes to be understood not 
simply as entertaining or amusing patterns of sound, but rather as a covert commentary 
on human life as lived during its period of composition. 
 
Susan McClary, for example, has argued that music fundamentally exists as a ‘human, 
socially grounded, socially alterable construct’, which draws upon ‘socially invested’ 
norms and semiotic conventions.
113
 This is shown by the development of different 
musical styles over time, such as the seventeenth century solo genres of the sonata and 
cantata, which serve to address the tensions evident between society and the individual 
at the time, and, by contrast, the polyphony of the preceding century, which 
demonstrates an ‘interest in integrating the best of both those worlds into one in which 
social harmony and individual expression are mutually compatible’.114 Even the 
Western tonal system itself, argues McClary, is an example of music’s social 
embeddedness, for having developed, and later declined, in relation to the interests of 
the European bourgeoisie, such tonality is essentially teleological in nature, causing the 
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listener to anticipate and ultimately experience a goal which is known from the outset 
but which can become meaningful only through delayed gratification.
115
 Although such 
a process might appear logical and rational, it in fact articulates ‘[t]he social 
values...held most dear by the middle class: beliefs in progress, in expansion, in the 
ability to attain ultimate goals through rational striving, in the ingenuity of the 
individual strategist operating both within and in defiance of the norm’.116 
 
Against these conventions are set the particular intentions of the individual composer, 
who can choose to either submit to or react against the established order of the time. 
Therefore it is only through considering both of these aspects together that an accurate 
appreciation of the intentions of the composer can be gained. As McClary puts it: ‘...no 
composition can be reduced simply to the narrative conventions that informed it... [T]he 
specific details of any given piece are intelligible only insofar as they engage 
dialectically with those conventions.’117 For example, J. S. Bach, in the Fifth 
Brandenburg Concerto, subverts the traditional order of the concerto grosso by giving 
the harpsichord continuo the role of a soloist, thus identifying with an ideology that 
wants to encourage freedom of expression whilst still maintaining social harmony: it 
speaks of ‘...the exhilaration as well as the risks of upward mobility, the simultaneous 
desire for and resistance of concession to social harmony’.118 Elsewhere, McClary 
discusses Brahms’ Third Symphony, and argues that his presentation of ‘tonality and 
sonata in a state of narrative crisis’ reveals something of the incompatibility of 
individual will and social contract, thus questioning the Enlightenment assumptions of 
his time.
119
 
 
For McClary, the idea of ‘absolute’ music is nothing more than an illusion – the 
presentation of ‘one’s own ideology as pure, non-social order’.120 Reactions to this 
illusion, she maintains, are dependent upon attitudes towards dominant culture at the 
time. Music of the eighteenth century, for example, which was formed in line with the 
values of the newly created middle class, appears as ‘harmonious, perfect, organic, 
                                               
115 McClary, ‘Narrative Agendas in ‘Absolute Music’’, p. 330 
116 McClary, ‘Blasphemy’, p. 22. For a more detailed discussion of tonality in relation to society, see 
Richard Norton, Tonality in Western Culture (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1984). 
117 McClary, ‘Narrative Agendas in ‘Absolute Music’’, p. 334 
118 McClary, ‘Blasphemy’, p. 41 
119
 McClary, ‘Narrative Agendas in ‘Absolute Music’’, p. 343 
120 McClary, ‘Blasphemy’, p. 55. Indeed, as McClary points out, Nietzsche, who originally coined the 
term ‘absolute music’, had intended it as a taunt, so it is somewhat ironic that it was then adopted by 
those he meant to parody. McClary, ‘Narrative Agendas in ‘Absolute Music’’, p. 331 
77 
 
unified, formally balanced, capable of absorbing and resolving all tensions’. Here the 
illusion of the absolute is allowed free-reign. In contrast, the ‘fragmented structures’ and 
‘illegitimate dissonances’ of seventeenth century music reflect the struggle of the new 
bourgeoisie against the prevailing norms of both the church and the aristocracy, and 
thus acceptance of the absolute ideal is less forthcoming.
121
 Either way, she argues, the 
myth of the absolute needs to be dispelled, not simply because it is untrue, but because 
it prevents us from properly understanding music as it was intended, instead reducing it 
to the ‘literal, note-perfect, reassuring but inert renditions of virtually all musics, 
whether originally affirmative or oppositional’ that have come to be commonplace 
today.
122
 Music’s universality, she argues, has been achieved only at the expense of its 
specific social meaning, so that ‘no compositional choice can mean anything, except by 
virtue as a kind of closet metaphysics: as evidence of something beyond, which is the 
source of all perfection’.123 Thus, she concludes, the reinterpretation of music becomes 
not only an artistic but also a political act – a rediscovery of how it might genuinely 
speak of and to human life.
124
 
 
Not everyone is convinced of the merit of sociological interpretations of music such as 
these offered by McClary. Roger Scruton argues that, although it is indeed the case that 
music bears relevance to the context of its creation, such claims about the implicit 
sociological commentaries found within even apparently absolute music are in fact not 
new, but rather are simply a re-presentation of the old debate about musical meaning. In 
response to McClary’s analysis of Bizet’s Carmen, he writes: 
 
It is undeniable that the music projects a particular conception of Carmen, using 
compelling folk-rhythms and chromatic melodies...in order to emphasize her 
threatening quality. And the threat is real, working its way into the soul of José 
and slowly undermining it... But what follows? When it comes to describing the 
meaning of Bizet’s work, McClary does exactly what any other critic would do: 
she shows how the drama is conveyed through the music...The sociological 
theory is dropped from the agenda...
125
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Such a reading makes McClary’s views less controversial and indeed more akin to 
Scruton’s own theory of musical expressivity. However, perhaps it remains the case that 
the real value and contribution of McClary’s sociology of music lies in the fact that that 
is precisely what it is – explicitly a sociology, which thus serves to bring to the forefront 
of our attention those aspects of musical interpretation which otherwise might pass 
unnoticed or be taken for granted within the broader appreciation of the meaning of 
music. McClary insists on interpreting music in relation to its wider context and argues 
that we need to do this if we are to understand it properly. 
 
Scruton challenges the importance of context to understanding music. Accepting the 
contention that everything cultural is at some level a social construct, the question is, 
what is constructed unintentionally and what is deliberately created? Although art might 
in some cases constitute ideology, he argues, it is also always more than ideology: ‘A 
work of art may express and endorse the social conditions which gave rise to it; but it 
may also question them. And if it is a great work of art, it will transcend them entirely, 
to see into the human heart’.126 Here Scruton cites Kierkegaard’s study of Mozart’s 
opera Don Giovanni, which points to how Mozart’s music both demonstrates for us the 
seductive nature of the title character and yet also remains one step removed so that we 
can critique this nature from afar. Music, argues Scruton, does not sanctify a culture, but 
‘turns the moral force of music upon human experience, and show this experience as it 
is lived’.127 Although only those from a certain cultural background might appreciate 
Mozart’s musical message, the message itself remains universal. Indeed, it even remains 
the case that a culture might be critiqued from within, such as is the case with Wagner’s 
Die Meistersinger, which, he suggests, constitutes ‘an attempt to dramatize through 
music, the very crisis that has put music in question’.128 
 
These critiques of Scruton regarding sociological theories of musical meaning 
ultimately lead him to a theory of the ideological significance of art which is 
diametrically opposed to the ideas we have explored so far. Far from seeking to expose 
the ideologies implicit in works of art, Scruton instead proposes that such ideologies 
might in fact be of the least importance within the aesthetic experience. Take the masses 
of Palestrina, he suggests. These are important not, as some have suggested, because 
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they absolutise the powers of the Counter Reformation, but rather because they have at 
their centre a profound human experience – an experience of ‘serene belief in the midst 
of tumultuous change, of timeless stasis in the stream of time’ which enables ‘critical 
meditation on the possibilities of emotion which is the true business of art’.129 Here 
Scruton would even appear to be seeking to justify the presence of ideology in art: ‘And 
if the music of Palestrina is ideology, then what is wrong with ideology? Is this music 
not the stuff of human life, and as good a justification as any that might be offered for 
those ‘power-relations’ which engendered the genius of Palestrina?’130 
 
For Scruton, then, the politicised forms of criticism espoused by Adorno and the New 
Musicologists might be ultimately rendered unnecessary if we do analysis properly. 
Pointing to the fact that ideological analysis tends to employ ambiguous terms such as 
‘expression’ and ‘meaning’ which are then used in purely descriptive ways, Scruton 
argues that such criticism subsequently fails to critique, but rather is reduced to a set of 
statements supported by sociological theory. On the contrary, he maintains, if we are to 
use analysis in our search for meaning, then it should seek to offer genuine critical 
argument, ‘describing the shape and structure of melodies, harmonies and rhythms, and 
the musical movement that is projected through them’.131 Here Scruton cites 
Christopher Ballantine’s analysis of Beethoven, which seeks to distinguish the 
composer’s music from the styles of his contemporaries, and which argues that this 
music expresses aesthetically the spirit of the French Revolution. Such analysis, he 
argues, ‘is not a piece of Marxist sociology, even if it is derived from the Marxian 
caricature of history. It is a piece of criticism, inviting us to hear the revolutionary spirit 
in Beethoven’s music, and to judge accordingly’.132 
 
In Scruton’s appraisal of music’s cultural connections, then, it is not denied that music 
is socially and politically embedded, but rather he argues for a return to a prioritisation 
of music as music – for an understanding of music primarily in terms of its musical 
expressivity, and only secondly in terms of its social context. What is interesting here, 
however, is that many points within Scruton’s argument would appear to be little-
modified adaptations of ideas which are in fact held by the New Musicology scholars: 
that music might express and endorse but also question social conditions is of key 
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importance within McClary’s work, whilst the notion that great art might transcend 
social conditions is not far removed from that which Adorno claims of the music 
of Schoenberg. 
 
(c) Heidi Epstein 
 
A feminist-theological gloss on this debate is given by Heidi Epstein who argues that 
many traditional theologies of music are in fact based on hidden gender assumptions 
which have, until now, passed largely unacknowledged and uncritiqued. Her aim, 
therefore, is twofold: to expose these underlying stereotypes, and then to suggest how 
we might respond theologically to a properly feminist understanding of music.  
 
Epstein begins by examining the origins of thought about music as found in the 
Platonic-Pythagorean tradition and in particular focuses on their metaphysical basis. 
Here she highlights the use of music as symbol, where musical forms are perceived to 
‘participate in the transcendent reality to which they point’ and thus become tied to a 
particular – and now outdated – worldview.133 Epstein also describes how, in 
performance at this time, text was prioritised over and above music – a preference 
which, she argues, demonstrates a subliminal attempt to avoid the perceived dangers of 
music’s sensuality and thus to overshadow its innate gendered and erotic overtones.134 
Thus, she concludes, the very foundations of the philosophy of music are at best 
ambivalent about music’s expressive qualities – a response which she interprets as 
implicitly gendered in nature and which, she argues, had led to the perpetuation 
throughout history of masculine dominance and the silencing of music’s more 
seductive, feminine characteristics.
135
 
 
The theologies of music of Augustine and Boethius, she argues, are a case in point, with 
their appeal to order rather than expression warning of the dangers of music’s emotive 
qualities and of the power of music to distract and misguide. ‘Music was indeed chaste 
and modest when it was performed on simpler instruments’, writes Boethius, ‘[b]ut 
since it has been squandered in various promiscuous ways, it has lost its measure of 
dignity and virtue; and, having almost fallen into a state of disgrace, it preserves nothing 
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of its ancient splendor’.136 In accounts such as this, then, Epstein discerns an implicit 
identifying of music’s ‘body’ – its expressive character beyond that of the simply 
numerical – with that of ‘Woman’, both of which then come to be understood as 
something inferior and in need of control.
137
 Therefore, she claims, despite their 
apparent concern with the purely transcendental, these theologies do in fact identify 
music as essentially bodily-based, but seek to suppress rather than celebrate this nature: 
they show metaphorically ‘the channelling and arousing of human desire’ and the 
resulting need for ‘music’s erotic powers...to be contained, sterilised, and if nothing 
else, redirected towards God’.138 
 
From here, Epstein charts the development of gendered ideas about music up to the 
twentieth century. In the writings of the early church fathers including Cyprian, John 
Chrysostom and Clement she identifies the emergence of an ‘eroticised, musical 
dichotomy between spirit and flesh’, in which ‘pure’ music, such as a capella vocal 
singing, is prioritised above the freer, instrumental music of the pagan tradition.
139
 
Throughout the Reformation, this condemnation of ‘fleshly’ music in favour of more 
spiritual tones is continued, demonstrated by Calvin’s ‘scorn [of] music’s 
voluptuousness’ and in Luther’s command to ‘shun perverted minds who prostitute this 
lovely gift of nature and of art with their erotic rantings’.140 In the modern era, the 
notion of music as Woman comes to be perpetuated first in the works of Kierkegaard 
and Nietzsche, both of whom depict music as ‘emasculating seductress’, and later in the 
twentieth century ideas of, amongst others, Adorno, for whom jazz presents a symbolic 
threat to male virility.
141
 In all of these accounts, Epstein points to the resultant socio-
cultural side effects which she perceives as manifest in the repression of women in 
music-making, and in the way that the notion of keeping women in place becomes 
analogous to that of keeping music in place – as she puts it, ‘subservient (to a text) and 
virtuously pure (free from the stain of dissonance)’.142 
 
In contemporary theologies of music, she argues, the idea of music as symbol for 
number, harmony and order is still unquestioningly accepted: music is decontextualised 
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and universalised rather than properly understood in relation to context, and its 
gendered subtext once again passes uncritiqued. As evidence for her argument, Epstein 
points to the works of many theologians, including Karl Barth and Jeremy Begbie, 
whom we discussed in the preceding chapter. In Barth, for whom the music of Mozart 
demonstrates the balance and order of creation, Epstein identifies a presentation of the 
composer as an idealised Christ figure – an ‘omniscient possessor and revealer of 
invisible truths’, in whom is to be found the ‘ultimate christic trait’ of freedom through 
submission, and who thus demonstrates both the perpetuation of a transcendentalised 
ideal as well as a masculinised sub-text.
143
 The works of Begbie, on the other hand, 
which understand music as illustrating for us various aspects of theology, fail, she 
argues, to take music seriously as a cultural document, for in their appeal often to 
general rather than particular musical examples they do not recognise the need to 
interpret each musical work on an individual basis, that is, in relation to its specific 
social and political context.
144
 
 
The second part of Epstein’s work seeks to define an alternative, feminist, theology of 
music, in which music is ‘reframe[d]... as a technique of the self’ and explicitly 
understood as ‘the metaphor for sexual relations that it has always been’.145 Reacting to 
the symbolism that she has identified as inherent within theologies of music thus far, 
she suggests instead the adopting of a metaphorical theology, such as that of Sally 
McFague, in which contrast and difference come to be properly acknowledged, and in 
which the inadequacy and impropriety of all language for God is emphasised. She 
also aims to draw upon Kathleen Sands’ ‘tragic sensibility’ – the notion that moral 
judgement has been stretched beyond conventional limits and thus can no longer fit 
within traditional metaphysical grounds. For Epstein, this idea is of central importance 
to the theology of music, as it does not demand an acceptance of music as ‘concrete 
evidence of God’s Truth, Beauty and Goodness...with its prerequisite of final 
harmonic resolutions... [which] defend an unequivocal good by erasing loss and 
negation’, but rather allows for a grappling with ‘the theological meanings of music’s 
nagging dissonances’.146 
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Epstein initially turns her attention to the recovering of a previously overlooked 
theological tradition which properly understands music’s emotive significance, and here 
she focuses on the work of Hildegard of Bingen. Arguing that Hildegard perceives 
music as a bodily process, and thus, in contrast to Plato, musical practice as informing 
theoretical statements, Epstein argues that Hildegard assumes human beings to be 
inherently musical.
147
 Through her fusing of Word and flesh, she maintains, Hildegard 
proposes a theology of music which is incarnational rather than mathematical or 
metaphysical. Music becomes not just a way of spreading the Gospel but rather an 
aspect of Christ’s very nature: Christ is the ‘incarnate song of God’, ‘God’s-music-
made-flesh’.148 Further, Epstein also draws upon Bruce Wood Holsinger’s reading of 
Hildgard’s theology of music, which identifies homoerotic themes throughout her work 
and argues for ‘a fundamental affinity between female spiritual devotion and female 
sexuality’.149 Although even Epstein is prepared to admit that this might be pushing the 
boundaries of interpretative licence a little too far, she nevertheless argues that such a 
view serves to open up Hildegard’s writings beyond what she perceives as the overly-
spiritualised accounts that have come to be widely accepted, thus providing, as she puts 
it, ‘seeds for a contemporary theology of music that enunciates music as an embodied 
practice and as an engagement of human sexuality’.150 
 
Secondly, Epstein attempts to develop a specifically feminist approach to the theology 
of music, and in so doing turns to the musical practices of two sets of women, thus 
reinforcing her thesis that theological reflection on music must be rooted in performance 
not theory. Investigating new interpretations of the previously overlooked musical 
practices of the nuns of Santa Cristina in early seventeenth-century Bologna, Epstein 
points to how their compositions and performances went against the edicts of the time, 
particularly in their use of banned musical dissonances and their singing of sacred texts 
set to Montiverdi’s ‘scandalous’ madrigal tunes.151 In such music, she argues, we might 
discern the presence of an alternative, illicit musical language within the Church which 
serves to emphasise a new dimension of music’s theological significance – that of music 
as ‘redemptively transgressive, fleshly imitatio’.152 Further, Epstein also looks to recent 
compositional developments in the music of African women who are the descendents of 
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slaves and who are thus writing contemporary music out of that background. Focusing, 
amongst others, on the musical contributions of Diamanda Galas, Epstein argues that 
here musical imitatio becomes dissonant, disrupted and tortured, so that ideas of 
harmonic resolution are replaced with the notion of music as ‘suffering love’ – a 
development which, she concludes, stands in contrast to earlier theologies of music in 
which the idea of love is always sacrificed before the idea of harmony.
153
  
 
Therefore Epstein presents a theology of music in which music is understood primarily 
as performed and in particular as bodily, sensual and sexual, and in which music’s 
relationship to theology is understood in equally bodily – that is, incarnational – terms. 
In her emphasis on music as performed, Epstein contributes to an area of theological 
reflection on the art form which has as yet remained largely untapped.
154
 Her reflections 
serve to challenge dominant ideas within the discipline about the importance of 
harmony, and in particular of harmonic resolution, allowing instead for the theological 
relevance of music’s more atonal qualities to be explored. Epstein also raises the 
possibility of looking beyond the traditional theological understanding of music as 
symbolic of certain metaphysical worldviews and of instead perceiving it in relation to 
other, more humanistic, concerns. 
 
A problem with her work is that it is overly polemical and, contrary to her opening 
avowal of pluralism, in fact committed to only one possible reading of music. It might 
also be argued that, whilst music doubtless plays a role in both the expression and 
creation of gender roles, her eagerness to dispel the masculinised emphasis which she 
associates with more traditional interpretations of music perhaps leads her to overlook 
the harmonic and mathematical aspects which also necessarily form an integral part of 
the musical experience. Further, her understanding of music as metaphor for the body 
and for sexual relations is in fact derived from the much older notion of musical 
expressivity as explored above and so, whilst not a comprising a dominant thread within 
the history of musical interpretations, the idea is perhaps not as revolutionary or as 
revelatory as she might have us believe. Indeed, as Philip Stoltzfus argues, Epstein to a 
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degree even continues with the Schleiermacherian tradition of expressivist theological 
reflection, even though her indebtedness to this tradition passes unacknowledged.
155
 
 
Consistent with the late twentieth-century’s positive reading of sexuality, Epstein argues 
that, contrary to traditional beliefs, bodily, sensual and sexual understandings of music 
need not be detrimental to theological endeavour, but rather might serve to enhance, 
broaden and enrich our understanding. For my project here, the value of her work is that 
it illustrates music’s relevance to theology beyond that of the numerical and formalistic 
interpretations prioritised in both traditional and contemporary reflections so far. It also 
demonstrates the importance of not making assumptions as to the nature of music and 
its role in our lives, but rather of seeking first to properly understand music in itself 
before turning to reflect theologically upon that which has been discovered. 
 
 
III. Theological Reflections on Musical Expressivism 
 
In this chapter, I have shown that understanding music as expressive constitutes an 
element essential both to a proper appreciation of the art form and to accounting for 
music’s significance within human life: as Scruton points out, expression is part of what 
is understood when a piece of music is understood as music, and as Hegel reminds us, 
music that does not relate to human life is not really to be counted as music at all. I have 
also argued that expressivist interpretations such as these need to be understood as 
fundamentally interconnected with those approaches towards music discussed in the 
previous chapter: as early as the ancient Greeks it has been acknowledged that music’s 
emotive affects are the product of its harmonic structures; as Scruton has shown, 
theories of form and expression are ultimately destined not to oppose but rather to 
converge; as Jeremy Begbie makes clear, emotional properties are intrinsic to music, yet 
anthropology remains rooted in cosmology.  
 
A full understanding of the art form, therefore, needs to take account both of music’s 
form and also of its expressivity. Within contemporary theological thought, Begbie, as I 
have shown, seeks to re-establish music’s expressive elements as grounded in a God-
given cosmos, re-situating music within the order of the world and giving theological 
grounding to music’s temporal processes. To complete a theological appreciation of the 
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art form, then, an account must also be offered of how we might relate theologically to 
music’s more expressive elements, for although prominent within the philosophies of 
music of modernity, theological reflection on expressivistic approaches towards music 
has remained relatively unexplored. 
 
Such reflection, however, is not without difficulty, as past attempts to engage 
theologically with elements of expressivity reveal. A successful theology of musical 
expressivism cannot simply ignore these matters, but rather must seek to effectively 
engage with them and then to offer possible ways in which they might be resolved. I 
now turn to briefly summarise the nature of these difficulties, some of which I have 
already touched upon, and to outline the ways in which I shall seek to respond to them 
in the following chapters. In this way, I set the scene for the investigations of 
Shostakovich which are to come. 
 
Firstly, for the Plato of The Republic, and also for Augustine, music’s expressive 
qualities, as we have seen, amount to a potential distraction of the soul, drawing it away 
from the proper contemplation of spiritual matters. Such a concern was also shared by 
the Reformation theologians. John Calvin, compiler of the Genevan Psalter and 
advocate of the importance of congregational singing, displayed a profound interest in 
music as a human, expressive art form, and in this way might be seen as very much a 
modern writer.
156
 Nonetheless, he at the same time still maintained the importance of 
not compromising God’s otherness in the use of music within worship and of 
remembering that all human activity, including music, is liable to sin. Musical 
expressivity, he cautioned, can add to the power of negative words to corrupt, and thus 
only Psalms should be sung, and even then we should pay more attention to the words 
than to the music which accompanies them.
157
 This prioritisation of text above music is 
also to be found in the work of Luther who, although affirming music as fundamentally 
good – the free gift of God to God’s creation which enables us to glimpse, if not 
comprehend, ‘God’s absolute and perfect wisdom’ – still upheld the primary purpose of 
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music within worship as that of conveying the gospel message.
158
 However, such an 
objection has since been dismissed as untenable: as Begbie has demonstrated, the 
physical is not to be feared as Augustine and perhaps Plato suggest. What is more, 
neither need we accept the distrust of sensuality which underlies the more formalistic 
theological reflections on music: as Barth reveals in his discussion of Mozart, God is 
also to be known in pleasure. 
 
Secondly, there is a tendency within theological reflection on musical expressivism for 
the experiences of music and of religion to become synonymous. As we saw in the 
opening to this chapter, for Schleiermacher, the cultivation of a sensibility towards 
musical feeling is at the same time the cultivation of a deeper level of spiritual 
awareness. For Barth, this was deeply problematic. He felt that theology had lost its 
freedom and had instead become imprisoned within a particular worldview, leaving no 
room for God to act in contrary to the will of humanity. Schleiermacher’s appreciation 
of the arts, he argues, amounts to the sanctification of cultural achievement, appealing to 
human feeling and experience to tell us about God. In his The Epistle to the Romans, 
Barth spells out this need to preserve God’s otherness, and in so doing, presents us with 
a theological vision of Adorno’s critical theory: that we must stand over and against 
culture and critique it.
159
 In my third chapter, and in relation to Shostakovich’s Fifth 
Symphony, I shall explore the impact of such views for theological reflection upon 
musical expressivism. 
 
Thirdly, following on from this, and as Nicholas Wolterstorff argues, there is the danger 
that we develop a ‘religion of aestheticism’. In this, he writes, 
 
Aesthetic contemplation takes the place of religious adoration; and the artist 
becomes one who in agony brings forth objects in absorbed contemplation of 
which we experience what is of ultimate significance in human life... When the 
secular religions of political revolution and of technological aggrandizement fail 
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their devotees, when they threaten to devour them, then over and over the 
cultural elite among modern Western men turn to the religion of aestheticism.
160
 
 
The concern here is that aesthetics might be construed in such a way that art comes to 
be seen as intrinsically revelatory – a move which stems largely from the Romantic 
view of the artist as revealer of the hidden depths of reality. In theological opposition to 
this, Barth’s argument as to the importance of preserving the freedom of God to act 
again comes into play, here reinforced in relation to the arts by Walter Benjamin’s 
warning that ‘There is no document of civilisation which is not at the same time a 
document of barbarism’.161 It is a notion such as this which lies behind the aniconic 
traditions such as Judaism and Islam, which seek to draw attention to the power of art to 
blind us to the truths which that art depicts.
162
 How, then, might aesthetic experience be 
valued within a theological framework without monopoly? In my fourth chapter, I turn 
to Russian Orthodox theologies of the icon to further explore this question in relation to 
Shostakovich’s Seventh Symphony. 
 
Fourthly, there is Jeremy Begbie’s argument that an ‘anthropological’ interpretation of 
music is theologically problematic. Although acknowledging the importance of context, 
as we have seen, Begbie argues that modern trends in musical interpretation seek to 
justify music ‘solely in terms of human needs and aspirations’ – that we are placing 
undue emphasis on the ‘inner stirrings of the heart in creative activity’ to the neglect of 
acknowledging the significance of music’s ‘sonic integrities’.163 Begbie is right to 
reassert music as fundamentally rooted in the order of the physical world, and some 
aspects of the Romantic tradition do indeed present us with a view of human nature and 
abilities which is idealised and even naïve. Yet it remains the case that exploring the 
depths of life forms an essential element of what it means to be human, and our 
experience of music is often one in which the art form is understood as primarily a 
means of personal expression. In my fifth chapter, then, I shall consider how, through 
Shostakovich’s string quartets, music understood in relation to interiority might be 
theologically embraced.  
                                               
160 Nicholas Wolterstorff, Art in Action: Towards a Christian Aesthetic (Grand Rapids, Michigan: 
Eerdmans, 1996), p. 50 
161 Walter Benjamin, Illuminations (London: Fontana, 1973), p. 248 
162
 Lionel Kochan, Beyond the Graven Image: A Jewish View (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997) 
163 Begbie, Resounding Truth, p. 94, p. 242 & pp. 53-56. Although Begbie does admit that this is 
something of an overgeneralization. Such understandings, he argues, have their origin in the romanticised 
views of the nineteenth century, but their legacy is still to be found in the musical views of today. 
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Finally, the subject of comedy, although remaining largely unexplored in theological 
reflection on musical expressivity, has frequently proved to be a theologically 
contentious issue. Some are sceptical of the theological value of humour and laughter; 
others argue for the importance of retaining theology’s tragic aspect; still others 
embrace theology as essentially comic in nature. In his opera The Nose, Shostakovich 
draws upon a number of comedic devices, including a use of satire, parody and the 
grotesque, and also reflects something of the nature of the relationship between the 
comic and the tragic. In my sixth chapter, therefore, I shall argue that this work invites 
a theological reflection on musical humour which is fundamentally eschatological 
in nature. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
Music and Culture 
The Fifth Symphony 
 
 
I. The Context of the Fifth Symphony 
 
(a) Soviet Expectations 
 
Following the death of Lenin in January 1924, the political and social climate in Russia 
was to change dramatically. Having trampled his rivals in the fight to take on leadership 
of the Soviet Union, and eliminated all those who opposed him or stood in his way, 
Joseph Stalin, together with his associates, set about affecting a complete overhaul of 
the way in which the country was run. 1928 saw the instigation of the First Five Year 
Plan – a series of reforms designed to facilitate the building of a new vision of 
socialism. Processes of industrialisation and collectivisation were set in place, 
accompanied by political and economic violence and the gradual formation of the Stalin 
personality cult.
1
 Such revolutions extended to every area of society, with matters of 
culture also subjected to Party dictates. Literature and the arts were placed under strict 
ideological control, and approval granted only for those endeavours deemed to be of 
benefit to the development of the State.
2
 
 
To facilitate such control, a number of ‘unions’ were created – first for writers and later 
for artists, composers and others – with the aim of ensuring the compliance of the 
various forms of cultural media to the purpose of furthering Party policy. The RAPM 
(Russian Association of Proletarian Musicians) was founded in 1925 and became 
increasingly powerful, until in 1928 a resolution was passed by the Central Committee 
granting the organisation exclusive ideological control of the musical arts. Under the 
RAPM, formalism was to be eschewed, and only music containing a social message 
which could be understood by the masses could be permitted.
3
 Richard Taruskin writes: 
                                               
1 Taruskin, ‘Public Lies and Unspeakable Truth’, pp. 18-19. For further details about Russia under Stalin, 
see Robert Service, A History of Modern Russia from Nicholas II to Putin, New ed. (London: Penguin, 
2003) 
2 Orlando Figes, Natasha’s Dance: A Cultural History of Russia (London: Penguin Books, 2002), p. 472 
3 Laurel E. Fay, Shostakovich: A Life (Oxford: OUP, 2000), p. 65 
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Ideologists of the RAPM...consigned the composers of the past wholesale to the 
dustbin of history, excepting only Beethoven, the voice of the French revolution, 
and Mussorgsky, the proto-Bolshevist ‘radical democrat’. Tchaikovsky, virtual 
court composer to Tsar Alexander III, was a special target of abuse. Composers 
were exhorted to spurn all styles and genres that had flourished under the tsars 
and cultivate instead the only authentically proletarian genre, the march-like 
massovaya pesnya, the ‘mass song’, through which proletarian ideology could 
be aggressively disseminated.
4
 
 
All did not go according to plan, however. In 1932, in a desperate attempt to win back 
support in the face of the failure of the First Five Year Plan, the Party falsely declared 
its premature success before embarking on yet more strategies for restructuring and 
reorganisation. The RAPM, together with the other artistic associations, were dissolved 
and replaced with Unions of art workers. The Union of Composers, established in April 
1932 first in Moscow and then in Leningrad following the passing of the resolution ‘On 
the Reconstruction of Literary-Artistic Organizations’, was one such attempt to regain 
control. The Union remained under the exclusive administration of the Party, although 
allowed for a greater degree of artistic freedom and a wider embracing of musical styles 
than had been permitted under the RAPM.
5
 Composers including Shostakovich were 
initially relieved and welcomed the change, although the apparent relenting of the rules 
was soon exposed as little more than a sham, with expectations of artistic and 
ideological conformity actually increased.
6
 
 
The same resolution also made the philosophy of Socialist Realism into state policy.
7
 
Advocating that all art must be relevant to and comprehensible by the workers, depict 
aspects of everyday life, and be supportive of the aims of the State, it in fact constituted 
a move towards the totalitarian control of the arts, insisting that they present to the rest 
of the world an image of Soviet society which, rather than realistic, was aspirational of 
all that a truly communist society might be. To this end, guidelines issues by the Union 
of Composers stated that: 
 
                                               
4 Taruskin, ‘Public Lies and Unspeakable Truth’,  p. 19 
5
 Fay, Shostakovich, pp. 63-65; Elizabeth Wilson, Shostakovich: a life remembered (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 70 
6 Taruskin, ‘Public Lies and Unspeakable Truth’, pp. 19-21 
7 Taruskin, ‘Public Lies and Unspeakable Truth’, p. 25 
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The main attention of the Soviet composer must be directed towards the 
victorious progressive principles of reality, towards all that is heroic, bright and 
beautiful. This distinguishes the spiritual world of Soviet man and must be 
embodied in musical images full of beauty and strength.
8
 
 
Socialist Realist art, therefore, contained no margin for critique or independent 
reflection; the image portrayed was not merely the right option but the only option, and 
in this way, the State assumed a monopoly on the arts as a means of social manipulation 
and control.
9
 
 
Despite these stipulations, the exact characteristics which defined Socialist Realism and 
precisely which art works would be considered acceptable remained somewhat 
uncertain. This was especially the case with regards to music, the depictional ambiguity 
of which simultaneously both provided a level of protection and left it open to scathing 
attack. In a bid to further define the requirements of Soviet art, works which were 
considered demonstrative of good practice were held up as exemplifications of the 
socialist ideal, and those branded as deviations were publically denounced. The 
consequences of producing art works deemed inappropriate were often severe, and 
many artists and musicians, including Shostakovich, lived in constant fear for their 
lives. Some were exiled or killed; others simply disappeared.
10
 It is therefore in relation 
to this climate of uncertainty and distrust that the composition of Shostakovich’s Fifth 
Symphony must be understood. 
 
(b) Lady Macbeth 
 
In the autumn of 1930 Shostakovich had begun work on a new opera. His subject was 
that of Nikolai Leskov’s 1864 novel Lady Macbeth of the Mtsensk District, which tells 
                                               
8 As cited in Boris Schwarz, Music and Musical Life in Soviet Russia (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1983), p. 114 
9 This is clearly deeply problematic. As Nikita Khrushchev puts it: ‘I think Stalin’s cultural policies, 
especially the cultural policies imposed on Leningrad through Zhdanov, were cruel and senseless. You 
can’t regulate the development of literature, art, and culture with a stick or by barking orders. You can’t 
lay down a furrow and then harness all your artists to make sure they don’t deviate from the straight or 
narrow. If you try to control your artists too tightly, there will be no clashing of opinions, consequently no 
criticism, and consequently no truth. There will just be a gloomy stereotype, boring and useless. Not only 
will this stereotype fail to encourage the people to benefit from their art; it will poison and kill their 
relationship to art.’ Nikita Khrushchev, as cited in Robert Stradling, ‘Shostakovich and the Soviet 
System, 1925-1975’, in Shostakovich: the man and his music, ed. by Norris, pp. 189-224 (pp. 204-205) 
10 Stradling, ‘Shostakovich and the Soviet System, 1925-1975’, p. 196 
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the story of Katerina Izmailova, the young merchant’s wife who engages in a passionate 
affair with Sergei, an employee of her husband. In order to sustain their relationship, 
Katerina is drawn to commit a string of murders with her lover, until the pair are caught 
and exiled to Siberia for their crimes. Blaming Katerina for their actions, Sergei here 
abandons her and instead attempts to seduce Sonyetka, another convict. Insane with 
jealously, Katerina drags Sonyetka into the icy Volga River and the two are swept away 
to their deaths.
11
 A brave choice of storyline, it might be argued, for a society in which 
upbeat heroism and cheerfulness of character were the enforced artistic norm. 
 
The opera was premiered in January 1934 and was largely well-received both in Russia 
and abroad.
12
 In December 1935, a new production opened at the Bolshoi Theatre, and 
on 26
th
 January 1936, Shostakovich was ordered to attend a performance at which Stalin 
and other officials would also be present. It had been expected that the composer would 
be praised for his work, but Stalin was to walk out before the final act. Two days later, 
an article entitled ‘Muddle Instead of Music’ appeared in Pravda magazine, the official 
Party mouthpiece, severely criticising the opera.
13
 The attack was overtly political and 
was much rumoured to have been written by Stalin himself, although it is more likely 
that the author was David Zaslavsky, a high-ranking Party official and journalist. The 
opera was branded ‘formalist’ in its modernism and as appropriating ‘coarse naturalism’ 
derived from the influence of the bourgeois West.
14
 For some, the motivation behind 
this attack lay in the work’s explicit and anarchic depictions of sexuality, which were 
clearly at odds with Communist ideals; others pointed towards Party disapproval 
of the undertones of the work, which parallel unmistakably the life and career of 
Stalin himself.
15
  
 
Following the article’s publication, Shostakovich became the subject of bitter 
persecution. Those who had previously admired the opera turned to criticise it, and 
friends, admirers and colleagues sought to distance themselves from the composer and 
                                               
11 Fay, Shostakovich, pp. 67-68 
12 Wilson, Shostakovich, pp. 94-96; Fay, Shostakovich, pp. 75-78 
13 Wilson, Shostakovich, p. 109. This was shortly followed by another Pravda article, ‘Ballet Falsehood’, 
which criticised Shostakovich’s ballet The Limpid Stream.  
14 Fay, Shostakovich, pp. 88-89. However, as Fay points out, when the opera is compared with 
Shostakovich’s The Limpid Stream, which disregards folk sources, and the success of Dzerzhinsky’s The 
Quiet Don, it might be argued that Lady Macbeth in fact presents an example of the attempt on the part of 
Shostakovich to deduce the requirements of Soviet Realism by looking at particular works of art. 
15 Tim Ashley, ‘Too Scary for Stalin’, The Guardian. 
www.guardian.co.uk/music/2004/mar/26/classicalmusicandopera.russia (26.03.2004; accessed 
27.06.2011) 
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the disgrace with which he was surrounded. Some, such Ivan Sollertinsky, dared to 
challenge the article and defend Shostakovich, and as a result found that they 
themselves become the subject of vicious attacks in the press. Punishment even 
extended to those critics who, in advocating the work of Shostakovich prior to Stalin’s 
attack, were deemed to have failed to have drawn the composer’s attention to his 
mistakes in time, and in doing so to have permitted others to follow his misguided 
example. Shostakovich himself managed to avoid further punishment but was advised 
to channel his efforts into the composition of music which drew more on Russia’s folk 
tradition and which would appeal more generally to the masses. The composer would 
appear, at least to some extent, to have taken this to heart, although his refusal to 
personally denounce the opera nonetheless speaks of a certain degree of resistance to 
the demands placed upon him by the State.
16
 
 
(c) The Fourth Symphony 
 
By the time of the publication of the Pravda article in 1936, Shostakovich had already 
nearly completed his Fourth Symphony. Continuing with the work in the face of 
criticism as a means of preserving his sanity, he described it as a ‘programmatic piece of 
great ideas and great passions’ and publically declared it as embodying the ‘credo’ of 
his creative work.
17
 Completed in the April of that year, the Fourth Symphony was a 
work of epic proportions, in which ‘expressivity...was couched in monumental terms, in 
the confrontation of extremes ranging from the banal to the sublime, the trivial to the 
tragic’.18 The initial reception of the work was positive, with both Fritz Stiedri, chief 
conductor of the Leningrad Philharmonic, and world-renowned conductor Otto 
Klemperer responding enthusiastically to Shostakovich’s demonstrations of the piece. 
However, rumours soon circulated that, in defiance of the criticisms levelled against 
him, the composer had dared to write a largely formalistic work, and visits from 
officials of the Union of Composers soon followed. On their recommendation, 
Shostakovich subsequently announced the withdrawal of the Symphony, which was 
already in rehearsal for its first performance.
19
  
 
                                               
16 Fay, Shostakovich, pp. 89-91 
17
 Wilson, Shostakovich, p. 115; Dmitri Shostakovich, ‘Moy tvorcheskiy otvet’ [My creative answer], 
Vechernyaya Moskva, 25th January 1938, as cited in Fay, Shostakovich, p. 93 
18 Fay, Shostakovich, p. 94 
19 Wilson, Shostakovich, pp. 161-120; Fay, Shostakovich, p. 95  
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Numerous rumours abounded as to the true reasons behind Shostakovich’s decision. 
Some point to the conductor, Fritz Stiedri, claiming that he was uncooperative in 
rehearsals of the work, or even suggesting that he was unable to deal with the demands 
of preparing a piece of such scale and complexity, and thus that the symphony would 
not have been ready in time for the premier.
20
 Others, however, reject these accusations, 
vouching for the professionalism of Stiedri and his dedication to the work.
21
 Still others 
remain convinced that Shostakovich’s decision was purely the result of pressure from 
the Party. Venyamin Basner, a friend of Shostakovich, writes: ‘He would never have 
cancelled the performance of the Fourth Symphony if it had not been for the heavy-
handed hints that were dropped by ‘the bosses’. He had no choice in the matter. After all 
it wasn’t only Dmitri Dmitriyevich that was threatened; it was insinuated that all the 
performers would live to regret the day if the performance of the symphony went 
ahead’.22 In any case, it seems likely that a premier of the work was unadvisable given 
the political interest surrounding Shostakovich at the time. There remains strong 
evidence that the work may have been interpreted as formalistic, and stylistically it was 
still far removed from the ideals required by the State.
23
 So regardless of the events 
which transpired to force the silencing of the work, it would appear to be generally 
agreed that Shostakovich must have realised that, given the situation, ‘for all concerned 
it was better to be ‘safe rather than sorry’’.24 
 
 
 
 
                                               
20 For example, M. S. Shak, violinist with the Leningrad Philharmonic, and conductor Alexander Gauk. 
Wilson, Shostakovich, p. 115 
21 Such as Issak Glikman and also Mark Reznikov, violinist with the Leningrad Philharmonic. Wilson, 
Shostakovich, pp. 116-120 
22 Wilson, Shostakovich, p. 123 
23 Fay, Shostakovich, p. 96. Taruskin says of the Symphony that, ‘...while the unconventionally 
structured, maximalistic Fourth had been grandiose...to the point of mania, it was anything but ‘classical’ 
– which is exactly why it could not be performed in the aftermath of [Shostakovich’s] denunciation’. 
Taruskin, ‘Public lies and Unspeakable Truth’, p. 26  
24 Wilson, Shostakovich, p. 116. In an interview in 1973, Shostakovich said of the episode: ‘I didn’t like 
the situation. Fear was all around. So I withdrew it’. Shostakovich, as cited in Fay, Shostakovich, p. 96 
Although Shostakovich himself pointed out faults in the work, claiming that it suffered from ‘folies de 
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Soviet symphony, even though it was not received as such. Pauline Fairclough, A Soviet Credo: 
Shostakovich’s Fourth Symphony (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006) If this is the case, then it provides us with 
an example of the impossibility of ascertaining precisely what the requirements of the Socialist Realist 
philosophy actually were. 
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(d) Issues in Interpreting the Fifth Symphony 
 
On 1
st
 December 1934, Sergei Kirov, a high-ranking Party official and opponent of 
Stalin, was shot dead in an assassination attributed to the NKVD, and those with whom 
he had associated rounded up and executed. This event heralded the start of a period of 
renewed feelings of hostility and suspicion in Russia. 1936 saw the first of the great 
purges and ‘show trials’, in which Stalin’s political enemies were forced into false 
confession and then humiliated before being killed, and ordinary people began to 
suspect anyone they knew of being a possible informer or collaborator. At the height of 
the Terror from 1937-1938, it is estimated that approximately seven million people, 
many of them innocent, were arrested; around one million of these were executed, and 
millions more were imprisoned or exiled.
25
  
 
As the Terror took hold, Shostakovich approached the Arts Committee to ask how best 
he might respond to the criticism presented by ‘Muddle Instead of Music’. He was 
advised to admit his errors, and his friend, the Party official Marshal Tukhachevsky, 
wrote directly to Stalin on Shostakovich’s behalf. A year later, Tukhachevsky was 
arrested and shot as an enemy of the people. Following this, another of Shostakovich’s 
friends, the musicologist Nikolai Zhilyaev, was arrested because of his connection with 
Tukhachevsky. Shostakovich’s own position was now one of great danger, a situation 
compounded by the continued arrest of an increasing number of his colleagues, friends 
and relatives, many of whom vanished without trace.
26
 In the spring of 1937, the 
composer himself only narrowly avoided arrest, having been summoned to the 
headquarters of the NKVD, questioned about his connections to the plot to assassinate 
Stalin and, despite his repeated denial of any involvement, ordered to return for further 
questioning the following week. After a weekend of what must have been unimaginable 
fear, Shostakovich returned only to find that Zanchevsky, the officer due to question 
him, had himself been arrested, leaving Shostakovich free to go.
27
 
 
It was this series of events that formed the context for the composition of the Fifth 
Symphony, completed in July or August 1937 and premiered on 21
st
 November 1937 by 
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26 Wilson, Shostakovich, p. 121 
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the Leningrad Philharmonic under Yevgeniy Mravinsky.
28
 The expectations 
surrounding the work were high: its success was vital both to restoring Shostakovich’s 
career and to saving his life, and it was clear from the outset that it would be subjected 
to close public and official scrutiny. So on the one hand, not to have heeded Party 
criticism would have been a highly dangerous move, yet on the other, Shostakovich’s 
commitment to the integrity of his own artwork remained strong, as did his desire to 
remain true to his fellow Russians, demonstrated in his refusal to flee the hostile climate 
of the Soviet Union and seek safety abroad as did so many of his contemporaries 
at the time.
29
 
 
As a result, Shostakovich’s Fifth Symphony is particularly renowned for the issues it 
presents in terms of musical interpretation. Shostakovich himself is said to have stated 
that ‘there can be no music without ideology’, and the search for ‘meaning’, or 
deliberate lack thereof, in this work has been near unending.
30
 As mentioned previously, 
an in-depth consideration of ‘the Shostakovich question’ – of the extent to which 
Shostakovich was supportive of or rebellious against the dictates of Stalinist society – 
falls beyond the scope of this project. Rather, the issues surrounding the interpretation 
of his music are here taken as an indication of the ways in which music is inextricably 
bound up with issues of context, and of how, in seeking a deeper understanding of such 
music, it is important to remain open to the influences borne upon a piece by the setting 
of its creation. Interpretation of the ambiguities of Fifth Symphony tends along a 
number of lines: some understand the music as a true example of Socialist Realist art 
and as a genuine attempt on the part of Shostakovich to atone for his past mistakes and 
to fully embrace Soviet ideals; others argue that the work is in fact anti-Stalinist and 
presents a mockery of the Soviet regime; others still argue that both positions are in fact 
problematic and detract from a proper engagement with and understanding of the work. 
I now turn to the further investigation of all these ideas, together with the possibilities 
and problems they raise, in an analysis and interpretation of the Fifth Symphony. 
 
 
 
                                               
28 Fay, Shostakovich, p. 99 
29 Others, such as Rachmaninov, reluctantly settled abroad. 
30 Shostakovich, as cited in Schwarz, Music and Musical Life in Soviet Russia, p. 130 
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II. The Fifth Symphony 
 
(a) ‘Fragments of Memory’ 
 
Shortly before the composition of the Fifth Symphony, Shostakovich completed a song 
cycle based on four poems by Pushkin. The first of the Pushkin Romances is a setting of 
the poem Vozrozhdeniye (‘Rebirth’), which tells the story of a painting defaced by a 
barbarian artist and then, as the new layer of paint peels away over the years, revealed 
once again. The final stanza of the poem reads thus: 
 
Так исчезают заблужденья    So do delusions vanish 
С измученной души моей,    from my wearied soul, 
И возникают в ней виденья    and visions arise within it 
Первоначальных, чистых дней.   of pure primeval days.31 
 
As Richard Taruskin points out, when properly understood, this verse amounts not to 
the promise of a brighter future, but is rather an attempt to escape into a better past.
32
 
The melody to which these lines is set, sung by a solo tenor, is accompanied by high 
strings playing a gentle, rocking figure (Fig. 3.1), and it is in the finale of the Fifth 
Symphony that we find the reappearance of this musical idea, as Shostakovich quotes 
from his own work in the still, quiet moment between the violent marches that both 
begin and end the movement. Here the rocking melody is found in the strings and harp, 
set below the theme of the movement in the horns (Fig. 3.2). In quoting the material 
from the song in this way, Shostakovich creates within the movement a layer of 
meaning which speaks of innocence and regeneration and which, given the recent 
completion of the songs, would at the time of composition have been understood only 
by the composer and a few of his closest friends.
33
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
31 Original text: Alexander Sergeyevich Pushkin, Sobranie sochinenii v odnom tome (Moscow: 
Khudozhestvennaia Literature, 1984), pp. 35-6. Translation: Tom Kennedy, ‘Rebirth’, The Lied, Art 
Song, and Choral Text Archive. www.recmusic.org/lieder/get_text.html?TextId=35688 (2008; accessed 
12.09.2011) 
32 Taruskin, ‘Public Lies and Unspeakable Truth’, p. 45 
33 ‘Shostakovich – Symphony No. 5’, Discovering Music, BBC Radio 3. 2008 
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Fig. 3.1: Shostakovich, Vozrozhdeniye, Op. 46/1, bb. 18-29 
 
Fig. 3.2: Shostakovich, Symphony No. 5, fourth movement, [120]-[121] 
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The connections between the Symphony and the song run deeper than simply one 
quotation. The pattern of alternating quaver semitones in the violins which appears in 
the Symphony between [112]-[113], leading up to the moment of quotation, is also 
taken from the song, where it appears in the piano and cello lines accompanying a 
phrase detailing how, over time, the paints of the barbarian artist ‘fall off like threadbare 
scales’.34 Further, the violin scale which leads into the quotation in the Symphony at 
2-1
[120] is an echo of the passage which introduces the rocking figure in the song – a 
figure formed from the locrian mode, a highly unstable tonality which creates an 
atmosphere of suspense and uncertainty.
35
 This section of the fourth movement, then, 
forms ‘the fulcrum for the whole Symphony. Its emotional weight pivots around this 
moment of rebirth...where hushed, troubled music grows into a moment of utter clarity. 
Here rebirth is not just a dream but a waking vision’.36 
 
It is not only in the final movement of the work that the presence of Pushkin’s Rebirth 
can be felt, but rather echoes of the quotation are to be found throughout the rest of the 
piece. In the second movement at [62], the modal scale and oscillating figure appear in 
the violins, now accompanying the second theme of the movement in the woodwind. 
The scalic pattern also features in the third movement at [89]
2
, where it appears in the 
celli and piano as the music builds towards its climax. Here, too, in the concluding 
section of the movement, we find allusions to the rocking melody in both the strings and 
the harp.  
 
So in effect, the Symphony is made up from ‘fragments of memory’ which resound 
throughout the different movements and which hold the power to make the listener react 
to the work in a variety of ways, depending on what is remembered from before and 
what links are made throughout the piece.
37
 When the full quotation appears in the final 
movement, the effect is that of a magnet, drawing all the fragments together and thus 
giving cohesion to and making sense of the overall structure of the work. These 
references function not as a code, which needs to be broken, but rather as clues, open to 
interpretation and there to be found by all who listen with understanding. The work, 
then, is in a sense a dramatic elaboration and extension of the short extract from the 
                                               
34 ‘Shostakovich’, BBC Radio 3; Pushkin, ‘Vozrozhdenie’; Kennedy, ‘Rebirth’ 
35
 The pattern of semitones and tones of the locrian mode can be found by playing a major scale starting 
on the seventh rather than the tonic. 
36 ‘Shostakovich’, BBC Radio 3 
37 ‘Shostakovich’, BBC Radio 3 
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song, and thus the meaning of the song, through quotation and allusion, ultimately 
reveals the meaning of the Symphony as a whole.
38
 
 
(b) First Movement 
 
Returning now to the opening of the first movement, we find material that in many 
ways contrasts with the theme of rebirth whilst at the same time continuing the notions 
of echo and of memory. The canonical motif (Fig. 3.3) with which the movement 
begins, consisting of a dotted rhythm which pits upper and lower strings against each 
other, has a largely chromatic feel and sets up a sense of tonal dislocation by gravitating 
towards the dominant rather than the tonic of the key. This forceful statement again 
presents the idea of an echo, only here the memory is recalled immediately in the 
imitative form of the canon, which is itself reminiscent both of the music of baroque 
composers such as J. S. Bach and of earlier works by Shostakovich himself. Also of 
significance in the opening bars of the Symphony is a short, dactylic motif (Fig. 3.4), 
consisting of a simple pattern of three detached quavers. Both the canonical motif and 
the dactylic pattern form essential elements in the later development of the work. 
 
Fig. 3.3: Shostakovich, Symphony No. 5, first movement, opening                                              
 
Fig. 3.4: Shostakovich, Symphony No. 5, first movement, 
2
[1]     
 
The violin melody at [1]-[2]
1
 forms the first subject of the movement (Fig. 3.5) and is 
derived from the same modal tonality as the scale which introduces the rocking 
quotation in the final movement. This theme is then developed and elaborated upon, as 
is the case with traditional sonata form, to provide the content for the remainder of the 
movement. Most notably, it appears in a distorted fashion in the horns and piano at [17]-
                                               
38 ‘Shostakovich’, BBC Radio 3 
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[19], then in the woodwind at [19]-[20] and the brass at [25]
3
-[26], before being 
transformed into the Red Army march theme at [27]-[32]. Here the originally serious, 
lyrical theme takes on a melodramatic feels as layers of familiarity are compounded on 
top of each other to form an almost cinematic, deafening climax.
39
 At [33], we find 
again the canonical motif from the opening, here echoed in extended form across the 
woodwind and strings below a different but equally canonical figure in the brass, itself 
derived from the originally lilting second subject of the movement which first appears 
in the strings at [9]-[11]
3
. 
 
Fig. 3.5: Shostakovich, Symphony No. 5, first movement, [1]
1-2
 
 
The movement closes with further lingering fragments. At [44]
1 
the flute recalls the first 
subject in inverted form, whilst at [45]
2-4
, the piccolo, solo violin and celest echo 
another motif (Fig. 3.6), this time from the opening of the work at 
2-1
[6]. These melodies 
remain unresolved, and are gradually submerged by the static, pulsating 
accompaniment, itself derived from the canonical and dactylic figures, until the music 
finally sinks beneath its own weight.
40
  
 
Fig. 3.6: Shostakovich, Symphony No. 5, first movement, [45]
2-4
 
 
 
(c) Second Movement 
 
The second movement of the Symphony is a scherzo, and as such makes overt stylistic 
references to the music of Mahler, who is renowned for his treatment of this particular 
musical form. Also echoed throughout is the influence of the Tchaikovsky waltz, 
although in Shostakovich this flowing dance is oddly disrupted, broken up by 
                                               
39 ‘Shostakovich’, BBC Radio 3 
40 Norman Kay, Shostakovich (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 35 
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occasional changes in metre and tempi and coloured variously by the comic and the 
grotesque. Written as a three-part rondo, this movement develops around the 
intertwining of two contrasting themes. The first of these is a grotesque march, initially 
in the lower strings at [48], then elaborated in the woodwind at [49] and later in the 
trumpets at [62]
6
. It even appears in a pizzicato version in the strings at [66], which 
present an almost ludicrous twist on an already bizarre theme. Here the influence of 
‘Soviet swagger’ is clear to see, presented as powerful, threatening and slightly 
ridiculous. As an additional dimension to these developments, the theme itself is in fact 
derived from the violin melody that formed the first theme in the previous movement, 
although here played much faster (Fig. 3.7). What is more, the woodwind entry at [49] 
is yet another interpretation of this theme, here twisted even further and also extended. 
Again, then, echoes of forgotten familiarities continue to pervade. 
 
Fig. 3.7: Shostakovich, Symphony No. 5, second movement cello opening and first 
movement violin theme at [1]
1-2 
 
 
 
The second theme, heard first in the solo violin then later in the flute, is by contrast 
light-hearted, beautiful and optimistic – as Hugh Ottaway remarks, characterised by 
‘genuine gaity’41 – and has been likened to both a delicate flower and a little girl 
skipping happily along a path.
42
 In this, the shadow of Mahler can once again be 
discerned, for this phrase bears a close resemblance to a theme found in the second 
movement of the composer’s Fourth Symphony. 
 
In the coda to this movement, both the interplay between the two themes, and thus the 
narrative of the movement, are brought swiftly to a conclusion. We hear the second 
theme for a final time, although now in a minor key and played by a forlorn-sounding 
solo oboe. In response, the brash first theme in unison fortissimo by the whole orchestra 
                                               
41 Hugh Ottaway, Shostakovich Symphonies (London: British Broadcasting Corporation, 1978), p. 28 
42 Nicholas Wilks, former Director of Music of HCYO, from an informal discussion, Spring 2002 
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pushes it out of the way, thus asserting its overall dominance within the movement. The 
flower is crushed beneath the soldier’s marching boot; the illusion is shattered, the 
dream is broken. 
 
(d) Third Movement 
 
The sombre, reflective mood of the Largo marks out the third movement as the centre 
of gravity for the whole Symphony.
43
 Here echoing Mahler’s chamber-style scoring – 
used by Shostakovich to create a hollow texture beneath lyrical melodies – this is the 
most ‘inward’ of all the movements.44 Intensely sonorous and moving, it is written for 
orchestra without brass and for eight string parts rather than the usual five – an effect 
which is of evidence especially in the opening to the movement, scored as it is for 
strings alone. 
 
As has already been shown, the Fifth Symphony played a role of great significance in 
the life of Shostakovich. It was also the case, however, that the work was to resonate 
deeply with those who were among the first to hear it, communicating something of the 
terror with which all were surrounded but of which no-one could speak, and bringing a 
small sense of solidarity to an otherwise fractured people. This is perhaps especially 
true of the third movement, which was received with open weeping by many present at 
the premier of the work.
45
 Shostakovich was not a religious person, and indeed religion 
was not tolerated by the Soviet regime, but in this movement we find him, 
uncharacteristically, drawing upon music from sacred traditions, in particular alluding 
to religious chants and the harmonies of the Orthodox Church, including ideas from the 
panikhida – the Russian Orthodox requiem chant or prayer for the dead.46 At [86], 
echoes of the vechnaya pamyat’ (Eternal Remembrance) (Fig 3.8), the final requiem 
hymn, are heard in the strings (Fig. 3.9), interwoven with a sad, lingering solo flute and 
austere tremolo in the strings.
47
  
 
                                               
43 Fay, Shostakovich, p. 102 
44 Ottaway, Shostakovich, p. 28 
45 Fay, Shostakovich, p. 100 
46 ‘Shostakovich’, BBC Radio 3 
47
 Taruskin, ‘Public Lies and Unspeakable Truth’, p. 41. Quoting from the Panikhida was a compositional 
device employed in the orchestral works of many of Shostakovich’s Russian predecessors and 
contemporaries and as such might be considered as characteristic of the genre. Taruskin, ‘Public Lies and 
Unspeakable Truth’, pp. 40-41 
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Fig. 3.8: Vechnaya pamyat’ (Eternal remembrance)48  
 
Fig. 3.9: Shostakovich, Symphony No. 5, third movement, [86] 
These are not the only evocations to be found within the movement. Again 
Shostakovich looks to Mahler, this time to a melody which originates in two 
movements from his Das Lied von der Erde (The Song of the Earth) – ‘Der Einsame in 
Herbst’ (‘The Lonely One in Autumn’) (Fig. 3.10) and ‘Der Abschied’ (‘The Farewell’) 
(Fig. 3.11). References from these works appear in the solo flute at [86]
3
 (Fig. 3.12), 
and also in oboe and clarinet solos of the same melody. For Taruskin, that this 
movement was composed as a mourning piece cannot be doubted, although such a view 
could not at the time be openly expressed. Some have suggested that it was 
Shostakovich’s memorial to Tukhachevsky, although as Taruskin points out, the impact 
and significance of the work would have stretched far beyond this in the minds of those 
who heard it first: ‘Every member of the symphony’s early audiences had lost friends 
and family members during the black year of 1937, loved ones whose deaths they had 
had to endure in numb horror’.49 
 
 
 
 
                                               
48 From Obikhod notnogo tserkovnogo peniya, ed. by N. I. Bakhmetev, as cited in Taruskin, ‘Public Lies 
and Unspeakable Truth’,  p. 42, transposed up a semitone for comparison 
49 Taruskin, ‘Public Lies and Unspeakable Truth’,  p. 42 
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Fig. 3.10: Mahler, Das Lied von der Erde, II ‘Der Einsame im Herbst’, [3]1 
 
Fig. 3.11: Mahler, Das Lied von der Erde, IV ‘Der Abschied’, [41]2 
 
Fig. 3.12: Shostakovich, Symphony No. 5, third movement, [86]
3 
 
The climax to this movement is a distraught passage in which, at [89], we find a return 
to the first theme, now in unison strings and woodwind and accompanied by fortissimo 
tremolo in the piano and violas. At [90], Mahler’s ‘Farewell’ theme appears in the 
cellos, with tremolo now in the clarinets and with accented chords in the double basses. 
The effect is emphatic and almost desperate – the ‘most distraught, Tchaikovsky-like 
passage in the whole work’.50 For some, this passage left no question as to the meaning 
of the Symphony. Writing in her diary the night after the first performance, a friend of 
Shostakovich put: ‘He has given them an answer, and what an answer!’51 By the end of 
the movement, however, the passion subsides. It is as though the music has worn itself 
out with distress and anger and, as a quiet cello melody tails away, is reduced to 
quiet pleading.
52
 
 
Finally in this movement we again find reference to those fragments of memory which 
pervade throughout the Symphony as a whole. Now the violin theme from the first 
movement appears in the flute at [79], this time in a slightly different version in which 
                                               
50 Ottaway, Shostakovich, p. 28 
51 ‘Shostakovich’, BBC Radio 3 
52 ‘Shostakovich’, BBC Radio 3 
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the minor mode becomes a major mode and in which the low Bb appears an octave 
higher (Fig. 3.13a). In the accompaniment of the second flute which joins at [80] we 
hear an even more obvious version of this theme, although here inverted (Fig. 3.13b). 
Lastly, the idea appears towards the end of the movement in the violin and harp duet at 
[94] (Fig. 3.13c).  
 
Fig. 3.13a: Shostakovich, Symphony No. 5, third movement, [79] 
 
Fig. 3.13b: Shostakovich, Symphony No. 5, third movement, [80] 
 
Fig. 3.13c: Shostakovich, Symphony No. 5, third movement, [94] 
 
(e) Fourth Movement 
 
The opening to the fourth movement erupts as if out of nowhere following the morendo 
at the end of the previous movement, and suggests, as Ottaway puts it, ‘a world that still 
has to be come to terms with’.53 For him, this finale has an almost improvisatory quality 
about it, appearing both spontaneous and yet at the same time well-directed. It is also 
pervaded by a sense of unresolved tension, wrought between the gradual accelerando 
which runs through the movement from beginning to end and the weight of the music 
which relentlessly struggles to contain it. Particularly notable here is that much of this 
tension is created by an accompanying figure which is in fact a transformation of the 
                                               
53 Ottaway, Shostakovich, p. 28 
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gentle, dactylic pattern of the first movement. The climax of the movement at [110] 
represents a jubilant scene of victorious celebration, although this is soon cast aside as 
the music turns to embrace the gentler, more nostalgic undertones of the middle section 
of the movement. 
 
So we arrive back at the point from which we started – at the moment of the pivotal 
reference to Pushkin’s ‘Rebirth’. All that we have encountered throughout the 
Symphony thus far has been leading towards this transformative moment, which forms 
the link between what has gone before and the concluding section of the work, which is 
now to be viewed in the light of that waking vision. In preparation for this, the march 
theme (Fig. 3.14) which dominates the movement, both before and after the Pushkin 
quotation, is also derived from the Rebirth song, the opening line of which – 
‘Художник-варвар’ (‘The artist barbarian’) – is set to a similar pattern of notes as is to 
be found at the start of the theme. What is more, this theme is at the same time derived, 
albeit more distantly, from part of the violin melody from the first movement. In this 
way, then, the violin theme from the opening of the Symphony becomes the seed from 
which every other movement in the work is grown, and from which memories of the 
work itself come to be spread throughout the whole piece. By contrast, the Pushkin 
quote, as the defining moment of the work, acts as magnet, drawing into itself in the 
final movement all the fragments which have gone before.
54
  
 
Fig. 3.14: Shostakovich, Symphony No. 5, fourth movement, [97]
2
 
 
It is the coda to this movement, and thus to the whole symphony, which has arguably 
been the ‘bone of interpretative contention’ for the entire work ever since its first 
performance.
55
 For some, the relentless, hammered-out unison quavers extending over 
some thirty bars are at best merely satisfactory, and perhaps even inadequate, in their 
concluding of the work.
56
 For others, as noted earlier, discussion centres on the ideas 
                                               
54
 ‘Shostakovich’, BBC Radio 3 
55 Taruskin, ‘Public Lies and Unspeakable Truth’, p. 45 
56 For example, composer Myaskovsky and conductor Yevgeniy Mravinsky. Taruskin, ‘Public Lies and 
Unspeakable Truth’, p. 45 
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and emotions intended to be conveyed throughout this passage, with opinion largely 
divided into those who view it as a victorious, pro-Stalin celebration and those who hear 
it instead as slow, drawn-out torture. Whichever interpretation is accepted or none, it is 
arguably the ending which makes the rest of Symphony mean something, and so before 
the wider interpretative questions surrounding the work can be considered, I need first 
to pause to consider in more depth what is at stake in each of these interpretations. To 
do so, I turn to look at the reception history which surrounded the first performance of 
the work. 
 
(f) Reception 
 
The significance of the premier was immediately apparent to all concerned. 
Shostakovich’s fate was at stake, and the survival of his professional reputation, not to 
mention his life, rode on the success of the work. To his immense relief, the Symphony 
was both publically and officially well-received.
57
 One eye-witness reported how, as the 
finale progressed, listeners rose to their feet, and as the audience cheered, the conductor, 
Mravinsky, waved the score above his head.
58
 The applause is said to have lasted for 
nearly half an hour, with the crowd threatening to break into a riot.
59
 Norris reflects: 
‘Shostakovich found a theme and a musical idiom perfectly suited to the demands of 
public occasion. One need not doubt the testimony of a witness at the first (Leningrad) 
performance, who reported that the impact of the music ‘was felt not only by the 
listeners but also by the performers who read the music sheets as if they were reading a 
living chronicle about themselves…’’.60 Juri Jelagin concurs: ‘[The work’s] musical 
qualities, no matter how great, were by themselves not enough to create that effect. The 
complex background of events and moods had to combine with the beautiful music of 
the Fifth Symphony to arouse the audience to the pitch of emotion which broke in the 
Leningrad auditorium...’61 
 
That the reception of the Fifth Symphony was so overwhelmingly positive is perhaps 
surprising given that it did not conform to many of the standards required of Socialist 
                                               
57 ‘D.D [Shostakovich] came out white as a sheet, biting his lips. I think he was close to tears.’ Lyubov 
Vasilievna Shaporina, as cited in Fay, Shostakovich, p. 100 
58 Fay, Shostakovich, p. 100 
59
 ‘St. Matthew Passion and a note about Shostakovich’s Fifth’, Gather. 
www.gather.com/viewArticle.jsp?articleId=281474977287596 (18.03.2008; accessed 30.06.2008) 
60 Norris, Shostakovich, p. 164 
61 Juri Jelagin, as cited in Taruskin, ‘Public Lies and Unspeakable Truth’, p. 36 
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Realist art. In particular, the work’s use of sonata form and thematic structuring marked 
it out as explicitly formalist, and formalism, as Norman Kay reminds us, ‘from the 
Soviet point of view...was the greatest of all artistic sins... abstract or individualist goals 
were to be eschewed’.62 Socialist Realism had banned the inclusion of the tragic in art, 
yet the Fifth Symphony ‘posed a dark drama that constantly bordered on the tragic’.63 
The influence of folk and national traditions, to which Shostakovich had specifically 
been ordered to refer in his music following the attacks in Pravda, was once again 
distinctly lacking. Given these apparent short-coming, then, it is interesting both that the 
work was nonetheless well-received and that Shostakovich had dared to write such 
music given the precarious position he occupied at the time. Indeed, officials from the 
Committee for Artistic Affairs were later drawn to conclude that the audience present at 
the premier had consisted of plants, handpicked to ensure the success of the work. It 
was even mooted that the celebration with which the work was received should be 
interpreted as a challenge to the Party’s aesthetic leadership.64 Alternatively, Taruskin 
suggests we might interpret the success of the Symphony as foreordained by the Party – 
that irrespective of the nature of the work, it had been decided that Shostakovich’s 
reputation was to be restored: ‘Its status as apology and as promise of a personal 
perestroyka was a conferred status, bestowed from above as if to show that the same 
power that condemned and repressed could also restore and reward’.65 
 
Despite such issues, however, the enthusiasm with which the work was greeted by the 
masses gradually transferred, at least in part, to the critics. The programmatic intentions 
of the piece, which we shall consider shortly, were viewed favourably, with Alexey 
Tolstoy, novelist and admirer of Shostakovich, remarking that the work was ‘an 
exemplar of the loftiest ideals of Socialist Realism’ and coining the catch-phrase 
‘stanovleniye lichnosti’ (‘formation of a personality (within a social environment)’) as a 
metaphor to explain its narrative core and social significance.
66
 Although not everyone 
was convinced by this interpretation, especially in light of the third movement, and also, 
in the case of those who had heard it, in comparison with Shostakovich’s Fourth 
Symphony, general opinion seemed to agree that the composer was at least beginning to 
                                               
62 Kay, Shostakovich, p. 30 
63
 Kay, Shostakovich, p. 30 
64 Fay, Shostakovich, p. 100 
65 Taruskin, ‘Public Lies and Unspeakable Truth’, p. 24 
66 Taruskin, ‘Public Lies and Unspeakable Truth’, p. 32 
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move towards a true embracing of Socialist Realism.
67
 Something of the uncertainty of 
his situation remained, however, for, as had been demonstrated in the case of Lady 
Macbeth, Stalin’s opinion could change at any time, and initial acceptance of a work 
was by no means a guarantee of continued approval. Indeed, Isaak Dunayevsky, 
chairman of the Leningrad branch of the Composer’s Union, pointed to the very success 
of the work as a potential danger to the government control of the arts: 
 
Unhealthy instances of agitation – even of psychosis to a certain extent – are 
taking place around this work. In our circumstances this might do both the work 
and its composer a bad turn... Because of the chatter and the sensation we may 
let the most important thing slip through our fingers: a healthy influence on the 
composer and his education in the spirit of the tasks confronting Soviet music... 
One does not need to be a great prophet to foresee what this might lead to.
68
 
 
Nonetheless, this time Shostakovich’s luck held out and the work maintained its 
positive position within the sensibilities of Soviet art – something which, given the 
circumstances of the time, was, as Fay points out, a ‘remarkable achievement’.69 
 
Shostakovich himself was initially reluctant to comment publically on the Symphony.
70
 
Following the premier, when asked to present an analysis of the piece to the 
Composer’s Union, he pointed simply to the performance of the work: for him, the 
music spoke for itself.
71
 In January 1938, two months after the first performance, he 
ventured an explanation of the work as in some way autobiographical – that it had as its 
subject the ‘suffering of man, and all-conquering optimism. I wanted to convey in the 
symphony how, through a series of tragic conflicts of great inner spiritual turmoil, 
optimism asserts itself as a world-view’.72 Whilst one might question the integrity of a 
statement such as this, the intention of the composer to be re-accepted into the Soviet 
system was made even more apparent in a further comment made on the same day, in 
which he stated that: ‘There is nothing more honourable for a composer than to create 
                                               
67 Fay, Shostakovich, pp. 102-103 
68 Fay, Shostakovich, p. 104 
69 Fay, Shostakovich, pp. 104-105 
70 As Fay argues: ‘Shostakovich’s reluctance to describe and discuss his music publicly in any terms but 
the most sweeping platitudes, a trait that would endure for the rest of his life, was born of common sense 
and a survival instinct.’ Fay, Shostakovich, p. 104 
71
 Fay, Shostakovich, p. 101 
72 Dmitri Shostakovich, ‘Pyataya simfoniya Shostakovicha’, Literaturnaya gazeta 12th January 1938, p. 5. 
It is perhaps interesting to mention here that that the programme note given to the work at the premier 
was ‘A lengthy spiritual battle, crowned by victory’. Fay, Shostakovich, p. 99 
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works for and with the people. The composer who forgets about this high obligation 
loses the right to this high calling... The attention to music on the part of our 
government and all the Soviet people instils in me the confidence that I will be able to 
give everything that is in my power.’73 
 
Shortly before the Moscow premier of the Symphony, another statement was issued, 
supposedly from the composer, entitled ‘My Creative Answer’, which supported 
Tolstoy’s ‘formation of personality’ idea as a rationalisation for the presence of the 
tragic within the work: ‘It was man with all his sufferings that I saw at the center of this  
work, lyrical from start to finish. The finale of the symphony resolves the tragically 
tense moments of the opening movements in a life-affirming, optimistic plan.’74 At the 
same time, Shostakovich is said to have asserted that, of the many critical 
interpretations which had been offered of the Symphony, ‘one gave me special pleasure, 
where it was said that the Fifth Symphony is the practical creative answer of a Soviet 
artist to just criticism’.75 Once again, we cannot be sure of the true intentions behind this 
endorsement, although this has not prevented much speculation on the subject, with 
some disputing the authenticity of the term ‘just’, and others claiming that it referred 
purely to the structural cohesiveness of the work rather than to any ideological 
content.
76
 Furthermore, there is no evidence to suggest that Shostakovich truly accepted 
the criticisms directed at him regarding his operas, and neither, it might be argued, does 
the Fifth Symphony do anything to demonstrate that he took genuinely to heart the 
advice regarding his compositional style, despite the fact that such a move would have 
constituted the most likely way of assuring his re-acceptance by the authorities.
77
 
 
(g) Musical Ambiguity and the Preservation of Value 
 
These remarks return us to the dichotomy of interpretation surrounding the conclusion 
to the Finale. For Tolstoy, for whom the Symphony represented a genuinely pro-Stalin 
acceptance of the Soviet ideal, the work could be read as primarily autobiographical – 
as the musical depiction of the composer’s struggles, crowned with victory in its 
                                               
73 Dmitri Shostakovich, ‘Vmeste s narodom’, Sovetskoye iskusstvo 12th January 1938, as cited in Fay, 
Shostakovich, p. 102 
74 Dmitri Shostakovich, ‘Moy tvorcheskiy otvet’, as cited in Fay, Shostakovich, p. 102 
75 Fay, Shostakovich, pp. 102-103. As Fay points out, and contrary to popular belief, the statement was 
not adopted by the composer as a subtitle to the piece.  
76 Ottaway, Shostakovich, p. 24; Roy Blokker, The Music of Dmitri Shostakovich: The Symphonies 
(London: The Tantivy Press, 1979), pp. 65-66 
77 Fay, Shostakovich, pp. 102-103 
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concluding bars. Of the final movement, Tolstoy writes that it produces ‘an enormous 
optimistic lift’ and, with the response of the audience present at the premier in mind, he 
concludes: ‘Our audience is organically incapable of accepting decadent, gloomy, 
pessimistic art. Our audience responds enthusiastically to all that is bright, clear, joyous, 
optimistic, life-affirming’.78  
 
For Taruskin, Tolstoy’s interpretation is overly simplistic, and he cites Georgiy 
Khubov’s analysis of the work as evidence of this. Tolstoy’s account, argues Khubov, 
consists primarily of descriptive rather than analytical writing, composed as it was by 
someone who was not a music specialist, and is also based largely on assumptions as to 
the programmatic nature of the work.
79
 Comparing the actual musical performance of 
the Symphony with Tolstoy’s report, Khubov demonstrates in great detail the ways in 
which the work falls short of Tolstoy’s claims, pointing in particular to the 
disassociation between the material of the finale and that of the rest of work, which 
leads to its perception as ‘not so much bright and optimistic as...severe and 
threatening’.80 So although deeply critical of the piece, (a Party official keen to maintain 
Shostakovich’s disgraced reputation, Kuhbov refers to the Symphony variously as 
‘inorganic’, ‘torpid’ and ‘lacking in conviction’), the review nonetheless serves the 
purpose of revealing how Tolstoy’s interpretation, when subjected to a closer analysis, 
simply falls apart.
81
  
 
The overwhelming majority of interpretations of the final movement, and by 
implication of the Symphony as a whole, have favoured less optimistic readings. 
Norman Kay argues that the attempt at ‘obvious optimism’ which concludes the 
Symphony is a common compositional device of Shostakovich’s, appearing in many of 
his works and never intended as genuine. In defence of this position, Kay cites the 
original tempo marking of the final section, which is considerably slower than the speed 
at which it is normally performed, and indeed than was the case at the premier. When 
played in this way, Kay hears within the music ‘undertones of Slav hysteria’, thus 
                                               
78 Alexey Tolstoy, ‘Pyataya simfonia Shostakovicha’, Izvestiya, 28th December 1937, as cited in Taruskin, 
‘Public Lies and Unspeakable Truth’, p. 32 
79 Taruskin, ‘Public Lies and Unspeakable Truth’, p. 31. It has even been suggested that Tolstoy’s 
analyses were in fact ghost-written. This is attested to by Volkov, however, who, as we have seen, has 
himself been the subject of much controversy regarding the authenticity of his work.  
80
 Georgiv Khubov, ‘5-ya simfoniya D. Shostakovicha’, Sovetskaya Muzϊka, 3, 1938, as cited in Taruksin, 
‘Public Lies and Unspeakable Truth’, p. 38 
81 Khubov, ‘5-ya simfoniya D. Shostakovicha’, as cited in Taruskin, ‘Public Lies and Unspeakable Truth’, 
pp. 38-39 
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implying a tragic rather than triumphant ending.
82
 Ian MacDonald, who adopts a similar 
interpretative approach, goes as far as to claim that the recapitulation section in the first 
movement represents a ‘cartoon satire’ of Stalin himself.83 Interpretations such as these, 
if in general less extreme than those of MacDonald, have come to largely dominate 
opinion as to the meaning of the work, and are frequently presented as the ‘correct’, 
post-Stalinist way in which the Symphony is to be received.
84
  
 
Taruskin, however, remains no more in agreement with these alternative interpretations 
of the work, which he describes as ‘hermeneutic folklore’, than he does with the 
optimism of Tolstoy.
85
 Considering the question of whether the Symphony in general, 
and the Finale in particular, were intended as a form of mockery of Stalin and the Soviet 
system, he concludes that such a theory has to be rejected as no more than a ‘self-
gratifying anachronism’. ‘There were no dissidents in Stalin’s Russia’, he writes. ‘There 
were old opponents...but by late 1937 they were all dead or behind bars. There were the 
forlorn and the malcontented, but they were silent. Public dissent or even principled 
criticism were simply unknown.’86 As Adam B. Ulam puts it: ‘People’s minds were 
benumbed by official propaganda or fear. How could there be any public protest against 
the inhuman regime when even a casual critical remark to an old acquaintance would 
often lead to dire consequences, not only for the incautious critic but for his family and 
friends?’87 Whilst it is easy in hindsight to claim that no one ever really believed in the 
Soviet way of life, at the time, as Andrey Ustinov reminds us, ‘Anyone who did not 
wish to take part either left this world or went to the Gulag’.88 Therefore, concludes 
Taruskin, if Shostakovich had written a Symphony as subversive as the likes of 
MacDonald seek to claim, ‘...it would have been more than an ‘amazingly bold 
                                               
82 Kay, Shostakovich, pp. 35-36. Indeed, Volkov, in his Testimony, has Shostakovich say of the ending: 
‘The rejoicing is forced, created under threat, as in Boris Godunov. It’s as if someone were beating you 
with a stick and saying, ‘Your business is rejoicing, your business is rejoicing’ and you rise, shakily, and 
go marching off muttering, ‘Our business is rejoicing, our business is rejoicing.’ Dmitri Shostakovich, as 
cited in Volkov, Testimony, p. 140 
83 MacDonald, The New Shostakovich, pp. 129-130. Here Roger Scruton’s warning that knowledge of the 
artist’s biography can lead to the over-interpretation of a musical work should be remembered. Scruton, 
Aesthetics of Music, pp. 144-145 
84 According to Testimony, the composer might even have deliberately intended the work to be 
denounced, intentionally ending it not with genuine celebration but rather with a sense of forced rejoicing.  
Fay, Shostakovich, p. 104 
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 Taruskin, ‘Public Lies and Unspeakable Truth’, p. 34 
86 Taruskin, ‘Public Lies and Unspeakable Truth’, p. 46 
87 Adam B. Ulam, as cited in Taruskin, ‘Public Lies and Unspeakable Truth’, p. 46 
88 Andrey Ustinov, as cited in Taruskin, ‘Public Lies and Unspeakable Truth’, p. 46 
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stroke’... It would have been suicide... [The work] may be viewed as irony, perhaps; but 
it is not mockery’.89 
 
Thus Taruskin begins a search for a musical interpretation which bears more weight 
than the highly-charged, polarised views of Tolstoy and MacDonald. Here he turns in 
the first instance to the suggestion of Leo Mazel’ regarding the ending of the 
Symphony, which identifies it as comprising a distinctive modal dissonance and 
melodic progression also to be found in Shostakovich’s other works, some of which are 
texted, and in which it is used to evoke ‘a sorrowful, gloomy, or angrily plaintive 
character’.90 In this way, argues Taruskin, together with other, similar aspects of the 
work, such as the ‘funereal’ third movement, the Symphony might be primarily 
characterised as ‘an act of witness that gives voice to the wounded’, achieved ‘not by 
‘objective description’ but by the purposeful intrusion of subjective feeling, the 
composer having learned that this subjectivity alone is what gives art – his art – its 
enduring value’.91 For Taruskin, it is this sentiment that was sensed by those present at 
the premier of the work, that underlies Khubov’s report, albeit obscured by censure, and 
that appears again in an interview by Mazel’ in 1960. Here, in a context masked by 
references to the Patriotic War, he sums up that which lies at the centre of the 
Fifth Symphony: 
 
A sense of responsibility, consciousness that ‘the struggle of progressive 
humanity with reaction is not over’, that one must remember fallen heroes and 
think of future generations, that into our thoughts of victory our former grievous 
anxiety and the tormenting pain of former misfortunes must flow like a living 
current – all this permeates the work of this composer.92 
 
Taruskin therefore gives us an interpretation of the Symphony which seeks both to 
handle the contextuality of the work in a responsible manner and to remain true to the 
musical analysis of the piece. Not content with the somewhat rash conclusions of the 
                                               
89 Taruskin, ‘Public Lies and Unspeakable Truth’, p. 50 & p. 52 
90 Leo Mazel’, as cited in Taruskin, ‘Public Lies and Unspeakable Truth’, p. 52 
91 Taruskin, ‘Public Lies and Unspeakable Truth’, p. 52. For Taruskin, although the trials endured by the 
composer whilst writing the Symphony ‘lent Shostakovich’s voice a moral authority perhaps unmatched 
in all of twentieth-century music’, he nonetheless acknowledges that ‘the impulse to communicate 
urgently in an atmosphere of threat did lead, at times, to an overreliance on extroversive reference as 
bearer of essential meaning, and a correspondingly debased level of musical discourse’. Taruskin, ‘Public 
Lies and Unspeakable Truth’, p. 55 
92 Leo Mazel’, as cited in Taruskin, ‘Public Lies and Unspeakable Truth’, p. 52 
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pro-Stalinist crowd, he also refuses to capitulate to the opposite extreme represented by 
many more recent expositions of the work – interpretations in which, he argues, ‘Black 
and white have been conveniently reversed, all grey still resolutely expunged’.93 Sadly, 
he notes, the process of glasnost’ would seem to have led not to greater interpretative 
clarity but rather to a sense of futility, and he finds himself, to a degree, mourning the 
passing of the ‘hedged, risky, guarded statements of the past’, which, he suggests, were 
‘so much more powerful, so much richer’.94 Here, then, we come to understand the 
work not as a demonstration of easy resolution but rather as one of complex revelation –
the very message of the Pushkin song which provided the kernel for the Symphony’s 
development.
95
 Indeed, it is in this very ambiguity, in danger of near complete erosion 
in the hands of the critics, that, he argues, the lasting value of the Fifth Symphony is to 
be found. It is the openness of the work to interpretation and reinterpretation that makes 
us actively engage with the music – that enables us to speak as part of the creative 
process and to be spoken to through the meanings which we find in the piece. This 
ambiguity was arguably the saving grace of the work at the time of its composition, and 
has served to open it to a variety of differing interpretations from those of the audience 
present at its premier right up to those who hear it today.
96
 
 
 
III. Theological Reflection on the Fifth Symphony 
 
The Fifth Symphony is, I contend, not an attempt on the part of Shostakovich to write 
music simply to entertain and boost the morale of the Soviet people as the dictates of 
Socialist Realism required. It cannot be identified as a pro-Stalinist acceptance of Soviet 
ideology, and yet at the same time neither is it entirely anti-Stalinist, for it does not 
descend into blatant, and thus very dangerous, mockery of the Stalinist system: contrary 
to popular belief, the Shostakovich of the Fifth Symphony is no political reactionary. 
Rather, what is revealed in the work runs far deeper and is much more complex than 
any such message: it is an attempt to explain something of the human condition – to 
                                               
93 Taruskin, ‘Public Lies and Unspeakable Truth’, pp. 55-56. Liana Genina also calls for a halt to ‘cheap 
inversionism: to the insistence on reading formulaic ideological programmes in every Shostakovich 
composition – only the reverse of what was read before – and especially to the easy presumption that 
Shostakovich, ‘in the grip of horror, said, signed and did one thing, but always thought another’’. Liana 
Genina, as cited in Taruskin, ‘Public Lies and Unspeakable Truth’, pp. 55-56 
94 Taruskin, ‘Public Lies and Unspeakable Truth’, p. 55. Indeed, others have even suggested that the true 
Socialist Realists are those who have spent the past sixty years in the futile process of trying to decide 
whether the work is in fact optimistic or pessimistic. ‘Shostakovich’, BBC Radio 3 
95 ‘Shostakovich’, BBC Radio 3 
96 Taruskin, ‘Public Lies and Unspeakable Truth’, p. 30 
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remain honest to the situation of the Russian people by exploring aspects of the reality 
of their lives and expressing their fear, suffering and confusion. In this way, the work 
takes on a culturally-generated significance, exploring through the medium of music 
those issues which lie at the centre of human experience, creating a sense of solidarity 
and social cohesion in an otherwise fractured and terror-ridden nation, and maybe even 
suggesting, amidst all of this, the presence of hope. It is from this understanding of 
music in relation to culture, therefore, that I aim to construct my theological reflection 
on the work. 
 
Before I can do this, I need first to say something about what it is that we mean when 
we talk about culture. In everyday speech culture has two normal uses: an 
anthropological one, in which it means a way of life, and a second, familiar from the 
‘culture’ sections of the broadsheets, to mean the sum of human creativity.97 By and 
large, over the last sixty years, this latter discussion has distinguished between ‘popular’ 
and ‘high’ culture. On the one hand, ‘high’ culture denotes that which it considered the 
‘best’ or ‘greatest’ amongst artistic endeavour, such as is housed or performed in 
museums, galleries and opera houses, necessarily entailing an aspect of elitism in 
production and appeal, and often selective in its audience on the grounds of wealth and 
economic advantage.
98
 On the other, ‘popular’ culture is that which appeals not to the 
elite but rather to the masses, and which has come to be associated not so much with 
artistic excellence as with entertainment and ease of consumption.
99
 
 
The notion of high culture has its roots in Plato, for whom, as we saw in chapter two, 
education in the high arts was essential to the moral development of human beings and 
thus to their ability to contribute to the good of society.
100
 In eighteenth and early 
nineteenth century Germany, many streams developed this idea: Kant’s notion of 
culture as moral autonomy; Hegel’s idea of Absolute Spirit as achieving self-awareness 
in the world through, amongst other things, the practice of high art; Schleiermacher’s 
emphasis on the importance of the expression of ‘feeling’; and Wilhelm von 
                                               
97 For Clifford Geertz, human beings are animals suspended in webs of significance which they 
themselves have spun, and ‘culture’ in this first sense is, for him, the name for these webs. Culture, he 
writes, is ‘an historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited 
conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop 
their knowledge about and attitudes toward life’. C. Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (London: 
Fontana, 1993), p. 5 & p. 89 
98 T. J. Gorringe, Furthering Humanity: A Theology of Culture (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), p. 47 
99 Gorringe, Furthering Humanity, pp. 52-58 
100 Gorringe, Furthering Humanity, p. 48 
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Humboldt’s conceptualising of Bildung (‘formation’) in Prussian educational reform.101 
In 1799, in the midst of the rise of Kultur, Schleiermacher published his famous 
Speeches, addressed to ‘die Gebildeten’ – ‘the cultured, amongst the despisers of 
religion’. These were those who, having the free time to study philosophy and the arts, 
were thus able to practice that which, for Schleiermacher, lay at the heart of religion: the 
cultivation of a sense and taste for the infinite. As a result, religion and culture become 
almost inseparable, as is demonstrated through Schleiermacher’s theology of music 
which, as we discovered in the previous chapter, seems to equate, in some sense, either 
music’s sense of absolute dependence or its appeal to ‘feeling’ with ideas of the 
experience of the divine. The obvious danger, which Schleiermacher does not quite 
avoid in the Speeches, is that it suggests that culture, and thus religion, are the preserve 
only of the wealthy.
102
 This was one of the reasons why Schleiermacher’s theology 
incurred Barth’s ferocious attack when he was teaching at Göttingen and Munster.103 
 
So how might we understand the music of Shostakovich in relation to definitions of 
culture such as these? Throughout Stalin’s lifetime, Shostakovich, following Socialist 
Realism, was supposed to produce music for the ‘ordinary working man’ – the 
proletariat. This was not quite popular culture, as we have come to understand it, but it 
was most certainly not high culture. However, much of the music which Shostakovich 
in fact wrote, including the Fifth Symphony, did not fit with official perceptions of this 
‘culture of the people’ but rather continued to adhere to the classical, high art tradition. 
This led not only to the criticisms we have explored of Lady Macbeth, but also formed 
the substance of the notorious denunciation of Shostakovich at the first ‘All-Union’ 
Congress in April 1948, at which the composer was forced to publically repent of his 
work and to declare that he was willing to follow Party dictates and compose music for 
the masses.
104
  
 
Theologically, we might perhaps concede a point to this Stalinist criticism. Jon Sobrino, 
for example, argues that ‘the history of God advances indefectibly by way of the poor; 
that the Spirit of Jesus takes historical flesh in the poor; and that the poor show the 
                                               
101 Gorringe, Furthering Humanity, p. 49 
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 Schleiermacher, On Religion, p. 12 
103 Karl Barth, Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century: Its History and Background, trans. by 
Brian Cozens & John Bowden (London: SCM Press, 1972), ch. 11 
104 Wilson, Shostakovich, p. 200; Fay, Shostakovich, pp. 161-162 
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direction of history that is in accord with God’s plan’.105 Is not high culture, then, the 
culture of the wealthy elite, standing against the Church’s commitment to the poor as 
highlighted by the liberation theologians? In fashioning works of high art such as the 
Fifth Symphony, was not Shostakovich abandoning the poor? In response to such 
questions, I draw upon Matthew Arnold’s appeal to the value of high culture in Culture 
and Anarchy. Arnold cites Jesus’ command: ‘‘Be perfect even as your Father in heaven 
is perfect’ (Matthew 5:48)’, and whilst allowing that religion is vital, nonetheless felt 
that culture added an emphasis on harmonious perfection, ‘developing all sides of our 
humanity’.106 Those who cultivate only religion ‘have developed one side of their 
humanity at the expense of all others, and have become incomplete and mutilated men 
in consequence’.107 Glossing these arguments, Gorringe argues that the gospel as a call 
to perfection requires difficulty; it is a call to commitment, and that commitment can be 
expressed through art, music and literature – through the essentially demanding and 
difficult nature of high culture.
108
 
 
Arnold, an inspector of schools, believed that it was the task of education to further 
culture. Like Karl Barth, he argues that no culture embodies the values of the kingdom, 
but rather that all are profoundly unjust and in need of radical change. Towards this end, 
he maintained, the curriculum should strive to teach ‘the best which has been thought 
and said’.109 For Gorringe, such education is continuous and worldwide. It does not 
have as its aim the notion of trying to make everyone upper class, nor of imposing one 
style of education on all, but it is concerned with insisting on difficulty, acknowledging 
that truth and justice necessarily have to be struggled for, and aiming for the genuine 
realisation of ‘life in all its fullness’.110  
 
So Shostakovich’s music might be understood as contributing to ‘high’ culture, and 
such culture might be perceived as of value to the theological task. To unpack the 
significance and implications of this claim, I return to the Socialist Realist tradition out 
of which Shostakovich wrote – an ideology which, as noted above, is more closely 
                                               
105 Jon Sobrino, as cited in Gorringe, Furthering Humanity, p. 47 
106 Matthew Arnold, Culture and Anarchy (London: John Murray, 1920), p. 9 & xi 
107 Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, xi 
108 Gorringe, Furthering Humanity, pp. 49-52. For Gorringe, folk culture offers a more favourable 
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109 Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, viii 
110 Gorringe, Furthering Humanity, p. 149 
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aligned to mass or popular culture than to high culture. In my second chapter, I 
discussed the views of Theodor Adorno regarding the nature of mass culture, including 
his argument that, as a result of the commodification of cultural practices, much modern 
music can no longer function in a counter-cultural way, challenging social norms, but 
rather merely endorses and perpetuates the status quo. Now the same might be said, I 
submit, in the case of Socialist Realism, for this, too, as we have seen, eliminates the 
possibility of cultural critique. With its emphasis on the creating of uniform artworks 
that can be easily accessed and understood by all, it left no room for change, 
independent thought, or reasoned criticism, and in so doing, prevented artistic honesty 
and was anathema to genuine creativity. Socialist Realism, then, despite not originating 
in the capitalist system Adorno had in mind, might perhaps be helpfully viewed in light 
of Adorno’s theory of the culture industry – that is, as a culture which is presented as ‘a 
culture of the people’ but is in fact instigated from the top by those in power. Again, it 
could be understood as the fetishisation of Russian folk culture – as the valuing of the 
Russian folk tradition only as a means of furthering Party ideology rather than for its 
own sake. 
 
For Adorno, mass culture marks the onset of terminal cultural decline. It is the 
beginning of the end of culture: music cannot escape from cultural determination to 
recapture its critical capacity; it cannot deny the expectations of society and still be 
understood by its audience. However, as I have shown, the Fifth Symphony in many 
ways refuses to conform to the requirements of Socialist Realism and yet still succeeded 
in being publically well-received. The audience present at the premier would appear to 
have related deeply and genuinely to the work, not as a mere form of morale-boosting 
entertainment, but as that which presented ‘a living chronicle about themselves’ – ‘an 
act of witness that gives voice to the wounded’, full of the ‘purposeful intrusion of 
subjective feeling which is what gives art its enduring value’. In this way, the work 
demonstrates, without recourse to the dictates of Socialist Realism, an appeal to 
‘ordinary’ people. The immediate achievement of a public resonance such as this is a 
particularly remarkable achievement for a classical symphony to make, especially one 
composed in the twentieth century. This is high art, but high art that engages rather than 
excludes. So might it be, then, that Shostakovich is presenting us with a solution to the 
apparent dichotomy between the need for music to be autonomous if it is function 
critically and the danger of such music becoming alienated from its intended audience? 
Perhaps we hear in this work music recovering its critical edge, and in so doing, we are 
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provided with that which Adorno himself sought in the music of composers such as 
Schoenberg and Mahler.
111
 
 
In order to make sense of all this theologically, I turn to read these views of Adorno in 
light of the theological understanding of culture presented by Karl Barth. As I touched 
upon in my second chapter, Barth remains critical of what he regards as 
Schleiermacher’s ‘sanctification of cultural achievement’, admonishing him for 
attempting to tie God too closely to human culture and for preventing the option for 
God to act in contrary to the will of humankind.
112
 However, when studied more 
closely, it becomes apparent that Barth’s approach to culture is in fact not entirely 
negative, but rather is dialectical. Christianity is not culture but at the same time is not 
other than culture; religion remains necessarily a part of culture, even though it cannot 
be identified with culture without the remainder of hope.
113
 Although arguing that 
cultural achievement cannot be sanctified in the way Schleiermacher attempts, Barth 
argues that there still always remains the possibility that culture might be revelatory.
114
 
For Barth, both theology and culture are concerned with full humanity, but theology has 
to remain open to the counter-cultural, because revelation always tells us something we 
cannot tell ourselves.
115
 
 
It is therefore through this theological appropriation of the views of Adorno that, I 
contend, the theological significance of the Fifth Symphony is to be found. This work, 
in my view, is an example of high art which functions in a counter-cultural way, seeking 
to subvert the artistic norms of its social context and thus critiquing the culture of which 
it is a part. By denying the perpetuation of the cultural deficiencies of Socialist Realism, 
the work stands as an example of music as a cultural artefact which nonetheless 
recognises the limitations and negativities of one particular culture and which strives to 
overcome these in the artistic creation of a new reality. The Symphony is revelatory in 
                                               
111 Judith Kuhn points to the fact that Adorno approved of Mahler as he created music that ‘honestly 
reflected a contemporary world full of ruptures, contradictions and disillusionment’, and argues that the 
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the way that Barth describes: it reminds us that cultural assumptions need to be 
challenged, and that art itself can form both question and reply.  
 
In order to achieve this, Shostakovich retains an astonishing degree of independent 
artistic thought in the creation of the work. From the hidden fragments of the Pushkin 
Romance, through the inclusion of elements of sadness (most notably the third 
movement, although also in areas such as the conclusions to both the first and second 
movements) and aspects which provoke thought and refection (in the third movement’s 
recourse to Orthodox chant and quotations of Mahler, and in the way in which the work 
repeatedly contains echoes of its own formation), to the tongue-in-cheek second 
movement with its satirical nod to the Soviet march, the Symphony perhaps provides a 
far truer testimony to the composer’s ability to subvert and challenge than can any 
written document. In this work, Shostakovich creates art which endeavours to truly 
reflect reality, even if that reality has become distorted, and that distortion has come to 
be accepted as the truth. To return to the dialect of Barth, this is music which recognises 
both the limitations and also the possibilities inherent within the cultural act.  
 
Through seeking to say something genuinely original and meaningful with his music, 
Shostakovich reclaims the musical work as of importance to the development and 
flourishing of humankind in a culture in which the prioritisation of the banal and fake 
had become the norm, and this might be construed as a musical realisation on the part of 
Shostakovich of the call to commitment and to perfection. The ‘reply to just criticism’ 
contained within the work, although in part arguably the taking on board of genuine 
criticism resulting from the denunciation of Lady Macbeth, at the same time stands as 
the refusal to bow to demands of society at the time: a refusal to refrain from the 
inclusion of the tragic in art by not exploring controversial yet pressing topics; a refusal 
not to use art as a means of personal expression; a refusal to seek to draw more upon the 
Russian folk tradition so that he, too, might become instrumental in the fetishisation of 
his country’s past. This is a work which does not refuse standards, but rather continually 
strives for that which can be achieved only through dedication to the ongoing task of the 
revival of cultural integrity. Such an act is a refusal to settle for the superficial and a 
decision to engage instead with the demanding and the difficult – with that which, 
theologically, makes for the perfection of humanity.  
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Understanding the Fifth Symphony within a context of the pursuit of the best that 
culture has to offer is an acknowledgement of the role of education in furthering culture. 
In this work, Shostakovich is giving musical life to the perception that we need to fight 
for that which is worth having. On one level, this is true in a musical sense, for 
Shostakovich is aiming for musical excellence rather than settling for the second-best, 
entertainment style of music so pervasive at the time of his writing. But on another 
level, this is also true in terms of that for which the music stands: Shostakovich is at the 
same time striving for creative excellence and the freedom to write what he likes and to 
write of life as it is. This is the antithesis of the vision of Socialist Realism and the 
reason why his music appealed to ‘the masses’ in a way in which that music which 
followed the dictates of the theory rarely achieved. The Fifth Symphony, therefore, 
shows us what music can be and what it can express: it strives for the best that is 
possible within musical composition, and as such might be viewed as forming an artistic 
contribution towards the genuine realisation of ‘life in all its fullness’. 
 
Having here shown that music understood as cultural expression need not lead to the 
sanctification of cultural experience but rather might be of value to theological 
endeavour, I now turn in my following chapter to address the concern that theological 
appeal to musical expressivity might result in a ‘religion of aestheticism’.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
Musical Icons 
The Seventh Symphony 
 
 
I. The Context of the Seventh Symphony 
 
(a) Declaration of War 
 
Prior to the outbreak of the Second World War, Stalin had remained unconvinced as to 
the dependability of the West to support Russia during conflict. A general distrust of the 
changeability of democratic government was compounded in the summer of 1939, when 
Britain was perceived as not responding with sufficient urgency over talks with the 
USSR regarding Hitler’s advances towards Warsaw.1 As a result, discussions between 
Russia and Germany, which had been proceeding at the same time, were raised to a new 
level, and culminated in the signing of the Soviet-Nazi Non-Aggression Treaty on 23
rd
 
August. The pact contained two sections: one which was made public, in which both 
countries agreed to avoid war and to increase bilateral trade, thus guaranteeing Hitler 
open access to Russia’s natural resources, and one which remained secret, in which the 
territories between Russia and Germany were divided between the two nations. Most of 
Poland was allocated to Hitler, who then invaded the country on 1
st
 September. When 
the Nazi forces refused to withdraw, Britain and France declared war on Germany, and 
the Second World War began.
2
 
 
The signing of the Treaty had lulled Russia into a false sense of security as to the nature 
of its relationship with Germany. Stalin, who had expected the war in Western Europe 
to be a lengthy affair, concentrated his efforts on securing Russia’s territory in Eastern 
Europe rather than preparing for attack. Even when French military resistance collapsed 
in June 1940, he remained convinced that Hitler would first want to secure control of 
Britain before turning his attention towards the USSR. Stalin also remained 
unrealistically optimistic about the outcome of Russia’s involvement in any such war, to 
the extent that Soviet commentators were banned from reporting on the true scale of the 
                                               
1 Service, A History of Modern Russia, p. 255 
2 Wilson, Shostakovich, p. 148; Service,  A History of Modern Russia, p. 256 
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German army. When a group of brave German soldiers swam across the River Bug 
from Eastern Europe to Russia on 21
st
 June 1941 to warn of an impending attack, they 
were shot as enemy agents, and the invasion of Nazi troops early the following morning 
– the start of ‘Operation Barbarossa’ – met with little resistance. Stalin even initially 
ordered the Russian troops not to respond to German ‘provocations’ – a move he was to 
later deeply regret – and, as a result, the German army began to make swift progress 
into the country.
3
 
 
(b) The Siege of Leningrad 
 
By the end of August 1941, Nazi troops had surrounded Leningrad.
4
 The city held a 
certain fascination for Hitler, and its capture and destruction was central to his plans for 
conquering the country. Although announcing publically in speeches and leaflets 
dropped on the city that, in order to avoid obliteration, it must surrender, Hitler secretly 
ordered Field Marshal Wilhelm von Leeb, the commander of the Nazi troops in the east, 
that both Leningrad and its inhabitants were to be annihilated, whatever the cost. A 
directive from Nazi general Walter Warlimont, entitled ‘The Future of the City of St. 
Petersburg’, reads: ‘The Führer has decided to raze the city of St. Petersburg from the 
face of the earth. After the defeat of Soviet Russia there will be not the slightest reason 
for the future existence of this large city.’5 At the same time, Stalin himself was ready to 
destroy both Leningrad, named after his predecessor, and Stalingrad, named after 
himself, rather than have to endure the spectacle of Hitler claiming them as his own.
6
 
 
Hitler had expected Leningrad to fall easily, but the ensuing siege was to last for over 
two years before the Nazis eventually withdrew in the face of the advancing Red Army. 
During this time, limited supplies could still reach the city, but these provisions were 
nowhere near the level needed to sustain a population of two and a half million.
7
 
German bombardment of power stations cut off electricity supplies, and coal reserves 
                                               
3 Service, A History of Modern Russia, pp. 256-260 
4 Wilson, Shostakovich, p. 148 
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soon disappeared.
8
 Food was rationed, and then the rations cut further.
9
 Composer 
Dmitri Tolstoy, resident in Leningrad during the siege, recalls: ‘The Germans 
completely surrounded us and the famine began. First of all the shops closed down. 
Then the lights went out. Then the water supply and the sewage system stopped. Then 
the heating. Winter was coming.’10 
 
Over the winter of 1941-42, temperatures in Leningrad reached thirty-five degrees 
below zero, and with allocated daily food rations well below those needed in such cold 
conditions, the citizens of Leningrad slowly began to starve.
11
 Over 52,000 people died 
in December 1941 alone.
12
 A witness recalls: ‘You walk, someone falls, and you 
haven’t even got the strength to help them get up’.13 Another remembers how ‘We went 
to the ice-hole [to collect water] and people were dying there. They would go with their 
bucket and freeze there. I’d go to work – from Tolmachov Street to Zhdanov Street. I 
went by foot. I’d go, I’d see people there. And in the evening there were corpses lying 
there.’14 The dead lined the streets before being dragged away to mass graves on 
brightly painted children’s sledges. Where the ground was frozen, or people too weak to 
dig, explosives were used to blast pits into which bodies were dumped and left to be 
covered with snow.
15
  
 
The battle against starvation was constant. Tolstoy again: ‘They ate nothing. Oh yes, 
they boiled glue, leather straps from the suitcases, things like that. All the cats and dogs 
had already been eaten by November or December.’16 Another survivor recalls how ‘At 
times you feel such pain that the stomach demands food, and everything inside you is 
clenched. Your psychological state changes. At these moments it seems you are ready to 
jump at the table, the chair, the walls, to gnaw at them, if only you could extinguish this. 
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And if you yield to this urge, that’s the end.’17 There were even rumours of cannibalism. 
One witness remembers: ‘We only really saw what winter did when the snow began to 
melt. ‘Look, here comes spring!’ But what did it bring? Decomposing, dismembered 
corpses in the streets that had been hidden under the ice. Severed legs with meat 
chopped off them. Bits of bodies in the bins. Women’s bodies with the breasts cut off, 
which people had taken to eat. They had been buried all winter but there they were for 
all the city to see how it had remained alive.’18 
 
It is this context of war, siege and starvation that provided the backdrop for the 
composition of Shostakovich’s Seventh Symphony. 
 
(c) Shostakovich and War 
 
On Sunday 22
nd
 June 1941, during Leningrad’s ‘white nights’, Shostakovich and Isaak 
Glikman had planned to attend a football match and then to go out for dinner. Whilst 
they were travelling to the stadium, Molotov’s radio broadcast announced Germany’s 
invasion of the Soviet Union.
19
 In the weeks that immediately followed, life continued 
with relative normality for Shostakovich, who was currently involved with 
examinations at the Leningrad Conservatoire where he was chairman of the piano 
commission as well as a member of the composition jury. Although poor eyesight 
meant that he could not sign up for active service, he was determined to help his 
country, and so became an auxiliary of the Fire Brigade, working to protect the roof of 
the Conservatoire against incendiary attacks. A photograph taken on 29
th
 July of him in 
a fireman’s helmet and holding a fire hose soon featured in newspapers around the 
world as a symbol of Leningrad’s resistance. In reality, however, the composer was 
never actually involved in the extinguishing of an incendiary and, after the war, 
Conservatoire official Aron Ostrovsky even confessed that excuses had been made to 
deliberately remove Shostakovich from the roof when danger threatened, such was the 
need for musical compositions for performance to frontline troops.
20
  
 
At the start of July, Shostakovich was writing arrangements of songs for the concert 
brigades to perform at the Front, and it was later that month that he began work on the 
                                               
17
 Shostakovich Against Stalin 
18 Viktor Koslov, as cited in Vulliamy, ‘Orchestral Manoeuvres: Part 1’ 
19 Fay, Shostakovich, p. 122 
20 Wilson, Shostakovich, p. 148; Fay, Shostakovich, pp. 122-123 
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Seventh Symphony.
21
 The vast first movement was completed in less than six weeks, 
and the second and third movements in only three weeks.
22
 He recalls: ‘I wrote my 
Seventh Symphony, the Leningrad, quickly. I couldn’t not write it. War was all around. 
I had to be together with the people, I wanted to create the image of our embattled 
country, to engrave it in music.’23 Indeed, such was his compulsion to write the piece 
that he even took the score with him to the roof of the Conservatoire so that he could 
continue to work on it by night between attacks.
24
 
 
By the end of August, the Nazi blockade of Leningrad had been consolidated and the 
siege began. Although many of the city’s artistic and intellectual elite had already been 
evacuated to the relative safety of nearby towns, Shostakovich refused to leave. 
Following the pleas of anxious friends concerned for his well-being, he wrote in a letter 
to Sollertinsky dated 29
th
 August of plans to leave with his family within the next two 
days. Nearly a week later, Shostakovich was still in Leningrad, and on 4
th
 September, 
the Nazis began to bombard the city with shells.
25
 On 17
th
 September, an announcement 
by the composer was broadcast on Leningrad Radio: 
 
An hour ago I finished the score of two movements of a large symphonic 
composition. If I succeed in carrying it off, if I manage to complete the third and 
fourth movements, then perhaps I’ll be able to call it my Seventh Symphony. 
Why am I telling you this? So that the radio listeners who are listening to me 
now will know that life in our city is proceeding normally.
26
 
 
                                               
21 Following the success of his Fifth Symphony, Shostakovich’s popularity had increased considerably. 
From a position of relative calm and stability, he had turned his attention to chamber music, completing, 
amongst others, the First String Quartet (July 1938) and the Piano Quintet (September 1940), both of 
which were well-received. During this time, he had also announced that he was working on a symphony 
dedicated to Lenin, which would consist of no less than four movements and would include texts by 
Russian writers and poets. However, it would appear that this description was purely aimed at silencing 
the critics, for the Sixth Symphony, completed in the summer of 1939, bore little resemblance to such 
programmatic ideals. Unlike the Fifth, the work did not adhere to traditional symphonic structure, 
consisting instead of a prolonged, introspective first movement, an energetic scherzo and a finale of 
‘almost flippant hilarity’. It was premiered on 5th November 1939 under Mravinsky as the opening to the 
autumn season of the Leningrad Philharmonic where it was received positively although not on the level 
of the Fifth. Wilson, Shostakovich, pp. 127-128 & pp. 130-131 
22 Wilson, Shostakovich, p. 148 
23 Dmitri Shostakovich, ‘Kak rozhdayetsya muzϊka’, Literaurnaya gazeta, 21st December 1965, as cited in 
Fay, Shostakovich, p. 124 
24 Fay, Shostakovich, p. 124 
25 Fay, Shostakovich, p. 125 
26 Dmitri Shostakovich, as cited in Fay, Shostakovich, p. 125 
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Two days later, Luftwaffe bombs fell on the Gostiny shopping area, killing and 
wounding hundreds of civilians. That evening, friends of Shostakovich were gathered in 
the composer’s home listening to him perform a piano arrangement of the first three 
movements of the Symphony when the sirens sounded. Pausing only to accompany his 
wife and children to safety in the cellar, Shostakovich then returned to finish his recital, 
his guests remaining at the house until the all clear was sounded.
27
 
 
The composer and his family were eventually evacuated from Leningrad to Moscow on 
1
st
 October by order of local Party officials. Amongst the few possessions they were 
allowed, Shostakovich took with him the three completed movements of the Seventh 
Symphony.
28
 The subject of art in wartime had evidently struck a chord both with local 
people and also with the authorities, who were keen to make the most of the composer’s 
popularity and success, and during his short stay in the city Shostakovich gave many 
interviews and made numerous appearances. As Fay puts it: ‘His made a compelling 
story, that of courageous young composer resisting evacuation to defend his native city 
not only by physical deeds but also through one of the most venerated of human 
endeavours – one inherently antithetical to the destructive impulse of war – the creation 
of art. [The Seventh Symphony] was a heady propaganda weapon, evoking both 
inspiration and defiance, and its publicity was exploited skilfully almost from the 
moment of the work’s conception.’29 
 
On 16
th
 October, Shostakovich and his family, together with a large group of other 
composers, artists and writers, were allocated places on a train heading for 
Sverdlovsk.
30
 The departure was chaotic. Karen Khachaturian, whose uncle, the 
composer Aram Khachaturian, was also leaving the city, recalls: 
 
I suddenly caught sight of Dmitri Dmitriyevich on the platform. He looked 
completely bereft. He was holding a sewing machine in one hand and a 
children’s potty in the other, while his wife, Nina Vasilyevna stood beside the 
                                               
27 Vulliamy, ‘Orchestral Manoeuvres: Part 1’, The Guardian 
28 Wilson, Shostakovich, p. 148; Fay, Shostakovich, p. 125. Shostakovich had been assured that his 
mother, sister and nephew would follow him to Moscow the following day. This did not happen, and a 
distraught Shostakovich went to great lengths to try and secure their safety, including attempting to 
charter a plane to go and get them. Despite his efforts, however, they did not escape until the spring of 
1942, by which time they were severely emaciated having endured winter in the besieged city. Wilson, 
Shostakovich, p. 167 & p. 169 
29 Fay, Shostakovich, p. 126 
30 Wilson, Shostakovich, p. 149 
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children and a mountain of stuff. I helped them load their things on to the 
train. Later, when I made my way home from the station, I was struck by the 
number of howling dogs roaming the snowy streets, having been abandoned by 
their owners.
31
 
 
The journey was slow, overcrowded and uncomfortable. There was not enough space 
for everyone to lie down, so the passengers resorted to sleeping in shifts. After several 
days, Shostakovich discovered that the two suitcases containing all of his and his 
children’s personal possessions had been left behind at Moscow. For a short time it was 
feared that the score for the symphony had also been lost, although fortunately this was 
later discovered among the composer’s remaining possessions on the train.32 
 
After seven days, the group reached Kuibyshev, the seat of the evacuated government 
and also the temporary home for a number of institutions including the Bolshoi Theatre 
and the editorial offices of Pravda. After much discussion, Shostakovich decided to 
alight here with his family rather than travel on to Sverdlovsk. Upon arrival, they were 
allocated spaces in a classroom in one of the local schools, together with a number of 
other artists, musicians and performers. They slept on the floor with no mattresses, 
although did receive access to the Bolshoi Theatre commissariat who provided a daily 
ration of food. A week later, the family were moved to a room of their own, and 
Shostakovich was given a grand piano in order that he might continue with 
his compositions.
33
 
 
During the evacuation, Shostakovich had not worked on the Seventh Symphony. Once 
in Kuibyshev, he announced that he had returned to work and that progress was strong: 
‘Currently I am completing the last, fourth, movement. I have never worked so quickly 
as now.’34 In reality, however, he was struggling to complete the piece. In a letter to 
Sollertinsky dated 29
th
 November he admitted that composition of the final movement 
was not going well; writing to Glikman the following day he revealed that he had not 
yet even started it.
35
 Friend and artist Nikolai Sokolov, who had accompanied 
Shostakovich on the train from Moscow, recounts a conversation with the composer in 
                                               
31 Karen Khachaturian, as cited in Wilson, Shostakovich, p. 150 
32
 Nikolai Sokolov, as cited in Wilson, Shostakovich, pp. 150-151 
33 Sokolov, as cited in Wilson, Shostakovich, pp. 151-152 
34 Shostakovich, as cited in Fay, Shostakovich, p. 127 
35 Fay, Shostakovich, p. 127 
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which he confided that ‘...as soon as I got on that train, something snapped inside me... I 
can’t compose just now, knowing how many people are losing their lives.’36 Living 
arrangements in Kuibyshev made matters worse, with Shostakovich again mentioning to 
Sokolov that ‘...now I realise how inconvenient it is to work in a single room; the 
children are rowdy and disturb me. Yet they have every right to be noisy, they are only 
children, but unfortunately I can’t work.’37 In early December, however, the family was 
found a larger apartment, and Shostakovich finally had the space he needed in which to 
work. Spurred on by news that the Nazi troops had been held back outside Moscow, he 
went on to finish the Seventh Symphony in less than two weeks, completing it on 27
th
 
December 1941.
38
 
 
 
II. The Seventh Symphony 
 
(a) ‘War Symphonies’ 
 
Many composers have taken war as the subject of their work, for example Boshuslav 
Martinu’s symphonic poem Memorial to Lidice, Gerogij Firtich’s cantata Leningrad, 
also in memory of the siege, and Benjamin Britten’s famous War Requiem to name but 
a few.
39
 Indeed, the Seventh Symphony is only one of Shostakovich’s three so-called 
‘War Symphonies’, which include the Eighth and Ninth Symphonies, and which all deal 
with themes of war in differing ways.
40
 The Seventh Symphony, however, is unusual 
amongst musical compositions for the immediacy of its connection to its subject, given 
the context of its composition, and eventual performance, during the very events which 
it portrays.
41
 As Nicholas Slonimsky puts it: ‘No composer before Shostakovich had 
written a musical work depicting a still raging war, and no composer had ever attempted 
to describe a future victory, in music, with such power and conviction, at a time when 
his people fought for their very right to exist as a nation’.42 
                                               
36 Sokolov, as cited in Wilson, Shostakovich, p. 153 
37 Solokov, as cited in Wilson, Shostakovich, p. 153 
38 Wilson, Shostakovich, p. 154 & p. 149; Fay, Shostakovich, p. 127 
39 Robert Dearling, in Norris, Shostakovich, p. 64 
40 For more on Shostakovich’s Eighth and Ninth Symphonies see Fay, Shostakovich, pp. 136-137 & pp. 
146-148 and Wilson, Shostakovich, pp. 174-178. For a discussion of the relationship between the War 
Symphonies, see David Gow, ‘Shostakovich’s ‘War’ Symphonies’, The Musical Times, 105:1453 (1964), 
191-193. 
41 Dearling suggests that we might draw a comparison between the Seventh Symphony and the poetry of 
Wilfred Owen. Dearling, in Norris, Shostakovich, p. 64 
42 Blokker, Shostakovich, p. 81 
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Although normally declining to provide dedications for his work, Shostakovich titled 
the Seventh Symphony ‘to our struggle against fascism, to our coming victory over the 
enemy, and to my native city, Leningrad’,43 and even provided accompanying 
programme notes for each movement, thus appearing much more, if not completely, 
open as regards his intentions in the creation of the work.
44
 In contrast to the Fifth 
Symphony, the Seventh is free from internal conflict, as Hugh Ottaway puts it: 
‘Running right through the Leningrad Symphony is an underlying joy, a peace of mind, 
as if the composer’s inner life had become simple and free. There are no subjective 
problems, and in that sense this is one of the happiest of works.’45 However, the 
undercurrent of an alternative agenda is detected by some, who suggest that the 
Symphony represents not only an opposition to fascism but also to Stalinism. Indeed, 
Flora Litvinova recalls a conversation with the composer in which he said of the work: 
‘Of course – Fascism. But music, real music, can never be literally tied to a theme. 
National Socialism is not the only form of Fascism; this music is about all forms of 
terror, slavery, the bondage of the spirit.’46 
 
(b) First Movement 
 
‘The exposition of the first movement’, writes Shostakovich, ‘tells of the happy, 
peaceful life of people sure of themselves and their future. This is the simple, peaceful 
life lived before the war by thousands of Leningrad militiamen, by the whole city, by 
our country.’47 The opening theme of the movement (Fig. 4.1) presents us with the 
musical depiction of this happy and peaceful life in the form of a unison string melody 
with solo bassoon. Nonetheless, and characteristically for Shostakovich, the mood of 
this passage remains open to interpretation, with its dark tone and resistance to 
development (at bar six we are returned unexpectedly to the opening motif of the theme) 
perhaps suggesting a less positive programme than is openly stated.
48
 
 
                                               
43 Dmitri Shostakovich, ‘Sed’maya simfoniya’, in Pravda 29th March 1942, as cited in Fay, Shostakovich, 
p. 131 
44 The programme notes for the Symphony were originally reported to Dmitri Rabinovich, a biographer of 
Shostakovich. Ottaway. Shostakovich, p. 33 As a piece of ‘programmatic’ music, then, the Symphony 
invites reflection on the intentions of the composer as overtly stated in words as opposed to consideration 
of it as an ‘absolute’ musical work. 
45 Ottaway, Shostakovich, p. 34 
46
 Flora Litvinova, as cited in Wilson, Shostakovich, pp. 158-159 
47 Dmitri Shostakovich, ‘V dni oboronϊ Leningrad’ [During the defence of Leningrad], in Sovetskoye 
iskusstvo 9th October 1941, as cited in Fay, Shostakovich, p. 129 
48 Blokker, Shostakovich, p. 83 
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Fig. 4.1: Shostakovich, Symphony No. 7, first movement, opening 
 
In the second subject of the movement (Fig. 4.2), introduced at [6]
2
, this interpretative 
tension continues, for although noticeably calmer and more placid than the first, this 
theme might at the same time be construed as somewhat ‘subdued and doubtful’.49 Also 
of significance here is a subsidiary scalic figure, for example in the oboe at [8]
8
, which 
then forms an integral part of the piccolo solo beginning at [14] before the exposition is 
concluded by a muted violin solo, setting the scene for the opening of the development 
section at [19].
50
 
 
Fig. 4.2: Shostakovich, Symphony No. 7, first movement, [6]
2
 
 
‘In the development’, continues Shostakovich, ‘war bursts into the peaceful life of these 
people.’ His portrayal of war, however, is not concerned primarily with the musical 
illustration of actual events but rather with the expression of feelings: ‘I am not aiming 
for the naturalistic depiction of war, the depiction of the clatter of arms, the explosion of 
shells, and so on. I am trying to convey the image of war emotionally...’51 This outbreak 
of war is symbolised in the opening bars of the development by a side drum ostinato 
(Fig. 4.3), which begins pianissimo at [19] before continuing in a gradual crescendo 
throughout the entire 350 bars of the section. Shostakovich himself anticipated that such 
a figure might invite comparisons, not all of them favourable, with Ravel’s Boléro, 
although, upon performing the extract to Glikman during its composition, declared: 
‘Well, let them, for this is how I hear the war’.52 
 
 
                                               
49 Blokker, Shostakovich, p. 83 
50
 Ottaway, Shostakovich, p. 35 
51 Shostakovich, ‘V dni oboronϊ Leningrad’, as cited in Fay, Shostakovich, p. 129; Ottaway, Shostakovich, 
p. 34 
52 Dmitri Shostakovich, as cited in Wilson, Shostakovich, p. 148 
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Fig. 4.3: Shostakovich, Symphony No. 7, first movement, [19] 
 
Over this ostinato appears the march theme (Fig. 4.4) for which this Symphony has 
become renowned – the sound of ‘the executioners invading Russia and the world’.53 
Consisting of a simple melodic line heard first at [19]
5
, it is then subjected to numerous 
repetitions, changing only in dynamic (a gradual crescendo matching that of the 
ostinato) and instrumentation. With each variation linked to the next by a four-bar string 
motif, the theme develops from an initial string pizzicato and col legno version to be 
performed by several permutations of wind, strings and brass, including, most notably, 
canonical versions between solo oboe and bassoon at [25] and oboes and clarinets at 
[31], and also in an inverted version in the brass at [45] (Fig. 4.5). Described by some as 
‘rat-like’, this theme has also been identified, again following Shostakovich’s 
instruction of the work as an emotional rather than literal depiction of conflict, as a 
portrayal of the recognition of war as it gradually encroaches upon the human psyche.
54
 
As Ottaway puts it: 
 
The tune is [at first] facile, jaunty, perhaps slightly cocky, but certainly not 
menacing. If Shostakovich really intended to portray Nazism on the march...he 
must have been dreaming of a paper tiger! His own words, however, were ‘war 
breaks suddenly into our peaceful life’. At first it is distant and unreal...but all 
the time it bears directly on more and more lives until at last the whole nation is 
involved in a life-and-death struggle.
55
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
53 Isaak Glikman, in Shostakovich Against Stalin. The theme has since been borrowed by other composers 
including Bartók and Jarre, and Shostakovich himself may have borrowed ideas for it from Nielsen and 
Sibelius. Blokker, Shostakovich, p. 82 
54 Flora Litvinova, as cited in Fay, Shostakovich, p. 128; Blokker, Shostakovich, pp. 84-85 
55 Ottaway, Shostakovich, p. 35 
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Fig. 4.4: Shostakovich, Symphony No. 7, first movement, [19]
5
 
 
 
Fig. 4.5: Shostakovich, Symphony No. 7, first movement, [45] 
 
The backdrop to this theme consists of a number of additional ostinati which are derived 
from a variety of differing motifs and which become increasingly dissonant and 
chromatic as the march progresses. Particularly significant amongst these accompanying 
figures are the imitative ostinato found in the cellos and basses at [23], derived from the 
opening notes of the march, and the staccato, angular ostinato, again in the cellos and 
basses, beginning at 
1
[25], then following in a variety instrumentations throughout the 
middle section of the march. At 
1[39], a ‘tortured’ ostinato appears to finally break free 
of its accompanying role to overpower the main theme, before a chromatic ostinato, 
initially in crotchets which become first quavers and then triplets, accelerates the 
development section towards its close.  
 
Some have criticised the development of the first movement, and indeed the symphony 
as a whole, as being ‘immensely protracted’, and as lacking in the musical material and 
compositional technique necessary to sustain a work of such proportions.
56
 Others have 
argued that the introduction of new material in this section, although necessary, perhaps, 
to fulfil the programmatic nature of the work, nonetheless cannot be defended on a 
musical level, especially in the context of the traditional sonata form on which this 
                                               
56 Dearling, in Norris, Shostakovich, p. 65 
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movement is supposedly based.
57
 However, the sheer scale and magnitude of this 
section doubtless makes a profound impression, as Litvinova remarks: 
 
I was overwhelmed by the impression made on me by the first movement. 
Initially just playful, primitive, if unserious, it is gradually transformed into 
something terrifying, acquiring a force capable of obliterating everything in its 
path. Mechanical and relentless, it possesses a seemingly unlimited and 
inexorable strength.
58
 
 
Finally in this movement, ‘The reprise is a funeral march or, rather, a requiem for the 
victims of the war. Simple people honor the memory of their heroes... After the requiem 
there is an even more tragic episode. I don’t know how to characterize this music. 
Maybe what is here are a mother’s tears or even that feeling when grief is so great that 
there are no tears left. These two lyrical fragments lead to the conclusion of the first 
movement, to the apotheosis of life, of the sun.’59 Here the tension of the march theme 
is finally resolved in a climax at [52], where material from the opening theme of the 
movement fuses the end of the development with the start of the recapitulation. As this 
section gradually dies away, we are left not with a funeral march as such, but rather with 
a solo bassoon singing a requiem for the dead – a melody derived from the second 
subject of the movement and here transformed to fit alternating 3/4 and 4/4 time 
signatures (Fig. 4.6).
60
 The movement ends with an echo of the opening theme, heard 
again in the strings although here far broader and somewhat elaborated, and also the 
memory of a later extract derived from this theme, heard first at [12] on solo flute and 
now presented on muted violins. Lastly, ‘At the very end distant thunder appears again 
reminding us that the war continues...’, as the irrepressible side drum ostinato and 
march theme on muted trumpet return in the movement’s concluding bars.61 
 
 
 
                                               
57 Ottaway, Shostakovich, p. 35 
58 Flora Litvinova, as cited in Wilson, Shostakovich, p. 158 
59 Shostakovich, ‘V dni oboronϊ Leningrad’, as cited in Fay, Shostakovich, p. 129. Shostakovich also tells 
us of his initial consideration of completing the work in a single movement with a choral ending, and of 
how, to his later satisfaction, he eventually decided against such a conclusion: ‘How much I needed 
words for this episode! But I couldn’t find them anywhere. There was even a moment when I set out to 
write them myself. But now I am glad that there aren’t any words, because it would complicate the score 
too much.’ Ottaway, Shostakovich, p. 34 
60 Blokker, Shostakovich, p. 87 
61 Shostakovich, ‘V dni oboronϊ Leningrad’, as cited in Fay, Shostakovich, p. 129 
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Fig. 4.6: Shostakovich, Symphony No. 7, first movement, [60]
4
  
 
(c) Second Movement 
 
In contrast to the epic first movement, writes Shostakovich, ‘The second and third 
movements are not associated with a specific program. They are intended to serve as a 
lyrical respite... The second movement is a very lyrical scherzo. There is a little humor 
in it, but for me it is somehow connected with the scherzo of the quintet.’62 Later, in his 
programme notes for the premiere, the composer expanded this description to the 
following: ‘The second movement is a scherzo, a fairly well-developed lyrical episode, 
recalling pleasant events and past joys. The atmosphere is of gentle sadness and 
reverie.’63 The movement opens with a theme in the second violins (Fig. 4.7), who are 
then joined by the first violins in developing the melody at [73]
1
. Here the ascending 
semiquaver scale found in both violin parts at [73]
4
 echoes the clarinet and bassoon 
figure found in the development of the first theme in the previous movement at [2]
10
. As 
the movement develops, we here find yet another rhythmic ostinato figure (Fig. 4.8) 
beginning in the strings at [76], over which is floated an oboe solo (Fig. 4.9) carrying 
the ‘infinitely searching’ second theme of the movement.64 In both this and the first 
theme are contained the ‘irregularity and unexpected inflections’ of both pitch and 
rhythm which might be regarded as characteristic of Shostakovich’s works.65 
 
Fig. 4.7: Shostakovich, Symphony No. 7, second movement 
 
 
 
 
                                               
62
 Shostakovich, ‘V dni oboronϊ Leningrad’, as cited in Fay, Shostakovich, p. 129 
63 Shostakovich, as cited in Fay, Shostakovich, p. 129 
64 Blokker, Shostakovich, p. 88 
65 Ottaway, Shostakovich, p. 36 
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Fig. 4.8: Shostakovich, Symphony No. 7, second movement, [76] 
 
Fig. 4.9: Shostakovich, Symphony No. 7, second movement, [76]
2
 
 
A pizzicato version of the first theme leads into the Trio section at [82]
7
, where a 
change of tonality – from B minor to C sharp minor – together with a metrical change to 
3/8 time facilitate a ‘horrifying episode’ in which the piccolo clarinet’s ‘dance of death’ 
at [82]
13
 leads the rest of the orchestra into a ‘distorted waltz full of pain and stress’.66 
Again we might here be led to question the integrity of Shostakovich’s statement 
regarding the optimistic nature of this movement’s programmatic intentions, for the 
passage would seem to be far removed from a depiction of ‘pleasant events and past 
joys’.67 The movement ends, however, with a return at [96] to the lilting first theme of 
the Scherzo and, despite a somewhat ‘sinister’ appearance of the second theme in 
the bass clarinet at [97]
2
, finishes with the lighter sound of a brief solo from the 
contralto flute.
68
  
 
(d) Third Movement 
 
Shostakovich continues: ‘Joy of life and the worship of nature are the dominant moods 
of the third movement’ which ‘is a passionate adagio, the dramatic center of the work’ – 
a commentary which would once more seem to belie the darkly emotive quality of the 
movement.
69
 The ‘Stravinsky-like’ opening of ‘vast, static, glacial chords’ on 
woodwind and horns has been referred to as a ‘haunted, almost sacral evocation of war 
and the meaning of war’.70 Within these chords is outlined a pattern of three notes – F#, 
                                               
66 Blokker, Shostakovich, p. 88 
67 Dearling, in Norris, Shostakovich, p. 66 
68
 Blokker, Shostakovich, p. 88 
69 Shostakovich, as cited in Fay, Shostakovich, p. 129; Shostakovich, ‘V dni oboronϊ Leningrad’, as cited 
in Fay, Shostakovich, p. 129 
70 Ottaway, Shostakovich, p. 36; Blokker, Shostakovich, p. 89; Vulliamy, ‘Orchestral Manoeuvres: Part 1’ 
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G and C# (Fig. 4.10) – which becomes a recurring motif throughout the movement.71 A 
theme which has been described as ‘strong but featureless’, like ‘a desolate Siberian 
winter landscape set with vast frozen mountains’, is introduced in the violins at [106] 
(Fig. 4.11), before an allusion to the Fifth Symphony at [109]
6-8
 is elaborated upon to 
become the second theme of movement on solo flute at [112]
3
, set to a sparse, pizzicato 
accompaniment in the upper strings.
72
 Also of interest within this first section are a 
tender, almost yearning melody in the violins at [119], and a chromatic, dotted figure 
which leads into the middle section. 
 
Fig. 4.10: Shostakovich, Symphony No. 7, third movement, three note motif 
 
Fig. 4.11: Shostakovich, Symphony No. 7, third movement, [106] 
 
The middle section, from [121], is by contrast much more violent than the opening of 
the movement. Again we find echoes of the Fifth Symphony – this time the canonical 
motif from the opening of the work (see Fig. 3.3) – in the trumpet theme which opens 
the section, here set against syncopated chords in the horns and strings (Fig. 4.12). As 
the section develops, the chromatic, dotted figure which formed its introduction now 
extends to form much of the accompanying material, providing the momentum that 
drives the section towards its climax at [129]. The recapitulation of the movement 
features fragments of the opening section mingled with the chromatic accompaniment 
of the middle section. Allusions to elements of the opening appear at [130] and [131]
6
 in 
the brass and at [132] at [134]
4
 in the wind and strings. The echoes of the Fifth 
Symphony found first at [109] are also reiterated here, first at [135] and then in the 
closing passages of the movement at [145]
6-8
. Finally, the first theme of the movement 
                                               
71 The intervals implied within these tones – a minor second or semitone, and a diminished fourth or 
tritone – were later to become characteristic of Shostakovich’s harmonic language. 
72 Blokker, Shostakovich, p. 89; Dearling, in Norris, Shostakovich, p. 66 
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is heard in direct repeat in the strings at [142] before quiet clarinet chords, again 
featuring the three-note motif of the opening, lead into the Finale. 
 
Fig. 4.12: Shostakovich, Symphony No .7, third movement, 
1
[121] 
 
(e) Fourth Movement 
 
Of the Fourth Movement, Shostakovich writes simply: ‘In the finale I want to describe a 
beautiful future time when the enemy will have been defeated’.73 Continuing attacca 
from the preceding movement, two ideas initially emerge which are of importance to the 
unfolding of this section: a dotted motif in the lower strings (Fig. 4.13) at [150]
1-5
, 
which develops to form a theme in the strings at [152], and a triplet motif (Fig. 5.14), 
appearing first in canon between oboe and muted horn at [151]
1-8
. 
 
Fig. 4.13: Shostakovich, Symphony No. 7, fourth movement, [150]
1-5
 
 
Fig. 4.14: Shostakovich, Symphony No. 7, fourth movement, [151]
1-8
  
 
                                               
73 Shostakovich, ‘V dni oboronϊ Leningrad’, as cited in Fay, Shostakovich, p. 129. Samosud tried to 
persuade Shostakovich that the finale needed to include soloists and chorus to sing the praises of Stalin. 
Shostakovich, however, declined to rearrange the parts, writing to Glikman that he accepted the 
conductor’s comments ‘for purposes of information rather than for guidance, since I don’t believe the 
movement needs either chorus or soloists and it has quite enough optimism as it is’. Dmitri Shostakovich, 
in Glikman, Story of a Friendship, pp. 6-7 
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From this follows a section which, calling to mind the composer’s Third Symphony, 
consists of a ‘torrent of fragmentary themes and rhythmic off-shoots’.74 Within this, the 
canonical triplet motif eventually returns to herald the climax of the movement at [174], 
where it morphs into an ostinato which combines with woodwind trills and a brass 
fanfare, again based on the interval of a diminished fourth (initially implied in the three-
note motif of the third movement), to create an impenetrable wall of sound. This motif 
is later to be found in the section immediately following the climax, where it launches a 
grotesque march at [175], set against a quaver accompaniment which then forms an 
integral part of the angular 7/4 section at [176], before gradually dying away.  
 
The concluding section of the movement, beginning at [179], returns to a rhythm 
derived from that of the march theme from the first movement (Fig. 4.15).
75
 Again the 
canonical triplet motif maintains a nagging, almost warning presence, heard in the cor 
anglais and bassoon at [193]
5-7
 and in the oboe and flute at 
4-3
[197]. From here onwards 
the movement builds towards its end in a manner not dissimilar to that of the Fifth 
Symphony, with a fortissimo quaver and triplet motif (Fig. 4.16) repeated mechanically 
in the woodwind and strings whilst a brass fanfare, developed from the string theme 
from the opening of the movement, sounds above them. For some, this conclusion 
pronounces a victory distinctively Russian in character.
76
 However, it might also be 
argued that the manner of the ending of this work depicts a battle which is still 
being fought rather than an enemy already defeated and thus, again as is the case with 
the Fifth Symphony, is the portrayal not of successful triumph but rather of 
gritty determination.  
 
Fig. 4.15: Shostakovich, Symphony No. 7, fourth movement – comparison of rhythms 
at [19]
5
 and [179] 
                                               
74 Blokker, Shostakovich, p. 91 
75 Blokker, Shostakovich, p. 91 
76
 Dearling, in Norris, Shostakovich, p. 66. Dearling argues that the ending of this movement is less 
ambiguous than that of the first, and suggests that this is possibly because of the composer’s distance 
from Leningrad at the time of its composition, making Shostakovich less involved in its struggles against 
the Fascists and so freer to portray a Russian victory.  
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Fig. 4.16: Shostakovich, Symphony No. 7, fourth movement, [204]  
 
 
 
 
(f) Reception 
 
The Seventh Symphony was premiered on 5
th
 March 1942 in Kuibyshev by the Bolshoi 
Theatre Orchestra conducted by Samuel Samosud and was a tremendous success.
77
 As 
with the Fifth Symphony, it immediately resonated with popular conscience and 
become ‘a potent national and even international symbol of just cause and steely resolve 
in the war against fascism’.78 Hailed as ‘the ultimate example of Patriotic Art’, the piece 
even met with the approval of Stalin, and on 11
th
 April 1942 it was announced that 
Shostakovich had been awarded a Stalin Prize, category one, for the work.
79
 The 
composer had now reached the height of his fame, and was regarded as something of a 
war hero in the mind of the public.
80
 
 
Within a month of its premiere, Samosud had directed the first performance of the 
Symphony in Moscow, and performances in other cities across Russia soon followed.
81
 
During the War, nearly every Soviet city that could amass the required instrumental 
forces gave at least one performance of the work, perhaps realising, as Litvinova points 
out, the political significance to be held in refuting the claim that ‘When cannons fire, 
the Muses remain silent’.82 In the April of 1942, a microfilmed copy of the score was 
smuggled out of the country via Tehran to the West, where it was performed under 
Henry Wood in London and later by Toscanini in New York.
83
 Undoubtedly the most 
                                               
77 Wilson, Shostakovich, p. 149. Shostakovich had wanted Mravinsky to conduct the premiere, but 
wartime conditions together with the propaganda value of an imminent performance of the work meant 
that this was not possible. Fay, Shostakovich, p. 130 According to Flora Litvinova, Shostakovich also 
went to the effort of signing a programme for each of the musicians in the orchestra, in the hope that 
‘maybe each one of them will try a little harder, and the performance will benefit as a result’. Flora 
Litvinova, as cited in Wilson, Shostakovich, pp. 159-160 
78 Wilson, Shostakovich, p. 160; Fay, Shostakovich, p. 131 
79 Wilson, Shostakovich, p. 174; Shostakovich Against Stalin, Fay, Shostakovich, p. 132 
80 Wilson, Shostakovich, p. 169; Dearling, in Norris, Shostakovich, p. 64. The later reception of the work 
was, however, less favourable, with some claiming that, when taken out of its wartime context, the 
Symphony loses its impact and meaning: ‘Stripped of its programmatic foundation, its huge gestures 
seem hollow’. Kay, Shostakovich, p. 40 
81
 Fay, Shostakovich, pp. 131-132 
82 Fay, Shostakovich, p. 132; Flora Litvinova, as cited in Wilson, Shostakovich, p. 159 
83 Wilson, Shostakovich, p. 149; Dearling, in Norris, Shostakovich, p. 64. The American premiere was 
held the week after the issue of Time magazine featuring the fireman image of Shostakovich reached the 
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significant performance, however, was that of the Leningrad premiere, held in the 
besieged city on 13
th
 August 1942 and performed by the Leningrad Radio Orchestra and 
Karl Eliasberg.
84
 
 
(g) Performance in Leningrad 
 
The Radio Orchestra was by now the only ensemble left in Leningrad. Ordered to 
remain there, they had continued to perform throughout the autumn of 1941, although 
following a concert on 14
th
 December including Tchaikovsky’s 1812 Overture, which 
depicts the Russian defeat of Napoleon’s army, the season was abandoned. Hereafter, 
the Orchestra’s log records the following: ‘Rehearsal did not take place. Srabian is dead. 
Petrov is sick. Borishev is dead. Orchestra not working.’85 However, following the first 
winter under siege, it was decided that, in order to raise morale, the city’s cultural life 
should be revived, and the authorities went to great lengths to ensure that this could be 
achieved.
86
 On 2
nd
 April 1942, the Leningrad edition of Pravda announced that a season 
of symphonic concerts was being planned and that the finale, naturally, was to be 
Shostakovich’s Seventh Symphony.87  
 
Facilitating a performance of the work became a matter of civic, and even military, 
pride.
88
 The Orchestra’s archive preserves a fragment of an order from the Party 
instructing that they should ‘By any means, get a score of the Seventh from Moscow. 
Transport it to Leningrad as soon as possible.’89 The score was flown by night to the 
city, where copyists worked around the clock and with a limited supply of paper, 
pencils and pens to prepare the parts.
90
 Andrei Krukov, then a music student, recalls 
Eliasberg’s reaction to first seeing the score: ‘When I saw the Symphony, I thought 
                                                                                                                                         
shelves. Fay, Shostakovich, p. 132 For more on the Western performances of the work, see Christopher. 
H. Gibbs, ‘‘The Phenomenon of the Seventh’: A Documentary Essay on Shostakovich’s ‘War’ 
Symphony’, in Shostakovich and his World ed. by Laurel E. Fay (Princeton & Oxford: Princeton 
University Press, 2004), pp. 59-113. The Symphony was finally performed by Mravinsky and the 
Leningrad Philharmonic in July 1942 in Novosibirsk where they were in evacuation – an event of special 
significance for Shostakovich. Fay, Shostakovich, p. 132 
84 Wilson, Shostakovich, p. 149 
85 Vulliamy, ‘Orchestral Manoeuvres: Part 1’ 
86 Fay, Shostakovich, p. 132; Ed Vulliamy, ‘Orchestral Manoeuvres: Part 2’, The Guardian. 
www.guardian.co.uk/theobserver/2001/nov/25/features.magazine27 (25.11.2001; accessed 30.12.2010) 
87 Vulliamy, ‘Orchestral Manoeuvres: Part 1’.  There exists only one historical document of this event – a 
booklet by Prof. Andrei Krukov, which has been out of print for many years. ‘Orchestral Manoeuvres: 
Part 2’ 
88 Fay, Shostakovich, p. 133 
89 Vulliamy, ‘Orchestral Manoeuvres: Part 2’ 
90 Fay, Shostakovich, p. 133 
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‘We’ll never play this.’ It was four thick volumes of music.’91 The work is one of 
monumental proportions, scored for the largest orchestra of any of Shostakovich’s 
symphonies, and at around eighty minutes in duration, it is also the longest.
92
 By 
contrast, the winter had reduced the Radio Orchestra to a mere fourteen players.
93
 
 
Remembering the first rehearsal of the work, oboist Edith Katya Matus recalls: 
 
When I got to the studio, I nearly fell over with shock. Of the orchestra of 100 
people, there were only 15 left. I didn’t recognise the musicians I knew from 
before, they were like skeletons... It was evident that we couldn’t play anything, 
we could hardly stand on our feet! Nevertheless, [Eliasberg] said: ‘Dear friends, 
we are weak but we must force ourselves to start work,’ and he raised his arms 
to begin. There was no reaction. The musicians were trembling. Finally, those 
who were able to play a bit helped the weaker musicians, and thus our small 
group began to play the opening bars... Everybody did their best, but we played 
badly, it was hopeless, and the first rehearsal broke up after 15 minutes.
94
 
 
Eliasberg realised that reinforcements must be found. Retired musicians were brought 
back to play and, following an order from commander-in-chief General Leonid Govorov 
himself that all military bands and musicians should report to the studio, many soldiers, 
and in particular brass players, were released from the army units defending the city.
95
 
Captain Parfionov, a senior officer in the orchestra of the army’s 45th Division, brought 
men from his ensemble to join the group. He recalls: ‘Rehearsals were from ten to one 
o’clock. No time for fun or to ask anyone who they were; we came, did our job and left. 
People were in a terrible condition... To be honest, no one was very enthusiastic.’96 
 
The musicians were issued with extra rations, although these proved desperately 
insufficient.
97
 Viktor Kosolov, a musician from Parfionov’s orchestra, remembers: ‘We 
would start rehearsing and get dizzy with our heads spinning when we blew. The 
symphony was too big... We might talk to the person sitting next to us, but the only 
                                               
91 Vulliamy, ‘Orchestral Manoeuvres: Part 2’ 
92 Fay, Shostakovich, p. 131 
93 Wilson, Shostakovich, p. 149 
94
 Vulliamy, ‘Orchestral Manoeuvres: Part 2’ 
95 Wilson, Shostakovich, p. 149; Fay, Shostakovich, p. 133; Vulliamy, ‘Orchestral Manoeuvres: Part 2’ 
96 Vulliamy, ‘Orchestral Manoeuvres: Part 2’ 
97 Wilson, Shostakovich, p. 149 
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subjects were hunger and food – not music.’98 Eliasberg himself once fainted on his 
long walk home from the studio and so was provided by the authorities with a bicycle, 
living quarters near the Philharmonic hall, a telephone and extra food supplies.
99
 
Rehearsals were also frequently interrupted; some of the musicians were working in 
anti-aircraft factories and had to leave when the sirens sounded, and some were called 
away to emergency fire-fighting duty.
100
 Others did not even survive. Parfionov 
recounts: ‘Some of our orchestra died. Three, as I recall, including a flautist called 
Karelsky. People were dying like flies, so why not the orchestra? Hunger and cold 
everywhere... Some people just fell over onto the floor whilst they were playing.’101 
 
Despite the appalling conditions, Eliasberg remained strict. Edith Matus again: 
 
He would allow for no mistakes, or delays. If a musician played badly, or was 
late, they would lose their bread ration. If someone was late because of a 
bombing raid, he would accept the excuse only if there had been no warnings 
from the siren. One day, a man came late because he had to watch them bury his 
wife that morning. But Eliasberg said that was no excuse, and the man would 
lose his ration.
102
 
 
Koslov, too, recalls the incident: ‘[Eliasberg] said ‘This must not happen again. If your 
wife or husband dies, you must be at rehearsal.’ He demanded absolute commitment 
and attention. When people said, ‘It’s no good, I can’t play it,’ Eliasberg would reply, 
‘Go on, No complaining!’103 ‘It sounds harsh’, continues Parfionov, ‘but he was right. 
We had a concert to prepare.’104 
 
Only one complete run-though of the symphony was rehearsed before the performance, 
for the musicians did not have the strength for any more.
105
  The concert itself was 
broadcast on loudspeakers throughout the city, on radio to the world and, in 
psychological warfare, to the German troops stationed outside the city, who, prior to the 
performance, had been subjected to a sustained period of artillery bombardment in order 
                                               
98 Vulliamy, ‘Orchestral Manoeuvres: Part 2’ 
99 Wilson, Shostakovich, p. 149 
100 Vulliamy, ‘Orchestral Manoeuvres: Part 2’ 
101 Vulliamy, ‘Orchestral Manoeuvres: Part 2’ 
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to ensure that the concert would not be interrupted.
106
 Edith Matus remembers how, 
although it was the middle of summer, ‘it was too cold to play without gloves. We wore 
them like mittens with the fingers cut off; even then it was hard to move the keys on my 
instrument.’ Cold-in-heat syndrome, associated with starvation, was also reported by 
Auschwitz survivors.
107
 Koslov recalls that ‘The lights above the stage went on. I’ll 
never forget that – they’d never been on before. I’d forgotten what electric light was 
like. It was more like a ceremony than a concert.’108 ‘For the first time in months’, 
continues Edith Matus, ‘there was silence. Eliasberg lifted his baton, and we began’.109 
 
That evening brought a new sense of purpose for all involved. Parfionov recounts: 
 
It had been an everyday job until now. But we were stunned by the number of 
people, that there could be so many people starving for food but also starving for 
music. Some had come in suits, some from the front. Most were thin and 
dystrophic. Some I recognised from fishing before the war. That was the 
moment we decided to play as best we could... The finale was so loud and 
mighty I thought we’d reach a limit and the whole thing would collapse and fall 
apart. Only then did I realise what we were doing, and hear the grand beauty of 
the symphony.
110
 
 
Edith Matus recalls how, ‘When the piece ended, there was not a sound in the hall – 
silence. Then someone clapped at the back, then another, then there was thunder’, as 
every member of the audience applauded with all the strength they had left.
111
 
Playwright Alexander Kron has said of their reaction: ‘People who no longer knew how 
to shed tears of sorrow and misery now cried from sheer joy’.112 Tatiana Vasilyeva, a 
member of that audience, remembers: ‘When I entered the hall, tears came to my eyes 
because there were many people, all elated. We all listened with such emotion, because 
we had lived for this moment, to come and hear this music. This was a real symphony 
which we lived. This was our symphony. Leningrad’s... It was so meaningful for all of 
                                               
106 Fay, Shostakovich, p. 133 
107 Vulliamy, ‘Orchestral Manoeuvres: Part 1’ 
108 Vulliamy, ‘Orchestral Manoeuvres: Part 2’ 
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us. We realised that this concert might be the last thing we’d do in our lives.’113 As 
Eliasberg himself puts it: ‘People...knew this was not a passing episode but the 
beginning of something. The hall, the homes, the front, the whole city, was one human 
being seizing his victory over the soulless machine. And we had it, in the music.’114 
 
The creation of an orchestra of this scale in such terrible conditions would seem almost 
beyond belief, and the Leningrad performance of the Seventh Symphony proved to be 
an event which not only inspired those within the city but also captured the imagination 
of those listening around the world. ‘Never before had music acquired such heroic force 
or become such an effective symbol of patriotism’.115 There remained, however, another 
eighteen months before the end of the siege, and no official recognition was given of the 
concert until after the War. Nevertheless, the importance of the event remains firmly in 
the hearts of many and, for some, might even be regarded as the moment when the fate 
of those in Leningrad was decided, as Edith Matus concludes: 
 
So many years have passed since that day and memory is a funny thing, like 
drying paint. It changes colour as it dries. But that symphony has stayed with me 
the way it was that night. Afterwards, it was still a city under siege, but I knew it 
would live. No-one could feed us, but music inspired us and brought us back to 
life. Music is life, after all, what is life without music?
116
 
 
 
II. Theological Reflection on the Seventh Symphony 
 
In reflecting theologically on the Seventh Symphony, I have taken my clue from 
Shostakovich’s well-known passion for Russian literature, and especially for the works 
of Fyodor Dostoevsky. Shostakovich’s knowledge of, and appreciation for, many of the 
Russian classics was extensive,
117
 as Tatyana Litvinova recalls: 
 
                                               
113 Tatiana Vasilyeva, as cited in Shostakovich Against Stalin 
114 Vulliamy, ‘Orchestral Manoeuvres: Part 2’ 
115 Wilson, Shostakovich, p. 149. This was doubtless fuelled by the fact that the performance was on the 
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[What] impressed one was his perfect mind, just like his perfect pitch, and his 
amazing knowledge of Russian literature from Pushkin and Lermontov to Babel 
and Zoshchenko. Once...he noticed that I was reading Dostoevsky’s A Raw 
Youth. He began to recite the book from memory, paragraph by paragraph... He 
was also very fond of Chekhov...
118
 
 
Shostakovich’s love of Russian literature also translated into his compositions, with his 
opera The Nose and his unfinished opera The Gamblers based on Gogol’s plays of the 
same names. Indeed, for film director Grigori Kozintsev, Shostakovich possessed a 
remarkable ability to depict in music Gogol’s own grasp of the Russian language. He 
argues that, in his compositions, Shostakovich appropriates musically ‘Gogol’s axiom 
that the Russian language has the potential to transform itself within a single sentence 
from the elevated to the everyday, from the frivolous to the tragic’.119 
 
Although the grotesque fantasy world of Gogol greatly appealed to Shostakovich, it was 
not until near the end of his life that he began to set the texts of his favourite authors – 
Chekhov and Dostoevsky.
120
 It is here that the first glimpse of the composer’s 
admiration of and respect for the latter writer in particular is to be found, as disclosed in 
a letter to Leningrad literary critic and musicologist Abraam Gosenpud: 
 
I have many times thought of writing on themes from Dostoevsky, but cannot 
bring myself to do so. It is too frightening. I thought of The Meek and 
Oppressed, and that most Dostoevskyan of all works, Bobky, and also the scene 
from Crime and Punishment with the crazed Marmeladov and his children. But I 
always retreat from these ideas. Do you know that it is easier to have dealings 
with Shakespeare than with Dostoevsky? I envy the courage of those composers 
who dare to handle Dostoevsky.
121
 
 
                                               
118 Tatyana Litvinova in Wilson, Shostakovich, pp. 169-170 
119 Wilson, Shostakovich, p. 458. For more on the connections between Shostakovich and Gogol, in 
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120 Wilson, Shostakovich, p. 459. However, Shostakovich’s intent to compose an opera of Chekhov’s The 
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However, Shostakovich did eventually dare to be inspired by Dostoevsky, with the Four 
Verses of Captain Lebyadkin (1974) painting a musical portrait of the writer’s character 
of the same name – the grotesque buffoon from The Devils.122 
 
What is more, when looked at in greater detail, several other of Shostakovich’s 
compositions do in fact contain passing references to aspects of Dostoevsky’s novels. 
Kovalyov’s lackey in The Nose sings the song ‘With Unconquerable Strength’, which is 
borrowed from The Brothers Karamazov, and in Lady Macbeth, Shostakovich’s 
attempts to justify the actions of Katerina given the suffering she endures and the love 
she has for Sergei arguably touch upon themes which feature prominently in many of 
Dostoevsky’s works.123 Shostakovich himself later confirmed these influences in his 
letters to Gozenpud, again making reference to how profoundly he was moved by the 
author, and it is here that we can see emerging a close affinity between the creative 
ideals of the two artists. ‘[I]t is very hard for me to convey to you what Dostoevsky’s 
work stirs up in me,’ he writes. ‘He has too powerful an effect on me, so powerful that it 
is difficult for me to organize my impressions... I love him and admire him as a great 
artist, I admire his love for people, for the humiliated and wretched.’124 
 
More specifically, Shostakovich shares in the Dostoevskian appreciation for the tragic. 
As Leningrad pianist and musicologist Mikhail Semyonovich Druskin comments: ‘It 
was Shostakovich’s vocation to realise the concept of tragedy, for this was how he 
perceived the world. One can draw an analogy in this with Dostoevsky’s work; in 
particular, the last act of Katerina Izmailova [Shostakovich’s film version of Lady 
Macbeth] was written under the influence of Dostoevsky’s From the House of the 
Dead.’125 Indeed, respected Russian intellectual Griorgi Kozintsev observes how the 
two share ‘...an obsessive need to react in an almost physiological way to the suffering 
of others (what Dostoevsky calls ‘the compulsive response’)...’126 This is made 
particularly apparent in the Seventh Symphony, as Gozenpud concludes: 
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A compassion for the wretched and unfortunate, a desire to help them and to 
defend them from abuse, injustice and the power of the forces of darkness – 
these are characteristic features of Shostakovich’s work. And in this he is close 
to Dostoevsky. There is so much that links the composer to this author: 
identification with the humiliated and distressed, hatred of man’s violence 
against man, an amazing capacity to penetrate the secret recesses of the soul, a 
merciless accuracy in depicting the terrors of this world, irony, sarcasm, a 
combination of the tragic and the comic. Shostakovich, like Dostoevsky, shows 
how evil is born, and how what appears to be harmless in origin can turn into 
something dangerous and destructive... [For example] in the first movement of 
Shostakovich’s Seventh Symphony the harmless marching song gradually 
acquires the force of a hurricane which blows everything from its path.
127
 
 
In order to flesh out the claim that a theological understanding of the Seventh 
Symphony is deepened by an understanding of Dostoevsky, I need now to say 
something about that author’s theology, and in particular about the importance he 
attributes to the role of the icon. This will involve rather a long excurse but I believe 
it ultimately gives the interpretative clue needed for a theological engagement with 
this work. 
 
(a) Dostoevsky and Russian Orthodox Theology 
 
The novels of Dostoevsky inhabit a world in which the beliefs of Russian Orthodoxy 
are intimately present, and the writer’s own, albeit at times ambiguous, faith and 
spiritual awareness, primarily shaped through his experiences in exile in Siberia, are 
made apparent throughout his narratives.
128
 As George Strem comments: ‘The moral 
world of Dostoevsky is dominated by precepts which are basic to Christian philosophy 
deepened by Christian mysticism’.129 Avril Pyman argues for the existence of an 
Orthodox ‘semiosphere’ – a cultural system of signs steeped in the Orthodox tradition 
from within which Dostoevsky (amongst others) writes, drawing attention to both the 
religious elements which might be rightfully discerned within Dostoevsky’s literature, 
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together with the dangers of over-interpretation which, he maintains, occur all too easily 
in such studies.
130
 Here Rowan Williams is in agreement, noting that the extent to which 
Dostoevsky might truly be called an ‘Orthodox’ novelist is open to debate, although 
nonetheless remaining open to that which might be gained from an engagement with the 
spiritual aspects of the author’s works.131 
 
In particular, Dostoevsky’s engagement with Russian spirituality is manifest in the form 
of a prioritising of suffering – a practice embraced within the Orthodox belief system as 
part of kenosis, or self-emptying, whereby the individual accepts poverty, simplicity 
and self-humiliation as part of what it is to follow Christ in his suffering.
132
 The theme 
of suffering is pervasive throughout Dostoevsky’s works: Alyosha Karamazov is sent 
by Zossima to experience suffering in the world outside of the monastery; Raskolnikov 
suffers after murdering the old pawn-broker woman in a vain attempt to prove his own 
nature; Stavrogin is tortured to the point of suicide by the guilt he suffers for his 
misguided actions.
133
 Such suffering, however, is not an empty or hopeless process, but 
rather one which plays an important role in the creation of the human person. As John 
Simons puts it: ‘...Dostoevsky felt that man must make his way through the machinery 
of life and suffering in order to become aware of life's real value – which is freedom’.134 
This is not to valorise suffering in any way, as Rowan Williams is keen to point out, but 
rather that, in Dostoevsky, ‘[s]uffering confers a certain authority. We learn from it. 
Dostoevsky is often accused of masochism. But he’s not saying suffering is good for 
you. He’s saying suffering is how you are likely to learn. Don’t be frightened when it 
happens to you.’135  
 
This acceptance of suffering is further embedded, it might be argued, deep within the 
very nature of what it is to be Russian – as part of the phenomenon that is the ‘Russian 
                                               
130 Avril Pyman, ‘Dostoevsky in the Prism of the Orthodox Semiosphere’, in Dostoevsky and the 
Christian Tradition ed. by George Pattison & Diane Oenning Thompson (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), pp. 103-115 (pp. 104-105) 
131 For more on this see Rowan Williams, Dostoevsky: Language, Faith and Fiction (London: 
Continuum, 2008), pp. 189-190 & pp. 211-212 
132 George P. Fedetov, ‘Religious Background of Russian Culture’, Church History, 12:1 (1943), 35-51 
(pp. 44-45) 
133 Chapple, ‘Catalogue of Suffering’, p. 94; Fyodor Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazov trans. by 
David McDuff (London: Penguin Books, 2003); Fyodor Dostoevsky, Crime and Punishment trans. by 
David McDuff (London: Penguin Books, 2003); Fyodor Dostoevsky, The Devils (The Possessed) trans. 
by David Magarshack (London: Penguin Books, 1971) 
134
 John D. Simons, ‘The Nature of Suffering in Schiller and Dostoevsky’, Comparative Literature, 19:2 
(1967), 160-173 (p. 163) 
135 Rowan Williams, as cited in L. Chamberlain, ‘Rowan Williams’, Prospect. 
http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/2007/05/rowanwilliams/ (26.5.2007; accessed 22.02.2011) 
153 
 
soul’.136 As Russian philosopher Nikolai Berdiaev puts it: ‘The problem of suffering 
stands at the center of Dostoevsky’s creation. And in this he is very Russian. The 
Russian is capable of enduring suffering (vynosit’ stradanie) better than the Westerner 
is, and at the same time he is exceptionally sensitive to suffering, he is more 
compassionate (bole sostradatelen) than the Western person.’137 Dostoevsky himself is 
cited as saying that, ‘[e]ven in its happiness, the Russian people feel it essential to have 
an element of suffering, otherwise its cup of happiness could not be full’.138 Suffering 
therefore takes on mystical properties, becoming even ‘a source of energy, a reason to 
love life’.139 Dostoevsky again: ‘I believe that the main and most fundamental spiritual 
quest of the Russian people is their craving for suffering – perpetual and unquenchable 
suffering – everywhere and in everything...it gushes from the people's very heart’.140 
 
A second, related, feature of Russian Orthodoxy of prominence in the works of 
Dostoevsky is that of the icon. Deriving from the Greek eikona meaning image or 
portrait (ikona in Russian, and frequently used with obraz or ‘image’), the icon and its 
veneration form distinctive aspects of the Orthodox faith in general and of Russian 
spirituality in particular.
141
 The traditions of iconography and icon veneration originated 
in Byzantium in the late fourth century and became widespread practices until the 
iconoclasm of the eighth century deemed such activities unacceptable and even 
idolatrous. The cult of the icon was eventually re-established by the second Nicene 
Council in 787CE, which stated that to reject icons is to reject the incarnation. 
Following a second period of iconoclasm in the early ninth century, the practice was 
eventually restored by Empress Theodora in 843CE. Iconography spread to Russia after 
the conversion of the country to Christianity in 988CE, and here rapidly developed a 
distinctive Russian form, as exemplified by the work of Andrei Rublev in the fourteenth 
and fifteenth centuries.
142
  
 
The icon itself exists as representation of and expression for the divine. Regarded in 
contemplative veneration, it is the archetype portrayed and not its image that is truly 
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adored.
143
 Thus icons remain as imperfect images, although, as Rowan Williams points 
out, this imperfection does not negate their importance. ‘There is’, he maintains, ‘a 
distinction between saying that the ultimate truth of God is incapable of being captured 
definitively by any picture or idea and saying that the truth of God is radically different 
from what is represented’.144 Therefore it is not that the image is dishonest in itself, but 
rather that it becomes this way only if the nature of representation is not properly 
appreciated and understood.
145
 
 
In the works of Dostoevsky, an icon is often used to take on a role of particular 
significance. As Sophie Ollivier puts it, the icon ‘testifies to Russian Orthodox faith, 
protects from evil and expresses the renewal of creative forces which can be fulfilled 
only through great sufferings’.146 ‘The presence of icons is never fortuitous in 
Dostoevsky’s works’, but rather always fulfils a particular purpose within plots and 
exists in certain relationships to characters, often enabling them to reveal – and even 
helping to shape – their inner selves.147 Icons are of central importance in both The 
Landlady, in which the reactions of the main characters to icons of the Mother of God 
speak of the natures of their faiths, or lack thereof, and also in The Idiot, where an icon 
represents the (albeit ignored) possibility of transformation and rebirth.
148
 It is in the 
relatively minor portrayals of icons in a number of Dostoevsky’s other works, however, 
that the interest of this present study of the Seventh Symphony lies, for it is in these that 
the relationship between the icon and suffering comes to be particularly explored. 
 
(b) Icons in Dostoevsky 
 
As a writer and also an artist, a fundamental aspect of Dostoevsky’s work was the 
creation of a lik – a ‘face’ that expresses an ‘idea’.149 Studying the faces of others was 
both a favourite pastime and also an essential part of his creative process: ‘When I 
wander about the streets I enjoy examining certain total strangers, studying their faces 
and trying to guess who they are, how they live, what they work at, and what is in their 
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minds at this particular moment’.150 For him, value is to be found not simply in the 
human life, but in the human facial image, representing as it does the ‘quality of single 
and unrepeatable individuality: the unity...of the internal (the ‘idea’) and the external 
(the face)... A man’s face is the image of his personality, his spirit, his human worth’.151 
Dostoevsky’s works, therefore, might be conceived as a collection of individual images, 
a ‘whole little gallery of family portraits’, although in reality, his literary portraits are 
far subtler than this, presenting us not with actual portrayals but rather with ‘the 
impression made by one man in the eyes of another, as they together make contact with 
and/or are repelled by Beauty/Truth’.152 In a sense, then, these images might be 
considered akin to those of the icon, which is also concerned with the evocation of the 
likeness between man and God.
153
  
 
For Dostoevsky, the highest expression of love is to ‘gaze lovingly into the face of a 
person, to seek spiritual communion with his or her lik’; by contrast, the greatest display 
of hatred is the destruction of a portrait.
154
 Violence against icons thus becomes doubly 
significant, representative of the sacrilegious destruction of God’s lik, but also 
containing a very human element of personal defacement.
155
 In A Raw Youth, the 
nobleman Versilov smashes an icon in an act which symbolises both his split 
personality and his (ultimately ineffectual) rejection of iconic spirituality. The title 
character of The Meek One pawns an icon, causing it to assume an ambiguous status as 
spiritual artefact and yet at the same time as commercial entity. Fyodor in The Brothers 
Karamazov threatens to spit on the icon of his wife, whose piety he can neither 
understand nor tolerate.
156
 Here, however, I shall be focusing on the desecration of icons 
as portrayed in one of Dostoevsky’s novels in particular – his 1872 work The Devils. 
 
Icons and their various destructions appear repeatedly throughout Devils.
157
 In one such 
event, an icon of the Mother of God is stolen from its place outside a church in the 
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town. Jewels are removed from its metal frame and a live mouse set to scurry inside the 
now empty glass casing. Amid the distraught outcries of the townspeople, a couple of 
young men push their way to the front of the crowd to throw an insultingly small 
offering into the collection plate. One onlooker, however – the beautiful Lizaveta 
Nikolaevna, whose increasing attraction to Stavrogin forms a part of the backdrop to the 
chapter – kneels in veneration before the absent icon and offers her diamond earrings to 
the collection.
158
  
 
Later in this section of the novel, a conversation takes place between the irresponsible 
and erratic intellectual Stepan Verkhovensky and his wealthy and influential patron, 
Vavara Stavrogina. Stepan is proposing to talk about the holy image of the Sistine 
Madonna at a forthcoming literary event; Vavara is adamant that he should not, fearing 
that his outdated appreciation of its aesthetic values will appear foolish in relation to 
contemporary intellectual judgements of the piece: ‘No one finds anything remarkable 
in it now, neither Russians nor the English’.159 Despite her efforts, Stepan will not be 
dissuaded, but rather strengthens his resolve to speak out against the ‘fashionable, 
rational, utilitarian spirit’ which he observes to be taking over the society in which they 
live, and which he feels has lost sight of what has true meaning and importance.
160
 
 
For Rowan Williams, these passages essentially have to do with the importance of 
sacrilege and desecration in the identification of that which is holy. In Dostoevsky, 
argues Williams, the diabolical results from the inability to understand loss – from the 
failure to grasp signification or depth. This is the case with Fyodor Karamazov, who 
appears to be incapable of relating in any way to the icon in his possession.
161
 In Devils, 
however, although she may not fully comprehend the meaning of the icon when present, 
Lizaveta nonetheless understands what it means for it to be lost. Similarly Stepan, 
despite his personal shortcomings, is still able to appreciate the truly human (the value 
of the picture) in the midst of the falsely human (the priorities of his society). Thus 
Dostoevsky highlights the difference between those who, despite the imperfections of 
their own lives, remain open to the possibility of a greater truth, and those who fail to 
make this realisation. As Williams puts it: ‘The difference is between someone whose 
evildoing “inhabits” a world in which acts have meanings because persons bear the 
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image of God, and someone whose evil is...essentially a refusal to belong in any world 
at all, to belong in bodies, histories and limits’.162 
 
So whilst Lizaveta and Stepan might be sinners, they do not become diabolical. 
Likewise, the escaped convict Fedka, who elsewhere in the novel steals jewels from 
icons and yet continues to believe in God, nonetheless retains the ability to recognise 
that ‘life has a meaning which he does not control’, and so there remains something of 
the icon about him: however disfigured, he remains to some extent an image of the 
truth.
163
 These passages therefore point towards what Williams identifies as a ‘basic 
polarity’ within Dostoevsky’s moral world, where people are divided not into ‘good’ 
and ‘bad’ but rather into ‘those who acknowledge their iconic dimension and those who 
struggle to resist or extinguish it’: for Dostoevsky, ‘...ethics is not about good and evil; 
it’s about truth and falsehood, reality and illusion. The right way to live doesn’t amount 
to a series of approved actions. It’s about living in recognition of reality.’164 
 
Here, observes Williams, Dostoevsky is making a number of points about the visual 
representation of that which is holy. Firstly, the icon is not merely an imitation of reality 
but is rather a transparency through which this reality might be seen: icons are ‘“true” 
images not because they reproduce something absent but because they express, and give 
vehicle for, something present’.165 So within the desecrated sacred image is contained 
something of the tension of the actual world, and in this way it provides a point of 
reference from which we might derive the significance of human action.
166
 What is 
more, in this the icon exists not simply as object but also as narrative, created by the life 
of the person who, through their embracing of presence, becomes iconic.
167
 The broken 
icon is thus symbolic for what it is to lose touch with, although not lose sight of, that 
which is essential to meaningful life.  
 
Further, Dostoevsky’s portrayal of the icon necessarily involves a Christological 
dimension in the form of a kenotic emphasis. As the vehicle for conveying the limitless 
world of the divine into the limited world which we inhabit – as sign of the ‘primordial 
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icon’ that is the eternal image of God as incarnate in Christ – the icon entails ‘the 
coexistence of infinite abundance with historical limitation...only thinkable in 
connection with a divine self-withholding, a voluntary absence that most powerfully 
testifies to loving presence’.168 In placing such importance on the acceptance of 
limitation, and therefore on suffering, Dostoevsky argues for resistance against placing 
the notion of invulnerability at the centre of human identity.
169
 For Williams, the idea 
which Dostoevsky is trying to get at here is that ‘it is in the nature of sacred images to 
be capable of desecration, and that what makes them sacred is not some magical 
invulnerability...but their capacity to retain in themselves the real energy of another 
world’.170 The icon, therefore, as reflection of and window on the incarnation, likewise 
portrays something of this vulnerability. As Williams puts it: ‘A true image of it will 
necessarily be something that can be broken or spat upon; a narrative image is one that 
has endured something of the self-disfiguring of rebellious individualism. Take away 
the ‘kenotic’ story at the centre, and the complex unfolding of true images in narratives 
of sin and forgiveness, rupture or suffering and enduring presence, loses its logic.’171 
 
Icons in Dostoevsky also perform a vital role in making visible the ‘assumption of 
plentitude’, that is, in questioning that which prevents human flourishing.172 Stepan 
eventually makes his plea for the meaningfulness of the Sistine Madonna in a society 
that is increasingly losing sight of that which matters more than simple social harmony, 
arguing, albeit ineffectually, for ‘a recognition that beauty is more important than 
science or bread, because there is no impulse to invent anything in a world without 
beauty and nothing to live for if our only concern is to guarantee that we all stay 
alive’.173 Although he is not without serious faults, Stepan has nonetheless grasped 
something of the importance of avoiding the reduction of human possibility: he has 
realised that ‘a humanity with its problems definitely solved is no longer human’.174  
 
Finally, Dostoevsky challenges us to consider what might become of a world in which 
there are no icons. Such a world, he seems to suggest, would be lacking in the very 
qualities which Stepan is so desperately seeking to preserve; it would be a world in 
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which those points of reference which enable a recognition of presence no longer 
exist.
175
 Here we are returned to the central question of Dostoevsky’s moral world to 
which we referred above, now expressed as the conflict between ‘a world in which 
image, word, and presence are realities that create transformation by addressing the 
human subject from outside their own frame of reference and one in which there is no 
such dimension to reality and no such register for speech’.176 Without icons, 
Dostoevsky would appear to be saying, the revelation of that higher plane which 
enables us to negotiate the depth of human life is prevented: the holy – ‘that which 
sustains an infinite perspective on the worth or dignity of every other’ – is denied.177 
 
(c) The Seventh Symphony as Musical Icon 
 
For Edith Matus, the Seventh Symphony ‘inspired us and brought us back to life’. 
‘Music is life’, she says; ‘after all, what is life without music?’ As I discussed in chapter 
two, the romanticised notion of art as intrinsically revelatory is problematic, both 
theologically and in terms of wider human life. To this we might add the view of P. T. 
Forsyth, for whom the aesthetic is not, in and of itself, ethically instrumental. ‘If Art is 
to be raised’, he tells us, ‘it is the public that must be raised. And that Art cannot do. It 
is not an evangelist, or a prophet, or a moral reformer.’178 Similarly, Tzvetan Todorov, 
reflecting on the crimes committed during the war by those in command of the 
concentration camps, notes how a love of art does not necessarily translate into a high 
moral standing. “Could people who love music’, he asks, ‘...people who can cry when 
they hear it, be capable, at the same time, of committing so many atrocities on the rest 
of humanity?”... Alas, they can be.’179 ‘Recent arguments in defense of culture’, he 
continues, ‘all of them more or less conscious avatars of Enlightenment thought, seem 
based on a total disregard of the caveat that cultural growth need not have a moral 
corollary. Intellectual pursuits may lead to material abundance, but they do not prevent 
our moral frailty.’180 Thus the aesthetic, although clearly of deep importance, cannot be 
allowed to become of ultimate importance. Perhaps it is rather the case, then, that the 
Seventh Symphony takes on, for those such as Edith Matus who respond so strongly to 
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its themes, something of the quality of an icon – that it becomes, in the Dostoevskian 
sense of the word, iconic. In this way, we might begin to understand the work as a 
musical representation of and vehicle for the expression of the holy: as a transparency 
onto that presence without which the worth of life is denied. 
 
The extent to which Shostakovich was directly affected by the Orthodox traditions 
discussed in this chapter remains a difficult question to answer. As a child of the Soviet 
era, he was raised an atheist in a society in which religion was banned and in which 
many of the traditions of the old Russia had been re-written. However, this is by no 
means to suggest that the composer remained completely immune to his wider cultural 
heritage; he, too, dwells within the ‘semiosphere’ of which Pyman speaks and, most 
notably, it would appear that the influence upon him of the Russian literary tradition 
was particularly profound. My argument, then, is that at the core of the Seventh 
Symphony there lie meanings which resonate deeply with the themes which Dostoevsky 
so skilfully portrays, and which relate in particular to his understanding of the icon. 
 
To suggest that the iconic might be found in non-visual, and even non-sacred, art is not 
new. Dostoevsky himself, argues Williams, employs the figure of the ‘narrative icon’, 
whilst for Barth, in the music of Mozart, turned as it is towards the light of the 
resurrection, we are enabled to hear the peace which passes understanding, that is, to 
glimpse an iconic dimension signifying the possibility of life transcended and right 
relations restored. But what of the Seventh Symphony? Whatever the work might be 
said to convey, it would seem clear that it is not the peace of God, given that it has as its 
subject a very different theme – that of war. 
 
However, whilst overtly presented as a piece concerned with ideas of a military or 
nationalistic intent, the Symphony nonetheless has at its heart far more humanitarian 
concerns – concerns which are also of paramount importance within the fictional world 
of Dostoevsky. Interviewed on the process of writing the work, Shostakovich was 
recorded as saying of it: ‘I was guided by a great love for the man in the street...love for 
people who have become the bulwark of culture, civilisation and life. I have written my 
symphony about them and others like them because I love them from the bottom of my 
heart.’181 Such love in the midst of suffering, or at least an intense dislike for the cause 
of that suffering, is referred to by Kozintsev, who puts it thus: ‘In Russian we have a 
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wonderful word – virulent. No good exists in Russian art without a virulent hatred of all 
that degrades man. In Shostakovich’s music I hear a virulent hatred of cruelty, of the 
cult of power, of the persecution of truth...’182 Ideas of love which survives barbarity are 
present throughout the main themes of this work, as identified by its programme – the 
mother’s tears, a requiem which mourns those whom we have lost – and thus the work 
as a whole is concerned not simply with matters of nationalistic pride, but also with the 
recognition of what stands to be lost in war, which, in the end, amounts to those very 
things that we are fighting to save. As Robert Dearling puts it: ‘Shostakovich provided a 
synthesis not only of war but also of all the things to be preserved by the struggle’.183  
 
So the Seventh Symphony is fundamentally a depiction of the suffering, brokenness and 
vulnerability of the Leningraders, and yet also of that which still remained despite the 
War. We might perhaps sense this best through the responses to the work of both the 
performers and audience present at the premier in Leningrad, for whom it spoke of 
solidarity in suffering and the will to survive. The Symphony served to make those who 
heard it aware of the depth of human life and also of what is at stake when that depth is 
denied: it showed how that which is holy, valued or cherished might become all the 
more apparent when set against the backdrop of its destruction, yet without losing a 
vital sense of spirit or energy. The Seventh Symphony, then, paints a musical picture of 
what it is to lose touch with, but not lost sight of, presence: it paints for us a 
Dostoevskian broken icon.     
 
Through the exploration of what is at stake in war – through the portrayal of war not 
naturalistically but emotionally, and primarily expressed through the theme of love in 
barbarity or grief at suffering – the work further constitutes the recognition of there 
being a meaning to life which lies outside our control. It gives musical voice to what it 
is to understand the experience of loss: it speaks of what it is to live in the presence of 
immeasurable value and to have the capacity to comprehend when this reality is broken 
or deformed. In this way, the work stands as a marker of the humane and the 
humanising – of that which, for Dostoevsky, makes us iconic rather than demonic. What 
is more, in so doing, it exists as a sign of human flourishing for, as was grasped by those 
who, during the Siege, drew hope from its performance, it forms the musical 
representation of the possibilities which exist for humankind, in spite of, and at times 
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precisely because of, the experience of suffering. Here the kenotic element of the 
icon comes into play, for this is a work which is complete only through its 
incompleteness – which is fully realised only through the acceptance of those very 
things it signifies against.
184
 
 
A world without icons, Dostoevsky tells us, would be infinitely the poorer, for it would 
lack a register of speech to enable us to relate to that dimension of reality which lies 
outside our own frame of reference: it would no longer be able to recognise presence. 
Stepan’s narrative has already expressed the truth of D. H. Lawrence that ‘the human 
soul needs actual beauty more than it needs bread’, and through the character of Prince 
Myshkin in The Idiot, Dostoevsky goes so far as to suggest that ‘beauty will redeem the 
world’.185 As I have noted, we cannot equate art with salvation, but there remains within 
the icon an element of the artistic transformation of reality into the envisaging of 
another realm of life – a way of interpreting existence without which humanity would 
be less than human. Roger Scruton, as we saw in the second chapter, alludes to this 
when he speaks of the value of music in human life. Music matters, he argues, in a way 
that goes beyond mere appearance: the aesthetic is fundamental to our perception of 
reality, shaping how we view our place in the world and marking us out as distinctively 
human. It was precisely this element of the aesthetic which Stalin’s dictates regarding 
the arts were designed to manipulate and control, but which nonetheless finds 
expression in at least some of the music of Shostakovich, and in particularly genuine 
and poignant form in his Seventh Symphony.  
 
The icon, writes Williams, ‘does not leave the world unchanged. Response to what the 
icon opens up draws more out of the icon itself: it is not something that we can finish 
with, interpretatively or imaginatively’.186 This continual process of the enabling and 
exemplifying of transformation, of the creating of an ongoing dialogue between icon 
and observer, starts for the Seventh Symphony with those musicians such as Edith 
Matus, whose performance of the work in the besieged city spoke to orchestra and 
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audience alike of the possibility of hope in the midst of destruction and the denial of 
human dignity and potential. From here, as Eliasberg realised, it was to spread 
throughout Russia, and then throughout the world, as a symbol of the victory of 
humanity over the ‘soulless machine’. And for us today, removed as we are from the 
context fundamental to the creation of the meaning of the work, although not from other 
instances of the inhumane, its message of the possibility of transformation in the face of 
brokenness and despair doubtless still remains as of the greatest significance. 
 
Dostoevsky’s exploration of the iconic, therefore, gives us the theological language to 
talk about the significance which the Seventh Symphony holds for many. The work 
demonstrates musically that which is expressed through many of the writer’s novels: 
that destruction is needed for transformation; that redemption occurs only out of 
suffering; that there exists a profound spiritual depth which comes precisely through the 
darkest experience. It shows us, too, how the aesthetic might be understood as of central 
importance to the recognition of presence, and thus to the transformation of humanity. 
The Seventh Symphony, then, perceived in the light of the Russian Orthodox tradition 
mediated by Dostoevsky as a musical icon, depicts the role of desecration in the true 
realisation of the holy, and the place of art in revealing the depths of human life.  
 
Having here shown that theological engagement with musical expressivity need 
not result in a ‘religion of aestheticism’, I turn in my next chapter to consider 
how an understanding of music as an expression of human interiority might be 
theologically embraced. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
The ‘Song of the Self’ 
The String Quartets 
 
 
Following the publication of ‘Muddle Instead of Music’ in Pravda in 1936, 
Shostakovich had been left with the choice of either not writing any more music, or 
only writing music that would not prove antagonistic to the Soviet authorities. For him, 
ceasing to compose altogether was simply not an option. As Wendy Lesser puts it: 
‘...silence was never a real possibility... If he was not a composer, he was nothing’.1 To 
have left the country, as did many of his contemporaries, was by this time no longer 
legal, and illegal defection would have endangered not only his own life but also those 
of his wife and young daughter. In any case, his ability to earn a living abroad was far 
from certain, given that his knowledge of the music profession was rooted firmly in 
Soviet Russia with its particular system of financial support for the arts and, practical 
issues aside, his attachment to his homeland was such that leaving it was not a thought 
that he could ever realistically entertain.
2
 
 
So Shostakovich continued to write full-scale symphonies but adopted a style which, as 
we have seen, if not entirely resigned to the Soviet ideal, was nonetheless often 
designed at least in part to placate the Party officials and thus ensure both his personal 
and professional safety. In order to earn a living (he had lost both of his professorships 
and thus a considerable proportion of his income during the ‘Muddle Instead of Music’ 
incident), he composed music for films, later going on to produce the scores for 
Grigoriy Kozintsev’s Hamlet (1963-64) and King Lear (1970).3 In addition to these 
more public works, however, Shostakovich also worked on a third kind of music – his 
‘desk drawer’ music, consisting of the compositions he wanted personally to write but 
which may not have been deemed acceptable by the authorities. These works were filed 
away, hidden from the public eye, and often performed only in front of a select few. 
 
                                               
1 Lesser, Music for Silenced Voices, p. 25 
2 Lesser, Music for Silenced Voices, pp. 24-25 
3 Lesser, Music for Silenced Voices, p. 87; Fay, Shostakovich, pp. 350-351 
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Among these more discreet compositions were many pieces for chamber ensembles and, 
in particular, a number of works for string quartet. This was a medium which 
Shostakovich, like many others before him, would come to favour as a relatively safe 
outlet for individual expression. Requiring fewer musicians and a smaller amount of 
space than works scored for larger forces, music for the string quartet could be 
performed in the private setting of a house rather than on the public platform required 
by orchestral works, and this would no doubt have proved an attractive option for the 
composer, working as he was in an environment of close public scrutiny and official 
critique. As Helga Landauer puts it: 
 
Writing quartet music was the closest he could come to being a poet who just 
picked up a pencil and wrote for himself, after playing for himself on the piano. 
The smallest model of the universe, the first acoustic. Nothing is required for 
these four people to come play: they are the closest friends, they can just come. 
With a symphony, you have to ask how and whom. These were the four who 
were always on his side.
4
 
 
In chamber music, then, and in the string quartet in particular, Shostakovich ‘could toy 
with cacophony, immerse himself in irony, indulge in all his darkest, least acceptable 
moods, and not be called unpatriotic, because nobody who cared about such labels was 
listening to these compositions’.5 
 
Shostakovich’s turning to the string quartet might be understood as having ideological 
as well as practical functions. Whereas the full symphony orchestra might be taken as 
representative of the lost individualism of mass society, and solo genres as the rebelling 
of the individual against the state, the string quartet, by contrast, presents the ‘ideal 
society in which musicians look to each other for guidance’: it is a ‘metaphorical 
democracy...of four equal players’.6 Indeed, the string quartet in particular is renowned 
amongst all the chamber ensembles for the way in which, at the highest level of 
musicianship, the timbres of the four instruments combine to form the sound of a single, 
unified whole. ‘When you have a piano trio’, writes Peter Cropper, ‘it is three soloists. 
                                               
4 Helga Landauer, as cited in Lesser, Music for Silenced Voices, p. 278 
5
 Lesser, Music for Silenced Voices, p. 178 
6 Lesser, Music for Silenced Voices, p. 42. For Mendelssohn, however, the string quartet is rather ‘the 
most sublime form of democratic anarchy you can imagine’! 4 Better 4 Worse: The Anatomy of a String 
Quartet. BBC4. 17th April 2009 
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[But] when you have a string quartet it becomes a new instrument’.7 Such an idealised 
vision of social harmony and democratic utopia would doubtless have held great appeal 
for Shostakovich, presenting as it did an image far removed from the reality of politics 
in Stalinist and post-Stalinist Russia.
8
 
 
As a more private means of personal expression, then, Shostakovich’s string quartets 
offer a unique insight into the composer’s inner world. As his widow, Irina 
Shostakovich, puts it: they are ‘a kind of “diary” that records “the story of the soul”’.9 
For Lev Ginzburg, the intimate reflection of the life of the individual afforded by the 
quartets becomes particularly apparent when they are viewed in relation to several of 
the composer’s symphonies, most notably the Eleventh and Twelfth, which, he argues, 
were written as ‘concessions to the rulers’, and as such display ‘all his mastery, but 
without a trace of his soul’.10 In the string quartets, by contrast, Shostakovich no longer 
had to resort to such self-censorship but rather could remain honest to himself. Philip 
Setzer puts it thus: 
 
I think art definitely can lie, or at least not tell the truth. I think Shostakovich 
wrote a lot of lies in his music, sometimes sacrificing the whole work: maybe in 
a moment of weakness, maybe because he had a sense of the bigger picture and 
wanted to preserve his ability to keep writing music... As much as I love 
Shostakovich – and the greatest of the symphonies are pinnacles of their kind – I 
think there’s a greater percentage of truth in the quartets than in anything else 
he wrote.
11
 
 
One of Shostakovich’s earliest childhood memories, he tells us, was of listening to his 
neighbours playing string quartets, his ear pressed up against the wall of their 
apartment.
12
 It was not until May 1938, however, after the successful premiere of his 
Fifth Symphony, that he began work on a quartet of his own, in the first of what would 
                                               
7 Peter Cropper, 4 Better 4 Worse 
8 Lesser, Music for Silenced Voices, p. 43 
9 Irina Shostakovich, as paraphrased in Lesser, Music for Silenced Voices, p. 3. Such a sentiment is also 
expressed by Peter Cropper, who argues that quartets have as their aim that of bringing out the deepest 
emotions and most intimate thoughts of the composer. Unlike an orchestra or brass ensemble, the quartet 
does not produce an enormous sound, and unlike the soloist, it does not try to reach out to the audience. 
Rather, the job of the string quartet is to bring the audience in. Cropper, 4 Better 4 Worse 
10 Lev Ginzburg, as cited in Lesser, Music for Silenced Voices, p. 285 
11 Philip Setzer, as cited in Lesser, Music for Silenced Voices, p. 284 
12 Dmitri Shostakovich, as cited in Wilson, in Lesser, Music for Silenced Voices, p. 34 
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be a total of fifteen recourses to the genre.
13
 Now aged thirty-one, this was the first time 
since his late teens that he had set to work on a musical form completely new to him, 
and as he himself notes, ‘the quartet is one of the most difficult musical genres’.14 That 
he was following in the footsteps of masters of the quartet including Haydn, Mozart, 
Schubert and Beethoven would doubtless have added to the pressure.
15
 
 
In Beethoven, it has been argued, the string quartet was pushed to the limits of musical 
possibility: now Shostakovich set about taking it one stage further. By nature a self-
exposing medium, it was here made even more so, with all traces of the sonorous 
tradition of Brahms stripped away until only the most basic tenets of the form remained. 
This, when combined with periods of silence either for some or all of the instruments 
simultaneously, enabled Shostakovich to introduce to the quartet his characteristic 
sparseness of timbre. In addition to the obsessive repetition and sudden changes of key 
and tempi to be found throughout the majority of his works, here he also made use of 
techniques specific to stringed instruments, such as pizzicato and double stopping, and 
in so doing disrupted the traditional eighteenth-century distinction between melody- and 
rhythm-carrying voices. The resulting works thus served to redefine how the string 
quartet might sound, and did so in a way that paid no heed to the Socialist Realist 
guidelines for a ‘simple and popular musical language accessible to all’.16 Instead, they 
paint for us an increasingly vivid picture of a ‘world of purgatorial numbness’, written 
as they were in response to the composer’s darkest moments of despair and recurrent 
thoughts about death.
17
 
 
Shostakovich composed his quartets over a period of some thirty-six years – a time span 
which took in major events in the life of the Russian state as well as significant 
developments in the life of the composer himself. In this chapter, I shall explore three of 
these works which, when taken together, provide a sense of the overall scope of his 
writing for the genre, and give something of an insight into that which he sought to 
express through this most personal form of art.  
                                               
13 Shostakovich had initially intended to write twenty-four quartets – one for each key, as with his 
Preludes and Fugues – although did not live to see his ambition realised. Fay, Shostakovich, p. 216 
14 Dmitri Shostakovich, as cited in Fay, Shostakovich, p. 111. As Mendelssohn puts it: ‘For a composer, 
the string quartet is the ultimate test. For the listener, it is the most refined relation with music they can 
have. Four instruments very much alike and a little bit different that tell a story.’ 4 Better 4 Worse 
15 Lesser, Music for Silenced Voices, p. 40 
16
 Lesser, Music for Silenced Voices, p. 40 & pp. 43-44 
17 David Fanning & Laurel Fay, ‘Shostakovich, Dmitri’, Grove Music Online. 
www.oxfordmusiconline.com/subscriber/article/grove/music/52560pg5 (2011; accessed 09.11.2011); 
Lesser, Music for Silenced Voices, p. 13 
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I. The Second String Quartet 
 
(a) Context 
 
In 1926, twenty-year-old Shostakovich was attending an oral exam in Marxism-
Leninism at the Leningrad Conservatory in order to be admitted for postgraduate study. 
Also taking the exam that day was a young man named Ivan Sollertinsky – talented, 
erudite and only a few years older than Shostakovich. The composer recalls the event: 
 
Before the exam I was extremely nervous. We were examined in alphabetical 
order. Presently, Sollertinsky was called in by the commission. He came out 
again very quickly. I plucked up courage and asked him: “Please would you tell 
me, was the exam very difficult?” “No, not at all,” he answered. “What did they 
ask you?” “The simplest of questions: the origins of materialism in Ancient 
Greece; the poetry of Sophocles as an expression of materialist tendencies; 
English seventeenth-century philosophers and something else as well [which 
Shostakovich was unable to recall].” Need I add that Ivan Ivanovich’s account 
of the exam instilled me with terror!
18
 
 
Although initially overwhelmed by Sollertinsky’s abilities, it was not long before 
Shostakovich had announced to his younger sister, Zoya, that he had made a ‘wonderful 
new friend’.19 She says of it: ‘They had an insane friendship. Sollertinsky came to see 
us every day in the morning and stayed until the evening. They spent the whole day 
together, laughing and chuckling... On the days they didn’t meet, Mitya and Ivan 
Ivanovich wrote to each other’.20 The two were ‘kindred spirits uniquely able to 
challenge and divert each other’; for Shostakovich, it was almost as though he had 
found another wife.
21
 
 
A talented philosopher, linguist and cultural historian, Sollertinsky lectured at many 
academic institutions in Leningrad and, although his knowledge of music was largely 
self-taught, grew to become a distinguished critic, first of music theatre and ballet, and 
                                               
18 Dmitri Shostakovich, as cited in Fay, Shostakovich, pp. 41-42. Although having first been introduced in 
1921, it was this second meeting that was to prove unforgettable. 
19
 Dmitri Shostakovich, as cited in Lesser, Music for Silenced Voices, p. 54 
20 Zoya Shostakovich, as cited in Fay, Shostakovich, p. 42 
21 Fay, Shostakovich, pp. 42-43; Lesser, Music for Silenced Voices, p. 55. Sollertinsky was also 
responsible for introducing Shostakovich to a number of other close friends, including Isaak Glikman. 
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later of the symphonic repertoire. It was Sollertinsky who encouraged Shostakovich’s 
interest in the music of Mahler, which was to prove highly influential in the 
development of his compositional style, and he remained one the few people willing to 
speak honestly of Shostakovich’s works, even when that meant risking official 
disapproval. Shostakovich valued greatly the professional opinion of his friend, and 
looked to him as a source of both inspiration and support.
22
 
 
During the War, Sollertinsky was evacuated from Leningrad to Novosibirsk, and among 
the few possessions taken with him were the precious letters written to him by 
Shostakovich.
23
 The two were able to meet occasionally in Novosibirsk in 1942 as 
Shostakovich attended rehearsals for the forthcoming performance of his Seventh 
Symphony and these were occasions of much joy.
24
 In the spring of 1943, Shostakovich 
managed to obtain a small apartment in Moscow and, in order to aid his move to the 
city, began to encourage his best friend to move there also. Sollertinsky would visit 
regularly, and at one such meeting in September 1943, Shostakovich played for him his 
newly-completed Eighth Symphony. They met again in the November of that year and 
further discussed their plans to transfer Sollertinsky to Moscow. This was to be the last 
time Shostakovich saw his friend: on 5
th
 and 6
th
 February 1944, Sollertinsky introduced 
premiere performances of the Eighth Symphony in Novosibirsk, and only five days 
later, on 11
th
 February, he suffered a sudden heart attack, collapsed and died. He was 
only forty-one.
25
  
 
With the War nearly over and his latest compositions in favour, life had been looking up 
for Shostakovich; now it fell apart. A sense of his utter devastation can be gained from 
his letter to Glikman of 13
th
 February: 
 
I must share with you bitter and most heartfelt condolences on the death of our 
closest and most beloved friend Ivan Ivanovich... We shall not see him again. I 
have no words with which to express the pain that wracks my entire being. May 
his memorial be our abiding love for him, and our faith in the inspired talent and 
                                               
22
 Fay, Shostakovich, pp. 42-43; Lesser, Music for Silenced Voices, pp. 55-56 
23 Lesser, Music for Silenced Voices, pp. 55-56 
24 Fay, Shostakovich, p. 132 
25 Fay, Shostakovich, pp. 141-142 
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phenomenal love for the art of music to which he devoted his matchless life. 
Ivan Ivanovich is no more. It is very hard to bear.
26 
 
 
The profound influence of Sollertinsky upon Shostakovich’s life and work, however, 
and the respect which the composer held for his friend and mentor, lived on. Whenever 
he finished a new composition, Shostakovich would ask himself, ‘And what would Ivan 
Ivanovich have said about this?’, and he would always be met by silence.27   
 
At the time of Sollertinsky’s death, Shostakovich had been working on his Piano Trio 
No. 2, which was to be his final foray into that particular musical genre. It was 
completed on 13
th
 August 1944 at the Ivanovo artists’ retreat and dedicated to the 
memory of Sollertinsky.
28
 On hearing the Trio’s second movement, Sollertinsky’s sister 
recognised ‘an amazingly exact portrait of Ivan Ivanovich, whom Shostakovich 
understood like no one else. That is his temper, his polemics, his manner of speech, his 
habit of returning to one and the same thought, developing it’.29 Lesser writes of the 
piece: ‘Those who knew Sollertinsky felt that the second movement...a haunting, lilting 
Allegro, perfectly mirrored the quicksilver intelligence of the man it honoured, and 
Shostakovich was no doubt eager to commemorate those years of shared jokes and 
sardonic laughter; but there is also a deep sadness to the piece...as well as the slowed-
down, quiet ending’.30 
 
The Second Piano Trio is very close in mood to that of a string quartet, and it might 
well have been this work which inspired the composer’s return to the form after a break 
of some six years.
31
 He wrote quickly, finishing the String Quartet No. 2 in A Major on 
20
th
 September 1944, less than a month after the completion of the Trio, and the piece 
was premiered by the Beethoven Quartet in Leningrad on 14
th
 November 1944.
32
 
                                               
26 Dmitri Shostakovich, in Glikman, Story of a Friendship, p. 24 
27 Lesser, Music for Silenced Voices, p. 53 
28 Fay, Shostakovich, pp. 141-143. Here Shostakovich was following the distinctively Russian tradition, 
also observed by Tchaikovsky and Rachmaninov, of composing musical memorials in the form of the 
piano trio. 
29 Fay, Shostakovich, p.143 
30 Lesser, Music for Silenced Voices, pp. 58-59 
31 Lesser, Music for Silenced Voices, p. 60. Judith Kuhn additionally points to a wartime growth in the 
composition of chamber music, fuelled by the founding of several notable string quartets together with 
the evacuation of composers to rural areas leading to the writing of folk-inspired works, as providing the 
perfect context for Shostakovich’s further exploration of the genre of the string quartet. Kuhn, 
Shostakovich in Dialogue, pp. 43-44 
32 Of the speed of his composition of the work, Shostakovich writes: ‘The process of music composition 
gives me no little concern and unrest. What bothers me is the lightning speed with which I compose. 
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Shostakovich dedicated the work to Vissarion Shebalin, a loyal friend and fellow 
composer, to mark the twentieth anniversary of their first acquaintance.
33
 However, the 
piece arguably honours not only Shebalin but also, once again, Sollertinsky. This delay 
in dedications was to happen several times over the course of Shostakovich’s career: the 
Twelfth Quartet, which was dedicated to the first violinist of the Beethoven Quartet, 
clearly reflects on the earlier death of its second violinist, to whom the Eleventh Quartet 
had been officially dedicated, whilst the Seventh Quartet was dedicated the memory of 
his late wife, Nina, even though he had written the Sixth Quartet immediately after her 
death.
34
 As Lesser points out, it is perhaps not surprising that it should take one or two 
compositions for the composer’s bereavements to sink in, and we should not take these 
discrepancies as meaning the dedications are insincere, but rather that ‘the dedicatee is, 
in each instance, also standing in for someone else’; after all, she remarks, ‘it would be 
natural for Shostakovich to associate his dead friend with the loyal and musically 
talented Shebalin’.35 
 
(b) Analysis and Interpretation 
 
In the same way that the official dedication of the Quartet seemingly distracts from its 
underlying intentions, so do the titles of the movements of the piece – Overture, 
Recitative and Romance, Waltz, and Theme and Variations – appear to serve as 
unemotional covers for the work’s true meaning. For Lesser, this conscious move away 
from a psychological or narrative programme has to do with resistance: ‘If 
Shostakovich is to be true to the memory of his strongly rational dead friend’, she 
writes, ‘he must not wallow self-pityingly in his grief...if he is to convey the profundity 
of his loss, he can best do so by not baring his soul too easily’. It is this inwardness, she 
argues, that is the key to the emotional power of quartets: ‘Something is being given to 
us freely, on the level where music and intuition converge, and something else is being 
withheld from us: that is the dynamic that makes the quartets both so moving and 
so mysterious’.36 
 
                                                                                                                                         
Without a doubt, it isn’t good. One shouldn’t compose as quickly as I do... It is exhausting, not 
particularly pleasant and, on conclusion, one has no confidence that the time hasn’t been wasted. But the 
bad habit reasserts itself and, as before, I compose too quickly.’ Dmitri Shostakovich, as cited in Fay, 
Shostakovich, p. 142 
33
 Fay, Shostakovich, p. 142 
34 Lesser, Music for Silenced Voices, pp.60-61; Fay, Shostakovich, p. 216 
35 Lesser, Music for Silenced Voices, pp. 60-61 
36 Lesser, Music for Silenced Voices, p. 61 
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The emphatic Moderato provides a ‘‘passionate assertion of vital human strength’ from 
which the rest of the work unfold[s]’.37 Opening with a theme on the violin (Fig. 5.1), 
which plays around with accentuation and is punctuated by chords in the other three 
instruments, and then featuring a secondary, dotted motif (Fig. 5.2), also in the first 
violin, the movement clearly alludes to the Jewish folk music tradition, with a klezmer-
like tonality and wailing quality to the highest notes. At [9], a quieter section is 
introduced, with a slower melody, derived from the opening theme, heard first in the 
violin and then in the cello with pizzicato accompaniment. This develops to include a 
countermelody comprising of rocking quavers which becomes increasingly forceful and 
prominent before a return to a modified version of the opening theme on the violin 
concludes the movement. The voice of the violin melody, then, provides the thread 
which leads us through the movement, and indeed through the whole of the Quartet, 
taking on a variety of differing emotions along the way. For Lesser, this is to be 
identified with the personality of Sollertinsky, and she writes of it: ‘This is a voice that 
is planning to keep us company for a while...to lead us into places that we may find both 
fearful and enjoyable, seductive and threatening... It is a strong voice, capable of snappy 
retorts and enlightening observations’.38 
 
Fig. 5.1: Shostakovich, String Quartet No. 2, Moderato, opening 
 
Fig. 5.2: Shostakovich, String Quartet No. 2, Moderato, [5] 
 
                                               
37 David Rabinovich, as cited in Kuhn, Shostakovich in Dialogue, p. 66 
38 Lesser, Music for Silenced Voices, p. 62 
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The Second Piano Trio had been Shostakovich’s first work to draw noticeably upon the 
traditions of klezmer music, and the Second Quartet remains one of his most overtly 
‘Jewish’ works.39 Such themes again link back to Sollertinsky, for he, too, held an 
appreciation for Jewish culture that went against the grain of popular opinion at the 
time. For some, this sympathy for, and even identification with, the Jews stemmed from 
a shared sense of oppression, and might even have taken the form of a political 
statement against the Soviet anti-Semitic regime. Others suggest the fact that many Jews 
were to be found in Russian intellectual and music circles of the day provided a natural 
connection to the Jewish cause. Alternatively, it might simply have been the case that 
Jewish folk music’s tendency to favour melodies in minor keys and its darkly humorous 
nature appealed to Shostakovich’s tastes, and that he was encouraged by Sollertinsky in 
the pursuit of such characteristics. In any case, Shostakovich’s use of Jewish melodies 
rapidly came to be associated with themes of tragedy, for as Judith Kuhn puts it: 
‘[Jewish music’s] undercurrent of sadness, its ‘laughter through tears’ seems to have 
provided Shostakovich with a wonderful language to say something he needed to say 
about trauma, the struggle to emerge from it, and the enduring injuries and scars 
that remain’.40 
 
In the second movement, the first violin continues to dominate, although here it is a 
very different voice to before – no longer bright and confident, but mournful and filled 
with occasional, uncertain silences. The movement begins with a recitative – a haunting, 
and once again Jewish-sounding, lament in the first violin accompanied by static, slow-
moving chords. The narrative device of opera, used to convey action and story, the style 
of recitative writing is akin to that of the spoken voice, and Shostakovich’s instrumental 
recitative here proves to be no exception, with the chromaticism of the violin melody 
mirroring the inflection of the spoken word.
41
 From here we are led into a short 
Romance – an initially beautiful waltz which becomes gradually more disturbed, with 
                                               
39 Kuhn, Shostakovich in Dialogue, pp. 44-46. Kuhn points to the music of three composers working in 
Russia in the early 1940s – Venyamin Fleischmann, Mieczyslaw Weinberg and Moisey Beregovsky – as 
providing for Shostakovich particularly rich resources of Jewish music. 
40 Lesser, Music for Silenced Voices, pp. 59-60; Kuhn, Shostakovich in Dialogue, p. 53. However, as 
Lesser points out, some of Shostakovich’s more explicitly Jewish music later came to be persecuted, for 
although the composer had followed the directives of Zhdanov and Stalin that he should draw more upon 
music from the folk traditions, the music from this particularly tradition had not been what they had in 
mind. Lesser, Music for Silenced Music, p. 90. For a more detailed examination of the influence of Jewish 
folk music on the works of Shostakovich and the resulting controversies, see Kuhn, Shostakovich in 
Dialogue, pp. 44-56 
41 Tsyganov once commented that the recitative of the Romance appeared to have been written with his 
personal performance style in mind. When he mentioned this to the composer, Shostakovich replied: 
‘Yes, indeed it was, Mitya. I wrote it for you’. Fyodor Druzhinin, in Wilson, Shostakovich, p. 440 
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frequent changes of time signature and increasingly dissonant harmonies. The 
movement concludes with a return to the opening recitative, this time punctuated by 
accented pizzicato chords in the violin, eventually dying away to leave the lingering 
sound of muted strings. For Kuhn, this movement is the image of ‘a dance that cannot 
quite dance wholeheartedly, of a struggle to move beyond grief without having 
experienced the full extent of its ravaging effects’.42 This sentiment is echoed by Lesser, 
for whom the violin voice now speaks of ‘intimacy, dependence and loss...professing its 
own weakness in the face of...death-dealt absence, and also its despair’.43 
 
Altogether the strangest movement is that of the Waltz. Here we are returned to the 
bright voice of the opening movement, but now it is a mere shadow of its former self. 
As Lesser puts it: it is as though ‘that first-violin self is no longer alive’ but rather 
‘moved by some force outside itself, compelled to do a dance of death’.44 The main 
theme of the movement, appearing initially in the cello, is once again deeply chromatic, 
and has an alluring yet strangely disconcerting quality about it. As one critic writes of it: 
this Russian-style waltz, in contrast to the tradition of Tchaikovsky, Liszt and Berlioz, is 
not graceful and dance-like, but rather ‘ominous; it is a terrifying waltz’.45 Creating 
rhythmic interest through syncopation devices such as the hemiola, for example at 
4–1
[58] and again at [66], the movement also contrasts the legato melody line with 
abrupt pizzicato and accented chords. Fast-moving quavers provide a frenetic backdrop 
to the middle section of the movement, before a return to the opening theme, with 
sparse pizzicato accompaniment, gradually fades away to a silent end. For Lesser, the 
Mahlerian nature of this movement’s waltz provides a thoughtful if eerie tribute to 
Sollertinsky, the founder of Leningrad’s Mahler Society, but it is also, she believes, a 
‘frightening portrait of the emptiness that is death’. ‘Shostakovich is attempting to 
revive his dead friend’, she writes, ‘to animate the inanimate, by using as his lure the 
kind of macabre music his friend loved. But the end result is ghoulish and scary... the 
Mahler expert has himself been Mahlerized, made into a thing that is no longer human, 
                                               
42 Kuhn, Shostakovich in Dialogue, p. 82 
43 Lesser, Music for Silenced Voices, p. 62 
44 Lesser, Music for Silenced Voices, p. 63. The relationship between dance and death has been explored 
by a number of other composers, and here we might in particular draw a parallel between Shostakovich 
and his contemporary, Igor Stravinsky, whose work The Rite of Spring tells the story of a young girl, 
offered in sacrifice to the god of Spring, who dances herself to death. 
45 David Rabinovich: ‘It seems to me that there is nothing more opposed than a waltz from 
Shostakovich’s Quartet and a traditional waltz of Tchaikovsky’. Kuhn, Shostakovich in Dialogue, p. 66 
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and the effort to retrieve him seems all the more hopeless as he disappears into the 
music’.46 
 
Finally, the Theme and Variations provides what is arguably the most rhythmically 
exciting sequence of any of the Shostakovich quartets.
47
 Following a brief, adagio 
introduction, the initial theme of the movement (Fig. 5.3) is presented in the viola. The 
melody, which draws upon traditional Russian folk song, then appears in several 
different guises, featuring variously semiquavers, triplets, off-beat quavers and accented 
crotchets.
48
 The emphatic adagio ending comprises an extended form of the introduction 
and concludes with a series of slow, fortissimo, minor chords. For one critic, this 
movement is ‘spirited, passionate, tempestuous in parts’, and yet also grounded in an 
‘inner harmony’ carried over from the first movement of the work.49 For Lesser, 
although the ‘galloping dance...carries us relentlessly onward’, that the initial theme 
survives throughout the variations gives us cause for ‘if not celebration, then at any rate 
resignation to the facts of existence’: the voice of the first violin, she believes, makes 
the decision to survive, not by forgetting death, but by taking death into itself in order to 
overcome it. ‘The feeling of this whole final movement’, she writes, ‘is one of setting 
off on this road, the only one available to us, and trying to get to the end of it in as good 
a shape as we can’.50 
 
Fig. 5.3: Shostakovich, String Quartet No. 2, Theme and Variations, 
1
[92] 
 
In the Second Quartet, then, Shostakovich demonstrates that he has already 
mastered the genre, and his skills in this area, which will be further refined over the 
years and works to come, provide him with the perfect means of expressing his most 
personal concerns and inward musings. Also in this work is to be found the true subject 
                                               
46 Lesser, Music for Silenced Voices, p. 63 
47
 Lesser, Music for Silenced Voices, p. 63 
48 Yury Shaporin, in Kuhn, Shostakovich in Dialogue, p. 61 
49 David Rabinovich, as cited in Kuhn, Shostakovich in Dialogue, p. 66 
50 Lesser, Music for Silenced Voices, pp. 63-64 
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of all his quartets: that of death, or more accurately, ‘mortal terror, sorrow [and] guilt-
ridden survival’.51 
 
II. The Eighth String Quartet 
 
(a) Context 
 
In July 1960, Shostakovich visited Dresden whilst writing a score for his friend Leo 
Arnshtam’s film Five Days, Five Nights – a Russian-East German collaboration which 
tells the story of the salvaging of artwork from Dresden by Red Army soldiers prior to 
the firebombing of the city at the end of the Second World War.
52
 On his return, 
however, he did not continue with the film score but rather started work on the Eighth 
Quartet, completing it in just three days. Although officially dedicated ‘to the memory 
of victims of War and Fascism’,53 the piece also contains the subtext of a more personal 
pre-occupation, made clear by Shostakovich’s encoding of his initials ‘DSCH’, D, Eb, C 
and B in German transliteration, into the motif (Fig. 5.4) from which the whole work 
derives.
54
 Furthermore, in a letter to his close friend, Isaak Glikman, Shostakovich said 
of the work: ‘I started thinking that if some day I die, nobody is likely to write a work in 
memory of me, so I had better write one myself. The title page could carry the 
dedication: ‘To the memory of the composer of this quartet’’!55 This statement, together 
with the dark mood of the piece and the fact that it was written shortly after 
Shostakovich’s apparently coerced joining of the Communist Party, have even led to 
                                               
51 Lesser, Music for Silenced Voices, p. 64 
52 Fanning, Shostakovich: String Quartet No. 8, p. 17 
53
 Dmitri Shostakovich, interviewed by Mikhail Dolgopolov, “The Happiness of Creating for the People”, 
1960, in Fanning, Shostakovich: String Quartet No. 8, p. 151. This dedication can also be read as 
subversive for, as Lesser points out, ‘the Party leaders could hardly complain about a work dedicated to 
‘the victims of fascism and war’ to whom they themselves were always building gigantic monuments. 
And yet who were the primary victims, or at least targets, of German fascism? Why, none other than the 
Jews, against whom the Russians had recently been waging their own vigorous campaign... [And] from a 
Dresden-based perspective, the “victims of war” would certainly have included the many thousands of 
German civilians killed in the Allied firebombing of that city.’ Lesser, Music for Silenced Voices, 
pp. 150-151  
54 This encoding of initials was also practiced by a variety of other composers, most notably J. S. Bach, 
and so Shostakovich is here acknowledging his Baroque ancestry. Also, the dark, Jewish-sounding nature 
of his motif fits perfectly with his appeal to klezmer melodies. Lesser, Music for Silenced Voices, p. 150 
The motif also appears in a number of Shostakovich’s other works, most notably the Tenth Symphony. 
For a more detailed study of its origins, see Stephen C. Brown, ‘Tracing the Origins of Shostakovich’s 
Musical Motto’, Intégral, 20 (2006), 69-103. Interestingly, the composer’s parents had originally intended 
to name their son Yaroslav but were persuaded otherwise by the priest who presided at the child’s 
christening. Fay, Shostakovich, p. 8 It is perhaps fortunate for Shostakovich that this was the case, as the 
alternative set of initials would doubtless not have formed such a versatile musical motif! 
55 Dmitri Shostakovich, in Glikman, Story of a Friendship, pp. 90-91 
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speculation that the work was originally intended as a suicide note, although 
Shostakovich was in fact to die of natural causes some fifteen years later.
56
 
 
Fig. 5.4: ‘DSCH’ motif 
 
The theme of death, then, is once again close at hand. Although the death of Stalin in 
1953 and the resulting onset of the Thaw had seen a move towards the rehabilitation of 
the reputations of those artists whose works had previously been denounced, and despite 
the success of Shostakovich’s latest compositions, most notably his Tenth Symphony, 
other events in the life of the composer remained decidedly bleak. In December 1954, 
Shostakovich’s beloved wife, Nina, died of cancer at the age of forty-three. Her illness 
had been undiagnosed, and her death came as a terrible shock to Shostakovich and their 
family.
57
 Shortly after, the composer married the young Margarita Kainova, but the 
relationship was unsuccessful and short-lived.
58
 At the same time, his own health was 
deteriorating, with as yet undiagnosed poliomyelitis causing tremors in his right hand, 
and he was increasingly plagued with guilt at having survived the Terror when so many 
of his friends and colleagues had not.
59
  
 
Having in mind the task of composing a film score whilst working on the piece, the 
Quartet is, as Fanning remarks, ‘rich in cinematographic continuity techniques’.60 
Throughout the work, Shostakovich weaves quotations from and allusions to previous 
compositions of his own together with references to a number of works by other 
composers, many of which, in line with the overall themes of the Quartet, draw 
associations with ideas of death, destruction and tragedy. Interspersed with these, 
musical images of his closest friends and family – Nina, Sollertinsky, Rostropovich – 
                                               
56 Lev Lebedinsky, in Fanning, Shostakovich: String Quartet No. 8, pp. 149-150 
57 Fay, Shostakovich, pp. 193-194 
58 Fay, Shostakovich, pp. 197-198. Shostakovich was later to marry his third wife, Irina, in 1962. His 
Ninth Quartet is dedicated to her. p. 227 & p. 243 
59 Fay, Shostakovich, pp. 209-210; Lesser, Music for Silenced Voices, p. 126. However, Shostakovich still 
managed to remain characteristically humorous about his increasingly compromised physical health, once 
remarking in a letter to Glikman: ‘Here is a general report. Target achieved so far: 75 per cent (right leg 
broken, left leg broken, right hand defective. All I need to do now is wreck the left hand and then 100 per 
cent of my extremities will be out of order.)’ Dmitri Shostakovich, in Glikman, Story of a Friendship, 
p. 147 
60 Fanning, Shostakovich: String Quartet No. 8, p. 40 
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flicker briefly to life, only to die away again once more.
61
 Arranged as they are in 
mostly chronological order, these extracts and images function as something of a 
musical flash-back over the major events in the life of the composer so far, and thus 
serve to further underline the autobiographical nature of the work. 
 
The employing of such techniques has meant that, of all Shostakovich’s quartets, the 
Eighth has doubtless been the subject of the greatest level of interest on the part of 
musicologists and critics, to the extent that, at times, it has been all too easy to view the 
work as merely an analysable structure rather than as a piece of music. Furthermore, the 
temptation to confuse the work as revealing to us something of Shostakovich’s 
emotional life with the work as having a meaning which can be perfectly and 
exclusively understood in relation to his biography has led to a degree of ‘reading in’ to 
interpretations of the piece.
62
 So whilst questions of context remain of interest and of 
relevance to the study of this work, it is important that events in the life of the composer 
are not allowed to eclipse an appreciation of the work as a musical entity. As Lesser 
reminds us, it is ‘a matter of balance’.63   
 
(b) Analysis and Interpretation 
 
The work opens with the initial presentation of the DSCH motif in the form of a fugue. 
This motif is to reappear throughout the work in a variety of melodic and harmonic 
permutations, most notably in the first section of the second movement at [17]–[18], in 
which it takes the form of a more violent fugal arrangement, in the opening to the third 
movement at [35]
1–3
, where the solo violin foreshadows the development of the 
movement’s first theme, and also in the conclusion to the fourth movement at [72]1–12. 
What is more, the intervals implied within this motif, in particular the semitone of the 
minor second and also the diminished fourth, are used to generate much of the other 
material found within the work, with an extensive use of the former both melodically 
and harmonically lending the work a deeply chromatic and dissonant tonality. Further, a 
falling semitone is used to form a ‘sigh’ motif (Fig. 5.5), initially found in the violin in 
the first movement at [2]
3
, then in an elaborated form at 
7
[3], and finally as part of an 
                                               
61 Lesser, Music for Silenced Voices, p. 152 
62 Such an error is referred to by Roger Scruton as the ‘biographical theory’, which suggests that ‘a work 
of art expresses a state of mind because the artist ‘puts his state of mind into’ the work’ so that ‘[i]n 
understanding the product, we recuperate the mental state that went into making it’. Scruton, The 
Aesthetics of Music, p. 144 
63 Lesser, Music for Silenced Voices, pp.142 
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extended sequence at 
3–1
[5]. Later, this motif forms part of a larger, dactylic pattern 
(Fig. 5.6), which is established in the first movement at 
5–3
[4], and is then used to form 
ostinati in both the first and second movements. 
 
 
Fig. 5.5: Shostakovich, String Quartet No. 8, first movement, ‘sigh’ motif 
 
Fig. 5.6: Shostakovich, String Quartet No. 8, first movement, dactylic pattern 
 
 
The DSCH theme that opens the work is itself a quotation, for Shostakovich used it first 
in his Tenth Symphony, composed in the year Stalin died. Also to be found in the first 
movement, the character of which is largely mournful and reflective, are allusions to 
Shostakovich’s Fifth Symphony – a work which, as I discussed in my third chapter, is 
renowned for its ambiguity of meaning and underlying current of suffering and despair, 
and which features prominently the diminished fourth interval, the dactylic pattern, and 
an almost modal tonality, present in the Quartet at [4]–[6]. In addition to these 
quotations from works of his own, at 
10–8
[3] Shostakovich also draws upon 
Tchaikovsky’s Sixth Symphony, a piece which is arguably one of the most tragic 
ever written. 
 
In the second movement, we are returned once again to the theme death in relation to 
dance. The second theme of this movement (Fig. 5.7), at [21]
1–26
, is drawn from the so-
called ‘Jewish’ theme of Shostakovich’s Piano Trio No. 2 which, built around the 
harshly dissonant interval of an augmented fourth (the ‘tritone’ or ‘devil’s chord’) and 
with awkward and irregular phrasing, has come to be associated with the image of Jews 
in Nazi labour camps being forced to dance, prior to their execution, in the pits that 
were to be their mass graves.
64
 Furthermore, the abrupt ending of the theme mid-phrase 
                                               
64 Reichardt, Composing the Modern Subject, p. 82 
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in the conclusion to the movement serves to highlight the notion of untimely death and 
disconcerting unpredictability.  
 
Fig. 5.7: Shostakovich, String Quartet No. 8, second movement, opening of ‘Jewish’ 
theme, [21]
1-26 
 
Shostakovich once again plays with musical connections between death and dancing in 
the third movement, where the first theme, at [36]
5–13
, alludes to Saint-Saëns’ Danse 
Macabre, a work which tells the story of how, at midnight on Halloween, Death calls 
the dead to dance whilst he plays the dance of death, again featuring the augmented 
fourth, upon a mistuned fiddle.
65
 This type of dissonant waltz is to be found in 
Shostakovich as far back as the third movement of the Second Quartet, although here, 
as Lesser remarks, it is ‘less alluring [and]...also less frightening, for there is not as 
much to lose now, when even death has become familiar’.66 Highly erratic in character, 
the movement features irregular bar lengths and many new themes which are introduced 
and then abandoned. For Fanning, this creates a sense of ‘unrealized potential’, both in 
terms of musical development and in a wider sense, and so once again indicates early 
death and failed opportunity.
67
 Such sorrow is overtly apparent in the concluding bars 
of the movement, in which a solo violin plays a sorrowful extract from the plainsong 
Dies Irae – the thirteenth century poem about the Day of Judgement used in the 
Requiem Mass. 
 
It is from this single melodic line that the fourth movement erupts with a motif (Fig. 
5.8) of three highly dissonant, pesante (strongly accented) chords, with which 
Shostakovich weaves yet more layers of meaning into the Quartet. On one level, these 
                                               
65 Fanning, Shostakovich: String Quartet No. 8, p. 92 
66 Lesser, Music for Silenced Voices, p. 155 
67 Fanning, Shostakovich: String Quartet No. 8, p. 100 
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chords represent the bombs that fell on Dresden, and the melodic line the drone of the 
aircraft overhead. On another, they are a quotation from the opening of Beethoven’s 
Fifth Symphony, where the hand of fate knocks loudly on the door. Deeper still, the 
knocking is here said to be that of the NKVD – a visit from whom Shostakovich lived 
constantly in dread.
68
 From this, the movement develops into what has frequently been 
referred to as a ‘collage of quotations’, once again revolving around the subject of 
death. Among the citations included are the theme from the execution scene of 
Shostakovich’s The Young Guard, funeral music from Wagner’s Götterdammerung and 
an extract from the revolutionary song Zamuchen Tyazholoy Nevoley (Tormented by 
Harsh Captivity). Arguably the most moving statement, however, is at 
1
[62]–2[63], 
where reference is made to a passage from Shostakovich’s opera Lady Macbeth. 
Originally an aria of Katerina’s in the final act, the phrase is here played by the haunting 
upper register of the cello, and although Katerina sings of her love for Sergei, the theme 
of death once again remains near at hand, for her song falls on deaf ears and is 
ultimately to lead to ‘heartbreak, despair and suicidal vengefulness’69. 
 
Fig. 5.8: Shostakovich, String Quartet No. 8, fourth movement, opening 
 
The final movement brings to the fore the work’s cyclical nature, implied through the 
repetitions of the DSCH theme and its derivations throughout the piece, and now 
revealed in a direct return to the material of the first movement. The start of this 
concluding section of the work mirrors almost exactly its opening, with the only 
differences found in the delayed entries of the fugal voices and the shorter reference to 
the First Symphony. The countersubject of this movement (Fig. 5.9), heard first in the 
cello at 
2
[66]–[66]1, is formed by another reference to Lady Macbeth, this time a phrase 
                                               
68 Fanning, Shostakovich: String Quartet No. 8, p. 103 
69 Fanning, Shostakovich: String Quartet No. 8, p. 115 
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which in the opera is associated with sleeplessness, although in contrast to the rest of 
the work, this is to be the only quotation contained within the movement. Instead, and 
again unlike the preceding movements, Shostakovich follows musical convention in 
terms of structure and development, presenting a fully worked-out fugue which is no 
longer interrupted by musical quotation. This creates a sense of musical coherence 
previously lacking in the work and, for Fanning, represents a ‘shift away from 
semantically charged gesture to pure(r) musical thought’.70 The Quartet ends with a 
sparse, sustained chord, the tonality of which is ambiguous as it contains no third, and 
above which the solo violin breathes a final, extended sigh.  
 
Fig. 5.9: Shostakovich, String Quartet No. 8, fifth movement, 
2
[66]-[66]
1 
 
 
 
 
The Eighth Quartet is therefore a work rich in allusion which creates multiple layers of 
meaning by drawing upon semantic encoding within the work itself (the DSCH motif) 
together with musical associations from wider repertoire. For Fanning, however, the 
work also presents us with something more than just a collage of quotations. The 
meaning of the piece as a whole, he argues, ultimately transcends the meanings implied 
by the individual extracts of which it is comprised, and thus it becomes a unique 
musical work. In particular, he points to the musical unity of the final movement to 
demonstrate that the work is in fact an example of ‘the overcoming of programmatic 
dependence and the ultimate triumph of philosophical reflection’ – an idea which 
echoes Shostakovich’s own conclusions about the finished piece, as expressed in a letter 
to Glikman: ‘...I tried a couple of times to play it through, but always ended up in tears. 
This was of course a response not to the pseudo-tragedy so much as to my own wonder 
at its superlative unity of form’.71  
 
For Fanning, such an interpretation might be translated in relation to the life of the 
composer, with the work raising questions of freedom, autonomy and liberation that 
operate not only on the level of musical form – in the relation between musical 
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71 Fanning, Shostakovich: String Quartet No. 8, p. 137; Dmitri Shostakovich, in Glikman, Story of a 
Friendship, p. 91 
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quotation and new composition – but also in terms of the relationship between 
individual and wider society. Understood in this way, the piece symbolizes one of 
music’s unique properties amongst the arts: its ability to ‘encapsulate the relationship 
between the self and the world’.72 He puts it thus: ‘At one level [the Quartet] is certainly 
a powerful reminder of an individual artist’s suffering, and of his compassion. But more 
than that, it is a reminder of what it is to have a self at all – in a society founded on the 
notion of subordinating the self to the collective, and in an era when the forces of 
dehumanization were by no means confined to that society’.73 Shostakovich’s use of 
self-quotation, and then the deliberate setting aside of this self-quotation, he argues, 
demonstrate that ‘the self – symbolized here by its cultural trope, music – is indeed the 
remainder when the phenomenal world, symbolized by quotation and allusion, is 
subtracted’. The Quartet thus ‘works its way from a concept of self bound up with 
suffering in the outside world to one that achieves – or at the very least strives for – 
inner liberation, by means of the power of creative thought’, and as such has at its centre 
a concern for the value of the individual.
74
 
 
A somewhat different argument is presented by Sarah Reichardt, for whom the 
continual presence of ideas derived from the DSCH motif throughout the work and the 
ultimate return of the motif in fugal form in the final movement serve to disrupt the 
musical development of the piece and repeatedly prevent its flourishing. For her, the 
Quartet presents not the triumph of the musical work above contextual association, but 
rather its sinking beneath the confines of inherited intentionality, and thus she perceives 
it as representative not of the liberation of the individual but rather of the ‘unfreedom 
of…[the] composer’.75 This is not to say, however, that the Quartet cannot speak to us 
of autonomy; on the contrary, she goes on to argue that ‘it is via its display of failure 
that the quartet is able to symbolize autonomy through a failed struggle for such 
autonomy’.76 At the heart of the interpretations of both Reichardt and Fanning, then, lies 
a shared concern: that the work ultimately has to do with the continuing struggle 
between freedom and captivity, exercised on both a musical and a personal level. Once 
again, the medium of the string quartet provides the perfect setting for such ideas to be 
explored for, as Adorno reminds us, it represents ‘a kind of utopian social balance 
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73 Fanning, Shostakovich: String Quartet No. 8, pp. 138-139 
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 Fanning, Shostakovich: String Quartet No. 8, pp. 138-139; Kuhn, Shostakovich in Dialogue, p. 1 
75 Sarah Jane Reichardt, Composing the Modern Subject: Four String Quartets by Dmitri Shostakovich 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), p. 97 
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between the promulgation of individuality, on the one hand, and the relation of 
individuality to the enactment of community, on the other’.77 
III. The Thirteenth String Quartet 
 
(a) Context 
 
In the years preceding the completion of the Thirteenth Quartet in 1970, the harsh 
reality of Russia’s political system became increasingly apparent. The gradual move 
away from the optimism of Khrushchev’s Thaw to the stagnation of the Brezhnev era 
was seen by many as a dangerous sign that Russia’s repression might not yet be over, 
whilst the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Russia in the August of 1968 marked a low 
point in the relationship of the USSR with the West. Political disagreement, however, 
no longer proved necessarily fatal and, although Shostakovich retained something of his 
learned instinct to keep a low profile wherever possible, new opportunities were 
presenting themselves for the expression of personal views and opinions.
78
  
 
Although only sixty-two, the composer’s thoughts were by now turning increasingly to 
the subject of death. His own demise had become the subject of frequent reflection after 
he was finally diagnosed, in late 1969, with the rare nerve disease poliomyelitis, 
following which he spent much time in a clinic in Kurgan in what was, by most 
accounts, an unsuccessful attempt to seek a cure.
79
 He also continued to be haunted by 
the memories of those he had lost. In August 1968, he and Glikman visited the grave of 
Mikhail Zoshchenko, who had died in poverty ten years earlier, and during a hospital 
stay in the February of 1969, Shostakovich’s found himself increasingly preoccupied by 
memories of Sollertinsky, writing to Glikman: ‘It is incredible to think that twenty-five 
years have passed since he died’.80 
 
This obsession with death was made overtly apparent in several of his more public 
works composed during this time. His Thirteenth Symphony, completed in 1962 and 
comprising settings of five works by young Russian poet Yevgeniy Yevtushenko, most 
famously includes the poem ‘Babi Yar’, which has as its subject the massacre of Jews in 
a ravine in Kiev during the war. Published in September 1961 and intended as an overt 
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 Richard Leppert, ‘Commentary’, in Adorno, Essays on Music, p. 522 
78 Lesser, Music for Silenced Voices, p. 224 
79 Lesser, Music for Silenced Voices, p. 323 
80 Dmitri Shostakovich, in Glikman, Story of a Friendship, p. 159 
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condemnation of the anti-Semitism of the Russian authorities in their refusal to provide 
a memorial at the massacre site, the poem had proven highly controversial, and the 
premier of the Symphony, although not forbidden, was downplayed by officials. Later, 
it was demanded that some of the text be changed, and Yevtusheko obligingly provided 
eight substitute lines which Shostakovich, despite his disapproval, then incorporated 
into the work.
81
  
 
By 19
th
 March 1969, Shostakovich was writing to Glikman: ‘It came into my head that 
there exist certain eternal themes, eternal problems. Among them are love and death... 
[U]p to now I haven’t tackled death. The day before I went into hospital I was listening 
to Mussorgsky’s Songs and Dances of Death, and idea of addressing the question of 
death finally came to fruition in me’.82 The form of this fruition was his Fourteenth 
Symphony, completed on 2
nd
 March of that year. Scored for chamber orchestra, the 
Symphony is ‘quieter and more painful’ than the Thirteenth, although, like its 
predecessor, is also a setting of textual sources.
83
 Built around a sequence of 
melancholic recitatives for bass and soprano, the Symphony draws on works by Lorca, 
Apollinaire, Rilke and Küchelbecker, all of which are concerned with the subject of 
death, and speaking at the unofficial premier of the piece in June 1969,
84
 Shostakovich 
gave the following explanation regarding his choice of theme: 
 
It is not because I am rather old and not because... I am losing my friends and 
relatives. I should like to recall the words of that remarkable Soviet writer 
                                               
81 Fay, Shostakovich, p. 228, pp. 234-236. 
Original text:       Replacement: 
I imagine now that I am a Jew.    I stand there as if at a wellspring, 
Here I wander through ancient Egypt.  That gives me faith in our brotherhood. 
And here, I am crucified on the cross and die, Here lie Russians and Ukrainians, 
And still bear the marks of the nails   With Jews they lie in the same earth. 
...         ... 
And I become like a long, soundless scream I think about Russia’s heroic feats, 
Above the thousand thousands here interred. In blocking fascism’s path. 
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I am each child shot dead here.    Her whole essence and fate is dear to me. 
82 Dmitri Shostakovich, in Glikman, Story of a Friendship, p. 160 
83 Lesser, Music for Silenced Voices, p. 227 
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Conservatory in front of an invited audience, as Shostakovich, with his health deteriorating, was by now 
particularly concerned about hearing his compositions performed as soon as possible lest he should die 
before the event. In the case of the Fourteenth Symphony, however, it turned out to be an audience 
member – the Communist Party functionary Pavel Apostolov, one of Shostakovich’s harshest critics – 
who suffered a heart attack or stroke during the unofficial premier and died the following month. Fay, 
Shostakovich, pp. 260-262 
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Ostrovsky, who said that life is given to us only once, so we should live it 
honestly and handsomely in all respects and never commit base acts. In part, I 
am trying to polemicize with the great classics who touched upon the theme of 
death in their work. Remember the death of Boris Godunov. When Boris 
Godunov has died, a kind of brightening sets in. Remember Verdi’s Otello. 
When the whole tragedy ends and Desdemona and Otello die, we also 
experience a beauteous serenity. Remember Aida. When the tragic demise of the 
hero and heroine occurs, it is assuaged by radiant music. I think that even among 
our contemporaries...for instance the outstanding English composer, Benjamin 
Britten. I would also fault him in his War Requiem... It seems to me that all this 
stems from various kinds of religious teachings that have suggested that as bad 
as life might be, when you die everything will be fine; what awaits you there is 
absolute peace. So it seems to me that perhaps, in part, I am following in the 
footsteps of the great Russian composer Musorgsky. His cycle Songs and 
Dances of Death – maybe not all of it, but at least “The Field Marshal” – is a 
great protest against death and a reminder to live one’s life honestly, nobly, 
decently, never committing base acts... [Death] awaits all of us. I don’t see 
anything good about such an end to our lives and this is what I am trying to 
convey in this work.
85
  
 
The Fourteenth Symphony, dedicated to Britten, might be conceived as something of a 
creative response to the War Requiem.
86
 The two composers were close friends and, 
upon hearing a recording of the Requiem, Shostakovich wrote to Glikman: ‘I...am 
thrilled with the greatness of this work, which I place on a level with Mahler’s Das Lied 
von der Erde and other great works of the human spirit’.87 As a non-believer, however, 
Shostakovich felt that the Requiem was compromised by its concluding lines, wherein 
lies the offer of eternal rest in the hereafter – the promise of ‘In paradisum deducant te 
Angeli’.88 By contrast, the Fourteenth Symphony offers little by way of consolation or 
reassurance, and its stark musical treatment of death and fundamental denial of the 
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existence of an afterlife have for many proved profoundly unsettling.
89
 Whilst not as 
overtly political as the Thirteenth Symphony, it nonetheless remains ‘shockingly 
rebellious’, not least because of its employing of levels of melancholy and despair 
which would have been unacceptable under Socialist Realism.
90
 As Lesser puts it: ‘To 
acknowledge death as Shostakovich is doing here is to place the individual’s fears and 
sorrows at the forefront of human experience. There can be no socially designed 
solution to the “eternal problem”...’91 
 
The Thirteenth Quartet, which was written over the period of a year, was completed in 
August 1970 between two of Shostakovich’s stays at the Kurgan clinic and premiered 
by the Beethoven Quartet on 13
th
 December in Leningrad.
92
 The composer shared a 
particularly close relationship with this group of musicians, offering them the first 
performances of all the string quartets save the first and last. Not a string player himself, 
he would also check with them as to the playability of his works.
93
 Later, he even came 
to incorporate aspects of the talents and personalities of its members into his writing, 
with the Eleventh and Twelfth Quartets dedicated to its second violinist (Vasiliy 
Shirinsky) and first violinist (Dmitri Tsyganov) respectively.
94
 With the Thirteenth 
came the turn of its original, then retired, violist, Vadim Borisovsky, to whom 
Shostakovich presented the work, which paid particular attention to the role of the viola, 
in celebration of his seventieth birthday.
95
 
 
(b) Analysis and Interpretation 
 
As aesthetic tolerance grew, and as Shostakovich turned increasingly to chamber music 
as a more personal and private means of musical expression, so he also began to 
experiment with various compositional techniques which would not have been 
considered acceptable in his earlier, more public works.
96
 By his Twelfth Quartet, 
completed in 1968, the composer was experimenting with twelve-tone rows – a modern, 
atonal technique made famous by the works of Arnold Schoenberg, in which melodies 
are created by sounding each of the twelve notes of the chromatic scale once before any 
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of them are repeated. If the Twelfth Quartet is to be deemed ‘modern’, then the 
Thirteenth Quartet is, as Lesser puts it, ‘downright strange’.97 Described by Alan 
George of the Fitzwilliam Quartet as ‘a harrowing experience for all concerned’,98 the 
work, which is formed from a single movement lasting around eighteen minutes, is both 
‘bleak and inventive, despairing and disruptive’.99 Lesser continues: 
 
Its horrors are those of the human condition, particularly as they manifested 
themselves in the twentieth century, but they are also the funhouse horrors of 
dancing skeletons and rattling bones. Creepiness has been elevated to the highest 
form of art here. At the same time, novelty has been pressed into active duty in 
the service of emotional seriousness. The tricks in this quartet are never just 
tricks; whatever pleasure they give on the level of invention is balanced, indeed 
weighed down, by the chilling sadness they help to convey.
100
 
 
Shostakovich’s morbid reflections are here evidenced in the melancholy mood of the 
work and perfectly matched by the sonorous timbre of the viola.
101
 For the quartet’s 
dedicatee, Borisovsky, the theme of death was also pertinent: having retired six years 
earlier due to ill heath, no-one had expected that he would live to this age, and indeed he 
was to die just two years later. Head of the viola department at Moscow Conservatory, 
principal violist with the Bolshoi Theatre’s orchestra and renowned soloist in addition 
to his role with the Beethoven Quartet, he was a note-worthy figure in the world of viola 
playing, as composer and fellow violist Paul Hindemith exclaimed in Berlin in 1967: 
‘The world Union of viola players! Borisovsky is their chairman’.102 For Shostakovich, 
however, the appeal of writing for this musician was not simply his technical expertise 
but also resulted from the deep friendship which had developed between the composer 
and all the members of the Quartet over the years. Reflecting on the subject, 
Shostakovich writes: ‘If asked what exactly attracts me most in Borisovsky’s 
personality, I would answer: Everything’.103 What is more, although dedicated to 
Borisovsky in particular, in a sense the work was also written in part for Fyodor 
Druzhinin, the young violist who had taken Borisovsky’s place in the Beethoven 
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Quartet and who would actually play the work. As Lesser notes, this gives the piece ‘a 
kind of life-in-death...quality, an acknowledgement that the world goes on without us 
even though we are no longer there’.104 
 
Although written in honour of Borisovsky, the role of the viola in the Thirteenth Quartet 
is coloured by Shostakovich’s characteristic ambiguity, for it is at once both the hero 
and the victim of the work, perhaps reflective not only of the famous violist’s successful 
life but also of his imminent death. The viola solo which opens the work, performed 
whilst the other players sit in silence, speaks as ‘the only voice in an otherwise empty 
world’, and this effect is recreated throughout the piece as each instrument in turn takes 
centre stage alone.
105
 Eugene Drucker of the Emerson Quartet says of it: ‘It’s as if 
you’re on a darkened stage and the spotlight is on one or two instruments at a time...I 
don’t know if he sat down and said, ‘I’m lonely and life is bleak,’ but that’s the feeling 
that this conveys’.106 These solos are formed from the twelve tone rows Shostakovich 
explored in his previous quartet, only now used to signal the end of life through their 
failure to develop: unlike the music of Schoenberg, in which the tone rows progress 
serially, or earlier works by Shostakovich, in which they return to tonality, here they hit 
a dead-end where they dissolve into harshly dissonant chords. In the conclusion of the 
work, the viola plays a final solo which is more melodic than those which have gone 
before, but which is ultimately swamped by the high-pitched crescendo of the violins 
until we can hear it no more.
107
  
 
Perhaps the most striking aspect of this Quartet, however, is the middle passage, in 
which the viola does not play a prominent role. Encased by a slower opening which 
returns as a recapitulation at the end, this section is used by Shostakovich to experiment 
with his newest and most unusual compositional techniques. The result is a ‘weirdly 
jazzy episode’, which has been described as a ‘very sinister passage that sounds like a 
jam session from hell’.108 Here rhythmic pizzicato on the cello creates a jazz walking 
bass line, whilst the high-pitched, three-note motif of the first violin alludes to the ‘three 
knocks’ of the fourth movement of the Eighth Quartet. The second violin performs a 
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series of pizzicato scales which interweave with the lines of the first violin and cello, 
whilst the tremolo of the viola shimmers ghost-like in the background.
109
  
 
The most bizarre element in this section is an unusually percussive sound created by 
tapping the wood of the bow on the front of the instrument – a technique which both 
sounds and looks odd, and of which only a handful of earlier occurrences are to be 
found.
110
 In the Fitzwilliam Quartet, so as to remove the possibility of damage to 
valuable instruments, the effect is created by suspending a cheap violin from a music 
stand and hitting it, although this affects not only the sound quality but also the visual 
effect of the musicians attacking their own instruments. As Lesser explains, ‘the point, 
of course, is psychological as well as visual and auditory. We need to feel that there is 
something truly at stake in the gesture – a serious possibility of less, the presence of real 
fear – if it is not to descend into the merely comical’.111 
 
Speaking of the Quartet to his colleagues at the Composer’s Union, who had the power 
to withdraw the piece, Shostakovich said simply that he had written ‘a short lyrical 
quartet with a joke middle’.112 However, Galina Shirinskaya recalls that, during 
rehearsals of the work with the Beethoven Quartet, the composer told them that the 
strange tapping device in fact made reference to ‘the lash of a whip in a concentration 
camp’.113 Reflecting on the unexpected reappearance of the sound in the concluding 
bars of the piece, Alan George of the Fitzwilliam Quartet remarks that ‘[t]he effect of 
the return of these taps during the awful stillness of the viola solo at the end is often 
shattering, even when one knows they are coming’. Wilson here concurs, noting that, 
for many Russians, such tapping is to be associated with ‘the last act of farewell, the 
sinister sound of the final nailing down of the coffin lid’.114 
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As Lesser points out: ‘In a period like the one Shostakovich lived through, the right to 
feel and express sadness takes on a political dimension’. She rightly observes that this 
need not mean that the composer necessarily wrote mournful music as a form of protest, 
but acknowledges that a certain degree of courage would have been needed to produce 
music as pessimistic and death-focused as that of the Thirteenth Quartet, even if it was 
intended for performance away from the public eye.
115
 For all its idiosyncrasies, 
however, the work nonetheless retains its formal coherence, as Drucker puts it: ‘It’s 
fugal, so it’s jazzy and fugal at the same time’.116 Indeed, for Lesser, the most terrifying 
aspect of the piece is to be found not in its obsessive morbidity but rather in ‘how 
unexpectedly enticing its weirdest passages are’. ‘To be drawn against one’s will into 
music like this’, she concludes, 
 
is to perceive how powerful a grip Shostakovich had on his material, and 
therefore on his audience. No wonder he had to disguise his Quartet No. 13 as “a 
short lyrical quartet with a joke middle” when he presented it to the musical 
commissars; they would have been appalled if they had understood what he was 
really doing. But the audiences understood... “Britten, moved and shaken after 
hearing the Thirteenth Quartet, kissed Shostakovich’s hand.”117 
 
 
IV. Theological Reflection on the String Quartets 
 
In reflecting theologically upon the string quartets my argument will follow two strands: 
one which explores how music understood as an expression of interiority might function 
theologically; and one which adopts the ideas of G. W. F. Hegel regarding the role of 
the negative in art. These aspects provide differing but related reflection upon the 
themes which lie at the heart of the string quartets. 
 
(a) Music and Interiority 
 
In my second chapter I discussed expressivist theory as it arose as part of the Romantic 
response to the Enlightenment. Focusing on the idea of connecting with nature through 
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turning to the inner self, expressivism points towards the possibility of art as a means of 
both conveying and creating our inmost thoughts.
118
 For Charles Taylor, the ‘subjective 
turn’ which occurs at this period bears negatively upon how we conceive of the self, 
bound up as it is with an essentially narcissistic frame of mind. ‘A total and fully 
consistent subjectivism would tend towards emptiness’, he writes. ‘[N]othing would 
count as a fulfilment in a world in which literally nothing was important but self-
fulfilment’.119 An individualistic outlook such as this, he argues, contributes to the 
‘erosion of the political’, so that ‘[c]ommunity affiliations, the solidarities of birth, of 
marriage, of the family, of the polis, all take second place... A society of self-fulfillers, 
whose affiliations are more and more seen as revocable, cannot sustain the strong 
identification within the political community which public freedom needs’.120 
 
Christopher Lasch, too, writes of ‘...the culture of competitive individualism, which in 
its decadence has carried the logic of individualism to the extreme of a war against all, 
the pursuit of happiness to the dead end of a narcissistic preoccupation with the self’.121 
Modern narcissistic man, he tells us, ‘extols cooperation and teamwork while 
harbouring deeply antisocial impulses. He praises respect for rules and regulations in 
the secret belief that they do not apply to himself. Acquisitive in the sense that his 
cravings have no limits, he...demands immediate gratification and lives in a state of 
restless, perpetually unsatisfied desire.’122 What is more, argues Lasch, ‘[s]trategies of 
narcissistic survival now present themselves as emancipation from the repressive 
conditions of the past, thus giving rise to a “cultural revolution” that reproduces the 
worst features of the collapsing civilisation it claims to criticize’.123  
 
Such narcissism has also proven to be theologically problematic. As far back as 
Augustine, and later in the works of Luther and of Barth, the notion of ‘homo incurvatus 
in se’, of ‘man curved in on himself’, has been used as a metaphor for sin, speaking as it 
does of the person turned away from God and towards the self.
124
 For Matt Jensen, this 
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idea speaks of sin in terms of relationality – of ‘sin as a violation, perversion or refusal 
of [our]...relationships with others...a radical self-centredness in which we assert an 
insidious gravitational force, seeking to pull all others into our orbit’.125 Again for 
Eberhard Jüngel: sin is ‘the urge towards relationlessness and disassociation’.126 By 
contrast, then, full humanity can exist only where we are prepared to move from the self 
to the other – where we seek to mirror the perfect relationality that exists between the 
members of the triune God.
127
  
 
In the work of Jeremy Begbie, such concerns come to be viewed in relation to 
theological reflection on music. He argues that within certain Romanticised approaches 
to music – namely those based on the perspectives outlined above – music comes to be 
swept up in the culture of the self and is no longer perceived in terms of the ‘sonic 
integrities’ which root it in the physical world. Here an over-emphasis is placed on the 
‘inner stirrings of the heart in creative activity’, and music is reduced to little more than 
the emotional outpouring of the artist – the narcissistic ‘song of the self’.128 
 
For Begbie, then, there exists a strong tendency, both within the philosophy of music of 
modernity and also within much Christian thought about the arts, for the ‘subjective 
turn’ of Romanticism to be unquestioningly adopted. In seeking to counter this, and as I 
explored in my first chapter, he suggests that the subjectivity and interiority of art might 
be more appropriately understood when contextualised as part of a broader vision of 
created reality, that is, as telling us something about the universe of which we are a part. 
What is needed, he tells us, is a move from looking inwards to looking outwards, where 
the turn to the self is replaced with a turn towards God.
129
 
 
Begbie is doubtless right about the flaws of the narcissistic subjective turn that 
characterises this distinctive strand of Romanticism. At the same time, however, there 
remains space for discussion about other aspects of the role and importance of 
interiority within music – elements which, I contend, remain relatively unexplored 
within theological reflection on music. Such exploration therefore seeks to develop 
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Begbie’s understanding of the expressive and emotive significance of music, as it exists 
within the wider order of creation.  
 
Interiority clearly remains of central importance to artistic endeavour, for without it art 
becomes shallow, superficial and meaningless.
130
 Shostakovich’s quartets, as my 
analyses have shown, are in essence prime examples of art used in this way, that is, as a 
means of conveying our innermost thoughts, yet without crossing the line of indulgence 
to fall foul of the narcissistic charges of self-absorption and self-obsession. So 
interiority, we might say, forms a necessary but not sufficient element of the artistic 
experience, and it is precisely this fact which is recognised and reflected in the music of 
the string quartets, which thus in turn point towards how we might engage with the 
‘song of the self’ in far more positive and theologically valid way. 
 
This form of introversion seems to me to echo the famous saying of Lessing, who wrote 
that, if God was to hold the knowledge of all truth in one hand and the continued search 
for truth in the other, and to offer him the choice between the two, then he would choose 
the latter: ‘The worth of a man’, he argues, ‘does not consist in the truth he possesses, or 
thinks he possesses, but in the pains he has taken to obtain that truth. For his powers are 
extended not through the possession but through the search for truth. In this alone his 
ever-growing perfection consists. Possession makes him lazy, indolent, and proud.’131 
Just as for Lessing the process of searching for truth is itself of importance, so it is this 
search which lies at the heart of Shostakovich’s string quartets. The medium of the 
quartet has as its essence a form of conversation, comprising as it does a series of 
interactions between differing voices, and it is through directing this conversation that 
the composer is enabled to explore and communicate his most personal ideas. Here 
Shostakovich is plumbing depths of human life, and doing it through the dialogue which 
this particular musical form allows.
132
 
 
The War Requiem of Benjamin Britten, written for the re-consecration of Coventry 
Cathedral in 1962 following its near-destruction at hands of Nazi bombers, sought not 
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to glorify war but rather to denounce its futility, waste and loss of life.
133
 As mentioned 
above, the work was the subject of deep admiration and yet also cautious reservation on 
the part of Shostakovich, whose appreciation of its musical achievement was tempered 
by its location within a spirituality of which he felt unable to partake. Despite such 
misgivings, however, the Requiem’s appeal proved to transcend the bounds of religious 
observance, with its musical outpouring of the sense of tragedy shared by a whole 
culture offering for many a profound and deeply moving experience.
134
 Addressing as it 
did the unanswered questions posed by the killing of so many, it served as a focal point 
for the outpouring of a collective grief left unacknowledged by traditional memorials 
such as Armistice Day. At the heart of the work, then, lies the message of philosophers 
going back to Plato: that meditation on death forms a necessary part of understanding 
and appreciating what it means to be human, and it is this message which is also to be 
found at the centre of Shostakovich’s string quartets.135  
 
Shostakovich, as we have seen, was a self-described unbeliever. ‘Death is terrifying’, he 
announced at the premier of his Fourteenth Symphony, ‘there is nothing beyond it. I 
don’t believe in a life beyond the grave’.136 This sentiment, consistent with the emotions 
expressed throughout the string quartets, does not, however, mean that the subject of 
death is neglected or ignored; on the contrary, it would seem to lead to an increasingly 
serious engagement with the issue, as Shostakovich continually returns to the musical 
medium as a way of exploring both the inevitability of mortality and also the 
complexity of the human emotional response to the event. Frequently, his theme is that 
of the death of close friends or members of his family, as he contemplates the feelings 
both of loss and of being left behind. In the Second Quartet, as he reflects on the death 
of Sollertinsky, Shostakovich tries to grasp what it means for those he has loved to now 
be entirely out of reach, and for their absence to be felt all the more strongly as a result 
of their vivid presence in his memory and music. Of the Sixth Quartet, composed 
shortly after the death of Nina, although still surprisingly upbeat in character, Lesser 
writes that it is nonetheless tinged by a sense of guilt which results from the realisation 
that, even in the midst of death, life continues, and even continues well. This 
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‘discomfort of happily surviving one’s dear dead’, however, is laid to rest in the 
following quartet which, as the work finally dedicated to Nina’s memory, speaks of the 
peace that is to be found in ‘the comfort of truly mourning them’.137 
 
Yet the quartets explore not only loss but also themes of survival and moving on. In the 
Second Quartet, the first violin melody which leads us through the work seeks by the 
final movement not to ignore or avoid death but rather to embrace it in a bid to move 
beyond it – to take death into itself and make it a part of an ultimately greater whole. 
Such ideas are taken further in Shostakovich’s later quartets. The Eleventh, dedicated to 
the memory of violinist Vasily Shirinsky, is coloured overwhelmingly by the pain of 
loss – ‘the quietest, most broken, most passively depressed quartet Shostakovich ever 
wrote’, for in it ‘musical structure (along with everything else) is breaking down under 
the pressure of an annihilating despair’.138 The Twelfth, however, ‘embodies a fierce 
attempt to create some kind of new order out of that chaotic disintegration’ in which we 
were left at the end of the preceding quartet, and thus to speak of death not as final 
destruction but rather as hope for a new beginning.
139
 
 
In other of the quartets, Shostakovich deals not with the deaths of those he knows but 
rather uses music as a means of reflecting upon his own mortality.  The Eighth Quartet, 
although publically a memorial to those who died in conflict, also provides the 
composer’s first attempt to depict in music what it means to perceive one’s own life in 
relation to its certain end. Whether it is ultimately interpreted as depicting the triumph 
of the individual in the face of adversity or the inescapability of the bonds of context 
and society, the work’s autobiographical nature and (albeit insincere) dedication to the 
composer himself doubtless point towards an intense and deeply personal wrestling with 
the nature, and ultimately the demise, of one’s own existence. In the later quartets, 
written as his health deteriorated, Shostakovich’s obsession with his own death becomes 
increasingly apparent. Discussing the Fifteenth Quartet, Kurt Sanderling uses the term 
abgründig, which has within its meaning the idea of ‘standing on the edge of a 
precipice, looking down into the abyss’,140 and, as Lesser points out, the finality of the 
work’s tonality, together with the absence of an official dedication, suggest that ‘this 
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piece was meant for the wishful fifth Beethoven’, that is, as a final memorial to 
Shostakovich himself.
141
 
 
The music of the quartets, then, is something of a double-edged sword, for whilst 
reminding us that we do in fact survive death in as much as a trace of our former selves 
remains in the minds of others, it at same time reveals that we cannot remember the 
dead without first reminding ourselves of their absence.
142
 This becomes especially 
apparent in the later quartets, marked as they are by a ‘pervasive and deepening sense of 
sorrow’ – in the Thirteenth, with its melancholy viola solos, undeveloped atonality and 
disconcerting percussive effects, and finally in the Fifteenth, the six slow movements of 
which speak of ‘death casting its shadow over life’.143 Death thus remains pervasive of 
the entire quartet cycle, even in its lighter, more optimistic moments. What is more, as 
Lesser reminds us, the very act of hearing music can itself awaken within us a 
heightened sense of our own mortality: ‘Music’, she writes, ‘speaks only to mortal ears, 
so its very assurance that we are alive is also a reminder that one day we won’t be.’144 
 
Underlying Shostakovich’s approach to death in the quartets is what Lesser identifies as 
an element of self-doubt – a ‘deeply internal and undemonstrative feeling’ not present in 
the Symphonies and which suggests that the quartets contain a greater degree of honesty 
than do the larger works.
145
 In particular, this doubt is manifest in the way in which 
Shostakovich remains critical of his own emotions, which ‘saves the saddest quartets, 
like the Eighth, from self-pity, and...the more cheerful ones, like the Sixth from any 
tincture of smugness or self-assurance’.146 As Lesser points out, for Bernard Williams, 
such shame is in fact evidence of freedom – not literal freedom, but rather an 
‘existential freedom through which a human being asserts that he is still a self-
determining individual rather than a mere movable force’.147 ‘Until we leave off being 
human’, she argues, ‘we will always – if we remain morally astute enough – retain a 
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persistently fragile health: ‘Altogether life is hard. But maybe it will be over soon; after all, I am over 
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curtailment of my earthly activities.’ Dmitri Shostakovich, in Glikman, Story of a Friendship, p. 67 
142 Lesser, Music for Silenced Voices, p. 265 
143 Lesser, Music for Silenced Voices, p. 200 & p. 265 
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 Lesser, Music for Silenced Voices, p. 269 
145 Lesser, Music for Silenced Voices, p. 300 
146 Lesser, Music for Silenced Voices, p. 299 
147 Lesser, Music for Silenced Voices, p. 302 
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salutary awareness of the difference between what we did do and what we might have 
done. And Shostakovich’s music speaks to that capacity in us.’148 
 
The sense in which Shostakovich relates to such questions of mortality, then, is 
fundamentally based in the reality of human life as it is lived. Commenting on the end 
of the Eighth Quartet, Lesser remarks that the feeling we are left with is not one of 
religious or spiritual transcendence but of something far more human: ‘...what we are 
being offered’, she writes, ‘is not consolation or redemption, but companionship’.149 
Ignat Solzhenitsyn, when asked whether he considered Shostakovich’s music to be 
transcendent, responded: 
 
No. Broadly speaking, I wouldn’t. I don’t know that Shostakovich tries to 
transcend: transcend our nature, the limitations of who we are. Beethoven’s 
entire will is bent upon that, I think, even from early on, and it becomes more 
evident as his life unfolds. With Shostakovich, I think more of adjectives like 
‘mesmerizing’, ‘hypnotizing’, ‘arresting’ – because his music can have this 
utterly intangible magic, but it’s centred around the human being sui generis, 
rather than the humans’ attempt to break free.150 
 
For Solzhenitsyn, however, this human-centredness is not reductive: that the quartets 
are the reflection on a particular time and context by no means prevents them from 
being of relevance to wider human life: ‘No composer’, he writes, ‘is more a 
reflection of his times, [but] what is completely obvious to me is that this is a genius 
for all time’.151 
 
It is also the case that the human-centeredness of the quartets need not be spiritually 
reductive. Although not having as their basis an explicitly religious theme, through 
engaging in depth with the reality of the world, that is, by exploring musically the 
subject of death, Shostakovich, I want to argue, is in fact dealing with that which the 
theist would call God. For Karl Rahner, for instance, ‘there is no form of human living 
in which an encounter with God does not take place at least anonymously, non-
thematically, and transcendentally (or however we may wish to express the reality 
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 Lesser, Music for Silenced Voices, p. 303 
149 Lesser, Music for Silenced Voices, p. 157  
150 Ignat Solzhenitsyn in Lesser, Music for Silenced Voices, pp. 298-299 
151 Solzhenitsyn in Lesser, Music for Silenced Voices, p. 299  
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referred to)’.152 Such a view led him to coin the term ‘anonymous Christian’ to describe 
those who would not identify themselves as Christians but whose actions and words 
nonetheless identify them as ‘taken hold of by...grace’.153 This claim sparked a huge 
debate, with many claiming that such an idea in fact amounted to the colonisation of 
atheism in that it failed to take unbelievers seriously and, to the extent that Rahner 
prevents the option for unbelief, this objection would appear to be justified. At the same 
time, however, Rahner’s views serve to highlight a tradition of transcendence which 
goes back as far as Plato and which states that where beauty, truth and goodness are to 
be found, human beings are touching the ultimate. As the Maundy Thursday antiphon 
reminds us: ‘Ubi caritas et amor, Deus ibi est’.154 In this way, then, the string quartets, 
in grappling with profound truths and that which is of the utmost importance within 
human life, provide us with a tangible encounter with that aspect of reality which 
is inescapable.  
 
Theological transcendentals such as these, as expounded in the thirteenth century by 
Thomas Aquinas, essentially have to do with that aspect of human life which cannot be 
fully articulated in words. They are the ‘certain necessary notes of being [which] recur 
in all beings... [and] reach out beyond the limited orders of individual beings or surpass 
all limits’,155 and which speak to us of the open-ended dimension of being to which 
Wittgenstein refers when he concludes his Tractatus with the admonition that ‘What we 
cannot speak about we must pass over in silence’.156 Very often, then, it is only through 
recourse to the expressive arts that we can gain access to this realm of the indescribable, 
as Wittgenstein in Culture and Value would again concur: there are, he agrees, matters 
of which we cannot conceive in words but which push us towards poetry, music and 
painting – towards that which enables us to grasp something of the mysterious truth 
of existence.
157
  
                                               
152 Karl Rahner, ‘Theological Considerations of Secularization and Atheism’, in Theological 
Investigations XI, trans. by David Bourke (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1974), pp. 166-184 
(pp. 175-176) 
153 Karl Rahner, ‘Anonymous Christians’, in Theological Investigations VI, trans. by Karl-H. & Boniface 
Kruger (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1969), pp. 390-398 (p. 395) 
154 ‘Where charity and love are, God is there.’ 
155 Johannes Baptist Lotz, ‘Transcendentals’, in Karl Rahner, ed., Sacramentum Mundi: An Encyclopedia 
of Theology (London: Burns & Oates, 1968), pp. 285-287 (p. 285). For more on the Thomistic tradition of 
the transcendentals, see Jan A. Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals: The Case of 
Thomas Aquinas (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1996). 
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 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. by D. F. Pears & B. F. McGuinness 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974), p. 74 
157 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and Value: A Selection from the Posthumous Remains, ed. by Georg 
Henrik von Wright in collaboration with Heikki Nyman, trans. by Peter Winch (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980) 
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For some, a humanistic emphasis such as this, which seeks to place the exploration and 
discovery of the human person in a central position within theological endeavour, might 
prove difficult to unite with, or even seem antagonistic to, the aims of Christian 
theology. For John de Gruchy, on the other hand, ‘the purpose of the Christian faith is 
not to make us religious, but to make us more truly human’.158 As far back as the 
Hebrew psalmist, he argues, theology has posed the question ‘What are human 
beings?’,159 whilst both Julian of Norwich and John Calvin tell us that although we 
cannot know ourselves without some knowledge of God, at the same time we cannot 
know God without some knowledge of ourselves.
160
 Finally, we can look to Barth’s 
response to Feuerbach’s view that ‘the true sense of theology is Anthropology’.161 Barth 
argues that Feuerbach is right in his claim, but in the sense that this is, in fact, precisely 
what the incarnation is all about – a point which Feuerbach had failed to understand.162  
 
(b) G. W. F. Hegel and the ‘Negative’ 
 
These themes which the quartets of Shostakovich explore resonate not only with the 
transcendental dimension of interiority but also with that of which Hegel writes in his 
appraisal of the arts. In chapter two, I discussed the Hegelian view of art, together with 
religion and philosophy, as part of the historical process through which Geist is made 
known in the world. The arts, argues Hegel, are the realisation of Geist in sensual form: 
first in the Symbolic art of the ancient civilisations; then in the Classical arts of 
sculpture and architecture; and finally in the Romantic art forms of music and poetry, 
through which Geist achieves ultimate self-expression in art. Music, then, having as its 
content the ‘inner life’, reconciles musical form and content, and so reveals to the soul 
its inmost nature. Thus music is not merely a matter of entertainment, but rather is 
fundamental to human growth and development, so that, for Hegel, ‘[m]usic without 
spiritual content is not yet music’, and music, as the inimitable expression of ‘felt life’, 
is for us a ‘vital expression of what it is to be human’.163 
 
                                               
158 de Gruchy, Being Human, p. 21 
159 Psalm 8.4, as cited in de Gruchy, Being Human, p. 2 
160 de Gruchy, Being Human, p. 107. This idea is also to be found in Rosemary Haughton’s The 
Passionate God (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1982), where she argues that we move from an 
understanding of human love to a revelation of divine love: ‘we can begin to make sense of the way God 
loves people if we look very carefully at the way people love people’. p.  6 
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 Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, trans. George Eliot (New York: Prometheus Books, 
1989), xvii 
162 Barth, Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century, pp. 534-540 
163 See chapter 2, pp. 55-59 
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What is especially interesting for thinking about Shostakovich is the role given by 
Hegel to the negative dimensions of experience. In Romantic art, argues Hegel, Geist 
achieves self-consciousness not only by reconciling form with content, but also by 
embracing its ‘opposite’ and in particular the ‘negative’ – a negative that results from 
the inadequacies of previous art forms which have failed to truly represent the self-
conscious realisation of the inner self. Romantic art, he claims, takes such negativity 
into itself and, in doing so, overcomes it. For Hegel, then, ‘the pain of the negative is 
simply something all consciousness must go through in order to fully realise itself’,164 
and the Absolute itself is formed from ‘infinite negativity’.165 ‘The infinite grief of 
subjectivity’s very heart’, he writes, ‘as well as suffering and death, which were more or 
less excluded from the representations of classical art or rather appeared there as mere 
natural suffering, acquire their real necessity only in romantic art’.166 Thus the ultimate 
self-conscious expression of Geist in sensual form is manifest not through harmony but 
rather through engaging in art with darkness, suffering and despair, and Romantic art is 
perfected not through the beauty of classicism but rather ‘...there enters here as a 
necessary feature what is unbeautiful in comparison with the beauty of Greek art’.167  
 
For Hegel, then, Romantic art requires ‘infinite grief’ for its completion – a phrase 
which, occurring throughout his works, is frequently used in order to make reference to 
the crucifixion.
168
 ‘[T]he process of negativity which the absolute subject enters in the 
course of overcoming the finitude and immediacy of his human appearance’ he writes, 
is ‘a process which is unfolded in the life and suffering of God and his death for the 
world and mankind whereby mankind’s reconciliation with God was made possible’.169 
Thus ‘the cross lies at the heart of romantic art as [Hegel] defines it’:  the story of art is 
one of resurrection viewed in the light of crucifixion.
170
 Such a subject, he maintains, is 
beyond the grasp of classical art, for ‘Christ scourged, with the crown of thorns, 
carrying his cross to the place of execution, nailed to the cross, passing away in agony 
of a torturing and slow death – this cannot be portrayed in the forms of Greek 
                                               
164 Unpublished lecture by Tim Gorringe 
165 Hegel, Lectures on Aesthetics, vol. 2, p. 519 
166 Hegel, Lectures on Aesthetics, vol. 2, p. 522 
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 Hegel, Lectures on Aesthetics, vol. 2, p. 538 
168 Hegel, Lectures on Aesthetics, vol. 2, p. 522 
169 Hegel, Lectures on Aesthetics, vol. 2, p. 533 
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202 
 
beauty...’.171 Christianity, therefore, provides the ultimate subject for Romantic 
depiction, and in turn finds its perfect expression in Romantic art. 
 
Hegel’s appraisal of Romantic art, then, with its notion of the centrality of fractured 
beauty within both art and theology, points us to the heart of a genuinely theological 
understanding of aesthetics. Through it, we are given the locus by which we might 
engage theologically with the arts, and in particular with music, in a way in which takes 
account of the more troubled aspects of artistic expression. The need for a theological 
response such as this has been made clear by Heidi Epstein who, arguing for the 
importance of attending properly to ‘the theological meanings of music’s nagging 
dissonances’,172 remains unsatisfied by those who simply point to music’s harmonic 
resolutions as implying ‘clean and peaceful resurrections’.173  
 
Romantic art, Hegel tells us, has Christianity, and particularly the crucifixion, at its 
centre. However, his definition of Romantic art need not be understood only in relation 
to theology but rather is also of relevance to that which Shostakovich was trying to 
achieve. As has been shown, the quartets explore repeatedly themes of death and the 
human response to death – of loss, loneliness, guilt and brokenness. More than this, 
however, they also speak of the drive to move beyond death – to create a new order out 
of the chaos of bereavement, to strive for inner liberation from the inevitability of life’s 
curtailment. So death, although pervasive, is not the final message of these works; 
rather, it forms but one, albeit essential, part of an ultimately greater whole.  
 
In the quartets, then, we find expressed the paradox located at the heart of Hegel’s 
aesthetics. In musical form, the questions of self-conscious recognition through art and 
of the achieving of this only in relation to the negative are posed. Through asking such 
questions – indeed, through simply having the capacity to ask such questions – the 
music thus interrogates the darkness implied within, and in the very act of so doing is 
enabled to look beyond these questions to demonstrate both the embracing and yet the 
overcoming of negativity. So the string quartets, as secular works of art, remain 
paradigmatic demonstrations of Hegel’s Romantic, and so truly Christian, art – of self-
expression which has to cope with darkness.  
                                               
171 Hegel, Lectures on Aesthetics, vol. 2, p. 538 
172 Epstein, Melting the Venusberg, p. 3 
173 Kathleen Sands, in Epstein, Melting the Venusberg, p. 3 
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Here we might return to the interiority with which I began this theological reflection, 
which perceives the quartets as part of the limitless exploration of the inexhaustible 
depths to life, embracing those negative elements of suffering and death that form 
unavoidable elements of the human experience. Now for de Gruchy, it remains the case 
that ‘the more we discover about ourselves, the more we recognize that we have only 
begun to scratch the surface’. In an echo of Dostoevsky, he argues that our perception of 
and relation to life is greatly altered depending on whether ‘our approach to being 
human is open or closed to this depth dimension of being human’, the fathoming of 
which ‘defies neat formulae and definition and is often best explored through art, 
poetry, drama, music and religion’.174 This, then, is the theological import of 
Shostakovich’s string quartets: they show us that there exists an aspect of human nature 
which grapples with profound questions and which finds expression in art forms such as 
music; and in so doing, they give us the space to explore that which lies at the heart of 
our existence and the opportunity to discover that aspect of reflection which marks us 
out as truly human.
175
 
 
Having here shown how music’s interiority might be theologically embraced, I turn in 
the following chapter to consider how we might engage theologically with that aspect of 
Shostakovich’s music which embraces comedy. 
                                               
174 de Gruchy, Being Human, p. 3 
175 Shostakovich is not the only composer to have used chamber music for explorations such as these. The 
famous Chaconne of J. S. Bach, scored for solo violin although implying through tortuously difficult 
chords the effect of a four-part fugue, might also be understood in this way. Following a period of time 
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with dissonant chords and anguished, drawn-out melodies. John Marchese, The Violin Maker: A Search 
for the Secrets of Craftsmanship, Sound, and Stradivari (New York: Harper Collins, 2008), p. 96 This use 
of music in such a personal, cathartic form undoubtedly parallels that which Shostakovich is doing in his 
string quartets. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
Music and Comedy 
The Nose 
 
 
One morning, barber Ivan Yakovlevitch sits down to his freshly-baked breakfast roll to 
find, to his surprise, that it contains a nose! What is more, this is not just any nose, but 
the one belonging to a client of his – the Collegiate Assessor Kovalyov. Yakovlevitch is 
at a loss to explain the presence of the nose – ‘Devil knows how it happened...bread is 
something you bake and a nose is nothing of the kind’ – and following accusations from 
his wife that he must have cut off the nose whilst drunk, resolves to discard the 
offending object.
1
 After several failed attempts, he eventually throws the nose into the 
Neva River, but is witnessed doing so by a police officer who, we are led to believe, 
reprimands him for the act.  
 
Meanwhile, in another part of St. Petersburg, Major Kovalyov has woken to find his 
nose mysteriously missing from his face and in its place merely ‘a ridiculous, empty, 
smooth space’.2 Now Major Kovalyov has a tendency to ideas of grandeur and is not 
lacking in social ambition, so this occurrence is for him the height of embarrassment 
and shame: ‘It would be all right for some market woman, selling peeled oranges on the 
Voskresensky Bridge, to sit there with no nose; but...I’m hoping for a promotion...’3 
Heading out on his daily walk on Nevsky Prospekt, his noseless face covered with a 
handkerchief, the Major is then shocked to discover his nose masquerading as a 
gentleman, dressed in the uniform of a State Councillor – a higher rank than that of 
Collegiate Assessor – and riding in an elegant carriage! 
 
When the Major eventually catches up with his nose and summons up the courage to 
approach it, the nose denies its true position before once again departing in its carriage. 
Kovalyov then attempts to place an advertisement in the newspaper offering a reward 
for the return of the nose, but is merely mocked by the clerk who offers him a pinch of 
snuff. His visit to the police is equally unhelpful, with the inspector remarking 
                                               
1
 Nikolai Gogol, ‘The Nose’, in Nikolai Gogol: Plays and Petersburg Tales, trans. and ed. by Christopher 
English, intro. by Richard Peace (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 38 
2 Gogol, ‘The Nose’, p. 41 
3 Gogol, ‘The Nose’, p. 43 
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dismissively that ‘if a man was respectable he would not thus be rudely parted from his 
nose’.4 The Major by now has nearly given up hope, when at his flat that evening 
appears the officer who happened to see the barber throwing an object into the river. 
The nose, he tells Kovalyov, was apprehended as it tried to leave the country with the 
stolen passport of an official, and he returns the lost nose, which has been wrapped in 
paper in his pocket, to Kovalyov. ‘‘That’s it!’ exclaimed Kovalyov. ‘The very one!’’5 
 
Now a new problem arises: how is the nose to be reattached? The Major consults a 
doctor who, after much prodding and examination, recommends that nature should be 
left to takes its course, lest matters be made worse by the reattachment. It would be 
better, he suggests, much to Kovalyov’s horror, that the nose be pickled and sold! With 
rumours of the nose’s escapades spreading throughout the city, Kovalyov seeks to 
blame the mother of a potential suitor for the misdeed, but when it appears that this is 
not the case after all, he is left utterly unable to explain the strange occurrence. A few 
days later, however, he wakes to find the nose reattached to his face, just as though 
nothing had ever happened. The Major goes about his business as normal, his much-
coveted position in society restored, and the nose, we are told, never leaves his 
face again. 
 
So concludes Nikolai Gogol’s story The Nose – a fantastical and humorous tale first 
published in 1836.
6
 Full of incongruities, to the extent that its only consistency is in fact 
its inconsistency, the work has provoked a variety of attempts to locate a cohesive inner 
theme around which the story is built.
7
 Some perceive the piece primarily as a satire, in 
part on the bureaucracy of the St. Petersburg officials but mainly on those who are 
possessed of social ambition.
8
 Personified by the character of Kovalyov, who desires 
promotion to ‘a position appropriate to his rank’, such ambition is mercilessly ridiculed 
by the author, who first removes Kovalyov’s nose, making him embarrassed to show his 
                                               
4 Gogol, ‘The Nose’, p. 50 
5 Gogol, ‘The Nose’, p. 53 
6 The piece was originally written in 1833-36 for the Moscow Observer but the manuscript was returned 
to Gogol as it was considered too ‘sordid’. Although initially resistant to further attempts at the work’s 
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Farce Born of an Impotence Complex’, The Slavic and East European Journal, 7:4 (1963), 361-374 
(p. 361) 
206 
 
face in public, and then parades his inadequacies before him as his nose adopts a 
position superior to his own.
9
 Others suggest that the work has at its centre a theme of 
sexual impotency, with the loss of the nose alluding to a castration complex on the part 
of Kovalyov.
10
 Here the nose becomes a symbol not only of social status but also of 
virility, with its loss equated with the loss of his sexual organ, or at least his sexual 
power, so that ‘under the guise of a grotesque farce, a drama of sexual failure 
is enacted’.11 
 
Still others argue that, rather than there being a deep, unifying meaning to the work, 
Gogol is instead deliberately applying the artistic principle of art for art’s sake, writing a 
tale that is simply a ‘nonsensical jest, brilliantly told in such a fashion as to produce an 
illusion of some kind of reality’.12 As D. S. Mirsky puts it: ‘The Nose...is a piece of 
sheer play, almost sheer nonsense. In it more than anywhere else Gógol displays his 
extraordinary magic power of making great comic art out of nothing.’13 Indeed, the 
Russian title of the work, ‘Nos’, is the inversion of ‘Son’, which means ‘dream’, and in 
an earlier version of the tale, Gogol explains away the apparent idiosyncrasies by having 
Kovalyov awaken at the end to discover that the whole escapade has been nothing more 
than a dream.
14
 Even in the final version, an essence of this dream-like quality is 
retained, for ‘the inverted logic of this world is in essence that of a nightmare’.15 
 
 
I. Shostakovich and The Nose 
 
(a) Creation 
 
Alban Berg’s modernist opera Wozzeck saw its Leningrad premier on 12th June 1927. 
Shostakovich, who had not yet reached the age of twenty-one, was at this time working 
                                               
9 Gogol, ‘The Nose’, p. 41; Richard Peace, intro. to Gogol, ‘The Nose’, xvii-xviii. For some, this is a 
reflection of the author’s own anxieties at the time, concerned as he was about his abilities as a university 
lecturer, yet still harbouring the ambition of becoming Chair of History of Kiev University. Indeed, when 
working on the manuscript for The Nose, Gogol on three occasions made the error of writing ‘collegiate 
professor’ rather than ‘collegiate assessor’! Peace, intro. to Gogol, ‘The Nose’, xix 
10 Peace, intro. to Gogol, ‘The Nose’, xix 
11 Spycher, ‘N. V. Gogol’s “The Nose”’, p. 365, p. 367 & p. 361. For a detailed account of the sexual 
imagery of The Nose, see Spycher, ‘N. V. Gogol’s “The Nose”’. 
12 V. Setchkarev, as cited in Spycher, ‘N. V. Gogol’s “The Nose”’, p. 361 
13
 D. S. Mirsky, A History of Russian Literature, ed. and abridged by Francis J. Whitfield (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1958), p. 152 
14 Peace, intro. to Gogol, ‘The Nose’, xvi-xvii 
15 Peace, intro. to Gogol, ‘The Nose’, xvii 
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on his symphony poem To October, but on the day before the Wozzeck premier, 
confided to his friend, the musicologist Boleslav Yavorosky, that he already had an idea 
for an ‘exciting new project’ in mind.16 This project was to be a musical setting of 
Gogol’s The Nose, the libretto for which the composer would himself write, and which 
would form his first attempt at the genre of opera.
17
 The Nose thus marks the beginning 
of Shostakovich’s lifelong appeal to Russian literature as a source of inspiration, the 
scope of which I discussed in chapter four. 
 
In contrast to those works of Shostakovich discussed in my previous chapters, The Nose 
has as its context a decade of relative musical freedom, resulting first from the October 
Revolution and later inspired by Lenin’s 1921 speech on the Five Year Plan, in which 
he stated that: 
 
A cultural problem cannot be solved as quickly as political or military 
problems... It is possible to achieve political victory in a few weeks in an acute 
crisis. In war it is possible to achieve victory in a few months, but it is 
impossible to achieve cultural victory in such a short time; for that we need to 
adapt ourselves to a longer period, plan our work and display the greatest 
persistence, perseverance and systematisation.
18
 
 
With the doctrine of Socialist Realism yet to be enforced, composers remained able, and 
indeed were encouraged, to explore a variety of different compositional devices. Whilst 
‘proletarian’ groups had as their ideal that music which was accessible to the wider 
population, those musicians who belonged to the Association for Contemporary Music 
focused instead on the study and performance of more innovative, intellectualised 
works, such as those by, amongst others, Hindermith, Berg, Schoenberg and Stravinsky. 
The Nose is clearly indebted to this latter group of composers.  Formed from an intricate 
interplay of complex rhythmic and harmonic structures, it contains a number of original 
orchestral effects – most notably the percussion entr’acte separating scenes ii and iii of 
Act I – and also experiments with the use of the grotesque, with both the ‘giant 
                                               
16 Fay, Shostakovich, p. 41 
17 In adapting Gogol’s text to form the libretto for the opera, Shostakovich ultimately sought some 
assistance. Whilst he was responsible for the majority of Acts I and II, the writing of Act III was shared 
with Georgiv Ionin and Alexander Preys. One scene in Act I was originally contributed by Yevheniy 
Zamyatin, but Shostakovich later announced that he had considered this piece to be unsuccessful and had 
removed it from the finished opera. Fay, Shostakovich, p. 41 
18 Geoffrey Norris, ‘Shostakovich’s ‘The Nose’’, The Musical Times, 120:1635 (1979), 393-394 (p. 394) 
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orchestral sneeze’ with which the work begins and the ‘grunting’ accompaniment to 
Kovalyov’s bedroom scene in Act I scene iii introducing a new style of music into 
Russian operatic repertoire.
19
  
 
Writing on his choice of subject matter for the libretto, Shostakovich comments that: 
‘One only has to read this story to see that The Nose, as a satire of the reign of Nicholas 
I, is more powerful than any of Gogol’s other stories’, and as Norris puts it, the score of 
the opera essentially ‘reveals to the full Shostakovich’s talent for stage-writing, his 
skills as an orchestrator, and, above all perhaps, a sharp, youthful wit’.20 As with 
Gogol’s tale, then, underpinning Shostakovich’s operatic realisation of The Nose is a 
frequent recourse to satire, and as such the work is representative of a trend dominant 
within Russian comedy of the 1920s.
21
 Although the composer was to later deny the 
presence of any intentional comedy within the score for the opera, for Norris, that it 
remains amongst the most entertaining of the Soviet comic operas –  ‘as bitingly 
satirical in its way as Gogol’ – points towards a degree of insincerity within 
Shostakovich’s remark, akin to the comedic values that the work itself portrays.  
 
In addition to the satirical qualities of the narrative, Shostakovich details Gogol’s use of 
language as another feature which drew him to the work: ‘...it seemed to me’, he writes, 
‘that, not being a professional literary man myself, I could recast the story as an opera 
more easily than Dead Souls...[whilst] the colourful language of the text of The Nose, 
more expressive than Gogol’s other ‘St. Petersburg tales’, presented more interesting 
problems of ‘musicalizing’ the text’.22 Commenting on Gogol’s writing, Shostakovich 
is said to have once exclaimed to a friend: ‘isn’t it well put, how wonderful!’,23 and in 
                                               
19 Norris, ‘Shostakovich’s ‘The Nose’’, p. 394 
20 Dmitri Shostakovich, ‘Pered prem’yeroy’, Rabochiy i teatr, as cited in Norris, ‘Shostakovich’s ‘The 
Nose’’, p. 394; Norris, ‘Shostakovich’s ‘The Nose’’, p. 394 
21 Norris, ‘Shostakovich’s ‘The Nose’’, p. 394  
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wishing to remain close to Gogol’s original text, Shostakovich made a number of changes to facilitate the 
successful scoring of the work: indirect speech was converted to direct speech to remove the need for a 
narrator; the style of speech became at times more vivid and colloquial; text was simplified in order that it 
might be clearly perceived within the musical phrase; and aspects of Gogol’s original text which had 
previously been censored – most notably the setting of Kovalyov’s first meeting with the Nose in Kazan 
Cathedral – were restored. Alexander M. Tumanov, ‘Correspondence of Literary Text and Musical 
Phraseology in Shostakovich’s Opera the Nose and Gogol’s Fantastic Tale’, Russian Review, 52:3 (1993), 
397-414 (pp. 402-403) Further, in order for there to be enough text to form an opera, additional passages 
from other of Gogol’s works were incorporated into the libretto, including scenes from Old World 
Landowners, May Night, Tara Bulba and The Tale of How Ivan Ivanovich Quarrelled with Ivan 
Nikiforovich, together with Smerdyakov’s song from Dostoevsky’s Brothers Karamazov. Norris, 
‘Shostakovich’s ‘The Nose’’, p. 394 
23 Dmitri Shostakovich to Grigori Kozintsev, as cited in Wilson, Shostakovich, p. 75 
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setting The Nose, he paid particular attention to preserving Gogol’s textual style within 
the musical phrase: the ‘musicalization of words’ pronunciation’, he maintains, ‘was 
placed at the foundation of the construction of vocal parts’, which are ‘built on 
conversational intonations’.24 Further, the score reveals a repeated use of vocal imagery, 
in which the musical settings enhance that which is conveyed by the text. As 
Shostakovich puts it: ‘I tried to present a synthesis of the art of speech and music... Why 
are all the parts written in such a high register? Let us take the police inspector. This is a 
police bureaucrat who speaks shouting at the top of his voice. This has already become 
a habit with him. So I gave him top notes.’25 
 
Finally, Gogol’s tale offered for Shostakovich ‘many interesting theatrical 
possibilities’.26 The composer held a long-standing interest in opera and the theatre, 
having been inspired chiefly by the contemporary work of Vsevolod Meyerhold, the 
productions of whom he had seen in both Leningrad and Moscow.
27
 In particular, 
Shostakovich was captivated by Meyerhold’s innovative approach to dramatics and by 
the central role he assigned to music in the theatre. Following a visit to Moscow in 
1927, during which time he stayed with Meyerhold and his wife, the young composer 
wrote to thank the director for his hospitality, saying: ‘I remember my entire stay with 
you with delight. I’ve never had such a wonderful time in Moscow as on my last trip. 
As for your theatre, it is the most remarkable thing I have ever seen in my life.’28 In 
1928, Shostakovich moved to Moscow to take up a temporary position as a pianist at 
the Meyerhold Theatre, whilst continuing to work on his score for The Nose.
29
 The 
opera thus shares a close affinity to many of the works of Meyerhold, in particular 
                                               
24
 Dmitri Shostakovich, ‘K prem’ere Nose’, Rabochii i teatre, as cited Tumanov, ‘Correspondence’, 
p. 413. As Tumanov points out, within this, two differing styles of composition are to be discerned. One 
favours a cosmopolitan modernism, generally involving a full correspondence between the musical and 
spoken phrases, and in the opera this is attached to dialogue belonging to the everyday, rational world. 
The other echoes the folkloric-nationalist realism of the Russian tradition, making use of modernistic 
musical language, often vastly removed from the flow of colloquial speech, and this represents dialogue 
from the fantastic world. Through the intertwining of these two apparently conflicting styles, 
Shostakovich is able to communicate musically the absurdity and unreality of the events which take place 
in the opera. Tumanov, ‘Correspondence’, pp. 413-414  
25 Dmitri Shostakovich, as cited in Tumanov, ‘Correspondence’, p. 410 
26 Shostakovich, ‘Pered prem’yeroy’, as cited in Norris, ‘Shostakovich’s ‘The Nose’’, p. 394 
27 Fay, Shostakovich, p. 44 
28 Dmitri Shostakovich, as cited in Fay, Shostakovich, p. 45 
29 Despite his enthusiasm for Meyerhold’s theatrical vision, Shostakovich was keen to ensure that he 
would be in receipt of a generous salary, and noted his resolve to ‘not sell my freedom cheaply’! During 
his stay, however, Shostakovich remained overwhelmed by the hospitality of the Meyerholds, recalling 
that ‘a serious fire once broke out at his [Meyerhold’s] flat. I was out at the time, but he gathered up all 
my manuscripts and returned them to me in perfect condition. I was amazed, after all, there were far more 
valuable things that could have burned.’ Dmitri Shostakovich, as cited in Fay, Shostakovich, p. 45 
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bearing a resemblance to his 1926 production of Gogol’s Inspector General.30 During 
the two months of his stay, and encouraged by Meyerhold, Shostakovich succeeded in 
completing the first Act, and made substantial headway with the second.  
 
The Nose was finally completed in the summer of 1928. Although he had been working 
on it sporadically over the past year, Shostakovich worked out that it had taken him a 
total of only nine weeks to write the entire opera.
31
 His sister, Zoya, however, recalls 
that the composer encountered a creative block when writing the third act: ‘It simply 
wouldn’t come. But then I remember him coming into our living room one morning and 
telling us that he had heard the whole of the third act in a dream; he there and then sat 
down and wrote it all out.’32 According to Shostakovich’s mother, he had dreamed that 
he had attended a dress rehearsal of the opera but had been running late and so only 
arrived in time to hear the final act of the work together with the ensuing applause of the 
audience. When he awoke, the composer wrote down everything he had heard, 
completing the opera in just a few days.
33
 The dreamlike nature of Gogol’s tale, then, is 
aptly mirrored by the dreamlike conception of its musical realisation.  
 
(b) Preparation for Performance 
 
Pervasive within Russian musical circles in the 1920s was the recognition that little 
headway had yet been made towards the development of a Soviet form of opera, despite 
there being a strong operatic tradition in the country’s past.34 So when, in the May of 
1928, Shostakovich auditioned the first two acts of The Nose in front of the Artistic 
Council of the Leningrad opera houses, the opportunity to stage this promising new 
work was eagerly accepted by the Leningrad Maly Theatre and initially scheduled for 
performance in their 1928-29 season.
35
 With the prospect of a bright future for Soviet 
opera now before them, the theatre’s creative team, including director Nikolai Smolich 
and conductor Samuíl Samosud, channelled all their energy and resources into the 
production. As the company announced at the time: 
                                               
30 Fay, Shostakovich, pp. 44-45 
31 Fay, Shostakovich, pp. 45-46 
32 Zoya Shostakovich, as cited in Fay, Shostakovich, p. 46 
33 Fay, Shostakovich, p. 46 
34
 Fay, Shostakovich, p. 53 
35 Fay, Shostakovich, p. 46; Wilson, Shostakovich, p. 73. The opera was also accepted by Moscow’s 
Bolshoi Theatre who hired Meyerhold to stage the work, but after many postponements the production 
was eventually cancelled without performance. Fay, Shostakovich, p. 46 
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With the staging of Shostakovich’s opera The Nose, the Malïy Opera Theater 
and its Artistic-Political Council are embarking on the path of the decisive 
Sovietization of the operatic repertory... Soviet opera should not arise by means 
of the lowering of artistic quality in comparison with the operatic works of the 
past. The form of Soviet opera should be different from the forms incorporating 
bourgeois ideology. Our goal, therefore, is to lend every possible assistance to 
the task of raising the cultural level of the proletarian masses.
36
 
 
The new production was also supported by a number of critics, including 
Shostakovich’s great friend Sollertinsky, who wrote: 
 
[Shostakovich] has finished with the old form of opera... he has showed opera 
composers the need for creating a new musical language, instead of drawing on 
the old clichés of those imitators of Tchaikovsky and Korsakov... he has offered 
the most interesting musical experiments, based on rhythm and timbre alone... 
he has given life to the usually slow-moving opera stage... he is perhaps the first 
among Russian opera composers to make his heroes speak not in conventional 
arias and cantilenas but in living languages, setting everyday speech to music... 
The opera theatre is at the crossroads. The birth of Soviet opera is not far off...
37
 
 
Despite such enthusiasm in professional circles, it was nonetheless realised that The 
Nose might well provoke controversy among its audiences, and so great care was taken 
to prepare the public for what would be a new kind of cultural experience.
38
 When 
Shostakovich had announced the initial conception of the work to Yavorsky, his friend 
had been somewhat incredulous about the composer’s choice of subject matter, and 
Shostakovich now felt obliged to explain the reasons behind his choice of a text which 
was neither Soviet nor revolutionary.
39
 The Soviet authors, he maintained, despite his 
repeated requests, had failed to produce a new libretto for his work and, given the 
absence of suitable material in existing contemporary repertoire, he had been forced to 
turn to the classics for inspiration.
40
 That the work was a satire of the historical period in 
question would doubtless have helped to support his case. In the summer of 1928, 
                                               
36 Maly Opera Theatre, as cited in Fay, Shostakovich, p. 54 
37
 Ivan Sollertinsky, as cited in Norris, ‘Shostakovich’s ‘The Nose’’, p. 393 
38 Fay, Shostakovich, p. 54 
39 Fay, Shostakovich, p. 41 
40 Fay, Shostakovich, p. 54 
212 
 
articles commenting on the innovative nature of the piece began to appear, whilst in the 
November of that year, Shostakovich, who was keen to hear a live performance of at 
least part of his latest work, arranged a suite of seven pieces based on parts of the opera, 
and this was performed in Moscow under Nikolai Malko on 25
th
 November.
41
 This 
event served to raise the profile of the work, as did lecture-demonstrations concerning 
the piece which were held for composers’ groups in the months that followed.42 
 
By June of the following year, plans had been made for a concert performance of the 
entire opera to be held as part of the All-Russian Musical Conference in Leningrad.
43
 
From the outset, Shostakovich was vehemently opposed to the project, arguing that, 
with the dramatic element removed, his work would lose all sense of meaning and 
purpose. Opera, he maintained, is essentially a ‘theatre symphony’, in which words are 
‘musicalised’ and the elements of music and theatre balanced equally.44 In a letter to 
Smolich he put it thus: 
 
Rimsky-Korsakov in the introduction to his operas wrote that “opera is, first of 
all, a musical work”. If one takes that position, then all opera theaters should be 
closed and operas should be performed in tuxedos in the Philharmonics. When I 
wrote The Nose, it seems to me that I was coming from quite a different position 
than Rimsky-Korsakov. That’s why The Nose loses all sense to me if it is viewed 
only from a musical standpoint. For its musical component is derived 
exclusively from action... It is clear to me that a concert performance of The 
Nose will destroy it... And offering The Nose at 10 per cent of its potential, 
instead of 100 percent will provoke a terrible song and dance.
45
 
 
Despite Shostakovich’s protests, the concert performance went ahead on 16th June and, 
as he had warned, resulted in an onslaught of attacks and criticisms. Some pointed 
                                               
41 Fay, Shostakovich, p. 54 & p. 46 
42 Fay, Shostakovich, p. 54 
43 Fay, Shostakovich, p. 54 
44 Dmitri Shostakovich, as cited in Fay, Shostakovich, pp. 54-55 
45 Dmitri Shostakovich, in a letter to Nikolai Smolich, as cited in Fay, Shostakovich, p. 54; Wilson, 
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‘Correspondence’, p. 402 
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towards the work’s absence of a properly Soviet theme, whilst others remained 
unconvinced by its musical complexity and apparent inaccessibility, and the accusation 
of ‘formalism’, which was to underlie so many of the later tirades against the 
composer’s works, was first used towards him in relation to this opera.46 The composer 
Zhitormirskiy, writing for the journal Proletarsky Muzikant, condemned the opera for 
its lack of social and ideological relevance to the masses: ‘...with his opera’, he wrote, 
‘Shostakovich, without a doubt, has strayed from the main road of Soviet art. If he does 
not accept the falsity of his path, then his work will inevitably arrive at a dead end.’47 
However, there remained enough support for The Nose for work to continue on the full 
production, and preparations for this continued throughout the rest of the year.
48
 
 
On 14
th
 January 1930, four days before the Leningrad premier, the decision was made to 
perform three scenes from the opera with piano accompaniment before an audience of 
workers from the city. Despite the absence of an orchestra, costumes and scenery, 
Shostakovich did not appear on this occasion to object to the performance of a reduced 
form of the work. As part of the event, members of the production team together with 
Sollertinsky gave introductions and explanations to help guide the audience through the 
work, and feedback from audience members following the performance revealed, along 
with a degree of confusion, nonetheless largely constructive responses.
49
 As 
Sollertinsky surmised: ‘It is evident that the majority are for the opera. I am satisfied 
that it will not be difficult for the working class viewer. It will be difficult for the opera 
buff accustomed to Italian opera, but understandable to the worker.’50 
 
(c) Reception 
 
Following in excess of a year’s preparation, The Nose was finally premiered at the Maly 
Opera Theatre on 18
th
 January 1930. Although only the composer’s first attempt at 
writing for the theatre, the originality and talent displayed in the opera were 
immediately apparent.
51
 Grigori Kozintsev, member of the Factory of the Eccentric 
                                               
46 Fay, Shostakovich, p. 55; Wilson, Shostakovich, p. 74 
47 Daniil Zhitormirskiy, ‘“Nos’ – opera D. Shostakovicha”, Proletarskiy muzïca, as cited in Fay, 
Shostakovich, p. 55; Wilson, Shostakovich, p. 71 
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 Fay, Shostakovich, p. 55; Wilson, Shostakovich, p. 74 
49 Fay, Shostakovich, p. 55 
50 Ivan Sollertinsky, as cited in Fay, Shostakovich, p. 55 
51 Fay, Shostakovich, pp. 53-54 
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Actor, for which Shostakovich had written music to accompany the silent film New 
Babylon, attended one of the final rehearsals for the premier and commented thus: 
 
Vladimir Dmitriev’s sets spun and reeled to the sounds of rollicking gallops and 
dashing polkas; Gogol’s phantasmagoria was transformed into sound and colour. 
The particular imagery of Russian art that was linked to urban folklore – the 
signs of taverns, shops and picture booths, cheap dance orchestras – all burst 
into the kingdom of Aida and Il Trovatore. Gogol’s grotesque raged around us; 
what were we to understand as farce, what as prophecy? The incredible 
orchestral combinations, texts seemingly unthinkable to sing (‘And what makes 
your hands stink?’ sung Major Kovalyov)...the unhabitual rhythms; the mad 
accelerando when the Nose is being beaten up at the police station and the 
chorus shrieks: ‘Take that, take that, and that!’; the incorporating of the 
apparently anti-poetic, anti-musical, vulgar, but what was in reality the 
intonation and parody of real life – all this was an assault on conventionality...52 
 
Also evident was the extreme complexity of the score. Malko commented that the 
director, Samosud, had been forced to call ‘innumerable stage rehearsals’ in order that 
the production be ready in time, and as one singer at the premier recalls: ‘It was difficult 
to present [the opera] in such a way that something useful and interesting might come 
out of our efforts’.53  
 
However, whilst Malko spoke of the opera’s ‘tremendous success’, the majority of 
reviews of the premier were unfavourable, with criticism focused not on the 
performance per se but rather on the opera’s ‘serious ideological flaws, esoteric style 
and rejection of classical operatic values’.54 Branded as ‘the infantile sickness of 
leftism’, despite questionnaires handed out to working-class audience members across 
two performances indicating one hundred percent support for the opera, proletarian 
critics maintained that the work was both unsuitable for and inaccessible to 
the masses.
55
  
 
                                               
52 Grigori Kozintsev, as cited in Wilson, Shostakovich, p. 75 
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 Wilson, Shostakovich, p. 74; B. O. Geft, ‘Kak ya pel v opere Nos’, Smena, as cited in Norris, 
‘Shostakovich’s ‘The Nose’’, p. 393 
54 Wilson, Shostakovich, p. 74; Fay, Shostakovich, p. 55 
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Underlying much of the criticism surrounding the work were questions regarding the 
ideological validity of the avant-garde.
56
 Despite the relative openness of 1920s Russia 
to experimentation in the arts, a number of groups with varying views on the matter 
were already in existence. The most experimental among them, referred to as ‘leftist’, 
fully embraced revolutionary ideology, others were overtly political and claimed to 
represent the view of the proletariat, and in the minority were those who simply sought 
to maintain professional artistic standards.
57
 In music, the most influential of the 
proletarian groups was the RAPM which, as discussed in chapter three, maintained that 
music should contain a social message and be accessible to the masses.
58
 Whilst the 
music of Beethoven was favoured for its revolutionary spirit, composers such as 
Tchaikovsky were considered decadent and most modern experimental music criticised 
as ‘formalist’. Although militant in its agenda, the organisation remained less anarchic 
than other organisations such as Proletkult, which had as its aim the destruction of all 
inherited bourgeois values and contexts. Disbanded by Lenin in 1920, the ideas of 
Proletkult nonetheless survived in the art of the most progressive Russian artists, and 
elements of its philosophy are even to be found in The Nose.
59
  
 
Despite its progressive nature, however, the opera failed to receive the approval of the 
RAPM or its associated organisations. Not only was its experimental nature now held 
against it, but it was also criticised both as ‘formalist’ and at the same time as 
‘decadent’.60 For Mark Yankovsky, The Nose stood ‘outside the development of Soviet 
opera and the development of the composer himself’, and although remaining true to the 
theme of Gogol’s story, nonetheless failed to produce true ‘social satire’.61 Semyon 
Kukurichkin, writing under the pseudonym A. Gres, offered harsher criticism in an 
article entitled ‘Ruchnaya bomba anarkhista’ (‘An anarchist’s hand-grenade’), in which 
he referred to The Nose as a ‘destructive phenomenon’ and a ‘talented row’ which 
‘spread[s] panic through the whole front of the music theatre establishment’,62 whilst a 
reviewer named Gvozdev concluded that: ‘It cannot be considered a Soviet opera; rather 
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60 Wilson, Shostakovich, pp. 70-71 
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 Mark Yankovsky, ‘Nos v Malom opernom teatre’, Rabochiy i teatr, as cited in Norris, ‘Shostakovich’s 
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an example of decadent Western traditions, of an outlived genre in the process 
of extinction’.63 
 
Understandably upset by this criticism, Shostakovich discussed the subject with 
Smolich, saying: ‘[The reviews] will make me suffer a week, and I will have to bear the 
malicious delight of my friends at the flop of The Nose for the next two months’.64 
When the scheduled fourth performance of the work was pulled at the last minute, the 
composer complained to Zakhar Lyubinsky, the director of State Theatres in Leningrad, 
that the true reason for the opera’s curtailment – the illness of a lead actor – had not 
been disclosed, thus sparking rumours of poor ticket sales.
65
 By 16
th
 April, 
Shostakovich was asking Lyubinsky to withdraw the work, stating that: ‘I am convinced 
that The Nose is one of my most successful works... The path taken by The Nose is the 
correct path. But if The Nose is not perceived the way I would like, then it is necessary 
to withdraw it.’66 Lyubinsky, however, ignored the composer’s request, and the opera 
went on to be performed a total of sixteen times during the Theatre’s 1929-30 and 
1930-31 seasons.
67
  
 
Shostakovich remained inordinately fond of his first opera, and later was even to form 
opinions of people on the basis of whether or not they approved of the work. He also 
remained frustrated at the hypocrisy of the critics who, despite having voiced their 
enthusiastic support during the run-up to its premier, nonetheless turned to deride the 
work following its performance. Earlier, in April 1929, as part of a debate regarding the 
state of musical criticism in Soviet Russia, Shostakovich had spoken out about the 
increasingly polarised positions occupied by the contemporary press, and had argued for 
‘objective, musically competent evaluations capable of explaining – both to the reader 
                                               
63 Gvozdev, as cited in Wilson, Shostakovich, p. 74 
64 Dmitri Shostakovich, as cited in Wilson, Shostakovich, p. 74. However, the composer also added that, 
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65 Fay, Shostakovich, p. 56 
66 Dmitri Shostakovich, as cited in Fay, Shostakovich, p. 56 
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 Fay, Shostakovich, p. 56. Although receiving several performances in the West, the work was not heard 
again in Russia until 1974, when it was revived by the Moscow Chamber Theatre. Wilson, Shostakovich, 
pp. 444-452. For a recording on this staging, see Dmitri Shostakovich, The Nose. Video Artists 
International. 2010 
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and to the composer being reviewed – why something is good or bad and how 
shortcomings could be avoided’.68 Now, in the wake of the criticism surrounding his 
opera, the composer felt that those responsible should be made to publically account for 
and explain their changes of opinion. In reality, and as Shostakovich himself would 
have been only too well aware, behind these shifts in allegiance lay ‘the increasingly 
militant hegemony of a narrowly defined “proletarian” cultural agenda’, which was to 
gradually take hold of the arts in Soviet Russia and which, as I discussed in chapter 
three, was to lead to the eventual condemnation of Shostakovich’s second, and final, 
opera, Lady Macbeth, on which he began work in the autumn of 1930.
69
 Had the course 
of Russian history been other than it was, then, the path of Shostakovich’s career might 
have taken a very different turn: as Mikhail Druskin points out, The Nose is clear 
evidence that, had he been so inclined, the composer could have become ‘the leader of 
the musical avant-garde’, and doubtless this would have included many more operas at 
the forefront of modernist musical theatre.
70
 
 
 
II. Comedy in The Nose 
 
In addition to its contributions to the operatic genre, The Nose also provided an 
excellent outlet for Shostakovich’s sense of humour and penchant for comedy. For Ed 
Vulliamy, this lighter side to the composer’s personality has often been overlooked by 
those seeking to emphasise the more troubled aspects of his life and works. Such 
negative accounts, he maintains, cannot be the whole story. He writes:  
 
[Shostakovich] played poker, had a complex love life and adored football... 
There is a photograph...I love, which shows him laughing, briefcase on his lap, 
between two friends at a match of his beloved Zenit [Leningrad football team]. 
Another shows him in what appears to be a gentlemen’s club, lighting a cigarette 
from a candelabra beneath a picture of a scantily-clad woman... According to 
Gergiev, the greatest Shostakovich interpreter of his generation, the composer 
would drink a large glass of vodka before entering a roomful of famous people, 
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Gogol, with his opera The Gamblers, although the work was to remain unfinished. Wilson, Shostakovich, 
p. 173 
70 Mikhail Druskin, as cited in Wilson, Shostakovich, p. 45 
218 
 
and was the life and soul of the party. There are accounts of him dancing on a 
piano... These hint at another Shostakovich.
71
 
 
It is this Shostakovich, Vulliamy maintains, that is expressed in paradigmatic form 
through the humour of The Nose.
72
 
 
Wendy Lesser, writing on the subject of comedy, asserts that ‘[p]ractically all humor is 
one way or another based on the discrepancy between truth and falsehood, between 
things as they are and things as they are not’, and it is a sense of comic ambiguity such 
as this which lies at the heart of Esti Sheinberg’s study of Shostakovich, to which I shall 
be referring throughout this chapter for analysis and explanation.
73
 Drawing upon ideas 
within the semantics of music, Sheinberg explores the variety of ways in which 
incongruity is expressed through musical structure and the statements of ambiguity that 
are produced as a result.
74
 Arguing that the ironic – in which two or more incongruous 
layers of meaning are brought together to create either temporary or permanent states of 
confusion – presents us with the prototype for such ambiguity, she points towards 
parody, satire and grotesque as specific realisations of the genre, and asserts that all of 
these techniques appear frequently in the music of Shostakovich.
75
 Informed by these 
ideas, I now turn to look more closely at each of these forms of irony in turn, and to 
examine the specific ways in which they are employed to comic effect in The Nose. 
 
(a) Satire 
 
Sheinberg argues that satire works through the interplay of two levels of meaning. In 
one there is an overt meaning which is later rejected, and in the other a meaning which 
is at first hidden but then comes to be accepted as the preferential value. This is 
achieved through the distortion of the initial phenomenon, often by a process of either 
exaggeration or understatement, so that it comes to be ridiculed, as is the case, for 
example, with the condemnation of greed in Jonathan Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels and in 
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www.guardian.co.uk/books/2011/jun/22/shostakovich-quartets-wendy-lesser-review (22.06.2011; 
accessed 26.11.2011) 
72 Vulliamy, ‘Shostakovich and his Fifteen Quartets’. For a detailed discussion of humour in the music of 
Shostakovich, see Sheinberg, Irony. 
73 Lesser, Music for Silenced Voices, p. 303 Indeed, as Lesser points out, a use of comedic devices such as 
those found in The Nose provides ‘an invaluable tool for someone who lives in a period when lies are 
routinely put forth as truth and vice versa’. 
74 For a more detailed discussion of the structure of musical ambiguity, see Sheinberg, Irony, pp. 3-27. 
75 Sheinberg, Irony, pp. 27-28 
219 
 
Gogol’s Dead Souls. In communicating a preference for a particular set of norms or 
values which are often ethical or social in nature, satire remains essentially underpinned 
by reality rather than fantasy, and by always revealing its true meaning rather than 
leaving an unsolved puzzle, it represents irony in its simplest form.
76
  
 
One way in which such exaggeration might be achieved in quantitative fashion is by 
means of repetition, whereby a feature of the subject being satirised is distorted as the 
result of appearing multiple times in close succession.
77
 This process of simplification, 
in which emphasis is placed arbitrarily on only a few chosen characteristics, is noted by 
Ernst Gombrich in his analyses of caricatures, and in The Nose is used to the extreme, 
with many passages derived from the continued repetition of a single motif.
78
 In the first 
scene of the opera, in which Yakovlevitch is thrown out of the house by his wife 
following the discovery of the nose in a bread roll, a surrealist event is played out, but 
behind these strange events, as Sheinberg points out, two human characters are 
caricatured: Ivan, trying to defend himself against the protests of his wife and claiming 
that he has no idea as to how the nose should have found its way into the bread, and his 
wife, Praskovya Osipovna, shocked by the discovery and gradually working herself into 
a state of frenzied hysteria. Gogol, in his original text, is at this point already employing 
the use of repetition as a satirical device for, in describing the outrage of Praskovya 
Osipovna, he resorts to a ‘stream of words’: 
 
‘Not another word! Do you think that I would allow a cut-off nose to sit in my 
room?... You numskull! All you’re good for is stropping razors, and soon you 
won’t even be able to do your job at all, you stupid oaf! You scoundrel! Do you 
think I’m going to stick up for you with the police?... No fear, you good-for-
nothing, you blockhead! Take it away! Away! I don’t care where you put it, just 
so long as I never set eyes on it again!’79 
 
Shostakovich, in his musical depiction of this scene, picks up on and further accentuates 
this use of repetition (Fig. 6.1). Against the non-repetitive melody line carried by Ivan, 
who is trying to ‘speak sense’ and rationalise the mysterious appearance of the nose, 
Praskovya Osipovna launches into a tirade of high-pitched screaming which culminates 
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with repeated shouts of ‘Out!’.80 In an additional layer of musical satire, this expression 
of horror, through its continued repetition, then forms a ‘piece of sound wallpaper’, thus 
ultimately becoming a caricature of its very self.
81
 
 
Fig. 6.1: Shostakovich, The Nose, Act 1, scene i, [40]-[41]
3 
 
Praskovya: Out! Out! Out! Out! Out! Out! Out! Out! Out! Out! 
Ivan: The devil knows what happened! I’m not sure if I was or wasn’t drunk last night. 
 
An alternative form of quantitative exaggeration is achieved as a result of the 
accumulation of characteristics of the satirised object. Satire of this kind is generally 
applied to subjects that are representative of a certain ‘type’, for example, a people, a 
race or a musical or literary style, and in the case of The Nose it is used in relation to the 
police.
82
 In the third act of the opera, a group of Russian policemen, who are waiting for 
a carriage to leave the station, engage in a singing session to pass the time. 
Shostakovich, in order to satirise the scene, draws their musical caricature by means of 
an exaggerated ‘New Soviet Folk Song’, in which a variety of features from the Russian 
folk tradition are accumulated (Fig. 6.2). Set to an already satirical text describing the 
Russian policeman’s life, the new folk song provides a ‘ridiculous amalgam’ of Russian 
musical characteristics, which are themselves exaggerated out of all proportion. The 
disorganised melodic leaps reminiscent of the Latvian, Lithuanian and Volga-Ural 
traditions depict the lack of direction and futility of the policeman’s role, whilst the 
heterophony characteristic of Volgorod, Kaluga and Bryansk folk music, here distorted 
to the point of dissonance, points towards the senselessness of both the plot in general 
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and figure of the policeman in particular. Accompanying this is a ‘North Estonian’ 
drone in the violas and ‘Siberian’ bass drum, used to indicate the policeman’s dullness 
of thought. In addition, part way through the repetitious passage the policeman’s captain 
becomes a ‘heroic tenor leader’, launching to a Ukrainian-style dishkant solo in a high 
falsetto voice, filled with Smolenskian whooping and held for a sustained period of time 
as is characteristic in the Armenian folk tradition (Fig. 6.3). The resulting effect, which 
is reminiscent of a dog’s howl, provides a satire on the life of the policeman which, as 
the text describes, is ‘like a dog’s’.83   
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Fig. 6.2: Shostakovich, The Nose, Act III, scene vii, [299]
5
-[301] 
 
Policemen: His tail is sagging like a dog’s, like Cain he is shaking all over, and tobacco is dribbling from 
his nose. 
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Fig. 6.3: Shostakovich, The Nose, Act III, scene vii, [303]-[306] 
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A third form of satirical exaggeration, this time qualitative in nature, is achieved by the 
increasing of a particular quality of the satirized object to extreme proportions. As 
Sheinberg points out, such a technique is commonly employed by Shostakovich, whose 
‘musical satires are not a subtle hint that arouses a smile but a shockingly absurd 
caricature’, and The Nose, the text of which already presents a satirical distortion of 
reality, is in Shostakovich’s opera caricatured further by the taking of exaggeration to 
the limits of possibility.
84
 Act II scene v, in which Kovalyov visits the newspaper’s 
office with the intention of placing an advertisement for the return of his missing nose, 
is clearly the portrayal of an absurd situation. However, Gogol’s text at this point also 
alludes to an additional layer of satire, here created by reference to the meaninglessness 
of the lives of the people Kovalyov encounters whilst waiting to speak to the clerk. A 
meaninglessness of this kind is articulated by Gogol in a letter to his mother in 1828, in 
which he writes that: ‘the people there seem more dead than alive. All the civil 
servants and officials can talk about is their department or government office; 
everything seems to have been crushed under a great weight, everyone is drowned by 
the trivial, meaningless labours at which he spends his useless life’,85 and it is precisely 
this sentiment that Gogol is depicting in exaggerated terms in the scene in the 
newspaper’s office: 
 
The worthy clerk listened gravely to this discourse and at the same time 
continued his calculations, counting the number of letters in the notice submitted 
for publication. Around him hovered a great number of old women, shop 
assistants, and doormen with notes. One sought employment for a coachman of 
sober habits, another advertised for sale a little-used calash, brought in 1814 
from Paris; elsewhere a position was sought for a serf-girl, 19 years old and 
trained as a laundress, but suitable for other work; offers were invited for a 
sturdy droshky, missing one spring, a spirited young horse with grey dappled 
markings, a mere 17 years of age, new turnip and radish seeds imported from 
London, a country cottage with all amenities; stabling for two horses and land 
on which an excellent birch or fir grove could be planted; another notice drew 
the attention of all those anxious to purchase old boot soles, inviting them to 
visit the auction rooms any day, between 8 a.m. and 3 p.m.
86
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Whilst in Gogol this meaninglessness is conveyed merely by means of an accumulative 
description, in Shostakovich emphasis is also placed on the human significance of the 
scene – on ‘the indifference that human beings feel and show for each other as the 
practical outcome of the disconnectedness between their goals and interests’.87 Here an 
image of musical disconnectedness is created, which is itself a parody of hocketus – an 
imitative technique used in medieval motets, in which each part has only a few 
scattered, disconnected notes, often set to meaningless shouts and cries such as ‘hau’, 
‘hou’ or ‘houp’.88 To further exaggerate this already absurd technique, Shostakovich 
adds to the disparate effect an atonal background and nonsensical individual melody 
lines (Fig. 6.4). So, concludes Sheinberg, whilst Gogol present a satire on the 
‘discommunication caused by the meaningless’, in Shostakovich, we find a further, 
musical satire on the ‘meaningless caused by non-communication’, with the fact that his 
setting of this scene is, in fact, a skilfully-elaborated canon, only adding to its 
ironic effect.
89
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
87 Sheinberg, Irony, p. 113 
88 Sheinberg, Irony, p. 113 
89 Sheinberg, Irony, p. 115 
226 
 
Fig. 6.4: Shostakovich, The Nose, Act II, scene v, [228]-
4
[233] 
 
(b) Parody 
 
Parody comprises one layer of meaning which is ripped from its original context and 
another which provides a new context. Normally involving some degree of distortion, 
often by exaggeration, parody can either ultimately reveal its true meaning, in which 
case it functions satirically, or leave an unresolved puzzle, in which case it forms an 
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example of either romantic or existential irony.
90
 In the former of these, humour arises 
from the irreconcilable nature of the paradox presented, whilst in the latter, the absence 
of a resolution is seen as reflective of the doubt and disorientation which lie at the heart 
of the human condition.
91
 
 
Of particular interest in Russian literature and art during the early twentieth century was 
the use of parody as a means of achieving defamiliarisation, or the distorted replication 
of a convention.
92
 Yuri Tinyanov, in his influential article ‘Dostoevsky and Gogol: 
towards a theory of parody’, writes of the technique as a tool which enables an artist or 
writer to ‘play’ with the style of an earlier artist, manipulating it so that a new personal 
style emerges in the form of a ‘struggle’ or parody.93 Tinyanov details a number of such 
techniques, several of which were to later become apparent in the music of 
Shostakovich, and, in relation to the works of Gogol, points in particular towards a 
device he terms a ‘mask’. This comprises an exaggerated appearance which serves to 
defamiliarise, and thus to parody, the true identity of the object, person or idea in 
question, and in Gogol, argues Tinyanov, the depicting of characters in such a way 
forms a basic parodic device.
94
  
 
‘Masks’ of this kind are also apparent throughout The Nose, with the musical portrayal 
of the hysterical Praskovya Osipovna in the opening scene of the opera providing a 
prime example. In the following scene, which opens with Yakovlevitch attempting to 
dispose of the nose but being caught in the act by the police constable, the tirade to 
which the barber is subjected by the officer, who stands increasingly close to 
Yakovlevitch so as to create an impression of intimidation and oppression, presents 
another such exaggerated ‘mask’. The culmination of this scene, in which the officer 
sings in an extremely high pitch, demonstrates a third occurrence, with the ‘mask’ here 
created not only through the comedic effect of the high tessitura, but also as a result of 
the immense vocal effort required on the part of the singer to produce such notes, which 
serves to add an element of physicality to the caricature.
95
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For Sheinberg, this scene might also be understood as a parody of the opening of Berg’s 
opera, Wozzeck. Shostakovich, she argues, ‘plays’ with Berg’s style of writing, thus 
employing that technique to which Tinyanov refers in his discussion of parody in the 
works of Dostoevsky: 
 
Dostoevsky’s style so obviously repeats, varies, combines the style of Gogol that 
his contemporaries were immediately struck by it... Dostoevsky’s letters are 
crammed with Gogolian bon mots, names and phrases... What we have here is 
stylization; it is not a question of following a style but rather of playing with it. 
And if one recollects how readily Dostoevsky underlines Gogol...how he so 
obviously proceeds from Gogol without concealing the fact, it becomes clear 
that it is more appropriate to speak about stylization than about ‘imitation’, 
‘influence’, and so on.96 
 
In The Nose, the high pitch the constable uses to address Yakovlevtich presents an 
exaggerated imitation of the register of the captain’s voice in Wozzeck, with the 
similarity between the rhythms of the two passages further underlining the parodic 
relation (Fig. 6.5). Yakovlevitch’s spoken replies, which on the one hand serve to 
accentuate Shostakovich’s caricature of the shrieking police officer, also provide an 
exaggerated echo of Wozzeck’s monotone responses, whilst the melody line of the 
officer mimics the laughter of Berg’s captain (Fig. 6.6). What is more, Shostakovich’s 
parody of Berg is to be found not only in his musical realisation of the opera, but also 
in his formation of the libretto: Wozzeck’s meek replies are exaggerated in 
Yakovlevitch’s ‘I wish your Highness the best’, and the constable imitates not only the 
melody and rhythm of the captain’s part but also his vowel sounds, reproducing the ‘he, 
he’ of the captain’s laughter in his own cry of ‘Nyet! Nyet!’. In this way, then, 
Shostakovich parodies Berg’s characters so that they, too, becomes examples of 
exaggerated ‘masks’.97 
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Fig. 6.5: Comparison of pitches of captain’s voice in Berg’s Wozzeck and constable’s 
voice in Shostakovich’s The Nose 
 
Fig. 6.6: Comparison of rhythms of captain’s voice in Berg’s Wozzeck and constable’s 
voice in Shostakovich’s The Nose 
 
 
Further, Sheinberg points towards the way in which Shostakovich transforms the 
tragedy of Berg’s opera into the comedy of Gogol’s tale. Once again, Sheinberg here 
draws upon the work of Tinyanov, here concerning the parodic relationship between the 
tragic and the comic: 
 
Stylization is close to parody. Both live a double life: behind the apparent 
structure of a work, its first level, lies a second level, that of the work which it 
stylizes or parodies. But in parody it is obligatory to have a disjunction of both 
levels, a dislocation of intent; the parody of a tragedy will be a comedy (it 
matters little whether this is done through an exaggeration of the tragic intent or 
through a corresponding substitution of comic elements), and a parody of a 
comedy could be a tragedy. In stylization there is no such disjunction. There is, 
on the contrary, a correspondence of the two levels – the stylizing level and the 
stylized level showing through it – one to another. Nevertheless, it is but a single 
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step from stylization to parody; stylization that is comically motivated or 
emphasized becomes parody.
98
 
 
Wozzeck ends in tragedy: the title character, having killed his former lover, Marie, in 
revenge for her unfaithfulness, throws the knife with which he has stabbed her into the 
river and, concerned he has not thrown it far enough, wades in after it and is drowned. 
In The Nose, argues Sheinberg, Yakovlevitch’s approach towards the river, his 
searching for a suitable place to discard the nose, and his eventual throwing of ‘the 
evidence of his crime’ into the water together provide a comic parody of Berg’s tragic 
scene. The ascending and descending lines in the orchestra in the concluding scene of 
Wozzeck parallel respectively the rising of the moon and the sinking of the knife, whilst 
Wozzeck’s drowning is accompanied by a chromatic ascent suggestive of the water 
rising around him. Similarly in The Nose, when Yakovlevtich throws the nose into the 
river, it, too, as the living being it will later become, appears to drown, accompanied 
again by an ascending glissando. The musical introductions to the scenes serve to 
further enhance their similarity, with Wozzeck featuring a polka in a tavern and The 
Nose a gallop which accompanies Yakovlevitch on his journey to the river (Fig. 6.7). 
These introductions are also followed by additional similarities, including the repetition 
of the theme at a higher pitch, thus reinforcing Shostakovich comedic parodying not 
only of syntactical elements but also of musical and motivic features of Berg’s work.99  
 
Fig. 6.7 Comparison of ‘polka in the tavern’ from Berg, Wozzeck and ‘gallop on the 
quay’ from Shostakovich, The Nose 
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(c) The Grotesque 
 
The grotesque appears frequently in the literature, art and music of the Romantic and 
Modern eras, and was again of particular prominence in Russian culture during the first 
thirty years of the twentieth century. Formed of a hybrid between the ludicrous and the 
horrifying, the grotesque comprises pairs of contradictory qualities, for example, 
tragic/comic, beautiful/ugly or life/death, and, like satire and parody, often involves the 
hyperbolic distortion of reality.
100
 Fundamentally unresolvable in nature, the grotesque 
often presents a form of existential irony, although the device may also be used 
satirically, whereby its two layers together comprise a single element within the larger 
satirical structure.
101
  
 
In music, this satirical form of the grotesque is commonly created by reference to 
popular social dances, which are then depicted in a distorted fashion. As Sheinberg puts 
it: ‘Dance, in Western culture, is associated with lightness and grace. Whatever clashes 
with this basic assumption will be perceived as a grotesque. A grotesque dance, then, is 
the antonym of refined dance. As such it is heavy, clumsy and exaggerated’.102 A 
variety of such dances are to be found in the music of Shostakovich, where gallops, 
polkas and waltzes are coloured by a Mahlerian-style grotesquery and incorporate a use 
of tension and even of violence – ‘an escape, a chase or a frantic motion that [is] caused 
by some horrible, even if undefinable, threat’.103 The gallop towards the end of Act III 
of The Nose, which accompanies Kovalyov’s journey to the police station to report the 
loss of his nose, is a case in point, portraying as it does a grotesque distortion which 
becomes particularly apparent when viewed in comparison to more traditional forms of 
the dance, such as those which are to be found in the music of Johann Strauss.
104
 
 
As can be seen in Fig. 6.8, the archetypal gallop of Strauss is formed from a light-
hearted melody which is reasonably quiet, contains no extremes of pitch and is set at a 
sensible speed. Accompanying this melody is an ostinato which changes in pitch and 
pattern every few bars, thus avoiding any feeling of tension or heaviness.
105
 By contrast, 
Shostakovich’s gallop in The Nose is characterised by a fast tempo, loud dynamics and 
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a background of relentless, stamping quavers. The four bars which precede the passage 
mock typical introductions to the gallop style, with the traditional ‘fall to the start’ 
mimicked by a high A-flat literally ‘falling’ in a long glissando to form a heavy, 
lumbering accompaniment. This, too, is distorted, with lower bass notes than are to be 
found in the Strauss and an absence of variation lending a heavy, violent and 
compulsive slant to the passage. In many of Shostakovich’s satirically grotesque dances, 
this element of violence is taken to the extreme, often far exceeding that which is 
necessary and at times approaching ‘frenzied insanity’, and it is a violence of this kind 
which, in The Nose, accompanies the scene of the crowd chasing along behind 
the nose.
106
 
 
Fig. 6.8: Comparison of Strauss’ ‘Jugendfeuer Gallop’ and Shostakovich’s gallop in The 
Nose 
 
In Russian visual art, the first influences of the grotesque can be discerned in the 
paintings of Boris Kustodiev (1878-1927), in which are depicted women who are 
‘ridiculous’ yet ‘astonishingly beautiful’.107 As a child Shostakovich was frequently 
invited to play the piano for Kustodiev and the influence of the artist on the young 
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composer can be seen in a number of his musical works. Most notably this is the case in 
his second opera, Lady Macbeth, which reflects Kustodiev’s paintings of ‘broad, 
sensual kupchikahs (merchant-women or merchants’ wives)’ in the figure of Katerina 
Izmalova. Further, the grotesque incongruity of the opera’s themes of love and murder, 
simultaneously portraying both the sublime and the depraved, are characteristic of the 
juxtapositions posed by many of the works of Kustodiev, who had a tendency to 
combine the satirical with the macabre.
108
  
 
Whilst Kustodiev’s influence on The Nose is less obviously apparent, the opera’s appeal 
to the bodily nonetheless suggests that it, too, may have been coloured by at least 
something of the artist’s interest in the grotesque. For example, in Act I scene iii, 
Kovalyev sleeps behind a screen whilst his servant, Ivan, helps himself liberally to a 
bottle of vodka. Accompanying the scene is the sound of Kovalyev’s snoring, 
performed in an exaggeratedly grotesque fashion. As Sheinberg puts it: ‘...Shostakovich 
uses here the extremes of the orchestral compass: the contrabassoon and the trombone, 
in their darkest, almost indecipherable sounds, in a series of moans and groans, echo 
Kovalyev’s snores, while a solo violin, in high-pitched squeaks of glissandos, 
flageolets, trills and out-of-tune sounds, mockingly imitates the wealth of whistles, 
sighs, and shrill sounds of sleep’ (Fig. 6.10).109 Furthermore, Shostakovich’s colourful 
musical depictions of groups of people to be found elsewhere in the opera are also 
suggestive of the influence of Kustodiev, with the crowd surrounding Yakovlevitch as 
he attempts to throw the nose into the river, the curious characters awaiting the arrival 
of their carriage and the rowdy mob pursuing the nose towards the end of the work all 
drawn from Kustodievian images of fairgrounds and marketplaces.
110
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Fig. 6.9: Shostakovich, The Nose, Act I, scene iii, [95] 
 
 
Garish and fantastical settings such as the fairground, circus or theatre, together with the 
imagery of crowds, are also to be found in the work of Russian artist Marc Chagall 
(1887-1985), whose fascination with chaos led him to create grotesque portraits of 
individuals with distorted faces, postures and proportions, as well as images of violent 
crowds, made up of the mass presence of disturbingly unidentifiable individual faces.
111
 
It is likely, although not proven, that Chagall’s work would have been known to 
Shostakovich, and in The Nose, he, too, depicts the faceless, angry mob as an 
embodiment of the grotesque. This is the case in the scene where the policemen accost 
the young pretzel-seller in the marketplace and, more significantly, in the scene in 
which the crowd chase the nose prior to its capture. Here, argues Sheinberg, 
Shostakovich is demonstrating in musical form not only the mentality of the mob itself, 
but also the process of dehumanisation by which individual persons are transformed 
into an impersonal crowd.
112
 
 
At the start of the capture scene, parts are scored for numerous individual characters, set 
at a moderate speed and with a quiet accompaniment so as to allow each voice to be 
clearly discerned. The melody lines are here unique in character and enter separately so 
as to create a sense of disconnectedness. Thus while each voice is enquiring about the 
whereabouts of the nose, the overall impression is of a balanced and comprehendible 
conversation between people with distinct personalities and individual points of 
view (Fig. 6.11).
113
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As the scene progresses, and an increasing number of people begin to inquire ‘Где?’ 
(‘Where?’) of the nose, the tempo and dynamic of the melody lines are raised, although 
some individual voices, such as those of the pretzel seller and the colonel, remain 
distinct from the crowd. Then one voice beings to cry in a monotone pitch, a 
characteristic feature of Shostakovich’s crowd-scene music, and gradually the others 
assembled begin to join in. Significantly, the melody lines at this point lose their 
individuality and are instead grouped into two choirs, thus providing, as Sheinberg puts 
it, ‘a metaphor for the individuals’ loss of identity for the sake of a unified, 
homogenized group sound’ (Fig. 6.12).114 In the climax to the scene, as the nose is 
finally glimpsed, the two groups unite in a repetitive, monotone shout of ‘Смотреть' 
('Look'), to the accompaniment of a dissonant yet resonant chord, composed of minor 
seconds, fifths and octaves.
115
 This moment, then, provides one of the most powerful 
examples of the satirical grotesque: that of ‘pitiful, harmless individuals who 
uncontrollably accumulate into a terrifying social chaos’.116 
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Fig. 6.10: Shostakovich, The Nose, Intermezzo after Act III, [463]-[464]
1 
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Fig. 6.11: Shostakovich, The Nose, Intermezzo after Act III, 
3
[479]-[480] 
 
 
III. Theological Reflection on The Nose 
 
My question, in this chapter, is what we take for theological reflection from this side of 
Shostakovich’s musical output. My proposal is that we understand it in terms of an 
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eschatological tension between comedy and tragedy, light and darkness. I shall begin 
with the comic. 
 
(a) Theology and Comedy 
 
Within Christian theological tradition, as Umberto Eco famously explores in his novel 
The Name of the Rose, there has been held an attitude of deep suspicion towards 
humour.
117
 John Chrysostom, for example, writing in the fourth century, points the 
finger at those who fail to display a sufficient degree of composure: ‘...thou standest 
laughing, raising a laugh after the manner of women of the world who are on the stage. 
This has overthrown, this has cast down everything. Our affairs, both our business and 
our politeness, are turned into laughing; there is nothing steady, nothing grave’.118 In 
particular he is critical of those who cannot take even their time at Church seriously: 
‘For the Church has been filled with laughter. Whatever clever thing one may say, 
immediately there is laughter among those present: and the marvellous thing is that 
many do not leave off laughing even during the very time of the prayer’.119 
 
In defence of this position, Chrysostom points to the teachings of Paul, writing: ‘Do ye 
not hear Paul saying, Let “filthiness and foolish talking and jesting” (Eph. v. 4) be put 
away from you? He places “jesting” along with “filthiness”, and dost thou laugh?’120 He 
also points to the example of Christ: ‘Where dost thou hear of Christ doing this? 
Nowhere: but that He was sad indeed oftentimes. For even when He looked on 
Jerusalem, He wept; and when He thought on the Traitor He was troubled; and when He 
was about to raise Lazarus, He wept; and dost thou laugh?’121 Finally, Chrysostom 
warns of the consequences that await those who refuse to cease from laughter: ‘This is 
the season of grief and tribulation...of conflicts and sweatings, and dost thou laugh? 
Dost not thou see how Sarah was rebuked? dost thou not hear Christ saying, “Woe to 
them that laugh, for they shall weep”? (Luke vi. 25)’122  
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This view is later echoed by the seventeenth century Lutheran theologian David Hollaz 
who, to Karl Barth’s indignation, urges the belief that Christ never laughed as evidence 
for his divinity.
123
 Barth argues that such a view is docetic. It also implies a dour view 
of creation, as laughter is equated with the fallenness of humanity and with those 
aspects of existence which are inherently sinful. 
 
Earlier, in the Munster ethics, which were unpublished during his lifetime, Barth had 
argued that ‘To have real humor...we have to be children of God... Those who have 
hope of Christ only in this life cannot laugh’.124 Arguing that humour comes about as 
the result of our continual awareness of the contrast between our existence now and our 
future existence (which is to say eschatologically), he maintains that this requires of us 
that we do not take the present with ultimate seriousness, not because we wish to make 
light or be dismissive of it, but rather because ‘God’s future, which breaks into the 
present, is more serious’.125 After all, he reminds us: ‘Humor makes concrete the saying 
in Romans 8:18: ‘I consider that the sufferings of this present time are not worth 
comparing with the glory that is to be revealed in us’, and the further saying in Romans 
8:28: ‘We know that all things work together for good to those who love God’.’126 
 
Christianity, then, both relates to and embraces the whole of life in all its dimensions: 
although including sorrow and suffering, it at the same time has room for laughter and 
humour. As the author of Ecclesiastes reminds us: ‘To everything there is a season...a 
time to weep, and a time to laugh’.127 Now this is also the case with art, for whilst some 
artists display either joy or sorrow but never both, in the works of the greatest artists we 
are enabled to glimpse the multiple dimensions of life. Pablo Picasso, for example, 
although melancholy in his blue period and tragic in Guernica, nonetheless remains 
teasing and joyful in much of his art, whilst Mozart, whose most profound works 
include the Requiem Mass, also gives us Ein Musickalischer Spass (A Musical Joke) – a 
light-hearted divertimento comically scored for two horns and strings.  
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1981), p. 507 (cf. 1 Cor. 15: 19) 
125 Barth, Ethics, p. 511 
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George Steiner agrees with Barth. In The Death of Tragedy, drawing upon the Divina 
Commedia of Dante, he argues that theology is written in the comic mode. The message 
of the resurrection, he argues, is that everything will ultimately be reconciled – that 
there will be victory over death and a final rest in God – and Christianity, therefore, is 
nothing other than comedy: ‘an anti-tragic vision of the world’.128 ‘The Passion of 
Christ’, he writes, ‘is an event of unutterable grief, but it is also a cipher though which 
is revealed the love of God for man. In the dark light of Christ’s suffering, original sin is 
shown to have been a joyous error (felix culpa). Through it humanity shall be restored 
to a condition far more exalted than was Adam’s innocence. In the drama of Christian 
life, the arrow beats against the wind but points upwards.’129 
 
Thus, argues Steiner, even death cannot be understood as ultimately tragic, and he 
points to Manoah’s command following the demise of Samson in Milton’s Samson 
Agoniste – ‘Come, come, no time for lamentation now’ – as an illustration of precisely 
this fact.
130
 Rather, for Steiner it remains the case that ‘Real tragedy can occur only 
where the tormented soul believes that there is no time left for God’s forgiveness’.131 
Faustus’ remark that ‘And now ‘tis too late’ thus goes some way towards expressing a 
tragic vision of Christianity but, as Steiner points out, even he is ultimately mistaken, 
for ‘It is never too late to repent, and romantic melodrama is sound theology when it 
shows the soul being snatched back from the very edge of damnation’.132 Christianity, 
then, ‘knows only partial or episodic tragedy’, for whilst there exist ‘moments of 
despair...cruel setbacks [which] occur during the ascent towards grace’, as the 
Portuguese proverb tells us: ‘Deus escreve direito por linhas tortas’ – God makes 
crooked paths straight.
133
 
 
The question is whether we can understand Shostakovich in this way. In the previous 
chapter I discussed Wendy Lesser’s view that his music speaks to us of shame and self-
doubt, and my explorations of the string quartets point in this direction.
134
 However, and 
as Lesser herself acknowledges, this is not the full story. Rather, as she continues: 
                                               
128 George Steiner, The Death of Tragedy (London: Faber and Faber, 1961), p. 331. Although in Dante, of 
course, we also have purgatory and hell. 
129 Steiner, The Death of Tragedy, p. 332 
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‘[Shostakovich’s] shame may speak to one aspect of our complicity in human error, but 
his notorious sense of humor addresses us in another, more companionable, possibly 
somewhat lighter way, though in his case even the lightness can be extremely dark’.135 
This is the Shostakovich of whom Vulliamy writes: the Shostakovich who enjoyed 
football and laughter, who entertained his friends, who danced on the piano. This, too, is 
the Shostakovich we hear in The Nose. Comedy and humour, then, have their place 
within the works of this composer just as much as do the tragic, the morbid and the 
moving, as the hysteria of Yakovlevitch’s wife at the discovery of the nose in the 
freshly-baked roll, the idiotic mimicking of Wozzeck’s tragic drowning, the hilarity of 
the exaggerated gallop and the grotesque grunts and groans of Kovalyov’s snores all 
reveal. Perhaps, then, we might say that Shostakovich shared Barth and Steiner’s view, 
but before jumping to that conclusion we need to examine the theme of theology 
and tragedy. 
 
(b) Theology and Tragedy 
 
Barth’s views on humour are, of course, exemplified by Mozart, for whom the darkness 
is ultimately overcome by the light.
136
 However, whilst this might indeed be true in the 
case of Mozart, we should perhaps question the extent to which it is true of the music of 
Shostakovich. Despite the more humorous elements of a number of his works, including 
The Nose, in his music as a whole, the presence of tragedy continually pervades, and the 
overriding sense conveyed is one of melancholy and sadness: here the Yea does not 
always ring louder than the ever-present Nay; here the shadow is at times darkness and 
deficiency can mean defeat. Even within his more humorous compositions this remains 
the case, as Lesser’s remark, quoted above, about the ‘extremely dark’ lightness of his 
music reveals, and this is indeed true of the music of The Nose, made apparent most 
notably in the grotesquely distorted caricatures of human nature which lurk among the 
apparent comedy of the work: the shallowness of Kovalyov; the drunkenness of 
Yakovlevitch; the stupidity of the policemen; the indifference of the crowd in the 
newspaper office; the savagery of the chasing mob. To fully reflect upon 
Shostakovich’s comedy, then, I need also to say something about the portrayal of the 
tragic and its place in theological endeavour.  
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In his work on the ethics of tragedy, Donald MacKinnon reflects on the subject of tragic 
expression in art. Focusing on Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar, MacKinnon discusses how 
the tragedy of the play unfolds as we witness Brutus wrestling with his inner self over 
his role in Caesar’s death. Here Brutus commits what is essentially an act of self-
deception as he attempts to avoid holding himself accountable for his own actions, but 
at the same time there remains a willingness on his part to engage with the moral unease 
with which he is now preoccupied. In this, argues MacKinnon, Shakespeare illustrates 
for us ‘the inwardness of the dilemma facing any man who finds himself compelled to 
consider playing a part in such an enterprise’. He continues: ‘[Here Shakespeare] is able 
to combine remarkable power in tracing the windings of human thought and 
imagination in men compelled to make such a decision, even indeed imposing upon that 
decision, once it has been made, the form of their spontaneous enquiry in the making of 
it’.137 For MacKinnon, then, what we are here shown are not just tragic events but also 
the mentality which necessary surrounds such actions and endows upon them the quality 
of the truly tragic.  
 
Further, he argues, such plays also serve to tell us something about the so-called victors 
of these tragic circumstances: even those characters who manage to achieve that which 
might be regarded as a degree of triumph are not free from the inner turmoil that besets 
the likes of Brutus, but rather their victories all too often are marred by the heavy costs 
incurred both to others and to themselves in the process of attaining such a goal. 
Victory, then, for MacKinnon, is in essence but another aspect of tragedy. This is 
illustrated again by Brutus, whose tribute, which he receives amid the victory of the 
triumvirs, is tragically devalued as a result of its being paid by men whose moral 
accountability does not match even that of Brutus himself. Here MacKinnon notes the 
reply of the elderly Duke of Wellington to the woman who supposed that victory must 
be ‘a supremely exhilarating and glorious experience’: ‘A victory, Madam, is the 
greatest tragedy in the world, only excepting a defeat’.138 
 
The tragic exploration of the human condition in art, argues MacKinnon, speaks across 
time and distance to all those who, like Brutus, must make a decision arising from a 
conflict of moral duties, warning them of that which stands to be unavoidably lost in the 
process. ‘From it they must learn to count the cost’, he writes, ‘and to see that they may 
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go forward only when they have counted it’.139 Here the consequences of our actions are 
played out in dramatic form before our very eyes, thus enabling us to perceive of our 
own emotional responses to the outcomes of the choices we have made, and requiring of 
us that we fully appreciate the devastation we have inevitably wrought upon the life of 
the individual.
140
 Here, too, we glimpse something of the intractable nature of our moral 
decision-making, which stems from both ‘the situation which confronts us as it 
develops... [and] from ourselves as we are revealed to ourselves in the action which we 
have to undertake...’.141 MacKinnon also remains clear about the challenges of such art. 
It is not the case, he maintains, that we should cease from acting in the face of the 
inevitably tragic outcomes of our deeds, but rather that our witness of tragic drama 
should serve to guard against precisely this potential failure to act – to forestall 
the danger that we might ‘[pass] by on the other side lest, by our intervention, 
we imperil not only ourselves, but those who have none other than ourselves to give 
them succour’.142  
 
For Sheinberg, it is a form of tragic art akin to that described by MacKinnon which is to 
be found in the music of Shostakovich, and particularly in The Nose. Citing the work of 
Søren Kierkegaard, for whom irony is ‘not a mode of speech, but a basic attitude 
towards life and human existence’ and thus ‘a matter of the utmost ethical 
consequence’, Sheinberg suggests that it is an ideological view such as this which is 
also to be found at the centre of works by this composer.
143
  Shostakovich’s music, she 
argues, ‘delivers a...satirical message condemning human stupidity and cruelty’, and in 
so doing continues the very Russian tradition of stating ethical aims through artistic 
endeavours, albeit now in a humane rather than political manner.
144
 In particular, she 
maintains, this becomes apparent through his use of music to convey a sense of 
existential irony – of those contradictions within reality which point not to our 
incapability to know the truth, but rather to the truth that is the ‘infinitely contradictory’ 
nature of our existence.
145
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Thus for Sheinberg, Shostakovich’s music speaks of that which we find at the heart of 
MacKinnon’s appraisal of the tragic in art. The Nose, although not tragic drama in the 
Shakespearian sense of the term, nonetheless shows, most particularly in its recourse to 
the grotesque, that this composer’s comedy is one that is also tempered by an 
underlying presence of the tragic. In his caricatures of the darker sides of human nature, 
Shostakovich is showing through his art that very same intractability of our moral 
decision-making, and thus the unavoidable tragedy inherent in human life, with which 
MacKinnon is concerned. As Sheinberg puts it: ‘...Shostakovich’s music speaks about 
human nature as horrifying and ludicrous, simultaneously repellent and cruel, cowardly 
and loving, humorous and courageous. This very presentation adorns his music with the 
bitter-sweet smile of human compassion, which embraces, with helpless resignation as 
much as with ironical acceptance, the view that all people are grotesque, simply because 
they are human beings.’146 What is more, Shostakovich does not spare even himself 
from such appraisals but rather counts himself among those he caricatures, for ‘[w]hen 
he inserted his own musical initials into several of his whirling, frenzied dances of life 
and death, he showed his awareness of being as human as those to whom his music 
is addressed’.147 
 
In so doing, argues Sheinberg, Shostakovich charts new territory in the musical 
expression of human nature. Whilst Mahler, one of the greatest influences upon 
Shostakovich’s musical development and the closest to him in terms of musical style, 
‘eventually grants the pathetic and banal humankind the gift of divine grace’, 
Shostakovich, by contrast, does not seek in his music to transcend the limits of the 
tragic reality of human nature.
148
 Rather, she concludes, what we are given instead is 
‘the gift of human compassion achieved through ironic acceptance’ – the musical 
realisation and embrace of the true nature of human existence.
149
 Here, then, in the same 
way as in the string quartets, Shostakovich desires to speak more immediately of the 
human than of the transcendent, and to speak of that humanity as it really is, in all its 
lightness and in all its tragedy.  
 
Returning to MacKinnon, we find in his work a way by which we might relate 
theologically to a sense of tragedy such as is here expressed. In contrast to Steiner, for 
                                               
146
 Sheinberg, Irony, p. 318 
147 Sheinberg, Irony, pp. 318-319 
148 Sheinberg, Irony, p. 319 
149 Sheinberg, Irony, p. 319 
245 
 
MacKinnon, Christianity is not comic, but rather has an essentially tragic resonance. For 
him we never escape from the surd of suffering and evil.
150
 Tragedy thus forms an 
inescapable part of theology, implicit within its very nature because of the fact that all 
victories are scarred by that which has been done to those instrumental in their success. 
Proper recognition of this, he remarks, is all too often lacking from the works of those 
who discuss the resurrection, which often become shallow and meaningless as a result, 
and many scholars have until relatively recently, he maintains, shied away from reading 
the gospels as the works of tragic literature which they truly are.
151
  
 
If Shostakovich’s musical comedy speaks to us theologically, then it would appear that 
it speaks of a theology such as this, for whilst The Nose contains much that is genuinely 
humorous, it also includes a perceptiveness of human nature that passes through the 
comically grotesque to embrace the grotesquely tragic.  
 
To bring together what I said earlier about humour and what I have said here about 
tragedy I turn to the notion of forgiveness. For Steiner, as we have seen, Christianity is 
only tragic when there is no room for God’s forgiveness – when we believe that the 
finite limitations of human nature are the sum total of our existence. This, I contend, is 
the oversight of MacKinnon who, in his estimation of theology as irredeemably tragic, 
fails to acknowledge the fundamentality of forgiveness to the work of theology, and 
thus cannot accept the ultimate comedy of Christianity. What is more, it also rings true 
of Shostakovich, whose music, although filled with empathy and compassion, has little 
to offer by way of restoration or reconciliation. Indeed, as was discussed in chapter five, 
Shostakovich struggled even to forgive himself, let alone to portray through his music 
the notion of forgiveness between others.
152
  
 
Following Barth’s suggestion in the Ethics, I propose that we understand the relation 
between comedy and tragedy in Shostakovich by way of eschatological tension: if 
Steiner’s comedic theology, glimpsed in the lighter moments of The Nose, awaits us in 
the fullness of a time still to come, then the tragedy of humanity inherent within this 
work serves to remind us of the distance left to travel, and of the inevitable darkness 
that lies along the way. This, then, is music not so much about forgiveness as about the 
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human need for forgiveness: of the need for that means by which we overcome tragedy, 
and through which that which is foreshadowed by the humour of this work comes to be 
genuinely and tangibly embraced. As with so many of Shostakovich’s works, therefore, 
at the heart of The Nose there lies an absence which speaks of a presence, where what is 
missing becomes all the more apparent precisely because of the fact that it is not yet to 
be found.  
 
Having explored the musical expressivity of Shostakovich in relation to culture, icons, 
interiority and comedy, I now turn in my concluding chapter to ask how we might 
conceive theologically of Shostakovich’s music as a whole. 
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Conclusion 
 
‘We shall not cease from exploring’, writes T. S. Eliot in the concluding part of his 
Four Quartets, ‘and the end of all our exploring will be to arrive where we started and 
know the place for the first time’.1 In this thesis, I have explored the music of 
Shostakovich from a theological point of view. Now, in the conclusion of my 
arguments, I return to that place from which I started – the musical works of this 
composer – to reflect upon how we might perceive them afresh in light of that which 
has gone before. 
 
Shostakovich’s music, I have argued, can be understood primarily as an engagement 
with, and an expression of, the nature of the human condition. In his public works, 
refusing either to simply support the government or to effectively commit suicide by 
frankly opposing it, Shostakovich instead provides a reflection of the reality of life for 
his compatriots, in all its fear and suffering, confusion and sadness. In his more intimate 
pieces, he turns to explore what I referred to in chapter five as the ‘eternal questions’ of 
love and death, and to consider the inner life of the individual. Human nature, he tells 
us, is both tragic and terrifying, humorous and courageous, and, most significantly, 
never lies beyond the possibility of transformative action. 
 
Within this music, I have argued, Russian themes are often prominent. In the Seventh 
Symphony Dostoevsky’s influence becomes particularly apparent, reflected in the 
composer’s portrayal of concerns central to this writer’s novels: the spirituality of 
Russian Orthodoxy; the importance of the icon; the value of the human person. Also of 
evidence both here and in other of Shostakovich’s works is a musical engagement with 
what we can call, especially although not exclusively in relation to Dostoevsky, a 
Russian notion of suffering – of those trials which are unavoidably present in human 
life and which are necessary for true fulfilment – heard in the slow, moving requiems of 
the Symphonies, the death-obsessed string quartets and the tragic vision of humanity 
contained within The Nose. 
 
At the same time, Shostakovich’s music is not entirely bleak, for it explores not only 
themes of suffering and death but also the idea of hope. This music, I have argued, 
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stands as a challenge to cultural inhumanities, offering the possibility of critique and 
also of regeneration. An expression of solidarity with those who suffer, it provides a 
testimony to that which should be preserved against all odds. It reveals the potential for 
the exploration of the depths of human life in art, and opens up the possibility of there 
being a register of expression through which we might refer to a dimension of reality 
outside of our own. What is more, even in its darkest moments, it still succeeds in 
raising questions of hope, here felt all the more profoundly by virtue of the absence of 
this very theme.  
 
My understanding of the music of Shostakovich, then, has been predominantly shaped 
by an expressivist interpretation of the art form, in which emphasis is placed not upon 
music’s form or structure but rather upon its interconnectedness with human experience. 
As Mozart is for Karl Barth a paradigm of musical order, so Shostakovich, I have 
argued, is exemplary of the relationship that exists between music and life. Through 
voicing the inner turmoil of its creator and the suffering of a whole nation, in taking on 
culturally-generated significances and by conveying both a sense of comedy and of 
tragedy, this music demonstrates for us that the value of aesthetic experience is, as 
Scruton puts it, ‘the attempt to create a place for ourselves in the world, and to situate 
our selves among our fellows’. To hear music thus, as McClary tells us, is to perceive it 
as a commentary on human life as it is lived, and so to liberate it to bear true meaning 
and significance within the world.
2
  
 
Whilst making a case about Shostakovich, I have also tried to establish that musical 
expressivity contributes to a Christian understanding of music. Drawing upon the work 
of Jeremy Begbie, who argues for a theological understanding of music in which the 
cosmological gives grounding to the expressive, I have attempted to do justice to the 
latter part of this account of music’s nature and, in so doing, to engage with and to 
ultimately overcome those difficulties which have previously been aligned with such an 
approach. In light of Barth’s warning, informed by the theology of Schleiermacher, that 
an appeal to musical expressivism makes music and religion synonymous, I have put 
the suggestion that, in the case of Shostakovich, the Fifth Symphony points to the 
preservation of God’s otherness by standing over and against culture and critiquing it. 
Responding to the concern that expressivism leads to a ‘religion of aestheticism’ I have 
argued, with recourse to a theology of the icon, that the Seventh Symphony 
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demonstrates the potential of art to inspire transformation without becoming 
intrinsically revelatory. Through the string quartets, I have sought to reflect upon the 
place of interiority within theology, arguing with reference to Hegel that an exploration 
of the depths of life such as is here achieved is central both to what it means to be 
human and to theological endeavour. Finally, I have affirmed the place of comedy 
within theology, demonstrating through The Nose how the comic and the tragic, when 
taken together, bring to the fore a sense of eschatological tension. 
  
Music’s ‘sonic integrities’, then, remain of central importance for theological reflection, 
but so, too, do those features that give music its life. Here the need for music to be 
understood as a metaphysical category is removed and we are enabled, as Epstein puts 
it, to ‘articulate music’s theological significance beyond its traditional symbolism of 
harmony and order’.3 In this, music’s relevance to the whole of human experience, in all 
its darkness and its light, becomes accessible to theological enquiry, and such enquiry is 
in turn prompted to engage with, appreciate and celebrate music as the human-made and 
culturally-embedded form of artistic expression that it truly is. 
 
At the heart of understanding music as expressive lies the notion of music as a 
fundamentally creative act. It is true that thinking of art in terms of creativity is found in 
Scripture only, at best, in Exodus 31, and not at all in the Patristic and Medieval 
tradition. By the late fifteenth century, however, as the curators of the Leonardo 
exhibition illuminatingly make clear, it was possible to move from a celebration of 
God’s works in creation to a celebration of imagination as a divine act.4 Three centuries 
later Blake can write in Jerusalem, ‘I know of no other Christianity and of no other 
Gospel than the liberty of both body and mind to exercise the Divine Arts of 
Imagination – Imagination, the real and Eternal World of which this Vegetable Universe 
is but a faint shadow, and in which we shall live in our Eternal or Imaginative Bodies, 
when these Vegetable Mortal Bodies are no more’.5 Imagination is, for him, ‘the Divine 
Body of the Lord Jesus’.6 Though Blake was a marginal figure he aptly expressed the 
veneration of creativity characteristic of Romanticism which has survived in our much 
more cynical and disenchanted age. Today it is more or less taken for granted that, as 
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John de Gruchy puts it, honouring human creativity is a way of honouring God who 
enables us to be creative, so that creativity comes to be understood as a gift of the 
spirit.
7
 Human creativity, he argues, should be understood not simply as a means to self-
satisfaction but rather as an element essential to the personal and social well-being of 
humankind: ‘Becoming more human’ he writes, ‘has to do with...the deepening of the 
capacity to imagine’.8 Drawing on the work of P. T. Forsyth, he concludes that ‘art 
speaks to the soul and can save religion from becoming closed and hardened. Faith 
without a sense of beauty, or religion severed from imagination and over-engrossed 
with public and practical affairs...leaves us with a ‘drought in our own souls’... Art, in 
fact, is ‘not a luxury’ but ‘a necessity of human nature’’.9 
 
Understanding creativity thus, I want to argue, provides the key to unlocking the 
specific contribution of Shostakovich to a theological understanding of music. As I have 
argued, hope runs through the works of this composer, and does so in the midst of great 
darkness: Shostakovich was able to be creative even whilst enduring hopelessness and 
despair. Even in its blackest moments, when it speaks only of the absence of hope, that 
this music should exist at all provides a testimony to the flourishing of creativity against 
all odds and, in so doing, affirms the survival of what it means to be human in the most 
inhumane of worlds. Artist Helga Weiss, who witnessed as a child the Holocaust in 
Poland and later survived imprisonment in Terezín, recounts that: ‘My father told me 
that, whatever happens, we must remain human, so that we do not die like cattle. And I 
think that the will to create was an expression of the will to live, and to survive, as 
human beings.’10 I understand Shostakovich as exemplifying precisely this and 
therefore as displaying some kind of redemptive force, as de Gruchy argues. ‘Artists’, 
he maintains, ‘help awaken our awareness to the present reality in all its pain and hope, 
thereby enabling transforming vision’.11 Ernst Bloch argued something similar, focusing 
on the hope which, ‘akin to inspiration and creativity’, keeps the utopian impulse 
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alive.
12
 For Bloch, as for Dostoevsky, there is no incentive to remain alive in a world 
devoid of beauty’s creative potential.13 
 
Famously, it was Bloch’s work which prompted Jürgen Moltmann’s Theology of Hope. 
Arguing that eschatology must form the starting point of theology, for Moltmann, the 
world of imagination is central to revolutionary change. ‘Christian hope’, he writes, 
‘is...summoned and empowered to creative transformation of reality’, and thus 
‘imagination for the kingdom of God in the world, and for the world in God’s kingdom’ 
necessarily lies at the heart of theological endeavour.
14
 As Trevor Hart puts it: ‘The 
power of the future to transform the present lies chiefly in the capacity of God’s Spirit 
to capture our imagination and to open up for us a new vision of God’s promise and the 
present which it illuminates, thereby stimulating alternative ways of being in the world 
in the present, living towards the future.’15 Eschatology, as Moltmann understands it, is 
fundamentally a matter of hope.
16
  
 
As we have seen, eschatology is not a new theme in theological reflection on music: in 
my first chapter, I discussed how, for Begbie, music’s temporal processes stand as an 
analogy to the unfolding of eschatological promise, whilst for Barth, it is in the 
harmony of Mozart that we are enabled to hear darkness being overcome by light. In the 
music of Shostakovich, however, this theme comes to be explored in a different way. 
Here, I have argued, we are not drawn to relate to ideas of hope through the harmony or 
temporality of musical form, but rather that it is through engaging with the value and 
meaning of music understood as an essentially expressive and creative act that we are 
enabled to perceive, interpret and relate to what it means to have hope for the world. In 
                                               
12
 Verena Kast, Joy, Inspiration, and Hope, trans. by Douglas Whitcher (Texas: Texas A&M University 
Press, 2004), p. 152; Ernst Bloch, The Principle of Hope 3 vols., trans. by Neville Plaice, Stephen Plaice 
& Paul Knight (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 2986), vol. 1, p. 10 
13 Douglas Kellner, ‘Ernst Bloch, Utopia and Ideology Critique’, in Not Yet: Reconsidering Ernst Bloch, 
ed. by Jamie Owen Daniel & Tom Moylan (London & New York: Verso, 1997), pp. 80-95 (p. 82); see 
chapter 4, p. 155. Bloch here calls into question the capitalist organising of society and, in asserting that it 
is creativity and not production that drives us forward, he also gives us a modified view of Marxist 
ideology. Kellner, ‘Ernst Bloch’, p. 81 
14 Jürgen Moltmann, Theology of Hope: On the Ground and Implications of a Christian Eschatology, 
trans. by James W. Leitch (London: SCM Press, 1967), p. 34; Jürgen Moltmann, The Coming of God: 
Christian Eschatology, trans. by Margaret Kohl (London: SCM Press, 1996), xiv 
15 Trevor Hart, ‘Imagination for the Kingdom of God? Hope, Promise, and the Transformative Power of 
an Imagined Future’, in God Will Be All in All: The Eschatology of Jürgen Moltmann, ed. by Richard 
Bauckham (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1999), pp. 49-76 (p. 75) 
16 Love, which for Epstein must play a part in theological reflection on music, is here also to be found, for 
as Tina Beattie puts it: ‘Hope is love’s commitment to the future.’ de Gruchy, Being Human, p. 210. 
Others who have sought to account for artistic creativity as in some way the key to a theological 
understanding of the significance of art include Anthony Monti in A Natural Theology of the Arts: 
Imprint of the Spirit (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003) and Nicholas Wolterstorff in Art in Action. 
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this way, then, music’s eschatological significance is revealed not only in the qualities 
that comprise its structural existence, but also through the unique experience of sound 
translated into art.  
 
In the works of Shostakovich, therefore, the expression of a truly Russian eschatology is 
to be found: here human nature is unredeemed but not beyond redemption; death is 
inevitable but the will to live triumphant; suffering is not negated but neither does it 
eclipse all hope. This, then, is the theological dialectic of Shostakovich’s music: a 
dynamic creativity in which hope and despair are found together, in which the light 
shines in the darkness, and the darkness does not overcome it. 
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